
Class. ; 



/■^ 2 3" 



HERMES 



OR 



A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 



CONCERNING 



UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR 



BY JAMES HARRIS ESQ. 



EI2IENAI 0APPOTNTA2 EINAI TAP KAI ENTAT0A ©E0T2. 



THE SE TENTH EDITION. 



LONDON : 
PRINTED FOR J. COLLINGWOOD, STRAND 




182.5. 



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r. C. Haiwaid, Pater-uoeter-iow Pre». 



TO 
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 

PHILIP LORD HARDWICKE, 

LORD HIGH CHANCELLOR OF GREAT BRITAIN.* 

My Lord, V 

•/is no one has exercised the Powers of 
Speech with juster and more universal 
applause^ than yourself; I hatie presumed 
to inscribe the following Treatise to your 
Lordship, its End being to investigate the 
Principles of those Powers, It has a far-- 
ther Claim to your Lordship's Patronage, 
by beiiig connected in some degree with that 
politer Literature, which, in the most im- 
portant scenes of Business, you have still 
found time to cultivate. With regard to 



* The above Dedication is printed as it originally stood, 
the Author being desirous that what he intended as real 
Respect to the noble Lord, when living, should be con- 
sidered as a Testimony of Gratitude to his Memory. 

A % 



iv DEDICATION. 

myself, if what I have written he the fruits 
of that Security and Leisure, obtained by 
living under a mild and free Government ; 
to whom for this am I more indebted, than 
to your Lordship, whether I consider you as 
a Legislator, or as a Magistrate, the first 
both in dignity aiid reputation ? Permit 
me therefore thus publicly to assure your 
Lordship, that, with the greatest gratitude 
and respect, I am. My Lord, 

Your Lordship's most obliged, 

and most obedient humble Servant, 

JAMES HARRIS. 



Close of Salisbury, 
OcM, 1751. 



PREFACE. 

X HE chief End proposed by the Author 
of this Treatise in making it public, has 
been to excite his Readers to curiosity and 
inquiry; not to teach them himself by 
prolix and formal Lectures (from the effi- 
cacy of which he has little expectation), 
but to induce them, if possible, to become 
Teachers to themselves, by an impartial 
use of their own understandings. He 
thinks nothing more absurd than the com- 
mon notion of Instruction, as if Science 
Avere to be poured into the Mind, like 
water into a cistern, that passively waits 
to receive all that comes. The growth of 
Knowledge he rather thinks to resemble 
the growth of Fruit; however external 
causes may in some degree co-operate, 
it is the internal vigour, and virtue of the 



Vi PREFACE. 

tree, that must ripen the juices to their 
just maturity. 

This then, namely, the exciting men to 
inquire for themselves into subjects worthy 
of their contemplation, this the Author 
declares to have been his first and principal 
motive for appearing in print: Next to 
that, as he has always been a lover of 
Letters, he would willingly approve his 
studies to the liberal and ingenuous. He 
has particularly named these, in distinction 
to others; because, as his studies were 
never prosecuted with the least regard to 
lucre, so they are no way calculated for 
any lucrative End. The liberal therefore 
and ingenuous (whom he has mentioned 
already) are those, to whose perusal he 
offers what he has written. Should they 
judge favourably of his attempt, he may 
not perhaps hesitate to confess, 

Hocjiwat €t mdli est,- 



PREFACE. Vii 

For tho' he hopes he cannot be charged 
with the foolish love of vain Praise, he has 
no desire to be thought indifferent, or in- 
sensible to honest Fame. 

From the influence of these sentiments, 
he has endeavoured to treat his subject 
with as much order, correctness, and per- 
spicuity as in his power; and if he has 
failed, he can safely say (according to the 
vulgar phrase) that the failure has been his 
misfortune, and not his fault. He scorns 
those trite and contemptible methods of 
anticipating pardon for a bad perform- 
ance, that " it was the hasty fruits of a 
" few idle hours ; written merely for pri- 
" vate amusement ; never revised ; pub- 
" lislied against consent, at the impor- 
" tunity of friends, copies (God knows 
" how) having by stealth gotten abroad f 
with other stale jargon of equal falsehood 
and inanity. May we not ask such Pre- 
facers, If what they allege be true^ what 



VIU PREFACE. 

has the world to do with them and their 
crudities. 

As to the Book itself, it can say this in 
its behalf, that it does, not merely confine 
itself to what its title promises, but ex- 
patiates freely into whatever is collateral ; 
aiming on every occasion to rise in its in- 
quiries, and to pass, as far as possible, from 
small matters to the greatest. Nor is it 
formed merely upon sentiments that are 
now in fashion, or supported only by such 
authorities as are modern. Many Authors 
are quoted, that now-a-days are but little 
studied ; and some, perhaps, whose very 
names are hardly known. 

The Fate indeed of antient Authors (as 
we have happened to mention them) is not 
unworthy of our notice. A few of them 
survive in the Libraries of the learned, 
where some venerable Folio, that still goes 
by their name, just suffices to give them a 



PREFACE. IX 

kind of wommaZ existence. The rest have 
long fallen into a deeper obscurity, their 
very names, when mentioned, affecting us 
as little, as the names, when we read them, 
of those subordinate Heroes, 

Akandrumque^ Haliumque, Noemonaque^ 
Prytanimque, 

Now if an Author, not content with the 
more eminent of antient Writers, should 
venture to bring his reader into such com- 
pany as these last, among people (in the 
fashionable phrase) that nobody knows, 
what usage, what quarter can he have 
reason to expect ? Should the Author of 
these speculations have done this (and it is 
to be feared he has), what method had he 
best take in a circumstance so critical ? — 
Let us suppose him to apologize in the 
best manner he can, and in consequence 
of this, to suggest as follows — 

He hopes there will be found a pleasure 



X PREFACE. 

in the contemplation of antient sentiments, 
as the view of antient Architecture, tho^ 
in ruins, has something venerable. Add 
to this, what from its antiquity is but little 
known, has from that very circumstance 
the recommendation of novelty; so that 
here, as in other instances. Extremes may 
he said to meet. Farther still, as the 
Authors, whom he has quoted, lived in 
various ages, and in distant countries; 
some in the full maturity of Grecian and 
Roman Literature ; some in its declension ; 
and others in periods still more barbarous 
and depraved ; it may afford, perhaps, no 
unpleasing speculation, to see how the 
SAME Reason has at all times prevailed ; 
how there is one Truth, like one Sun, 
that has enlightened human Intelligence 
through every age, and saved it from the 
darkness both of Sophistry and Error. 

Nothing can more tend to enlarge the 
Mind, than these extensive views of Men, 



PREFACE. Xi 

and human Knowledge ; nothing can more 
effectually take us off from the foolish 
admiration of what is immediately before 
our eyes, and help us to a juster estimate 
both of present Men, and present Lite- 
rature, 

It is perhaps too much the case with 
the multitude in every nation, that as they 
know little beyond themselves, and their 
own affairs, so out of this narrow sphere 
of knowledge, they think nothing worth 
knowing. As we Britons by our situ- 
ation live divided from the whole world, 
this perhaps will be found to be more 
remarkably our case. And hence the rea-* 
son, that our studies are usually satisfied 
in the works of our own Countrymen ; 
that in Philosophy, in Poetry, in every 
kind of subject, Avhether serious or 
ludicrous, whether sacred or profane, we 
think perfection with ourselves, and that 
it is superfluous to search farther. 



xu preface: 

The Author of this Treatise would by 
no means detract from the just honours due 
to those of his Countrymen, who either in 
the present, or preceding age, have so 
illustriously adorned it. But tho' he can 
with pleasure and sincerity join in cele- 
brating their deserts, he would not have 
the admiration of these, or of any other 
few, to pass thro' blind excess into a con- 
tempt of all others. Were such admira- 
tion to become universal, an odd event 
would follow ; a few learned men, without 
any fault of their own, would contribute 
in a manner to the extinction of Letters. 

• 

A like evil to that of admiring only the 
authors of our own age, is that of admir- 
ing only the authors of one particular 
Science^ There is indeed in this last pre- 
judice something peculiarly . unfortunate, 
and that is, the more excellent the Sci- 
ence, the more Ukely it will be found to 
produce this effect. 



PREPACE. Xlll 

There are few Sciences more intrin- 
sically valuable, than Mathematics. 
It is hard indeed to say, to which they 
have more contributed, whether to the 
Utilities of Life, or to the sublimest parts 
of Science. They are the noblest Praxis 
of Logic or universal Reasoning. 
It is thro' them we may perceive, how the 
stated Forms of Syllogism are exemplified 
in one Subject, namely, the Predicament 
of Quantity. By marking the force of 
these Forms, as they are applied here^ we 
may be enabled to apply them of ourselves 
elsewhere. Nay, farther still — by viewing 
the Mind, during its process in these syllo- 
gistic employments^ we may come to know 
in part, what kind of Being it is; since 
Mind, like other Powers, can be only 
known from its Operations, Whoever 
therefore will study Mathematics in this 
view, will become not only by Mathe- 
matics a more expert Logician, and by 



XIV PREFACE. 

Logic a more rational Mathematician, but 
a wiser Philosopher, and an acuter Rea- 
soner, in all the possible subjects either of 
science or deliberation. 

But when Mathematics, instead of being 
applied to this excellent purpose, are used 
not to exemplify Logic, but to supply its 
place ; no wonder if Logic pass into con- 
tempt, and if Mathematics, instead of 
furthering science, become in fact an 
obstacle. For when men, knowing nothing 
of that Reasoning which is tmiversal, 
come to attach themselves for years to a 
single Species, a species wholly involved 
in Lines and Numbers only; they grow 
insensibly to believe these last as insepar- 
able from all Reasoning, as the poor 
Indians thought every horseman to be in- 
separable from his horse. 

And thus we see the use, nay, the 



PREFACE. XV 

necessity of enlarging our literary views, 
lest even Knowledge itself should obstruct 
its own growth, and perform in some mea- 
sure the part of ignorance and barbarity. 

. Such, then, is the Apology made by the 
Author of this Treatise, for the multi- 
plicity of antient quotations, with which 
he has jSHed his Book. If he can excite 
in his readers a proper spirit of curiosity ; 
if he can help in the least degree to en- 
large the bounds of Science ; to revive the 
decaying taste of antient Literature; to 
lessen the bigotted contempt of every 
thing not modern ; and to assert to Authors 
of every age their just portion of esteem ; 
if he can in the least degree contribute to 
these ends, he hopes it may be allowed, 
that he has done a service to mankind. 
Should this service be a reason for his 
Work to survive, h^ has confest already, 
it would be no unpleasing event. Should 



XVi PREFACE. 

the contrary happen, he must acquiesce 
in his fate, and let it peaceably pass to 
those destined regions, whither the pro- 
ductions of modern Wit are every day 
passing, 

— ~m vicum vendentem thus et odores. 



ADVERTISEMENT. 

The Reader is desired to take notice^ that 
as often as the author quotes V. I. p. &c. 
he refers to Three Treatises published first 
in one Volume^ Octavo^ in the year 1745. 



CONTENTS. 



BOOK I. 



Chapter L 

PAGE 

Introduction. Design of the whole , . I 

Chap. IL 

Concerning the Analyzing of Speech into 
its smallest Parts . . . . . . 9 

Chap. III. 

Concerning the several Species of those 
smallest Parts . . . . . . 23 

Chap. IV. 
Concerning Substantives^ properly so called 37 

Chap. V. 

Concerning Substantives of the Secondary 
Order . . 63 

a 



XVlll CONTENTS. 

Chap. VL 



PAGE 



Concerning Attiibutives, and first concern- 
ing Verbs . . . . . . . . 87 

Chap. VII. 
Concerning Time and Tenses . . . . 100 

Chap. VIIL 
Concerning Modes . . ... . , 140 

Chap. IX. 

Concerning Verbs, as to their Species and 
other remaining Properties . . . . 173 

Chap. X. 
Concerning Participles and Adjectives . . 184 

Chap. XI. 

Concerning Attributives of the Secondary 
Order . . . . . . . . 19 



BOOK II. 



Chapter I. 
Concerning Definitives . . . . 213 



CONTENTS. XIX 

Chap. II. 



PAGE 



Concerning Connectives, and first those 

called Conjunctions ... . . . . 237 

Chap. III. 

Concerning those other Connectives, called 

Prepositions . . 261 

Chap. IV, 

Concerning Cases . . . . . . 275 

Chap. V. 

Concerning Interjections- — Recapitulation — 

Conclusion . . . . . . . . 289 



BOOK IIL 



Chapter I. 

Introduction — Division of the Subject into 
its principal Parts . . . . . . 305 

Chap. II. 

Upon the Matter or common Subject of 
Language . . . . . . . . 316 



XX CONTENT S, 

Chap. III. 



PAGE 



Upon the Form^ or peculiar Character of 
Language . . . . . . . . 328 

Chap. IV. 
Concerning general or universal Ideas . . 350 

Chap. V. 

Subordination of Intelligence — Difference 
of Ideas, both in particular Men, and in 
whole Nations — Different Genius of 
different Languages — Character of the 
English — the Oriental, the Latin, and 
the Greek Languages — Superlative Ea:- 
cellence of the Last — Conclusion .. 403 






HERMES 



OR 

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 

CONCERNING 

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. 



BOOK I. 



* CHAP. I. 
INTRODUCTION. 

Design of the Whole, 

If Men by nature had been framed for 
Solitude, they had never felt an Impulse to 
converse one with another: And if, like 
lower Animals, they had been by nature 
irrational, they could not have recognized 
the proper subjects of Discourse. Since 
Speech, then, is the joint Energy of our 
best and noblest Faculties,^''^ (that is to say, 
of our Reason and onx social Affection) being 

^°^ See V. I. p. 147 to 169. See also Note xv. p, 292, 
and Note xix. p. 296, of the same Volume 

B 



2 HERMES. 

withal ouY peculiar Ornameijtand Distinc- 
tion, as Men ; those Inquiries may surely 
be deemed interesting as well as liberal, 
which either search how Speech maybe 
naturally resolved ; or how, when resolved, 
it may be again combiiied. 

He RE a large field for speculating opens 
before us. We may either behold Speech, 
as divided into its constituent Parts, as a 
Statue may be divided into its several limbs ; 
or else, as resolved into its Matter and 
Forin, as the same Statue may be resolved 
into its Marble and Figure. 

These different Analy sings or Resohi- 
tions constitute wliat we call ^^^ Philoso- 
phical, or Universal Grammar. 

^^^ Grammaticam etiam bipartitam ponemus^ ut alia sit 
liter aria, alia philosophica, ^c. Bacon, de Augm. Scient. 
VI. 1. And soon after he adds — Verumtamen hdc ipsa 
re moniti, cogitatione compkxi sumus Grammaticam quan- 
dam, qua non analogiam verborum ad invicem, sed analo- 
giam inter verba et res sive rationem sedulb inquirat. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. I. 3 

When we have viewed Speech thus 
analysed^ we may then consider it as com- 
pounded. And here, in the first place, we 
may contemplate that ^'^ Synthesis which by 
combining simple Terms produces a Truth ; 
then by combining two Truths produces a 
third; and thus others, and others, in 
continued Demonstration, till we are led? 
as by a road, into the regions of 
Science. 

Now this is that superior and most excel- 
lent Synthesis^ which alone applies itself 
to our Intellect or Reason^ and which to 



^'^^ Aristotle says — rihv ^l Kara fnti^^niav (rvfXTrXoKrjvXEyo- 
liiv(i)v soey sre a\r}Osg sre ipEvdlg I'^iv' oiov avOptoTTog 
XeifKog, rpi^ei, viku — Of those words which are spoken 
without connexion, there is no one either true or false ; as 
for instance, Man, white, runneth, conquereth. Cat. C. 4. 
So again in the beginning of his Treatise Delnterpretatione, 
irepl yap (ruvSemv ^ diaipeaiv e'^i to \pevd6g te l^ro aXriOig. 
True and False are seen in Composition and Division. 
Composition makes affirmative Truth, Division makes 
negative, yet both alike bring terms together, and so far 
therefore may be called synthetical. 

B 2 



4 HERMES. 

conduct according to Rule, constitutes, the 

Art of Logic. 

After this we may turn to those 
^'^ inferior Compositions, which are pro- 
ductive cf the Pathetic, and the Pleasant, 

^'^^ Ammonius in his Comment on the Treatise litpi 
Epfirivetag, p. 5S, gives the following extract from Theo- 
phrastus, which is here inserted at length, as well for the 
Excellence of the Matter, as because it is not (I believe) 
elsewhere extant. 

AiTTTig yap Bcrr^Q rs Xoys a^iar^w^ (jca0' a ditjpKTtv 6 
f\iL\6ao<^og 0£O(^|oa^oc), riJc rt DPOS TOYS AKPOfl- 
MENOTS, QIC i^j crrifxaivei ri, itf rrig HPOS TA 
nPAFMATA, virlp wv 6 Xc-ywv irucrai irporiOrjTai rsg 
aKpouyfiivsq' irepl fxlv sv rrjv a^iaiv avTHT^v IIPOS TOYS 
AKPOATAS KarayivovTai TroiriTiKri ^ pr\TopiK.ri' ^lOTtspyov 
avTalc eKXiyEdOai to, aefjivoTepa rwv ovOfxaTWv , aWa fiij 
TO. KOiva itf dt^YifXivimsva, i^ ravTa ivapjuoviwQ (Tvp.7r\iKEiv 
dXXiXoig, a)^£ Sia t8Twv itf tCjv THTOig iiro/miviov, oiov 
(Ta<pY}vdag, yXvscvrriTog, itj tCjv aXXwv l^uov, %ti rs juajCjOoXo- 
yiag, i^ l^pa^uXoyiag, Kara Kaipov ttcivtiov irapaXafi^a- 
vofjiivhiv, olaai re rov aKpoar^v, ^ iKTrXi^^at, i^ Trpog rrjv 
TTiiOo) x^ipwOivTa tx^iv Trig d( ye DPOS TA OPAFMATA 
t5 Xoys (T')(iae(i)g 6 (l>iX6(TO<liog irporiysfxevwg twifieXriaeTat, 
TO, TE xpkv^og ^uXEy)((i)v itf to aXriOlg awo^HKVvg. The Re^ 
lation of Speech being twofold (as the Philosopher 
Theophrastus hath settled it) one to the Hearkrs to whom 



BOOK I.—CHAP. I. 5 

in all their kinds. Tliese latter Composi- 
tions aspire not to the Intellect, but being, 
addressed to the Imagination, the Affections^ 
and the Sense, become, from their differ- 



it explains something, and one to the Things, concerning 
which the Speaker proposes to persuade his Hearers : 
With respect to the Jirst Relation, that which regards the 
Hearers are emploi/ed Poetry and Rhetoric. Thus it 
becomes the business of these two, to select the most re- 
spectable Words, and not those that are ^common and of 
vulgar use, and to connect such Words harmoniously one 
with another, so as through these things and their con- 
sequences, such as Perspicuity, Delicacy, and the other 
Forms of Eloquence, together with Copiousness and Bre- 
vity, all employed in their proper season, to lead the Hearer, 
and strike him and hold him vanquished by the power of 
Persuasion, On the contrary, as to the Relation of Speech 
to Things,' here the Philosopher will be found to have 
a principal employ, as well in refuting the False, as in 
demonstrating the True. 

Sanctius speaks elegantly on the same subject. CVea- 
vit Deus hominem rationis participem; cut, quia Socia- 
bilem esse voluit, magno pro munere dedit Sermonem.— 
Sermoni autem perficiendo tres opifices adhibuit. Prima 
est Grammatica, qua ab oratione sofacismos et barbarismos 
expellit ; secunda Dialectica, qua in Sermonis veritate uer- 
satur ; tertia Rhetorica qua ornatum Sermonis tantum 
exquirit. M. in 1. 1. c. 2. 



6 HERMES. 

ent heightenings, either Rhetoric or 
Poetry. 

Nor need we necessarily view these 
Arts distinctly and apart ; we may observe, 
if we please, how perfectly they co-incide. 
Grammar is equally requisite to every 
one of the rest. And though Logic may 
indeed subsist without Rhetoric or 
Poetry, yet so necessary to these last is a 
sound and correct Logic, that without it, 
they are no better than warbling Trifles. 

Now all these inquiries (as we have said 
already) and such others arising from them 
as are of still sublimer Contemplation, 
(of which in the Sequel there may be 
possibly not a few) may with justice be 
deemed Inquiries both interesting and 
liberal. 

At present we shall postpone the whole 
synthetical Part (that is to say Logic and 



BOOK I.—CHAP. I. 7 

Rhetoric), and confine ourselves to the 
analytical, that is to say. Universal 
Grammar. In this we shall follow the 
Order, that we have above laid down, first 
dividing Speech, as a Whole, into its 
CONSTITUENT Parts ; then resolving it, 
as a CoxMPOsiTE, into its Matter and 
Form ; two Methods of Analysis very 
different in their kind, and which lead to 
a variety of very different Speculations. 

Should any one object, that in the 
course of our Inquiry we sometimes de- 
scend to things which appear trivial and 
low ; let him look upon the effects, to 
which those things contribute, then from 
the Dignity of the Consequences, let him 
honour the Principles. 

The following Story may not impro- 
perly be here inserted. " When the Fame 
" of Heraclitus was celebrated throughout 
" Greece, there were certain Persons, that 



8 HERMES. 

" had a curiosity to see so great a man. 
" They came, and, as it happened, found 
" him warming himself in a Kitchen. The 
" meanness of the place occasioned them to 
" stop ; upon which the Philosopher thus 
" accosted them— Enter (says he), bold- 

'^ LY, rOR HERE TOO THERE ARE GoDS/'^" 

We shall only add, that as there is no 
part of Nature too mean for the Divine 
Presence ; so there is no kind of Subject, 
having its foundation in Nature, that is 
below the Dignity of a philosophical 
Inquiry. 

^'^ See Aristot, de Part* Animal, 1. 1. c. 5. 



BOOK I.-CHAP. II. 



CHAP. II, 



Co7icerning the Analysing of Speech into 
its smallest Parts, 

iHOSE things which ^rejirst to Nature 
are not Jirst to Man, Nature begins from 
Causes, and thence descends to Effects, 
Human Perceptions first open upon Effects 
and thence by slow degrees ascend to 
Causes, Often had mankind seen the Sun 
in Eclipse, before they knew its Cause to 
be the Moon's Interposition ; much oftener 
had they seen those unceasing Revolutions 
of Summer and Winter, of Day and 
Night, before the\^ knew the Cause to 
be the Earth's double Motion/''^ Even 



^"^This Distinction o£first to Man, andjlrst to Nature, 
was greatly regarded in the Peripatetic Philosophy. — 
See ^m^ Pki/s. Auscult. 1. 1. c. 1. Themistius's Com- 
ment on the same, Poster, Analyt. 1. 1. c. 2. De Animay 



10 HERMES. 



in Msittevs of Art and hu?nan Creation, if 
we except a few Artists and critical Ob- 



i. 2. c. 2. It leads us, when properly regarded, to a very 
important Distinction between Intelligence Divine and 
Intelligence Unman. God may be said to view the First 
as first ; and the Last as last ; that is, he views Effects 
through Causes in their natural Order, Man views the 
Last, as first ; and the First, as last ; that is, he views 
Causes through Effects^ in an inverse Order^ and hence 
the Meaning of that passage in Aristotle ; wcrirEp yap rd 
-wv vvKTEpidijJV ofifjLara npog to (piyyog e\ei to jueO' r\}iipav, 
8Tb) itf Tr\Q rijUiLT£pag \pv)(jiig 6 NSc TTpoQ to. Tr\ ipvau 
^av£pa)TaTa TrdvTwv^ As are the Ei/es of Bats to the Light 
of the Dai/, so is Man's Intelligence to those Objects, that 
are hy Nature the brightest and most conspicuous of all things. 
Metaph. 1. 2. c. 1. See also 1. 7. c. 4. and Ethic. Nicom. 
1. 1. c. 4. Ammonius, reasoning in the same way, says 
very pertinently to the subject of this Treatise — 'AyaTrrj- 
Tov rp dvOp(i)7rivy ^vo-et, £/c twv aTeXs'^tpwv ^ (TvvueTijjv ItiX 
TO, aTrXs^^epa i^ TeXeiOTepa irpo'livaC id ydp avvOiTa juaXXov 
Gvvr]dr] r}[MV, i^ yvii)pifX(x)Tepa' "Ovtio ySv i^ 6 iraXg eipai 
fxkv \6yov, itf uiruVf '2i(i)KpdTr}g TrepnraTeT, olce' tstov ce 
dvaXvcrai elg ovofia i^ prifxa, itf TavTa dg (rvWajddg, KaKHva 
elg '^oix^ta, sketl* Human Nature may be well contented 
to advance from the more imperfect and complex to the more 
simple and perfect ; for the complex Subjects are more fa- 
miliar to us, and better known. Thus, therefore, it is, that 
even a Child knows how to put a sentence together, and say, 
Socrates walketh ; but how to resolve this Sentence into a 



BOOK I.— CHAP. II. a 

servers, the rest look no higher than to the 
Practice and mere Work, knowing nothing 
of those Principles on which the whole 
depends. 

Thus in Speech for example — All men, 
even the lowest, can speak their Mother- 
Tongue. Yet how many of this multitude 
can neither write, nor even read? How 
many of those, who are thus far literate, 
know nothing of that Grammar, which 
respects the Genius of their own language ? 
How few, then, must be those, who know 
Grammar Universal; that Grammar 
which without regarding the several Idioms 
of particular Languages, only respects those 
Principles that are essential to them all ? 

Tis our present Design to inquire 
about this Grammar; in doing which we 

Noun and Verb, and these again into Si/llabks, and Sylla- 
bles into Letters or Elements, here he is at a loss. Am. in 
Com. de Praedic. p. 29. 



12 HERMES. 

shall follow the Order consonant to human 
Perception, as being for that reason the 
more easy to be understood. 

We shall begin therefore first from a 
Period or Sentence, that combination in 
Speech, which is obvious to all ; and 
thence pass, if possible, to those its pri- 
mary Parts, which, however essential, are 
only obvious to a few. 

With respect, therefore, to the different 
Species of Sentences, who is there so igno- 
rant, as if w^e address him in his Mother 
Tongue, not to know when "'tis we assert, 
and when we question; when 'tis we com- 
mand, and when we pray or wish ? 

For example, when we read in Shake-- 

speare^, 

The Man that hath no music in himself, 

And is not moved with concord of sweet sounds, 

Is fit for Treasons 

* Merchant of Venice. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. 11. 13 

Or ill Milto7i,^ 

O Friends J I hear the tread of nimble feet 
Hasting this way 

'tis obvious that these are assertive Sen- 
tencesy one founded upon Judgment, the 
other upon Sensation. 

When the Witch in Macbeth says to 
her Companions, 

When shall we three meet again^ 
In thunder y lightnings and in rain ? 

this, 'tis evident, is an interrogaiive Sen- 
tence, 

When Macbeth says to the Ghost of 
Banqiio, 

He7ice, horrible Shadow, 



Unreal Mock'ry, hence!- 



he speaks an imperative Sentence^ founded 
upon the passion of hatred. 

* P. L. IV. 866. 



14 H E E M E S. 

When Milton says in the character of 

his Allegro^ 

Haste thee, Nymph, and bring with thee 
Jest and youthful Jollity, 

he too speaks an imperative Sentence^ 

though founded on the passion, not of 

hatred but of love. 

When in the beginning of the Paradise 
Lost we read the following address, 

And chiefly thou, O Spirit, that dost prefer 
Before all temples th' upright hearty and pure, 
Instruct me, for thou know^st — 

this is not to be called an imperative Sen- 
tence^ though perhaps it bear the same 
Form, but rather (if I may use the Word) 
^tis a Sentence precative or optative. 

What then shall we say ? Are Sen- 
tences to be quoted in this manner with- 
out ceasing, all differing from each other 
in their stamp and character? Are they 
no way reducible to certain definite Classes? 



BOOK I.~CHAP. II. 15 

If not, they can be no objects of rational 
comprehension. — Let us however try. 

"'TIS a phrase often appUed to a man, 
when speaking, that he speaks his mind; 
as much as to say, that his Speech or 
Discourse is a publishing of some Energy 
or Motion of his Soul, So it indeed is in 
every one that speaks, excepting alone 
the Dissembler or Hypocrite ; and he, too, 
as far as possible, affects the appear- 
ance. 

Now the Powers of the Soui. (over 
and above the mere * nutritive) may be 
included all of them in those of Percep- 
tion, and those of Volition. By the 
Powers of Perception, I mean the Senses 
and the Intellect ; by the Powers of Voli- 
tion, I mean, in an extended sense, not 
only the Will but the several Passions and 

* Vid. Aristot. de An. II. 4. 



16 HERMES. 

Appetites ; in short, all that moves to action 
whether rational or irrational. 

If, then, the leading Powers of the Soul 
be these two, 'tis plain that every Speech 
or Sentence, as far as it exhibits the Soul, 
must, of course, respect one or other of 
these. 

If we assert^ then it is a Sentence which 
respects the Powers of Perception. For 
what indeed is to assert^ if we consider the 
examples above alleged, but to publish some 
Perception either of the Senses or the 
Intellect ? 

Again, if we interrogate^ if we command^ 
if we pray, or if we wish (which in terms 
of Art is to speak Sentences interrogative y 
imperative^ precative, or optative) what do 
we but publish so many different Voli- 
tions ? — For who is it that questions? He 
that has a Desire to be informed. — Who is 



BOOK i.~CHAP. ir. 17 

it that commands? He that has a Will, 
which he would have obeyed. — What are 
those Beings, who either wish or pray ? 
Those, who feel certain wants either for 
themselves, or others. 

If then the SouFs leading Powers be the 
two above mentioned, and if it be true that 
all Speech is a publication of these Powers, 
it will follow that EVERY Sentence will 

BE EITHER. A SENTENCE OF ASSERTION, 

OR A Sentence of Volition. And thus 
by referring all of them to one of these two 
classes, have we found an expedient to 
reduce their infinitude. 



^^^'Prjrlov 8V oTi riig \pvxrig Trig rjiueripag ^iTTag lxH<Tr]g 
^vva/jLEig, Tag filv yvuy'^LKag, Tag ^l Swrt/caCj Tag i^ optic- 
TiKag Xeyo/Jiivag' (Xeytv dl yvw'^iKag filv, Ka&* ag 
yivbj<TKO/uv EKa'^ov tC)v 6vT(i)v, olov V8V, ^lavoiav, ^o^av, 
^avTacTiav i^ aicrOriCFiv' opEKTiKag Si, KaB' ag opeyofieOa 
Twv aya9C)v, rj tCjv ovTisJV, r) twv SoKsvrwv, oiov jdsXricnv 
Aiywy TTpoaipetnv, ^vfiov, i^ eTTiOvfiiav) ra MEN TirTapa 
tiorj r5 Aoys (ra wapa tov a7ro(f>avTiKOv) airo awv opeKTiKwv 
ovvaHE(jJv TTpoipxovTai Tijg \pv')(rig, 8ic avTrig KaO' amrjv 



18 HERMES. 

The Extensions of Speech are quite 
indefinite, as may be seen if we compare 



kvepystrrig, aXXa irpog erepov airoTeivofiivr^g (rov (TUjujSaX- 
\eaOai coKSvra irpog to tv)(^hv rrig opi^Ewg) i^ ^tol \6yov 
Trap avT8 Srjrstrr^c, KaOairep IttI ts nYSMATIKOY i^ 
EPaTHMATIKOY KaXsjuiivs X078, rj irpayfxa, i^ el 
TTpajima, rjroi avTs eKetvs tv)(hv l(j)iefxivr]g, irpog ov 6 
\6yog, ii)(77rep IttX rS KAHTIKOY, rj rivog trap avrs Trpa- 
^swg' i^ ravTrjg, rj thg Trapa Kpdrrovog, wg liri Trig EYXHS, 
rj wg Trapa ^^tpovog, wg lirl ts KVpiwg KCLkHfiivr\g HPOS- 
TA^EOS- fiovov AE to AnO<l>ANTIKON ano tCov 
yv(t)^iK(ov, i^ eVi tsto e^ayysXTiKov Trig yevofxhrig iv rifiiv 
yvoj/reiog tu)v irpayfxaTdyv dXriOtjg, rj (jtaivofxlvwgf cio Kf 
jULOvov rSro ^ektikov e^iv aXriOdag rj ipcv^sg, tojv SI aWwv 
8^iv. The Meaning of the above passage being implied in 
the Text, we take its translation from the Latin Interpreter. 
Dicendum igitur est, cum anima nostra dupUcem potestatem 
habeat, cognitionis, et vita, qua etiam appetitwnis ac cupi- 
ditatis appellatur, qua vero cognitionis est, vis est, qua res 
singulas cognoscimus, ut mens, cogitatio, opinio, phantasia, 
sensus : appetitus verofacultas est, qua bona, vel qua sunt, 
vel qua videntur, concupiscimus, ut sunt voluntas, consilium^ 
ira, cupiditas : quatuor orationis species, prater enuncian- 
t$in, a partibus animi proficiscuntur, qua concupiscunt ; 
non cum animus ipse per se agit, sed cum ad alium se eon- 
vertit, qui ei ad consequendum id, quod cupit, conducere 
posse videatur ; atque etiam vel rationem ah eo exquirit, ut 
in oratione, quam Percunctantem aut Interrogantem vocant ; 
vel rem : sique rem, vel cum ipsum consequi cupit, qukum 



BOOK I. CHAP. II. 19 

the jEneid to an Epigram of Martial But 
the longest Extension, with which Grammar 
has to do, is the Extension here considered, 
that is to say, a Sentence. The greater 
Extensions (such as Syllogisms, Paragraphs, 
Sections, and complete Works) belong not 
to Grammar, but to Arts of higher order ; 
not to mention that all of them are but 
sentences repeated. 

Now a Sentence ^'^ may be sketch- 
ed in the following description — a com- 
pound Quantity of Sound significant, of 

loquitur, ut in optante oratlone, vel aliquam ejus actionem : 
atque in hdc, vel ut a prcestantiore, ut in Deprecatione ; 
vel ut ah inferiore, ut in eo, qui proprie Jussus nomina- 
tur. Sola autem Enuncians a cognoscendi facultate profi- 
ciscitur : haque nunciat rerum cognitionem, qua in nobis 
est aut veram, aut simulatam. Itaque Haec sola verum 
falsumque capit : praterea vera nulla. Ammon. in Libr. 
de Interpretatione. 

^'^^ Aoyo^ Si (fitjvri (TVvOeTri trr^/iavrtKi?, ^c ^vm /ilpri KaS^ 
avTa ay]fiaivH Ti. Arist. Poet. c. 20. See also de Inter- 
pret, c. 4. 

c 2 



so HERMES. 

which certain Tarts are themselves also 
significant. 

Thus when I say [the Sun shineth~\ not 
only the whole quantity of sound has a 
meaning, but certain parts also, such as 
\^Sun~\ and [shineth']. 

But what shall we say ? Have these 
Parts again other Parts, which are in like 
manner significant, and so may the pro- 
gress be pursued to infinite ? Can we sup- 
pose all Meaning, Uke Body, to be divisible, 
and to include within itself other meanings 
without end ? If this be absurd, then must 
we necessarily admit, that there is such a 
thing as a Sound significant, of which no 
Partis of itself significant , And this is what 
we call the proper character of a '''^^Word. 



^^^ ^Ljvrj (TtiiuavTiKrj, — rig fiipog s^ev i^i Kad^ avro 
<T)7juavrtKov. De Poetic, c. 20. De Interpret, c. 2 & 3. 
PrisciarCs Definition of a Word (Lib. 2.) is as follows— 



BOOK I.— CHAP. II. 21 

For thus, though the Words [Sun] and 
[shineth] have each a Meaning, yet is there 
certainly no Meaning in any of their Parts, 
neither in the Syllables of the one, nor in 
the Letters of the other. 

If therefore all Speech, whether in 
prose or verse, every Whole, every Section, 
every Paragraph, every Sentence, imply a 
certain Meanino;, divisible into other Mean^ 
ings^ but Words imply a Meaning, which 
is not so divisible : it follows that Words 
will be the smallest parts of Speech^ in as 
much as nothing less has any Meaning 
at all. 



Dictio est pars minima oralionis condructa, id est, inordine 
composite. Pars autem, quantum ad totum intelligendum, 
id est, ad totius sensus intellectum. Hoc autem ideo dictum 
est, ne quis conetur vires in duas partes dividere, hoc est, in 
vi et res ; non enim ad totum intelligendum hac Jit divisio. 
To Priscian we may add Theodore Gaza.-^AiKt^ dl, /Jiepog 
tXa^i'^oy Kara avvra^Lv Xoys. Introd. Gram. 1. 4. Plato 
shewed them this characteristic of a Word — Sec Cratylus 
p. 385. Edit. Serr. 



22 HERMES. 

To know therefore the species of Words^ 
must needs contribute to the knowledge of 
Speech^ as it implies a knowledge of its 
minutest Parts. 

This therefore must become our next 
Inquiry. 



BOOK 1.— CHAP. III. 23 



CHAP. III. 

Concerning the Species^ of JVords, the 
smallest Parts of Speech, 

Let us first search for the Species of 
Words among those Parts of Speech, 
commonly received by Grammarians. For 
Example in one of the passages above 
cited — 

The Man that hath no music in himself, 
And is not movd with concord of sweet sounds y 
Is ft for treasons — 

Here the Word \The~\ is an Article ; — 

[Manl [No] [Mws/c] [Concord'] [Sweef] 
[Sounds'] [Fit] [Treasons] are all Nouns, 
some Substantive^ and some Adjective — 
[That] and [Himself] are Pronouns — 
[Hath] and [Is] are Verbs — [Movd] a 
Participle — [No^]an Adverb — [And] 
a Conjunction — [In] [With] and [Foi-]. 



24 HERMES. 

are Prepositions. In one sentence we 
have all those parts of Speech, which the 
Greek Grammarians are found to acknow- 
ledge. The Latins only differ in having no 
Article, and in separating the Interjec- 
tion, as a Part of itself, which the Greeks 
include among the Species oi Adverbs, 

What then shall we determine? why 
are there not more Species of Words ? why 
so many .? or if neither more nor fewer, why 
these and not others ? 

To resolve, if possible, these several 
Queries, let us examine any Sentence that 
comes in our way, and see what differences 
we can discover in its Parts. For example 
the same Sentence above. 

The Man that hath no music, &^x. 

One Difference soon occurs, that some 
Words are variable, and others invariable. 
Thus the Word Man may be varied into 
Man's and Men ; Hath, into Have, Hast, 



BOOK I.— CHAP. III. 25 

Had, ^c. Sweet into Sweeter and Sweets 
est ; Fit into Fitter and Fittest. On the 
contrary, the Words The, In, And, and 
some others, remain as they are, and can- 
not be altered. 

And yet it may be questioned, how far 
this Difference is essential. For in the first 
place, there are Variations, which can be 
hardly called necessary, because only some 
Languages have them, and others have 
them not. Thus the Greeks have the dual 
Variation, which is unknown both to the 
Moderns, and to the ancient Latins. Thus 
the Greeks and Latins vary their Adjectives 
by the triple Variation of Gender, Case, 
and Number ; whereas the English never 
vary them in any of those ways, but 
through all kinds of Concord preserve them 
still the same. Nay even those very Vari« 
ations, which appear most necessary, may 
have their places supplied by othermethods; 
some by Auxiliars as when for Bruti or 



S6 HERMES. 

Bruto we say, of Brutus ^ to Brutus ; some, 
bt/ mere Position^ as when for Brutum ama- 
vit Cassius, we say, Cassius loved Brutus, 
For here the Accusative^ which in Latin 
is known any where from its Variation^ is in 
English only known from its Position or 
place. 

Lf then the Distinction of Variable and 
Invariable will not answer our purpose, let 
us look farther for some other more essen- 
tial. 

Suppose then we should dissolve the 
Sentence above cited, and view its several 
Parts as they stand separate and detached. 
Some, 'tis plain, still preserve a Meaning 
(such as Man, Music, Sweet, &c.) others on 
the contrary immediately lose it (such as, 
And, The, With, &c.). Not that these last 
have no meaning at all, but in fact they 
never have it but when in company, or 
associated. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. III. 27 

Now it should seem that this Distinc- 
tion, if any, was essential. For all Words 
are significant or else they would not be 
Words ; and if every thing not absolute ^ is 
of course relative, then will all Words be 
significant either absolutely or relatively. 

With respect therefore to this Distinc- 
tion, the first sort of Words may be call'd 
significant by themselves ; the latter may be 
caird significant by relation ; or if we hke 
it better, the first sort may be called Frin- 
cipals, the latter Accessories. The first are 
like those stones in the basis of an Arch, 
which are able to support themselves, even 
when the Arch is destroyed ; the latter are 
like those stones in its Summit or Curve, 
which can no longer stand, than while the 
whole subsists. ^'^ 



^'^ Apollonius of Alexandria (one of the acutest 
Authors that ever wrote on the Subject of Grammar) 
illustrates the different power of Words, by the different 
power of Letters. "Ert, ov rponov rtov 'soix^itjv ra jiiv 



.^8 HERMES. 

§ This Distinction being admitted we 
thus pursue our Speculations. All things 
whatever either enst as the Energies, or 



l^i (j>(i)vii£VTaf a i^ KaO^ eavTci (jtuivriv diTOTeXei* to. of avfi- 
<j)tjjva,a7r£p avsv rdv <pb)vr\ivT(jJv 8k £X£t pr\TrivTr]v tK^wvij- 
o-fv. Tov avTOv TpOTTOv I'^lvlTrivoTqcTai KairX twv \iq,£(i)v. al julIv 
/yop avTWV, rpoTrovTiva rwv ^wvriivT(jJV pr\raL uaC KaOaTrep 
lin tCjv prifxarwv, ovofiaTtov, avTMVvfiiCyVy iTrippr^iuLaTtjv. — 
at §£, warrepei avfx<p{i)va, dvafievscn to. ^wvrjfvra, 8 ^vvafjiEva 
Kar Idiav pr}Ta elvat — KaOdirep lin tCjv TrpoSicrewv^ twv 
ap9p(i)v,T(jJv avvciaixwv' rd yap TOiavra del t(ov fiopiwv <ru(T~ 
(TTfifiaivH. In the same manner, as of the Elements or Letters, 
some are Vowels, which of themselves complete a Sound; others 
are Consonants, which without the help of Vowels have no 
express vocalitj/ ; so likewise may we conceive as to the 
nature of Words. Some of them like Vowels, are of them- 
selves expressive, as is the case of Verbs, Nouns, Pronouns, 
and Adverbs ; others, like Consonants, wait for their Vowels, 
being unable to become expressive by their own proper 
strength, as is the case of Prepositions, Articles, and Con- 
junctions ; for these parts of Speech are always Consigni- 
ficant, that is, are only significant, when associated to some- 
thing else, Apollon. de Syntaxi. L. 1. c. S. Itaque 
quibusdam philosophis placuit nomen et veiibum Solas 
ESSE PAHTEs Orationis ; Cetera vero Adminicula vel 
JuNCTURAS earum: quomodo navium partes sunt tabula et 
trabes, cater a autem (id est, cera, stuppa, et clavi, et similiaj 
vincula et conglutinationes partium navis (hoc est, tabu- 



BOOK I.—CHAP. III. 29 

Affections, of some other thing, or without 
being the Energies or Affections of some 
other thing. If they exist as the Energies ^ 
or Affections of something eke, then are they 
called Attributes. — Thus to think is the 
attribute of a Man ; to be white, of a Swan ; 
to fly, of an Eagle ; to be fourfooted, of a 
Horse. — If they exist no^ after this manner, 
then are they called Substances.* Thus 
Man, Swan, Eagle, and Horse, are none 
of them Attributes, but all Substances, 
because however they may exist in Time 
and Place, yet neither of these, nor of 
any thing else, do they exist as Energies 
or Affections. 

And thus all things Avhatsoever, being 

larum et trabium) non partes navis dicuntur. Prise. L. 
XI. 933. 

* Substances.] Thus Aristotle. Nvv jmlv 8v Tvircff 
fipTjrat, TL TTOT i<^Xv 7) Hoia, OTL TO firj Ka&* vTroKUfiivs, aXXa 
Ka0'5ra^XXa. Metaph. Z y. p. 106. Ed. Sylb. 



30 HERMES. 

either ^^ Substances or Attributes, it follows 
of course that all Words, which are signiji' 
cant as Principals^ must needs be significant 
of either the one or the other. If they are 
significant of Substances, they are called 
Substantives ; if of Attributes, they are 
called Attributives. So that all Words 
whatever, significant as Principals, are either 
Substantives or Attributives. 

Again, as to Words, which are only 
significant as Accessories, they acquire a 
Signification either from being associated 
to one Word or else to many. If to one Word 
alone, then as they can do no more than in 
some manner define or determine, they may 
justly for that reason be called Defini- 



^^^ This division of things into Substance and Attribute 
seems to have been admitted by Philosophers of all Sects 
and ages. See Catagor. c. 2, Metaphys. L. VII. c. 1. 
De Ccelo, L. III. c. 1. 



BOOK I.-CHAP. III. 31 

TivEs. If to many Words at once^ then as 
they serve to no other purpose than to con^ 
nect^ they are called for that reason by the 
name of Connectives. 

And thus it is that all Words whatever 
are either Principals or Accessories ; or 
under other Names, either significant from 
theinselvesy or significant hy relation. — If 
significant from themselves^ they are either 
Substantives ov Attributives; i^ significant 
by relation, they are either Definitives or 
Connectives. So that under one of these 
four Species, Substantives, Attribu- 
tives, Definitives, and Connectives 
are all Words, however different^ in a 
manner included. 

If any of these Names seem new and 
unusual, we may introduce others more 
usual, by calling the Substantives^ Nouns ; 
the Attributives, Verbs ; the Definitives, 



32 HERMES. 

Articles; and the Connectives, Con- 
junctions. 

Should it be asked, what then becomes 
of Pronouns y Adverbs, Prepositions, and 
Interjections; the answer is, either they 
must be found included within the Species 
above-mentioned, or else must be admitted 
for so many Species by themselves. 

§ There were various opinions in 
ancient Days, as to. the number of these 
Parts or Elements of Speech. 

Plato in his ^Sophist mentions only two, 
the Noun and the Verb, Aristotle mentions 
no more, where he treats of -f-Prepositions. 
Not that those acute Philosophers were 
ignorant of the other Parts, but they 
spoke with reference to Logic or Dialec^ 

* Tom. 1, p. 261. Edit. Ser. 
t De Interpr. c. 2 and S. 



BOOK L— CHAP. III. 33 

tic ^^^ considering the Essence of Speech 
as contained in these two, because these 
alone combined make a perfect assertive 
Sentence, which none of the rest without 
them are able to eftect. Hence therefore 
Aristotle in Jiis ^treatise of Poetry (where 
he was to lay down the elements of a more 



^^^ Partes igitur orationis sunt secundum Dialecticos duay 
NoMEN et Verbum; quia ha sola etianiper se conjunct^ 
plenam faciunt orationem ; alias autem partes GvyKaTYiyo- 
QTifiara, hoc est, consignificantia appellabant. Priscian 1. S. 
p. 574. Edit. Putschii. Existit hie queedam qutestto, cur 
duo tantum, Nomen et Verbum, se (Arhtoteles sc.) de- 
ter minare promittat, cum plures partes orationis esse videan- 
tur. Quibus hoc dicendum est, tantum Aristotelem hoc 
libra diffinisse, quantum illi ad id, quod instituerat tractare, 
suffecit. Tractat namque de simplici enuntiativa oratione, 
qua scilicet hujusmodi est, ut junctis tantum Verbis etNomi- 
nibus c(ymponatur. — Quare superfluum est quarere, cur alias 
quoque, qua videntur orationis partes, non proposuerit, qui 
non totius simpliciter orationis, sed tantum simplicis 
oraXionis instituit elementa partiri. Boetius in Libr. de 
Interpretat. p. 295. Apollonius from the above principles 
elegantly calls the Noun and Verb to. l/m^pyxorara /uLepn 
r5 Xoya, the most animated parts of Speech, De Syntaxi, 
1. 1. c. 3. p. 24. See also Plutarch. Quasi. Platon. p. 

1009. 

* Poet. Cap.9,0. 



34 HERMES. 

variegated speech) adds the Article and 
Conjunction io the Noun and Verb, and 
so adopts the same Parts, with those esta- 
bhshed in this Treatise. To Aristotle's 
authority (if indeed better can be required) 
may be added that also of the elder 



The latter Stoics instead of four Parts 
made five, by dividing the Noun into the 
Appellative and Proper. Others increased 
the number, by detaching the Pronoun 
from the Noun ; the Participle and Adverb 
from the Verb ; and the Preposition from 
the: Conjunction. The Latin Grammarians 
went farther, and detached the Interjection 
from the Adverb, within which by tlie 
Greeks it was always included, as a 
Species. 

^^^ For this we have the authority o£ Diom/sius, oi Halt- 
car nassus, De Struct, Or at. Sect. 2. whom Quintilian 
follows, Inst. I. 1. c. 4. Diogenes Laertius and Priscian 
make them always to have admitted five parts. See 
Priscian, as before, and Laertius, Lib. VII, *SV^. 57*. 



BOOK I.-^CHAP. IIL m 

Wj& are told indeed by ^'^ Dionysim of 
Halicarnassiis and Quintiliany that Aristotle 
mth Theodectes, and" the mom early 
writers, held but three parts^ of speecE, the 
Noun the Verb^ smd the Conjunction. Thfe^ 
it mast be owned, accords with the oriental 
Tongues, whose Grammars (we are ^*^ told) 
admit no other. 3tit ^% to Aristotle, ^Ve 
have hii5 own authority to assert the con* 
trary, who not only enumerates the four 
Species which we have adopted, but 



^*^ See the places quoted in the note immediately pre- 
ceding. 

^^^ Antiquissima eorum est opinio, qui tres classes faciunt. 
Estque hddc Arahum quoque sententia — HehrcBi quoquc 
{qui, cum Arahes Grammaticam scribere desinerent, artem 
earn demum scribere cceperunt, quod ante annos contigit 
circiter quadringentos) Hebrai, inquam, hac in re seculi 
sunt magistros suos Arabes. — Immo vero trium classium 
numerum alia etiam Orientis lingua retinent. — Dubium, 
utrum ed in re Orientales imitati sunt antiquos Gracorum, 
an hi potius secuti sunt Orientalium exemplum, Utut est, 
etiam veteres Gracos tres tantum partes agnovisse, non 
solum autor est Dionysius, S^c. Voss. de Analog. 1. 1. c. 1. 
See also Sanctii Minerv. I. 1. c. 2. 

D 2 



36 HERMES. 

ascertains them each by a proper Defini- 
tion.'^ 

To conclude — the Subject of the follow- 
ing Chapters will be a distinct and separate 
consideration of the NO0N, the Verb, the 
Article, and the Conjunction ; which 
four, the better (as we apprehend) to ex- 
press their respective natures, we chuse to 
call Substantives, Attributives, De- 
finitives, and Connectives. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. IV. m 

CHAP. IV. 

Concerning Substantives properly so called. 

Substantives are all those principal 
Words^ which are significant of Substances 
considered as Substances. 

The first sort of Substances are the 
NATURAL, such as Animal, Vegetable, 
Man, Oak. 

There are other Substances of our own 
making. Thus by giving a Figure not 
natural to natural Materials, we create 
such Substances, as House, Ship, Watch, 
Telescope, &c. 

Again, by a more refined operation of 
our Mind alone we abstract any Attribute 
from its necessary subject, and consider it 
apart^ devoid of its dependence. For 



38 HERMES, 

example, from Body we abstract to Fly ; 
from Surface, the being White ; from Soul 
the being Temperate. 

And thus it is we convert even Attributes 
into Substances^ denoting them on this 
occasion by proper Substantives^ such ^s 
Flighty Whiteness^ Temperance ; or else by 
others more general, such as Motion, Colour, 
Virtue. These we call abstract Sub- 
stances ; the second sort we call AiCTir 

FICIAL. 

Now all those several Substances have 
their Genus, their Species, and their Indi- 
viduals. For example, in natural Sub- 
stances, Animal is a Genus ; Man, a 
/Species: Alexander, an Individual, In 
artificial Substances, Edifice is a Genus ; 
Palace, a Species ; the Vatican an Indivi- 
dual. In abstract Substances, Motion is <j 
Genus ; Flight, a Species ; this Flight or 
th(it Flight are Individuals. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. IV. 39 

As therefore every ^^^ Genus may be 
found whole and intire in each one of its 
Species ; (for thus Man, Horse, and Dog, 
are each of them distinctly a complete and 
intire Animal) ; and as every Species may 
be found whole and intire in each one 
of its Individuals (^for thus Socrates^ Plato 
and Xenophon, are each ofthem completely 
and distinctly a Man) ; hence it is, that 
every Genus, though One is multiplied into 
Many ; and every Species^ though One, 
is also multiplied into Many, by reference 
to those beings which are their proper subor- 
dinates. Since, then, no individual has any 
such subordinates^ it can never in strictness 
be considered as Many, and so is truly 
an Individual as well in Nature as in 
Name, 

^"^ This is what Plato seems to have expressed in a man- 
ner somewhat mysterious, when he talks of fiiav i^lav ^la 
TToXXwv, tvoc licaTs K^ifiivs \(i)pL^, Tvavry] dtaTerafJLivr}V — 
i^ iroXXag, hepag aWriXwv, vtjo fxiaq I^mO^v ir^QL^^Ofiivaq . 
— Sophist, p. S53 Edit. Serrani. For the common defini- 
tion of Genus and Species, see the Isagogc or Introduc- 
tion of Porphyry to Aristotle s Logic. 



40 H E R M E S. 

From these Principles it is, that Words 
following the nature and genius of Things 
such Substantives admit of Number as 
denote Genera or Species^ while those 
which denote ^^^ Individuals, in strictness, 
admit it not. 

(^^ Yet sometimes Individuals have plurality or Num- 
kr, from the causes following. In the first place the 
Individuals of the human race are so large a multitude, 
even in the smallest nation, that it would be difficult to 
invent a new Name for every new-born Individual. — 
Hence, then, instead of one onb/heiiag caWdMarcits, and owe 
only Anionius, it happens that mani/ are called Marcus 
and many called Antonius ; and thus 'tis the Romans had 
their Plurals, Marci and Antonii, as we in later days have 
our Marks and our Anthonies. Now the Plurals of this 
sort may be well called accidental^ because it is merely by 
chance that the names coincide. 

There seems more reason for such Plurals, as the Pto- 
lemies, Scipios, CatoSf or (to instance in modern names) 
the Howards, Pelhams, and Montagues ; because a Race 
or Family is like a smaller sort of Species ; so that the 
family Name extends to the Kindred, as the specific Name 
extends to the Individuals. 

A third cause which contributed to make proper Names 
become Plural, was the high Character or Eminence of some 
one Individual, whose Name became afterwards a kind of 
common Appellative, to denote all those who had nreten*^''*'^' 



BOOK I.— CHAP. IV. 41 

Besides Number, another characteristic 
visible in Substances, is that of Sex. Every 
Substance is either Male or Female ; or 
both Male and Female ; or neither one nor 
the other. So that with respect 'to Sexes 
?ix\d \he\x Negation, all Substances conceiv- 
able are comprehended under this fourfold 
consideration. 

Now the existence of Hermaphrodites 
being rare, if not doubtful; hence Lan- 

to merit in the same way. Thus every great Critic was 
called an Aristarchus ; every great Warrior^ an Alexander; 
every great Beauty^ a Helen, &c. 

A Daniel come to judgment ! yea, a Daniel, 

cries Skylock in the Play, when he would express the 
wisdom of the young Lawyer. 

So Martial in that well-known verse, 

Sint M.ECENATES, uon deerunty Fiacce, Marones. 

So Lucilius, 
AiriAinOI mojUes, iExN^ f>mnes, asperi Athones. 

noaijt ^AEGGNTES, r) AEYKAAiaNES. Lucian in 
Timon. T. I. p. 108. 



n HERMES. 

guage, only regarding those distinctions 
which are more obvious, considers Words 
denoting Substances to be either Mascu- 
line, Feminine, or Neuter.* 

As to our own Species, and all those 
animal Species, which have reference to 
common Life^ or of which the Male and the 
Female, by their size, form, colour, &c. are 
eminently/ distinguished, most Languages 
hav^ different substantives, to denote the 
Male and the Female. — But as to those 
animal Species, which eitheT less frequently 
occur, or of which one Sex is less ap- 
parently distinguished from the other, in 
these a single Substantive commonly serves 
for both Sexes. 

* After this manner they are distinguished by Aristotle. 
Twv bvof^iaruyv ra julIv appiva, ra ^£ OriXea, to. ^e juteTa^v. 
Poet. cap. 21. Protagoras before him had established the 
same Distinction, calling them a|0/o£va, 6i]\ia, i^ (tk^vt). — 
Aristot. Rhet, L. III. c. 5. Where mark, what were 
^terwards called sScT^a, or Neuters, were by these called 

TCL JUL^Ta^U icj (TKCUrj. 



BOOK I.---CHAP. IV. 4a 

* In the English Tongue it seems a ge- 
neral rule (except only when infringed by 
a figure of Speech) that no Substantive is 
Masculine^ but what denotes a Male animal 
Substance ; none Feminine but what de- 
notes a Female animal Suhstaiice ; and that 
where the Substance has no Sex'^ the Sub- 
stantive is always Neuter. 

But 'tis not so in Greek, Latin, and 
many of the modern Tongues. These all 
of them have Words, some masculine, some 
feminine (and those loo in great multitudes 
which have reference to Substances, where 
Se^ never had existence. To give one in- 
stance for many. Mind is surely neither 
male, nor female ; yet is NOTS, in Greek 
masculine, and mens, in La^m, feminine. 



* Nam ^uicquid per Naturam Sexui non adsignatur, 
neutrum haheri oporteret, sed id Ars, ^c. Consent, apud 
Putsch, p. 2023, 2024. 

The whole passage from Genera flominu^^ ^^^ naturQlta 
sunt, Sfc. is worth perusing. 



44 HERMES. 

In some Words these distinctions seem 
owing to nothing else, than to the mere 
casual structure of the Word itself : It is 
of such a Gender from having such a Ter- 
mination ; or from belonging perhaps to 
such a declension. In others we may 
imagine a more subtle kind of reasoning, 
a reasoning which discerns, even in things 
without SeXy a distant analogy to that 
great natural Distinction, which 
(according to Milton) animates the World.* 

Jn this view we may conceive such 
Substantives to have been considered 
as Masculine, which were " conspicuous 
" for the Attributes of imparting or com- 
"municating; or which were by nature 
" active, strong, and efficacious, and that 
" indiscriminately whether to good or to 



* Mr. LiuTUtus, the celebrated Botanist, has traced the 
Distinction of Sexes throughout the whole Vegetable World, 
and made it the Basis of his Botanic Method. 



BOOK I.-CHAP. IV. 45 

'* ill ; or which had claim to Eminence, 
" either laudable or otherwise/' 

The Fe mi nine 5 on the contrary, were 
" such as were conspicuous for the Attri- 
" butes either of receiving, or of contain- 
" ing, or of producing and bringing forth ; 
" or which had more of the passive in 
" their nature, than of the active ; or 
" which were peculiarly beautiful and 
" amiable ; or which had respect to such 
" excesses, as were rather Feminine, than 
" Masculine/' 

Upon these Principles the two greater 
Luminaries were considered, one as Mas- 
culine, the other as Feminine ; the Sun 
(^HXiOc; Sot) SLS^MascuUne^ from commu- 
nicating Light, which was native and ori- 
ginal, as well as from the vigourous warmth 
and efficacy of his Rays ; the Moon SsAw 
Luna) as Feminine^ from being the Recep- 



4^ HBRME8. 

tacte only of another's Light, and from 

shining with rays more delicate and soft. 

Thus Milton, 

First m HIS East the glorious Lamp was seen, 
Itegent of Day, and all tK Horizon rqund 
Invested with bright rays ; jocund to run 
Hjs longitude thro' Heaifn's high road: the gray 
Dawn, and the Pleiades before him duncd 
Shedding sweet influence. Less bright the Moon 
But opposite, in leveWd West was set, 
His mirrour, with full face borrowing her 'Light 
From HJM ; for other light she needed none: 

By Virgil they were considered as 
Brother and Sister, which still preserves 
the same distinction. 

Nee Fratris radiis obnoxia surgere Luna. 

G. I. 396. 

Th=e Sky or Ether is in Greek and 
3Latin Masculine, as being" the source of 
those showers, which impregnate the Earth. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. IV. m 

*The Earth on the contrary is univer- 
sally Feminine, from being the grand Re- 
ceiver, the grand Container, but above all 
from being the Mother (either mediately 
or immediately) of every sublunary Sub- 
stance, whether animal or vegetable. 

Thus Virgil, 

Turn Pater Omnipotens fcecundis imbribus 

jEther 
Con J vGis in gremium l^t^e desc€ndit, etomnes 
Magnus alit magna commi.vtus corpore foetus, 

G. 11. 325. 

Thus Shakespear, 

1 Common Mother, Thou 

Whose Wonib unmeasurable^ and infoiite breast 
Teems and feeds all — ^Tim. of Athens. 

So Milton, 
Whatever Earth, all-bearing Motheh, yields, 

P. L. V. 



* Senecee Nat. QuasU 111, 14. 
t riajUju^TOjO 7?}^ ^(atpg-^GrasG. Anth. p. 281. 



48 HERMES. 

So Virgil^ 

Nonjani mate^ alitTELLuSyviresgueiJiinistrat/^^ 

Mn. XL 71. 

Among artificial Substances the Ship 
(NoLvg^ Navis) is feminine^ as being so emi- 
nently a Receiver and Contai?ier of various 
things, of Men, Arms, Provisions, Goods, 
&c. Hence Sailors, speaking of their vessel, 
say always, "she rides at anchor,'' "she 
is under sail/' 

A City (TloXig, Civitas) and a Coun- 
try, (YIxTpig^ P atria) are femi?iine also, 
by being (like the Ship) Containers and 
Receivers, and farther by being as it were 
the Mothers and Nurses of their respective 
Inhabitants. 



^'^—^i6 Itf h T(^ 6\o) TTJv THS (j>v<nv, wq GHAT i^ 
MHTEPA vofilZstTiV OYPANON Se i^j HAION, itf et n 
rwvaWtjvTtJVTOisTwv wc TENQNTAS /^ IIATEPAS 
irpo(Tayoptv8<n. Arist. de Gener. Anim. I.e. 2. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. IV. 49 

Thus Virgil, 

Salve, MAGNA Parens frugum, Saturnia Tel-^ 

lus. 
Magna Virum Geor. II. 173. 

S05 in that Heroic Epigram on those 
brave Greeks^ who fell at Chceronea, 

7%aV parent Country in her boso7n holds 
Their wearied bodies, — * 

So Milton^ 

The City, which Thou seest, no other deem 
Than great and glorious Rome, Queen of the 
Earth, Par. Reg. L. IV. 

As to the Ocean, tho' from its being 
the Receiver of all Rivers, as well as the 
Container and Productress of so many 

* Demost. in Orat. de Corona. 
E 



%0 HERMES. 

Vegetables and Animals, it might justly 
have been made (like the Earth) Feminine ; 
yet its deep Voice and boisterous Nature 
have, in spite of these reasons, prevailed 
to make it Male, Indeed the very sound 
of Homer s 

IJt^iyoi crUy(^ 'UMiOLvoio^ 

would suggest to a hearer, even ignorant 

of its meaning, that the Subject was 

incompatible with female delicacy and 
softness. 

Time (Xp(?vo$) from his mighty efficacy 
upon every thing around us, is by the Greeks 
and English justly considered as Masculine, 
Thus in that elegant distich, spoken by a 
decrepit old Man, 



* Q, Xpove, TravTOuov 6vr)T.Cjv iravs^TriiTKOTre AaT/xov. 
Gr^c. Aiitb. p. 290. 

t Stob. Eel. p. 591. 



BOOK I.-CHAP. IV. .^1 

,4/^ Time hath.hent, that sorry A}iist, he 
That surely makes, whateer he hayidles, loorse. 



So too Shakespear, speaking likewise of 
Time, 

Orl. Whom doth he gallop withal? 
fips. r Wilh a, tkkf tojhe g^-llows,— 

cAs. you like it. 

The Greek QaMOLTog or Ai%g, and the 
English Death, seem from the same irre- 
sistible power to have been considered as 
Masculine. Even the vulger with us are 
so aGCUstomed to this notion, that a 
Female Death they would treat as 
ridiculous/'^^ 



'^ Well therefore did Milton in his Paradise Lost not 
only adopt Death as a Person, but consider him as Mas- 
suline: in which hq was so far from, introducing a -Phan- 
tom of his own, or from giving it a Gender not supported by 
Custom, that perhaps he had as much the Sanction of 
national Opinion for his Masculine Death, as the ancient 
Roets had for many of their Peities. 

E 2 



52 HERMES. 

Take a few examples of the masculine 
Death. 

Callimachus upon the Elegies of his 
Friend Heraditus — 



7/et thy sweet warbling strains 

Still live immortaly nor on them shallDEATH 
His hand e'er lay, tho' Ravager of all. 



In the Alcestis of Euripides, QhoLToq 
or Death is one of the Persons of the 
drama ; the beginning of the play is made 
up of dialogue between Him and Apollo ; 
and towards its end there is a fight between 
Him and Hercules, in which Hercules is 
conqueror, and rescues Alcestis from his 
hands. 

It is well known too, that Sleep and 



BOOK I.—CHAP. IV. 53 

Death are made Brothers by Homer. It 
was to this old Georgias elegantly alluded, 
when at the extremity of a long life he lay 
slumbering on his Death-bed. A Friend 
asked him, " How he did?" " Sleep (replied 
the old Man) is just upon delivering me 
over to the care of his Brother/'^ 

Thus Shakespear^ speaking of Life, 

" merely Thou art Death's Fool; 
For HIM Thou labour St by thy flight to shun^ 
And yet run'st towards him still. 

Meas. for Meas. 

So Milton, 

Dire was the tossing, deep the groans ; Despair 
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch : 
And over them triumphant Death his dart 

Shook ; but delay d to strike 

P. L. XL 489.^ 



^'^"HSrj jU£ O YIINGS ai^x^rai Tra^)aKaraTW^(jOai T 
AAEA^ai. Stob. Eel. p. 600. 

^^^ Suppose in any one ot* these examples we introduce a 
femak Death ; suppose wc read. 




# HERMES^ 

Th]^ siipteme Bfeirig (God, Qdg^ .Dens, 
Dieu, &c.)'is'ina]l hitiguug^s Masculine, irl 
afe mtich as the masculine Se^ is tlie stipe^* 
rtor and more excerient ; aiid as Hfe is the 
Greater of all, the Faithei^ of G6ds and 
Men. Sometimes indeed we meet with 
such words as ToYtpSiTOv, to^ &)^WNumeri, 
Deity (which last we English join to a 
neuter, saying t>eity itself) sometimes, I 
say, we meet with these Neuters, The 
reai^h in these instances seems to be, that 
as God is prior to all things, both in dig- 
nity and in time, this Priority is better 
characterized and exprest by a Negation, 
than by any of those Distinctions which 
are co-ordinate with some Opposite, as Male, 



And over them triumphant Death her dart 
Shook, <S*c. 

What a falling off! How are the nerves atld strength of 
the whole sentiment weakened ! 



I 



BOOK L~CHAP. IV. 55 

for example is co-ordinate with Female, 
Right with Left, &c. &c/^^ 

Virtue (Aper^^ Virtus) as well as 
most of its Species, are all Feminine, per- 
haps from their Beauty and amiable 
Appearance, which are not without effect 
even upon the most reprobate and corrupt. 



^^^Thus Ammonius, speaking on the same Subject — 
TO nPQTON Xiyo^ev l(f t{f fii) ^6 tmv dta ^vOoXoyiag 
TrapaSovrwv i7/,uv rag OeoXoyiag £roX/xi]C7£ tiq rj appevu)Trov, 
in BvXTqTTQZTrri (lege Onkv-n-Q^irri) ^LcifjLopclxjOfJLv (pEpsiv' itj 

T8TO UKOTiOQ' TL^ fxlv JCip CippeVl TO OtiXv (TV^Ol^OV' TO 

(lege TO)) dt nANTHI AOAQS AITIGI av-oixov 8civ. 
aXXa a) oTav apcraviKCog TON 0EON bvo'fiaZoiiav, [Trpo^] 

TO (TEflVOTepOV tCjV JEvioV rS V(^Uj.liv8 irpOTLfxCjVTEQ^ STWq 

avTov TTpocrayopevofxav. PiilMUM dicimus, quod nemo 
etiam eorum, qui theologiam nobis fabidarum integumentis 
ohvohitam tradiderunt, vel maris veljoeminte specie fingere 
ausus e^t : idque merito: conjugatum emm mari frmininiim 
est, Caus-E autem omnino absolute: ac simplici nihil 
est conjugatum. Immo vero cum Deum masculino genere 
appellamus, ita ipsum nominamus, genus prcestaniius suh- 
misso atque humili praferentes. — Ammon. in Lib. de 
Interpr. p. 30. b. — 8 yan IvavTiov ti^) n«wr<^> sclv. 
Aristot. Metaph. A. p, 210. Sylb. 



56 HERMES. 



-abasKd the Devil stood, 



And felt how awful Goodness is, and saw 
Virtue in her shape how lovely ; saw and pin d 

His loss 

P. L. IV. 846. 

This being allowed, Vice (^Kixm) be- 
comes Feminine of course, as being, in 
the (JvqoLXiciL^ or Co-ordination of things, 
Virtue's natural Opposite '^''^ 

The Fancies, Caprices, and fickle 
Changes of Fortune would appear but- 
awkwardly under a Character that was 
Male : but taken together they make a 



^^^ They are both represented as Females by Xenophon 
in the celebrated Story o^ Hercules, taken from Prodicus. 
see Memorab. L. II. c. 1. As to the av^oixia here 

mentioijed, thus Varro Pythagoras Samius ait omnium 

rerum initia esse hina : iit finitum et infinitum^ honum et 
malum, vitam et mortem, diem et noctem. De Ling. Lat* 
L. IV. See also Jrist. Metaph. L. 1. c. 5. and Eccle- 
siasticus, Chap. Ixii. ver. 24. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. IV. 57 

very natural Female, which has no small 
resemblance to the Coquette of a modern 
Comedy, bestowing, withdrawing and shift- 
ing her favours, as different Beaus succeed 
to her good graces. 

Trcmsmutat incertos honores^ 

Nujic 77iihi, nunc alii benigna. Hor. 

Why the Furies were made Female, 
is not so easy to explain, unless it be that 
female Passions of all kinds were consider- 
ed as susceptible of greater excess, than 
male Passions ; and that the Furies were 
to be represented, as things superlatively 
outrageous. 

Talibus Alecto diet is ejcarsit in iras. 
At Juveni or ant i subitus tremor occupat artus : 
Diriguere oculi: tot Erinnys sibilat Hydris, 
Tantaque se fades aperit : tumjlammea torquens 
Lumina cunctantem et qucerentem dicere plura 
RepiUit^ et geminos credit crinibiis angucs, 



58 HERMES. 

Yerberaque insonuit, rabidjoque hac acldidit 
En! Ego victa situ, 8^ c. 

Mii. VII. 455/^^ 



ore: 



He, that, would see more on this Subject, 
may consult Ammonius the Peripatetic, in 
his Commentary on the Treatise de Inter- 
pretatione, where the Subject is treated at 



^'^ The Words abm'e mentioned. Time, Death, Fortune, 
Virtue, ^c. in Greek, Latin, French, and most modern 
Languages, though they are diversified with Genders i^i 
the manner described, yet never vary the Gender which 
they have once acquired, except in a hw instances, where 
the Gender is doubtful. We cannot say ?j cipsr^ or 6 aper^ 
heec Virtus or hie Virtus, la Virtu or le Virtu aijd so of the 
rest. But it is otherwise in English. We in cur own 
language say, Virtue is its own reward, or Virtue is her 
own reward ; Time maintains its wonted Pace, or Time 
maintains his wonted Pace. 



There is a singular advantage in this liberty, as it en- 
ables us to mark, with a peculiar force, the Distinction 
between the severe or Logical Style, and the ornamental 
or RhetoricaL For thus when we speak of the above 



BOOK I.— CHAP. IV. 59 

large with respect to the Greek Tongue. 
We shall only observe, that as all such 



Words, and of all others naturally devoid of Sex, as 
Neuters, we speak of them as they are, and as becomes a 
logical Inquiry . Wheff ^e give them Sex, by making 
them Masculine or Feminine, they are from thenceforth 
personified ; are a kind of intelligent Beings, and become, 
as such, the proper ornaments either of Rhetoric or of 
Poetry. 

Thus Milton, 

^-^—The Thunder, 

Wing'd with red ligMning and impetuous^ rage, 

Perhaps hath spent ms shafts^ P. Lost I. 174, 

The Poet having just before called the Hail, and Thun- 
der, God's Ministers of Vengemce, an<J so personified theYn, 
had he afterwards said its Shafts for his Shafts, would have, 
destroyed his own Image, and approached withal so much 
nearer to Prose. 



Tlte foHowing Passage is frem the same Poena. 

Should intermitted Vengeance arm again 

His red right hand 

P. L. II. 174. 

In this Place Mis Hafid is clearly preferable either to 
Hers 6r It$, by immediately referring us to God himself, 
the Avfenger. 



60 HERMES. 

Speculations are at best but Conjectures, 
they should therefore be received with can- 
dour rather than scrutinized with rigour. 
Varro's words on a Subject near akin, are, 
for their aptness and elegance, well worth 
attending. Non mediocres enim tenebrcB in 



I shall only give one instance more, and quit this 
Subject. 

At his command tK up-rooted Hills retird 
Each to HIS place : thej/ heard his voice and went 
Obsequious : Heaven his wonted face renewed, 
And with fresh Jlowrets Hill and Valley smiVd. 

P. L. VI. 

See also ver. 54, 55, of the same Book. 

Here all things are personified ; the Hills hear^ the 
Valleys smile, and the Face of Heaven is renewed. — 
Suppose then the Poet had been necessitated by the laws 
of his Language to have said — Each hill retird to its 
Place — Heaven renew'' d its wonted face — how prosaic and 
lifeless would these Neuters have appeared ; how detri- 
mental to the Prosopopeia, which he was aiming to establish ! 
In this therefore he was happy, that the Language in 
which he wrote imposed no such necessity ; and he was 
too wise a Writer, to impose it on himself. It were to be 
wished, his correctors had been as wise on their parts. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. IV. 61 

silvd, uhi hcEc captanda ; neque eo, qud per- 
venire volumus, semitce tritce ; neque non in 
tramitibus qucedam objecta, quce euntem 
7'etinere possiint.^ 

To conclude this Chapter. We may 
collect from what has been said, that both 
Number and Gender appertain to 
Words, because in the first place they ap- 
pertain to Things ; that is to say, because 
Substances are Many, and have either Se.v 
or no Sex; therefore Substantives have 
Number, and are Masculine^ Feminine, or 
Neuter. There is however this difference 
between the two Attributes : Number, in 
strictness, descends no lower, than to the 
last Rank of Species 'J^^ Gender on the 



* De Ling. Lat. L. IV. 

^*^ The reason why Number goes no lower is, that it does 
not naturally appertain to Individuals : the cause of which 
see before, p, 39- 



m HERMES. 

contrary stops not here, but da^isends .to 
i'evei^y xindividualy ,l^ow,ev,^r . divjer^ified. And 

t^o.much for SuBSiTAMTIVESj PEOPEI^lJ^Y 
so CALLED. 



BQOK I.— OHi^P. V. €3 

CHAP. V. 

Concerning Substantives of the Secondary 
Order, 

tVE are now to proceed to a Secondary 
Race of Substantives, a Race qAiite 
different from any ak^ady mentioned; and 
whose Nature may be explained in the 
following manner. 

Every Object which presents itself to 
the Senses oi the Intellect, is either then 
perceived for ^aiq first time^ or else is re- 
cognized as having been perceived before* 
In the former case it is called an Object 
TViq np^T^g yvcocTf 00^, of the first knowledge 
or acquaintance ; ^""^ in the latter it is called 



<«^ See JpoIL de Syntaxi, 1. 1. c. 16. p. 49. 1. 2. c. 3. p. 
1 03. Thus Priscian — Interest ajitem inter demonstrationem 
et relationem hoc ; quod demonstration interrogationi reddita, 
Primam Cognitionem ostendit ; Quis fecit ? Ego ; rejatio 



64 HERMES. 

an Object rvig hvTSpoLg yvw(7fw$, of the second 
knowledge or acquaintance. 

Now as all Conversation passes between 
Particulars or Individuals, these will often 
happen to be reciprocally Objects TVig TTpco- 
TVfg yvco(76COij, that is to say, till that instant 
unacquainted with each other. What then 
is to be done ? How shall the Speaker ad- 
dress the other when he knows not his 
Name ? or how explain himself by his own 
Name, of which the other is wholly ignor- 
ant ? Nouns, as they have been described, 
cannot answer the purpose. The first ex- 
pedient upon this occasion seems to have 
been ^sJ^ig^ that is Pointings or Indication 
by the Finger or Hand, some traces of 
which are still to be observed, as a part of 
that Action which naturally attends our 



vero Secundam Cognitionem significat, ut, Is, dc quo jam 
dixi. Lih. XI L p. 936. Edit. Putschu. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. V. 65 

But the Authors of Language were not 
content with this. They invented a race 
of Words to supply this Pointing; which 
Words, as they always stood for Substantives 
or Noims^ were characterized bj^ the Name 
of AvTCovi^jUik/, or Pronouns/^ These also 
they distinguished into three several sorts, 
calhng them Pronouns of the First, the 
Second, and the Third Person, with a view 
to certain distinctions, which may be ex- 
plained as follows. 

Suppose the Parties conversing to be 
wholly unacquainted, neither Name nor 



(^^ 'EkcTvo 8V 'AvTiiyvvfila, to fiera AEISEQS in ava^o- 
pac 'ANTONOMAZOMENON. Apoll. de Synt. L. II. 
c. 5. p. 106. Priscian seems to consider them so pecu- 
liarly destined to the expression of Individuals^ that he 
does not say they supply the place of any Noun, hut that 
of the proper Name only. And this undoubtedly was 
their original, and still is their true and natural use. Piio- 
NOMEN est i^tars oratioms, qn^ pro nomine proprio unius- 
cuj usque accipitur. Prise. L. XII. See also Jpoll. L. 
II. c. 9. p. 117,118. 



66 HKRMES. 

Gountenance on either side known, and 
the Subject of the Conversation to be the 
Speaker himself. Here, to supply the place 
of Pointing by a Word of equal Power, 
they furnished the Speaker with the Pro- 
noun^ I. I write^ I say 9 1 desire^ ^c. and 
as the Speaker is always principal with re- 
spect to Jiis own discourse, this they called 
for that reason the Pronoun of the First 
Person. 

Again, suppose the Subject of the Con- 
versation to be the Party addrest. Here 
for similar reasons they invented the Pro- 
noun^ Thou. Thou writest^ Thou walkest^ 
Sfc. and as the Party addressed is next in 
dignity to the Speaker, or at least comes 
next with reference to the discourse ; this 
Pronoun they therefore called the Pronoun 
of the Second Person, 

Lastly, suppose the Subject of Con- 
versation neither the Speaker, nor the Party 



BOOK I.— CHAP. V. 67 

addrest, but some Third Object, different 
from both. Here they provided another 
Pronoun. He she, or it, which in distinc- 
tion to the two former was called the Pro^ 
noun of the Third Person. 

And thus it was that Pronouns came 
to be distinguished by their respective 
Persons/'^ 



^'^^ The description of the different Persons here given 
is taken from Prtscian, who took it from Apollonius, 
Persona Pronominum sunt tres; prima, secunda, tertia. 
Prima est, cum ipsa, qua loquitur, de se pronuntiat; 
Secunda, cum de ed pronunciat, ad quam directo sermone 
loquitur ; Tertia, cum de ed, quae nee loquitur, nee ad se 
directum accipit sermonem. L. XII. p. 940. Theodore 
Gaza gives the same Distinctions. Ilpwrov (irponioirov sc) 
<J TTfpt kavTs ^pa^Ei 6 \iy<i)v' dlvrepov, <j) wepi t5, tt^oc 
6v 6 Xo-yoc' Tplrov, «J> irepl trips* Gaz. Gram. L. IV. p. 
152. 

This account of Persons is far preferable to the common 
one, which makes the First the Speaker ; the Second, the 
Party addrest ; and the Third, the Subject. For though, 
the First and Second be, as commonly described, one the 

F 2 



m HERMES. 

As to Number, the Pronoun of each 
Person has it : (I) has the plural (we), be- 
cause there may be many Speakers at once 
of the same Sentiment; as well as one, 



Speaker, the other the Party addrest, yet, till they become 
subjects of the discourse, they have no existence. Again 
as to the Third Person's being the subject, this is a cha- 
racter which it shares in common with both the other 
Persons, and which can never therefore be called a peculi- 
arity of its own. To explain by an instance or two. When 
^neas begins the narrative of his adventures, the seco7id 
Person immediately appears, because he makes Dido, 
whom he addresses, the immediate subject of his Discourse. 

Infandum, Regina, jubes, renovare dolorem. 

From hence forward for 1500 V^erses (though she be all 
that time the party addrest) we hear nothing farther of 
this Second Person, a variety of other Subjects filling up 
the Narrative. 

In the mean time the First Person may be seen every 
where, because the Speaker every where is himself the 
Subject. They were indeed Events, as he says himself, 

— quceqve ipse miserrima vidi, 
Et quorum pars magna fui 

Not that the Second Person does not often occur in the 



BOOK I.—CHAP. V. 69 

wbO) including himself, speaks the Senti- 
ment of many. (Thou) has the plural 
(you), because a Speech may be spoken 
to many, as well as to one. (He) has the 
plural (they), becaase the Subject of 
discourse is often many at once. 

But tho' all these pronounshave Number, 
it does not appear either in Greek or Latin 
or any modern Language, that those of the 
first and second Person carry the distinc- 
tions of Sex. The reason seems to be, 



course of this Narrative ; but then it is always by a Figure 
of Speech, when those, who by their absence are in fact 
so many Third Persons, are converted into Second Persons 
by being introduced as present. The real Second Person 
(Dido) is never once hinted. 



Thus far as to VirgiL But when we read Euclid, we 
find neither First Person, nor Second, in any Part of the 
whole Work. The reason is, that neither Speaker nor 
Party addrest (in which light we may always view the 
Writer and his reader) can possibly become the Subject 
of pure Mathematics, nor indeed can any thing else 



70 HERMES. 

that the Speaker and Hearer being gene- 
rally present to each other, it would have 
been superfluous j to have marked a dis- 
tinction by Art, which from Nature and 
even Dress was commonly^*''' apparent 
on both sides. But this does not hold 
with respect to the third Person, of whose 
Character and Distinctions (including Sex 
among the rest) we often know no more 
than what we learn from the discourse. 
And hence it is, that in most Languages 
the third person has its Genders^ and that 
even English (which allows its Adjectives 
no Genders at all) has in this Pronoun the 
triple/^; distinction ofHe^She, and It. 



except abstract Quantity, which neither speaks itself, nor 
is spoken to by another. 

^'^^ Demonstratto ipsa secum genus ostendit. Priscian. 
L. XIL p. 912.. See ApolL de Syntax. L. II. c. 7. 
p. 109. 

^*^ The Utility of this Distinction may be better found in 
supposing it away. Suppose,^ for example, we should read 
in history these words — He caused him to destroy him — and 



BOOK I.~CHAP. V. 71 

Hence too we see the reason why a 
single Pronoun^^^ to each Person, an I to 
the First, and a Thou to the Second, are 
abundantly sufficient to all the purposes of 



that we were to be infonned the [He], which is here thrice 
repeated, stood each time for something different, that is 
to say, for a man for a Woman, and for a City, whose 
Names were Alexander, Thais, and Persepolis. Taking 
the Pronoun in this manner, divested of its genders, how 
would it appear, which was destroyed ; which was the de- 
stroyer ; and which the cause that moved to the destruc- 
tion ? But there are not such doubts, when we hear the 
Genders distinguished ; when, instead of the ambiguous 
sentence. He caused him to destroy him^ we are told with 
the proper distinctions, that she caused him to destroy it. 
Then we know with certainty, what before we could not, 
that the Promoter was the woman ; that her Instrument 
was the Hero ; and that the Subject of their Cruelty was 
the unfortunate City. 

^-^^ Qaaritur tamen cur prima quidem Persona et secun- 
da smgula Pronomina haheant, tertiam vera sex diversye 
indicent voces ? Ad quod respondendum est, quod prima 
quidem et secunda Persona ideo non egent diversis vocibus, 
quod semper praesentes inter se sunt, et demonstrative; 
tertia veio Persona modo demonstrativa est, ut. Hie, Iste; 
modo relativa, id Is, Ipse, c^c. Priscian. L. XII. p. 933. 



n HERMES. 

Speech. But it is not so with respect to 
the Thit'd Person. The various relations 
of the various Objects exhibited by this (I 
mean relations of near and distant, present 
and absent, same and different, definite and 
indefinite, &c.) made it necessary that 
here there should not be one, but many 
Pronouns, such as He, This^ TJiatj Other, 
Ani/y Some, S^c. 



It must be confest, indeed, that all 
these Words do not always appear as 
Pronouns. When they stand by them- 
selves, and represent some Noun (as Avhen 
we say. This is Virtue, or ^siKTimq^ Give 
me That), then are they Pronouns. But 
when they are associated to some Noun 
(as when we say This Habit is Virtue ; or 
^Si'/Jimq^ That Man defrauded me) then 
as they supply not the place of a Noun, 
but only serve to ascertain one, they fall 
rather into the Species of Definitives or 
Articles, That there is indeed a near re- 



BOOK I.— CHAP. V. ?3 

lation between Pronouns and Articles^ the 
old Grammarians have all acknowledged, 
and some words it has been doubtful to 
which Class to refer. The best rule to dis- 
tinguish them Is this — ^The genuine Pro- 
noun always stands by itself, assuming the 
Tower of a Noun, and supplying its place 
— ^The genuine Article /letter stands by 
itself, but appears at all times associated 
to something else, requiring a Noun for 
its support, as much as Attributes ^^^ or 
Adjectives. 



(8) j^ "ApOpov fUTCL ovonaroQy i^ v ^AvTMVVfxla avr 
ovofiaroq. The Article stands with a Noun; hut 
THE Pronoun stands for a Noun. Apoll. L. I. c. 3, 
p. 22. 'AvTci 8v TO. apBpUj r?)c irpog ra ovofxara crvvapTT}" 
crewg aTro^avra, eIq tt]v viroTETayfjiivriv avTiovvfiiav fx^ra^ 
TTLTTTtL. Now Articks thcmselves, when they quit their 
Connection with Nouns, pass into such Pronoun as is 
proper upon the occasion. Ibid. Again — "OTavTo"kpdpov 
fxri fiET ovofiarOQ TrapaXafxjddvr^TaL, 7roLi]ar]TaL §£ avvTa^Lv 
ovojuaroc >]v irpoeKTeOdiitOa, Ik Traar\g avayKrjg tig avTU)vv~ 
jiiav niTa\r}(l)Or}(T£TaL, aye 8k iyyivojuvov fi^r ovojiaTOQ 
^vvttfiu (xvtX ovojiaTog TTap{\.{]f^O)h When the Article is 



74 HERMES. 

As to the Coalescence of these Pronouns, 
it is as follows. The First or Second will, 
either of them, by themselves coalesce 



assumed without the Noun, and has {as we explained before) 
the same Syntax which the Noun hasy it must of absolute 
necessity be admitted for a Pronoun, because it appears 
without a Noun, and yet is in Power assumed for one, 
Ejusd. L. II. c. 8. p. 113. L. I. c. 45. p, 96.— /n^er 
Pronomina et Articulos hoc Interest, quod Pronomina 
ea putantur, qute, cum sola sinf, vice m nominis complent, 
ut auis, ILLE, iSTE : ArticuU vero cum Pronominibus, aut 
Nominibus, aut Participiis adjunguntur, Donat. Gram, 
p. 1753. 

Priscian, speaking of the Stoics, says as follows : Ar- 
TictJLis autem Pronomina connumer antes, finitos ea 
AUTicviuOS appellabant ; ipsos autcm Articulos, quibus 
nos caremus, infinitos A rticulos dicebant, Vel, ut alii 
dicunt, Articulos connumerabant Pronominibus, et Articu- 
LARiA eos Pronomina vocabant, <Sfc. Pris. L. I. p. 574. 
Varro, speaking of Quisque and Hie, calls them both 
Articles, the first indefinite the second definite. De Ling, 
Lat.L. PIT, See also L. IX. p. 132. Vossius, indeed, 
in his Anal6gia (L I. c. 1.) opposes this Doctrine, because 
Hic has not the same power with the Greek Article 6. 
But he did not enough attend to the antient Writers on this 



BOOK li— CHAP. V. 75 

with the Third, but not with each other. 
For example, it is good sense, as well as 
good Grammar, to say in any Language — 
I AM He — ^Thou art He — but we cannot 
say — I AM Thou — nor Thou art I. The 
reason is, there is no absurdity for the 
Speaker to be the Subject also of the Dis- 
course, as when we say, I am He ; or for 
the Person addrest ; as when we say, Thou 
art He, But for the same Person, in the 
same circumstances, to be at once the 
Speaker, and the Party addrest, this is im- 
possible ; and so therefore is the Coalescence 
of the First and Second Person. 

And now perhaps we have seen enough 
of Pronouns to perceive how they differ 



Subject, who considered all Words, as Articles, which 
being associated to Nouns {and not standing in their place) 
served in any nuDuicr to ascertain, and detcnnine their sig- 
nijication. 



76 HERMES. 

from other Substantives. The others are 
Primary^ these are their Substitutes ; a kind 
of secondary Race, which were taken 
in aid, when for reasons already ^^'^ men- 
tioned the others could not be used. It is 
moreover by means of these, and of Arti- 
cles^ which are nearly allied to them, that 



^* See -these reasons at the beginning of this chapter, of 
which reasons the principal one is, that " no Noun, pro- 
" perly so called, implies its own Presence. It is therefore 
" to ascertain such Presence, that the Pronoun is taken in 
" aid ; and, hence it is, it becomes equivalent to dilKtg, 
" that is, to Pointing or Indication bi/ the Finger ^ It is 
worth remarking in that Verse of Persius, 

Sed pulchrum est digito monstrart, et dicier^ Hi€ est. 

how the du^tg and the Pronoun are introduced together, 
and made to co-operate to the same end. 

Sometimes by virtue of du^ig the Pronoun of the third 
Person stands for the Jirst. 

Quod si multibus parces, erit Hic quoque Miles. 
That is, / also will be a Soldier, 

Tibul. L. II. EL 6. v. 7. See Vulpius, 



BOOK I.— CHAP. V. 77 

" Langu^\ge, though in itself only signi- 
'^ ficantof general Ideas, is brought down 
" to denote that infinitude of Particulars^ 
" which are for ever arising, and ceasing 
" to be/' But more of this hereafter in a 
proper place. 

As to the three orders of Pronouns 
already mentioned, they may be called 
Prepositive^ as may indeed all Substantives, 
because they are capable of introducing or 
leading a Sentence, without having refer- 
ence to any thing previous. But besides 
those there is another Pronoun (in 



It may be observed too, tbat even in Epistolary Corres- 
pondence, and indeed in all kinds of Writing, where the 
Pronouns I and You make their appearance, there is a 
sort of implied Presence^ which they are supposed to indicate 
though the parties are in fact at ever so great a distance. 
And hence the rise of that distinction in Jpollonius rag 
filv Triv 6t//€wv eivat ^d^eig, rag Se ts vs, that some Indi^ 
cations are ocular^ and some are mental. De Syntaxi, 
L. II.c. 3. p. 104. 



78 HERMES. 

Greek og, ogigi^'^ in Latiuy Qui^; in 
English^ Who, Whichy That), a Pronoun 
having a character peculiar to itself, the 
nature of which may be explained as fol- 
lows. 

Suppose I was to say — Light is a 
Body, Light moves with great celerity. 
These would apparently be two distinct 



^*' The Greeks, it must be confest, call this Pronoun 
'^iroraKTiKov apdpov, the subjunctive Article. Yet, as it 
should seem, this is but an improper appellation. ^poU 
loriius, when he compares it to the irgoraKTiKov or true 
prepositive Article, not only confesses it to differ, as being 
exprest by a different Word, and having a different place 
in every Sentence ; but in Syntax he adds, it is wholly dif. 
ferent, De Syntax. L: I. c 43. p. 91. Theodore Gaza 
acknowledges the same, and therefore adds— 60tv S19 /^ 
8 Kvpiijjg av fctij apOpov ravTi—'^-for these reasons this 
{meaning the Subjunctive) cannot properly be an Article^ 
And just before he says, Kvpiuyg ye fxr^v apOpov to Trporolc- 
riKov-'-^^^kowever, properly speaking, it is the Prepositive is 
the Article. Gram. Introd. L. IV. The Latins there- 
fore have undoubtedly done better in ranging it with th? 
Pronouns. 



BOOK I.~CHAP. V. 79 

Sentences. Suppose, instead of the Second 
Light, I were to place the prepositive 
Pronoun, it, and say — Light is a Body ; 
IT moves with great celerity— {he Sen- 
tence would still be distinct and two. But 
if I add a Connective (as for Example an 
and) saying — Light is^ a Body, and 
it moves with great celerity — I then by 
Connection make the two into one, as 
by cementing many stones I make one 
Wall. 

Now it is in the united Powers of a Con-* 
nective, and another Pronoun, that we may 
see the force and character of the Pronoun 
here treated . Thus therefore, if in the place of 
AND IT, we substitute that, or which, 
saying Light is a Body which moves with 
great celerity — the Sentence still retains its 
Unity and Perfection, and becomes if pos- 
sible more compact than before. We may 
with just reason therefore call this Pronoun 
the Subjunctive, because it cannot (like 



80 HERMES. 

the Prepositive) introduce an original Sen- 
tence, but only serves to subjoin one to some 
other ^ which is previous J''^ 

The Application of this Subjunctive 



^*^ Hence we see why the Pronoun here mentioned is 
always necessarily the Part of some complex Sentence, 
which Sentence contains, either exprest, or understood, 
two Verbs, and two Nominatives. 

Thus in that Verse of Horace. 



Qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit unquam* * 

Illenon erit liber — is one Sentence; qui metuens vivit — is 
another. Ille and Qui are the two Nominatives ; Erit and 
Vivit, the two Verbs ; and so in all other instances. 

The following passage from Jpollonius (though some- 
what corrupt in more places than one) will serve to shew 
whence the above speculations are taken. To viroTaKTLKOv 
apOpov Itti joiy/xa tdiov (j)ipeTai, (tvv^£^£]uevov Sia Tj]g ava- 
^opag T(^ TTpo/cEfjulvfj) ovofxaTL' /^ IvtevOev airXsv Xoyov 8 
Trapi'^avH Kararrjv rwv dvo pruiiarcov (rvvra^iv (Xiyw rrjv ev 
Tt^ ovofiari, i^ ttjv Iv avrtf rio apOpio) owep iraXiv Trapdirsro 
T(i} KAI (jvvdi<JiLUi). Kotvov /ulv (lege TO KAI yap koivov 
^€v) 7rap£Xa/u/3ay£ to ovojuia to tt poKd fiivov, GVfXTTXiKov ^l 



BOOK I.— CHAP. y. 81 

like the other Pronouns, is universal. It 
may be the Substitute of all kinds of Sub- 
stantives, natural, artificial, or abstract ; as 
well as general, special or particular. We 



'irspov Xoyov Travrwg kj 'irepov prifAa TrapiXafipavs, kj 
HTijjTb, nAPErENETO O rPAMMATIKOS, OS AI- 
EAESATO, ^vvafxei tov avrbv aTTorfXcT r5 (fors. tc^) O 
rPAMMATIKOS nAPEPENETO, KAI AIEx\E^ATO. 
The subjunctive Article (that is, the Pronoun here mention' 
ed) is applied to a Verb of its own, and i/et is connected 
withal to the antecedent Noun. Hence it can never serve to 
constitute a simple Sentence, bi/ reason of the Si/ntax of the 
two Verbs, I mean that which respects the Nounor Antecedent, 
and that which respects the Article or Relative. The same 
too follows as to the Conjunction, and. This Copulative, 
assumes the Antecedent Noun, which is capable of being ap- 
plied to many Subjects, and bij connecting to it a new Sen- 
tence, oftiecessity assumes a new Verb also. And hence it 
is that the Words— the Grammarian came who discoursed 
— form in pouer nearly the same sentence, as if we were 
to say — the Grammarian came and discoursed. Apoll. 
de Syntaxi, L. I. c. 43. ;;. 92. See also an ingenious 
French Treatise, called Grammaire generale et raisonnee, 
Chap. IX. 

The Latins, in their Structure of this Subjunctive, 
seem to have well represented its compound Nature of part 
Pronoun, and part Connective, in forming their qui et 

G 



82 HERMES: 

may say, the Animal^ Which, <^c. the Mari^ 
Whom 5^c. the Ship, Which, §c. Alexander y 
Who, ^c, Bucephalus, That, SfC. Virtue, 
Which, S^^c, S^^c. 

Nay, it may evexi be the Substitute of 
all the other Pronouns, and is of course 
therefore expressive of all three Persons. 
Thus we say, I who now read, hat'e near 
finished this Chapter; Thou, who now 
readest : He, who now readeth, r^c. ^'C. 

And thus is this Subjunctive truly 
a Pronoun from its Substitution, there being 
no Substantive existing, in whose place it 



auis from Q.UE and is, or (if we go with Scah'ger to the 
Greek) from KAI and 'OS, KAI and 'O. Seal, de Cans. 
Ling.Lat. c. 127. 

Homer also expresses the Force of this Subjunctive 
Pronoun or Article, by help of the Prepositive and a 
Connective^ exactly consonant to the Theory here establish- 
ed. See Iliad. A. ver. 270, 65^. N. 571. n. 54, 157, 
158. 



I 



BOOK I.— CHAP. V. 83 

may not stand. At the same time, it is 
essentially distinguished from the other 
Pronouns, by this pecuhar, that it is 
not only a Substitute^ but withal a Con- 
nective f^ 



^'^ Before we quit this Subject, it may not be improper 
to remark, that in the Greek and Latin Tongues, the two 
principal Pronouns, that is to say, the First and Second 
Person, the Ego and the 7 m, are implied in the very Form 
of the Verb itself (ypa^w 7pa(^£fC5 scribo, scribis) and are 
for that reason never exprest, unless it be to mark a Con- 
tradistinction ; such as in Virgil, 

Nos patriam fugimus ; Tu, Tityre, lentus in umbra 
Formosam resonare doces, &c. 

This, however, is true with respect only to the Casus 
rectus^ or Nominative of these Pronouns, but not with 
respect to their oblique Cases, which must always be added, 
because though we see the Ego in Amo, and the Tu in 
Jmas, we see not the Te or Me in Amat or Antant. 

Yet even these oblique Cases, appear in a different 
manner, according as they mark Contradistinction, or not. 
If they contradistinguish, then are they commonly placed 
at the beginning of the Sentence, or at least before the 
Verb, or leading Substantive. 

G 2 



84 HERMES. 

And now to conclude what we have said 
concernins; Substantives. All Substan- 
TiVEs are either Primary, or Secondary^ 



* Thus Virgil, 

Quid Thesea, magnum 

Quid memorem Alciden ? Et mi genus ah Jove summo. 



Thus Homer, 

'rum ^i\v ^Eo\ ^oUv- 



Uat^a §^ MCI \{)aaT^ <l>i\y]v iX. A. 

where the 'Yfitv and the Mot stand, as contradistinguished, 
and both have precedence of their respective Verbs, the 
'Y/iti/ even leading the whole Sentence. In other instances 
these Pronouns commonly take their place behind the Verb 
as may be seen in examples every where obvious. The 
Greek Language went farther still. When the oblique 
Case of these Pronouns happened to contradistinguish, 
they assumed a peculiar accent of their own, which gave 
them the name of op^orovsjulvaf, or Pronouns uprightly ac- 
cented. When they marked no such opposition, they not 
only took their place behind the Verb, but even gave it 
their accent, and (as it were) inclined themselves upon it. 
And hence they acquired the name of EyicXirtKaij that is. 
Leaning or Inclining Pronouns The Greeks too had in 
the first person 'E^s, 'E^oi, 'EjliI, for Contradi^tinctives, 
and M8, Moi, Mf, for Enclitics, And hence it was that 
Apollonius contended, that in the passage above quoted 
from the first Iliad, we should read iralla S' 'EMOI 



BOOK I.~CHAP. V. V 85 

that is to say, according to a Language 
more familiar and known, are either Nouns 
or PiioxouNs. The Nouns denote Sub- 
stances^ and those either Natural, Artificial^ 
or Abstract'^ They moreover denote Things 
either General or Special or Particular. 
The Pron^ouns, their Substitutes, are 
either Prepositive, or Subjunctive. The 
Prepositive is distinguished into three 
Orders called the First, the Second, and 
the Third Person* The Subjunctive 



for TTttlSa Sf MO I, on account of the Contradistinction 
which there occurs between the Grecians and Chri/ses. 
See JpoU. de Sj/ntaxi. L. I. c. 3. p. 20. L. II. c.^.p^ 
102, 103. 

This Diversity between the Contradistinctive Pronouns, 
and the Enclitic, is not unknown even to the E?tglish 
Tongue. When we say, Give me Content, the (Me J 
in this case is a perfect Enclitic. But when we say, Give 
Me Content, Give Him his thousands, the (J/e) and 
{Him) are no Enclitics, but as they stand in opposition, 
assume an Accent of their own, and so become the true 
6p0orov8jU£vai. 

* See before p. 37, 38. 



86 HERMES. 

includes the powers of all those three, 
having superadded^ as of its own, the pe- 
culiar force of a Connective, 

Having done with Substantives, 
we now proceed to Attributives. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VI. 87 



CHAP. VI. 
Coiicernmg A ttribntives. 

Attributives are aii those principal 

Words^ Ihat denote Attributes^ considered as 
Attributes, Such for example are the 
Words, Black, White, Great, Little, Wise, 
Eloquent, Writeth, Wrote, Writing, SfcJ''^ 



^"^ 111 the above list of Words are included what Gram- 
marians called Adjectives, Verbs, and Participles, in as 
much as all of them equally denote the Attributes of Sub- 
stance. Hence it is, that as they are all from their very 
nature the Predicates in a Proposition (being all predicated 
of some Subject or Substance, Snow is white, Cicero writeth 
&c.) hence I say the Appellation PHMA or Verb is em- 
ployed by Logicians in an extended Sense to denote them 
all. Thus Ammonias explaining the reason, why Aristotle 
in his Tract de Interpretatione calls XtvKog a Verb, tells us 
Traaav (jxtjvriv, KaKjjyops/Ltt i^ov o^oov £V irpoTacrii 7rof«(Tav, 
'PHMA KaXtiaOat, ihat every Sound articulate, that forms 



m HERMES. 

HowEVEK, previously to these, and to 
every other possible Attribute, whatever a 
thing may be, whether black or white, 
square or round, wise or eloquent, writing 
or thinking, it must j^rs^ of necessity exist 
before it can possibly be any thing else. 
For Existence may be considered as an 
universal Genus^ to which all things of all 
kinds are at all times to be referred. The 
Verbs therefore, which denote it, claim 
precedence of all others, as being essential 
to the very being of every Proposition, in 
which they may still be found, either 6^- 
presty or by implication ; exprest, as when 
we say y The Sun is bright ; by implication 



ihQ Predicate iii a Proposition is calkd a Veeb p. 24. Edit. 
Veil. Prisciana obseivatioii, though made on another 
occasion, is very pertinent to the present. JS^oii Declinalio 
sed proprietas excuiienda e4 signijicationis. L. II. p. 576. 

And in another phice he says non similitudo declinationis 

omnimodo conjungit vel discernit partes orationis inter se, 
sed vis ipsius significationis. L. XIII. p. 970, 



BOOK I.— CHAP. Yl. 89 

as when we say, The Sun rises, which 
means, when resolved, The Sun is rising f^ 

Till: Verbs, Is, Groweth, Becometh, Est 
Fit, U7rctp%f 5 cc;\ zssKsi, yfyvsTOLi^ are all of 
them used to express this general Genus, 
The Latins have. called them Feiba Sub- 
stantiva, Vvrbs Substantive, but the Greeks 
'Pi^fjLOLTOL ^TnapKlim^ Verbs of Existence, a 
Name more apt, as being of greater lati- 
tude, and comprehending equally as well 
Attribute, as Substance. The principal of 
those Verbs, and which we shall here par- 
ticularly consider, is the Verb, 'Eq\, Est, 
Is. 

Now all existence is e'ither absolute or 
qualified — absohite, as wlien we say, B is ; 
qualijied, as when we say, B is an Ani- 
mal ; B IS BLACK, IS KOUND, &C. 



(fc) 



See Metaphys. Aristot. L. V. c. 7. Edit. Du-Vall 



90 V HERMES. 

With respect to this difference, the 
Verb (is) can by itself express absolute Ex- 
istence^ but never the qualified^ without 
subjoining the particular Form, because 
the Forms of Existence being in number 
infinite, if the particular Form be not ex- 
prest, we cannot know which is intended. 
And hence it follows, that when (is) only 
serves to subjoin some such Form, it has 
little more force, than that of a mere As- 
sertion, It is under the same character, 
that it becomes a latent part in every other 
Verb, by expressing that Assertion, which 
is one of their Essentials. Thus, as was 
observed just before, Riseth^ means, is m- 
ing ; Writeth is writing. 

Again — As to Existence in general, 
it is either mutable oi* immutable ; mutable, 
as in the Objects of Sensation ; immutable 
as in the Objects of Intellection and Science. 
Now mutable Objects exist all in Tme, and 
admit the several Distinctions of present? 



BOOK I.—CHAP. VI. 91 

past, and future. But immutable Objects 
know no such Distinctions^ but rather stand 
opposed to all things temporary. 

And hence two different Significations 
of the substantive Verb (is) according as 
it denotes mutable^ or immutable Being. 

Foil example, if we say, This Orange is 
ripe, (is) meaneth that it ewisteth so nozs) at 
this present^ in opposition to past time, 
when it was green, and io future time when 
it will be rotten. 

But if we say, The Diameter of the 
Square is incommensurable with its side, we 
do not intend by (is) that it is incommen- 
surable now, having been formerly com- 
mensurable, or being to become so here- 
after ; on the contrary we intend that Pe?'- 
fection of Existence, to which Ti7ne and its 
Distinctions arc utterly unknown. It is 
under the same nieaninu we emplov this 



92 HER M E S. 

Verb, when we say Truth is, or, God is. 
The opposition is not of Ti?ne present to 
other Times, but of necessary Existence to 
all temporary Existence whatever J'^ And 
so much for Verbs of Existence commonly 
called Verbs Substantive, 

We are now to descend to the common 
Herd of Attributives, such as black and 
white, to write, to speak, to walk, 4'^c. among 
which when compared and opposed to each 
other, one of the most eminent distinctions 
appears to be this. Some, by being joined 
to a proper Substantive, make without 

^'^^ Cum enim dicimus, Deus est, non eum dicimus 
NUNC ESSE, sed tantum in Substantia esse, ut hac ad 
£mmutabilitatem potius substantias, quam ad tempiis aliquod 
referatur. Si autern dicimus, dies est, ad nullam diet 
substantiam pertinet, nisi tantum ad temporis constitutionem ; 
hoc enim, quod significat, tale est, tanquam si dicamus, 
NUNC est. Qtiare cum dicimus esse, ut substantiam de- 
signemus, simpliciter est addimus ; cum vero ita ut aliquid 
prasens significetur, secundum Tempus. Boeth. in Lib 
de Interpr. p. 307. See also Plat Tim. p. 37, 38. EdiL 
Serrani. 



BOOK I.-CHAP. VI. 93 

farther help a perfect assertive Sentence ; 
while the rest, though otherwise perfect, 
ure in this respect deficient. 

To explain by an example. When we 
say, Cicero eloquent^ Cicero wise, these are 
imperfect Sentences, though they denote 
a Substance and an Attribute. The reason 
is, that they want an Assertion, to shew 
that such Attribute appertains to such 
Substance. We must therefore call in the 
help of an Assertion elsewhere, an (is) or 
a (was) to complete the Sentence, saying, 
Cicero is wise, Cicero was eloquent. On 
the contrary, when we say, Cicero writeth 
Cicero walketh, in instances like these there 
is no such occasion, because the Words 
{writeth) and (walketh) imply in their 
own Form not an Attribute only, but an 
Assertion likewise. Hence it is they may 
be resolved, the one into I^- and Writing, 
the other into Is and Walking, 

Now all those Attributives, which have 



94 HERMES. 

this complex Power of denoting both an 
Attribute and an Assertion, make that 
Species of Words, which Grammarians call 
Verbs. If we resolve this complex Power 
into its distinct Parts, and take the Attri- 
bute alone without the Assertion, then have 
we Participles. All other Attributives, 
besides the two Species before, are included 
together in the general Name of Adjec- 
tives. 

And thusitis, that all Attributives 
are either Verbs, Participles, or Ad- 
jectives. 

Besides the Distinctions above men- 
tioned, there are others, which deserve 
notice. Some Attributes have their Es- 
sence in Motion ; such are to walk, to Jiy^ 
to strike^ to live. Others have it in thepn- 
vation of Motion ; such are to stop, to rest, 
to cease, to die. And lastly, others have it 
in subjects, zohich have nothing to do with 
either motion or its Privation ; such are the 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VI. 95 

Attributes of Great and Little^ White and 
Blacky Wise and Foolish, and in a word the 
several Quantities and Qualities of 'dWThings. 
Now these last are Adjectives ; those 
which denote Motions, or their Privation 
are either Verbs or Participles. 

And this Circumstance leads to a far- 
ther Distinction, which may be explained 
as follows. That all Motion is in Time, 
and therefore, wherever it exists, implies 
Time as its concomitant, is evident to all 
and requires no proving. But besides this, 
all Rest or Privation of Motion implies Time 
likewise. For how can a thing be said to 
rest or stop, by being in 07ie Place for one 
Instant only? — so too is that thing, whiqli 
moves with the greatest velocity. *f- To 
stop therefore or rest, is to be in one Place 

for more than one instant, ^hat is to say, 

■ — _ — ) . . 

t Thus Froclus in the Beginning of his Treatise con- 
cerning Motion : Up^fisv £<^t to TrpoTspov i^ v^cpov Iv ri^ 
avTi^ TOTT^j ov, i^ avTO, icf ra fiipr\. 



96 HERM E S. 

during an Extension betn^een two Instants^ 
and this of course gives us the Idea of Time. 
As therefore Motions and their Privation 
imply Timers their concomitant, so Verbs, 
which denote them, come to denote Time 
also/'^^' And hence the origin and use of 
Tenses, " which are so many different 
" forms, assigned to each Verb, to shew, 
" without altering its principal meaning, the 
" variousTiMEs in which such meaning,may 
'' exist/' Thus Scribit, Scripsit^ Scripserat^ 
and Scribet^ denote all equally the Attri- 
bute, To Write, while the diiference between 
them, is^ that they denote Writing in differ^ 
ent Times. 

^'^^ The antient Authors of Dialectic or Logic have well 
described this property. The following is part of their 

Definition of a Verb prjfia ce i^t rb TrpocKTYfjULaivov 

^(^poifov a Verb is something which signifies Time over 
AND ABOVE (for such is the force of the Proposition, 
Ilpoc ) If it should be asked, over and above what? It 
may be answered over and above its principal Signification, 
which is, to denote some moving and ener^z^m^ Attribute. 
See Aristot. de Interpret, c. 3. together with his Commen- 
tators Ammonius and Boethius. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VI. 97 

Should it be asked, whether Time itself 
may not become upon occasion the Verb's 
principal Signification ; it is answered. No. 
And this appears, because the same Time 
may be denoted by different verbs (as in 
the words writetk and speaketh^ and differ- 
ent Times by the same verb (as in the 
words, writeth and wrote), neither of 
which could happen, were Time any thing 
more than a mere Concomitant. Add to 
this, that when words denote Time, not 
collaterally, but principally, they cease 
to be verbs, and become either adjectives, 
or substantives. Of the adjective kind are 
Timely^ Yearly^ Dayly^ Hourly, SfC, of the 
substantive kind are Time, Year, Day, 
Hour, SfC, 

The most obvious division of Time is 
into Present, Past, and Future, nor is any 
language complete, whose verbs have not 
Tenses, to mark these distinctions. But 
we may go still farther. Time past and 

H 



9S HERMES. 

future are both injinitelf extended. Hence 
it is that in unwersal Time past, we uiay 
assume many particular Times past, and in 
universal Time future, many particular 
Times future, some more, some less, remote 
and corresponding to each other under 
different relations. Even present Time itself 
is not exempt from these differences, and 
as necessarily implies some degree of Eocten- 
sion, as does every given line, however 
minute. 

Here then we are to seek for the reason, 
which first introduced into language that 
variety of Tenses. It was not, it seems, 
enough to denote indefinitely (or by 
Aorists) mere Present, Past, or Future, 
but it was necessary on many occasions to 
define with more precision, what kind of 
Past, Present, or Future. And hence the 
multiplicity of Futures, Praeterits, and 
even Present Tenses, with which all lan- 
guages are ftwand to abound, and without 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VI. 99 

which it would be difficult to ascertain our 
Ideas. 

However as the knowledge of Tenses 
depends on the theory of Time, and this 
is a subject of no mean speculation, we 
shall reserve it by itself for the following 
chapter. 



u 2 



100 HERMES. 

CHAP. VIL 

Concerning Time, and Tenses. 

Time and Space have this in common, 
that they are both of them by nature things 
continuous^ and as such they both of them 
imply Extension, Thus between London 
and Salisbury there is the Extension of 
Space^ and between Yesterday and To-mor- 
row, the Extension of Time, But in this 
they differ, that all the parts of Space exist 
at once and together, while those of Time 
only exist in Transition or Successions"^ 
Hence then we may gain some Idea 
of Time, by considering it under the 



^«^See Vol. I. p. 275. Note XIII. To which we may 
add, what is said by Ammomus — ov^e yap 6 xp^^^Q oXog 
afxa {x^ti'^aTaL, aXX rj Kara jiiovov to NYN* Iv yap n^ 
yivEcrOaL i^ (jyOdpecrOai to elvai '^x^i- TiME doth not subsist 
the whole at once, but only in a single Now or Instant ; 
for it hath its Existence in becoming and in cea&ing to be. 
Amm. in Predicam. p. 82. b. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VII. 101 

notion of a transient Continuity, Hence 
also, as far as the affections and properties 
of Transition go, Time is different from 
Space ; but as to those of Extension and 
Continuity^ they perfectly coincide. 

Let us take, for example, such a part 
of Space, as a Line. In every given Line 
we may assume any where a Pointy and 
therefore in every given Line there may be 
assumed infinite Points. So in every given 
Time we may assume any where a Now or 
Instant^ and therefore in every given Time 
there may be assumed infinite Nows or 
Instants. 

Farther still — A Point is the Bound 
of every finite Line ; and a Now or In- 
stant, of every finite Time. But although 
they are Bounds, they are neither of them 
Parts, neither the Point of any Line, nor 
the Now or Instant of any Time. If this 
appear strange, we may remember, that 
the parts of any thing extended are neces- 



102 HERMES. 

sarily extended also, it being essential to 
their charaeter, that they should measure 
their Whole, But if a Foint or Now were 
extended^ each of them would contain 
within itself infinite other Points^ and iw- 
finite other Nows (for these may be assumed 
infinitely within the .minutest Extension) 
and this, it is evident, would be absurd 
and impossible. 

These assertions therefore being ad-- 
mitted, and both Points and Nows being 
taken as Bounds^ but not as Parts^^^^ it will 
follow, that in the same manner as the 



^^^ — fjiuvipov OTL eSe fnopiov to NYN ts xP^vs, w(nrep 
80* at '^lyfiat Trjg ypafifxrig' at ^£ ypajifim $vo t^^ filag 
fxopia. It is evident that A Now or Instant is no more a 
part of Time, than Points are of a Line, The parts 
indeed of one Line are two other Lines, Natur. Ausc L». 
IV. c. 17. And not long before— To ?£ NYN s nipog- 
fiirpu, Tf yap to fJLtpog, ^ avyKUcQai ^tt to o\ov Ik. tCov 
lULspwv' 6 §a XPONOS 8 ^OKU (TvyKEKrOaL k twv NYN. 
A Now is no Part of Time ; for a Part is able to measure 
its Whole, and the Whole is necessarily made up of its 
Parts; but Time doth not appear to be made up of Nows 
Ibid. c. 14. 



BOOK I.--CHAP. VIL lOS 

same Point may be the End of one Line, 
and the Beginning of another, so the same 
Now or Instant may be the End of one 
Time and the Beginning of another. Let 
us suppose, for example, the Lines, A B, 
BC. 

B 




A C 

I say that the Point B, is the End of the 

Line AB, and the Beginning of the Line 
BC. In the same manner let us suppose 
AB, BC, to represent certain Times, and 
let B be a Now or Instant. In such case 
I say that the Instant B is the End of the 
Time AB, and the Beginning of the Time 
BC. I say likewise of these two Times, 
that with respect to the Nozo or Instant^ 
which they include, the first of them is 
necessarily Past Time, as being previoiis 
to it; the other is necessarily Futuke, as 
being subsequent. As therefore every Now 



104 HERMES. 

or Instant always exists in Time, and 
without being Time, is Times Bound ; the 
Bound of Completion to the Past^ and the 
Bound of Commencement to the Future ; 
from hence we may conceive its nature or 
end, which is, to be the medium of Continuity 
between the Past and the Future, so as to 
render Time, thro' all its Parts, one Intire 
and Perfect Whole/'' 

From the above speculations, there 
follow some conclusions, which may be 
perhaps called paradoxes, till they have 
been attentively considered. In the first 
place there cannot (strictly speaking be antf 

'''^ To ^l NYN I'^L (Tvvi\Ha ^p6vs,io(T7rEp £Xa)(Ori. 
(TVvixH yap rbv xpovov, tov TrapaXOovra i^ tdOjUfvov, i^ 
oXwg Tripag xpovs I'^iv' eVt yap rs julIv apx^> "^^ ^^ reXevrt]. 
A Now or Instant is (as was said before J the Continuity/ 
or holding together of Time ; for it makes Time continuous, 
the past and the future, and is in general its boundarj/, as 
being the beginning of one Time and the ending of another. 
Natur. Auscult. L. IV. c. 19. ^wax^ta in this place 
means not Continuity/, as standing for Extension , but rather 
that Junction or Holding together, by which Extension is 
imparted to other things. 



BOOK I.-CHAP. VII. 105 

mch thing as Time present. Forif all Time be 
transient as well as continuous^ it cannot like 
a Line be present all together, but part will 
necessarily be gone, and part be coming.. 
If therefore any portion of its continuity 
were to be present at once^ it would so far 
quit its transient nature, and be Time no 
longer. But if no portion of its continuity 
can be thus present, how can Ti?7ie possibly 
be present^ to which such Continuity is 
essential? 

Farther than this — If there be no such 
thing as Ti?ne Present^ there can be no 
Sensation of Time by any one of the'senses. 
For ALL Sensation is of the ^Present only^ 
the Past being preserved not by Sense but by 
Memory^ and the Future being anticipated 
by Prudence only and wise Foresight. 



* "VavTij yap {aicrOiiaBL sc.) ovte to ficAAov, ovra to 
yiyvofx^vov yvtvptZofxev, aWa to Trapov fiovov. Apig. 

TTEpX MvYJfJL. A. a. 



loo HERMES. 

But if wo Portion of Time be the ob- 
ject of any Sensatio7i ; farther, if the Pre- 
sent never exist; if the Past be no more^ 
if the Future be not as yet ; and if these 
are all the parts, out of which Time is 
compounded : how strange and shadowy 
a Being do we find it ? How nearly ap- 
proaching to a perfect Non-entity /'^^ Let 
us try however, since the senses fail us, if 
we have not faculties of higher power, to 
seize this fleeting Being. 



^*^"Ori fxlv 8V 6\(i)g 8k cVtv, rj jJLoyig i^ ajiwdpiog, Ik twv 
^i rig av virOTTTEVGHC to julIv yap avTs yiyove^ itf sic eVi* 
TO 8e jxiXku, i^ STTO l<^iv' Ik §£ tstwv itf 6 airHpog i^ 6 atl 
Xajuj^avofievog ^ovog avyKHTaC to (S' Ik fuirj ovrwv 
avyKdjxsvov, advvaTov av So^ae KaTSXEiv Trort scnag. 
That therefore Time exists not at all^ or at least has but 
a faint and obscure existence^ one may suspect from hence : 
A part of it has been, and is no more ; a part of it is coming 
and is not as y>et ; and out of these is made thai infinite 
Time, which is ever to be assumed still farther and farther. 
Now that which is made up of nothing but Non-entities, if 
should seem was impossible evsr to participate of JEntity. 
Natural. Ausc. L. IV. c. 14, See also Philop. M. S. 
Com. in Nicomach. p. 10. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VII. 107 

The World has been likened to a variety 
of Things, but it appears to resemble no 
one more, than some moving spectacle 
(such as a procession or a triumph) that 
abounds in every part with splendid 
objects, some of which are still departing, 
as fast as others make their appearance, 
llie Senses look on, while the sight passes, 
perceiving as much as is immediately present, 
which they report with tolerable accuracy 
to the Soul's superior powers. Having done 
this, they have done their duty, being con- 
cerned with nothing, save what is present 
and instantaneous. But to the Memory, to 
the Imagination, and above all to the Intel- 
lect, the several Nowsov Instants are notlost, 
as to the Senses, but are preserved and made 
objects of steady comprehension, however 
in their own nature they may be transitory 
and passing. " Now it is from contemplat- 
'^ ing two or more of these Instants under 
" one view, together with that Interval of 
" Continuity, which subsists between theui 



108 HERMES. 

'! that we acquire insensibly the Idea of 
" Time/''''^ For exaniple The Sun rises; 



^"^ Tore 0a^tfv yeyovivai \p6vov, orav rs Trporlps i^ 
tf^ips Iv T^ Kivi](ju aiaOrjariv Xaj3wjU£V. 'OptZofxev ^e rt^ 
aXXo ^ aWo vTToXajddv avra, i^ jneTa^v tl avrojv erepov' 
oTav yap ra aKpa erepa rS fliers voriaMfX^v, itf ovo bltt^ ri 

xfjVXn TO. NYN, TO filv TrpOTEpOV, TO §£ V'^epOV, TOTE i^ 

T8TO ^aju£v elvat XPONON. It is then we sai/ there has 
been Time, when we can acquire a Sensation of prior and 
subsequent in Motion. But we distinguish and settle these 
two, by considering one first, then the other, together with 
an interval between them different from both. For as often 
as we conceive the Extremes to be different from the Mean, 
and the Soul talks of two Nows, one prior and the other sub- 
sequent, then it is we sai/ there is Time, and this it is we call 
Time. Natural. Auscult. L. IV. c. 16. ThemistiussCom- 
mentupon this passage is to the same purpose. '^Orav yap 6 
vsg avap.vr}aOHQ ts NYN, oX^^C^^ttev fVcjOov irdXiv tiTrri to 
Ty]fjLepov yTOTe i^ xpovov tvdvg Ivevoriaev, v7fo tCjv dvo NYN 
opiZoiuevov, olov vtto iTEpaTtJv ^voTv itf stm \iyeiv e\ei, 
OTi TTOdOve'^L TrevTeKaideKa iopCjv, rj kKKai^SKa, oXov £? cnrdps 
ypafipJUig 7rr}\vaLav dvo (jy]jxuoLg aTroTepvopsvog. For when 
the Mind, remembering the Now, which it talked of yesterday, 
talks again of another Now to-day, then it is it immedi- 
ately has an idea of Time, terminated by these two Nows, 
as by two Boundaries ; and thus is it enabled to say, that 
the Quantity is of fifteen, or of sixteen hours ^ as if it were 
to sever a Cubitus length from an infinite Line by two 
Points, Themist. Op. Edit. Aldi. p, 45. b. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VII. 109 

this I remember ; it rises again ; this too I 
remember. These Events are not together ; 
there is an Extension between them — not 
however of Space, for we may suppose the 
place of rising the same, or at least to ex- 
hibit no sensible difference. Yet still we 
recognize some Extension between them. 
Now what is this Extension, but a natural 
Day? And what is that, but pure Time? 
It is after the same manner, by recognizing 
two new Moons, and the Extension between 
these : two vernal Equinoxes, and the Ex- 
tension between these ; that we gain Ideas 
of other Times, such as Months and Years, 
which are all so many Intervals, described 
as above; that is to S3.y, passiiig Intervals 
of Continuity between two Instants viewed 
together. 

And thus it is, the Mind acquires the 
Idea of Time. But this Time it must be 
remembered is Past Time only, which 
is always i\\e first Species that occurs to 
the human intellect. How then do we 



110 HERMES. 

acquire the Idea of Time Future? The 
answer is, we acquire it hy Anticipation. 
Should it be demanded still farther. And 
what is Anticipation ? We answer, that in 
this case it is a kind of reasoning by analogy 
from similar to similar ; from successions 
of events, that are past already, to similar 
successions, that are presumed hereafter- 
IW example : I observe as far back as my 
memory can carry me, how every day has 
been succeeded by a night ; that night by 
another day ; that day by another night ; 
and so downwards in order to the Day that 
is now. Hence then I anticipate a similar* 
succession from the present Day, and thus 
gain the Idea of days and nights in futurity. 
After the same manner, by attending to 
the periodical returns of New and Full 
Moons ; of Springs, Summers, Autumns 
and Winters, all of which in Time past I 
find never to have failed, I anticipate a like 
orderly and diversified succession^ which 
makes Months, and Seasons, and Years, 
in Time future. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VII. Ill 

We go farther than this, and not only 
thus anticipate in these natural Periods? 
but even in matters of human and civil con- 
cern. For example : Having observed in 
many past instances how health had suc- 
ceeded to exercise, and sickness to sloth ; 
Yie anticipate /^^^^^re health to those, who, 
being now sickly use exercise ; and future 
sickness to those, who, being now healthy, 
are slothful. It is a variety of such obser- 
vations, all respecting one subject, which 
when systematized by just reasoning and 
made habitual by due practice, form 
the character of a Master-Artist, or Man 
of practical Wisdom. If they respect the 
human body (as above) they form the Phy- 
sician ; if matters military, the General ; 
if matters national, the Statesman; if 
matters of private life, the Moralist ; and 
the same in other subjects. All these several 
characters in their respective ways may be 
said to possess a kind of prophetic discern- 
mejTt, which not o«ly presents them the 



112 HERMES. 

barren prospect of futurity (a prospect not 
hid from the meanest of men) but shews 
withal those events, which are hkely to at- 
tend it, and thus enables them to act with 
superiorcertainty and rectitude. And hence 
it is, that (if we except those, who have had 
diviner assistances) we may justly say, as 
was said of old, 

He's the best Prophet ivho conjectures wellS-^ 
— s ■ I ■ > . ■ I I ■ 

So Milton. 

Till old Experience do attain 
To something like Prophetic Strain. 
Pt facile existimari potest, Prudentiam esse quodammodo 
Divinationem, Corn. Nep. in Vit. Attici. 

There is nothing appears so clearly an object of the mind 
or Intellect only, as the Future does, since we can 
find no place for its existence any where else. Not but the 
same, if we consider, is equally true of the Past, For tho' 
it may have once had another kind of being, when (accord- 
ing to common Phrase) it actualh/ was, yet was it then 
something Present, and not something Past. As Past, it 
has no existence but in the Mind or Memory, since had 
it in fact any other, it could not properly be called Past. 
It was this intimate connection between Time, and the 
Soul, that made some Philosophers doubt, whether if there 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VII. 115 

From what has been reasoned it appears 
that knowledge of the Future comes from 
knowledge of the Fast ; as does knowledge 
of the Fast from knowledge of the Fresent^ 
so that their Order to us is that of Present 
Past, and Future. 

Of these Species of knowledge, that of 
the Fresent is the lowest, not only ^^ first 
in perception, but as far the more extensive, 
being necessarily common to all animal 
Beings, and reaching even to Zoophytes, 
as far as they possess Sensation. Knowledge 
of the Fast comes next, which is superior 



was no Soul, there could be any Time, since Time appears 
to have its Being in no other region. ITortpov §£ fxri scrrtg 
^pv^rjg £i?j av 6 xpovog, dirofiriGEiev av rig, k. t. A. Natur. 
Auscult. L. IV. c. 20. Themistiusy who comments the 
above passage, expresses himself more positively. Et tolvvv 
CL^iog XiyeruL tote dpiOfJiriTov itf to d^SfiHji^vov, to fxlv 
TO apSixr)Tov ^r\ka^ri ^vvd[XH, to Se IvE/oyEi^, TavTa ^l sk 
av vTTO'^dir], fxrj ovTog th aQSimaovToq fir\TE ^vvufiu fiyTE 
lv£pyH(^i, (pavepov wg ovk av 6 xpovog ctrj, fxrj '^arjg ipv^rig , 
Them. p. 48. Edit. Aldi. Vid. etiam ejusd. Comm. in Lib. 
de An. p. 94. 



114 HERMES. 

to the former^ as being confined to those 
animals, that have Memory as well as Senses. 
Knowledge of the Future comes last, as 
being derived from the other two, and which 
is for that reason the most excellent as well 
as the most rare^ since Nature in her super- 
additions rises from worse always to better, 
and is never found to sink from better 
down to worse.* 

And now having seen how we acquire 
the knowledge of Time past, and Time 
future ; which is first in perception, which 
first in dignity ; which more common, which 
more rare ; let us compare them both to 
the present Now or Instant, and examine 
what relations they maintain towards it. 

In the first place there may be Times 
both past and future, in which the- present 
Now has no existence, as for example in 
Yesterday, and To-morrow, 

* See below, note (r) of this chapter. 



BOOK I.--CHAP. VII. 115 

Again, the present Now may so far be- 
long to Time of either sort, as to be the 
End of the past, and the Beginning of the 
future ; but it cannot be included within 
the limits of either. For if it were possible 
let us suppose C \he present Now included 



B C D E 



within the limits of the past Time AD. In 
such case CD, part of the past Time AD, 
will be subsequent to C the present Now, 
and so of course be future. But by the 
Hypothesis it is pasty and so will be both 
Past and Future at once, which is absurd. 
In the same manner we prove that C cannot 
be included within the limits of a future 
Time^ such as BE. 

What then shall we say of such Times, 
as this Day, this Month, this Year, this 

I 2 



116 HERMES. 

Century, all which include within them the 
present Now? They cannot he past Times 
ov future, from what has been proved ; and 
present Time has no existence, as has been 
proved likewise * Or shall we allow them 
to be present, /rom the present Now, which 
exists between them ; so that from the pre- 
sence of that we call these also present, 
tho' the shortest among them has infinite 
parts always absent ? If so, and in con- 
formity to custom we allow such Times 
present, as present Days, Months, Years, 
and Centuries, each must of necessity be 
a compound erf the Past and of the Future, 
divided from each other by some present 
JSTow or Instant, and jointly called Vkb^ 
SENT, Z(2;Az7e that Now remains within them. 
Let us suppose for example the Time XY> 
which 

X A B C D E Y 

/ g 

^' Sup. p. 104. 



BOOK I.—CHAP. VII. 117 

let us call a Day, or a Century ; and let 
the present Now or Instant exist at A. I 
say, in as much as A exists within XY, 
that therefore XA is Time past, and AY 
Time future, and the whole XA,AY, Time 
present. The same holds if we suppose 
the present Now to exist at B, or C, or D, 
or E, or any where before Y. When the 
present Now exists at Y, then is the 
whole X Y Time past, and . still more so 
when the Now gets to g, or onwards. In 
like manner before the Present Now en- 
tered X, as for example when it was at /, 
then was the whole XY Time future ; it 
was the same, when the present Now was 
at X. When it had past that, then XY 
became Time present. And thus it is, that 
Time is Present, while passing, in its 
PRESENT Now or Instant. It is the 
same indeed here, as it is in Space. A 
Sphere passing over a Plane, and being 
for that reason present to it, is only present 
to that Plane in a single Point at once 



118 HERMES. 

while during the whole progression its parts 

absent are inJimteJ^^ 

From what has been said, we may per- 
ceive that ALT. TiMB, of every denomination 



^^^ Place, according to the antients, was either medi- 
ate or immediate. I am (for example) in Europe^ because 
I am in England ; in England, because in Wiltshire ; 
in Wiltshire, because in Salisbury ; in Salisbury, because 
in my own house ; in my own house, because in my study. 
Thus far Mediate Place. And what is my immediate 
Place ? It is the internal Bound of that containing Body 
(whatever it be) which co-incides with the external Bound 
of my own Body* TS Trepiixovrog iripag, KaO^ o irepiexH 
TO TTEpiexofJi^^ov. Now as this immediate Place is included 
within the limits of all the former Places, it is from this 
relation that those mediate Places also are called each of 
them my Place, tho' the least among them so far exceed my 
magnitude. To apply this to Time. The Present Cen- 
tury is present in the present Year; that, in the present 
Month ; that, in the present Day ; that, ii^? the present 
Hour ; that, in the present Minute. It is thus by circum- 
scription within circumscription that we arrive at that 
KEAL and indivisible Instant which by being itself the 
very Essence of the Present, diffuses Presence through- 
out all even the largest of Times, which are found to in- 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VII. 119 

is divisible and extended. But if so, then 
whenever we suppose a definite Time^ even 
though it be a Time present, it must needs 
have a Beginning, a Middle and an End- 
And so much for Time. 

Now from the above doctrine of Time, 
we propose by way of Hypothesis the fol- 
lowing Theory of Tenses. 

The Tenses are used to mark Present, 
Past, and Future Time, either indefinitely 
without reference to any Beginning, Middle, 



dude it within their respective limits. Nicephorits Blemmides 
speaks much to the same purpose. 'Eve^wc «v xgovog 
I'^Xv 6 £0* iKCLTepa irapaKdixEvog rt^ Kvgiwg NYN* ^povoc 
fiipLKoq, Ik irapsXriXvOoTog ^ fiiXXovTog <Tvv€'^<jjg, i^ cia 
Tr]v TTpog TO KvpLwg NYN yciTviaaiv, NYN Xeyo/jievog i^ 
avTog, Present Time therefore is that which adjoins 
to the REAL Now or Instant on either side, being a 
limited Time made up of Past and Future, and from its 
vicinity to that real Now said to be Now also itself 
'ETTtr. (pvmKrig Ke(j>» &. See also Arist. Physic. L. VI. 
c. 2, 3, &c. 



120 HERMES. 

or End ; or else definitely^ in reference to 

such distinctions. 

If indefinitely, then have we three 
Tenses, an Aorist of the Present, an 
Aorist of the Past, and an Aorist of the 
Future. If definitely, then have we three 
Tenses to mark the Beginnings of these 
three Times ; three to denote their Middles; 
and three to denote their Ends; in all 
Nine. 

The three first of these Tenses we call 
the Inceptive Present, the Inceptive Past, 
and the Inceptive Future. The three 
next, the Middle Present, the Middle 
Past, and the Middle Future. And the 
three last, the Completive Present, the 
Completive Past, and the Completive 
Future. 

And thus it is, that the Tenses in their 
natural number appear to be twelve ; 



BOOK L— CHAP. VII. 121 

three to denote Time absolute^ and nine 
to denote it under its respective distinc- 
tions, 

Aorist of the Present. 
Tpi(p(j^^ Scribo. I write. 

Aorist of the Past. 
"Eypot-v^ot. Scripsi. I wrote. 
Aorist of the Future. 
rpa-vj/co. Scribam. I shall write. 

Inceptive Present. 
M^AAco ypGL(p6iv. Scripturus sum. I am 
going to write. 

Middle or Extended Present. 
Tuy%avco ypixcpcov. Scribo or Scribens sum 
I am writing. 

Completive Present. 
TeypxCpx. Scripsi. I have written. 

Inceptive Past. 
"EjOtfAAov ypoL(psiv. Scripturus eram. I 
was beginning to write. 



12g HERMES. 

Middle or extended Past: 
EypaCpo^ or ^Tiy%avov ypoL(poov, Scribebam. 
I was writing. 

Completive Past. 

'EytypdcpSDf. Scripseram. I had done 
writing. 

Inceptive Future. 
MsKXvicCf^ ypoi(pSi]f. Scripturus ero. 1 
shall be beginning to write. 

Middle or extended Future. 

"EaoiJLOLi ypdc^oov. Scribens ero, I shall 
be writing. 

Completive Future. 
^EtTOfjiOLi ysypoL(pddg, Scripsero. I shall 
have done writing. 

It is not to be expected that the above 
Hypothesis should be justified through all 
instances in every language. It fares with 



BOOK I.-^CHAP. VII. Ute 

Tenses, as with other affections of speech ; 
be the Language upon the whole ever so 
perfect, much must be left, in defiance of 
all analogy, to the harsh laws of mere 
authority and chance. 

It may not however be improper to 
inquire, what traces may be discovered 
in favour of this system, either in lan- 
guages themselves, or in those authors who 
have written upon this part of Grammar, 
or lastly, in the nature and reason of 
things. 

In the first place as to Aorists. Aorists 
are usually by Grammarians referred to the 
Past : such are viXkv, I went ; eTtsaov^ I fell 
cf-c. We seldom hear of them in the 
Future, and more rarely still in the Present. 
Yet it seems agreeable to reason, that 
wherever Time is signified without a/ny far- 
ther circumscription, than that of Simple 



124 HERMES. 

present, past or future^ the Tense is an 

AORIST. 



Thus Milton. 

Millions of spiritual creatures walk the earth 
Unseen^ both when we wake, and when we sleep. 

P. L. IV. 277. 

Here the verb (walk) means not that they 
were walking at that instant only^ when 
Adam spoke, but oLopic;(;:ig indefinitely, take 
any instant whatever. So when the same 
author calls Hypocrisy, 

the only Evil, that walks 

Livisible, concept to God alone, 

the Verb (walks) hath the like aoristical 
or indefinite application. The same may 
be said in general of all Sentences of the 
Gnomologic kind, such as 

Ad poenitendum proIperat, cito quijudicat, 
Avarus, nisi cum moritur, nil recte facit, ^c. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VII. 125 

All these Tenses are so many Aorists 

OF THE PRESENT. 

Gnomologic Sentences after the same 
manner make likewise Aorists of the 
Future. 

Tu nihil admittes in te, formidine pcence 

Hor. 

So too Legislative Sentences, Thou shalt 
not kill, Thou shalt not steal, <^c. for this 
means no one particular future Time, but 
is a prohibition extended indefinitely to 
every part of Time future.''''^ 



^*^ The Latin Tongue, appears to be more than ordina- 
rily deficient, as to the article of Aorists. It has no pecu- 
liar form even for an Aorist of the Past, and therefore (as 
Priscian tells us) the Prateritum is forced to do the double 
duty both of that Aorist, and of the perfect Present, its 
application in particular instances being to be gathered 
from the Context. Thus it is that feci means (as the 
same author informs us) both TTfTroirjKa and lnoir}aa, I have 



Ig6 HERMES. 

We pass from Aori&ts^ to tjhe incep- 
tive TENSES. 

These may be found in part supplied 
(like many other Tenses) by verbs auxiliar, 
MEAAQ ypoi(p6iv^ Scripturus sum. I am 
GOING to write. But the Latins go farther, 
and have a species of Verbs, derived from 
others, which do the duty of these Tenses 
and are themselves for that reason called 
Inchoatives or Incepfives. Thus from Ca- 
/eo, I am warm, comes Calesco, I begin to 
grow warm ; from Tumeo, I swell, comes 
Tumesco, I begin to swell. These Inchoa- 
tive Verbs are so peculiarly appropriated 
to the Beginnings of Time, that they are 
defective as to all Tenses, which denote it 
in its Completion, and therefore have nei- 
ther Perfectum, Plusquam-perfectum, or Per- 



done ity and / did it ; vidi both cwpaica and h^ov I have 
just seen it, and / saw it once. Prise. Gmm. L. VIII. 
p. 814, 838, Edit. Putsch. 



BOOK I.--.CHAP. VII. 127 

feet Future, There is likewise a species 
of Verbs called in Greek 'E(pS7imy in 
Latin Desiderativa, the Desideratives or 
Meditatives, which if they are not strictly 
Inceptives^ yet both in Greek and Latin 
have a near affinity with them. Such are 
7roK€iJU/i(7SL(/), Bellaturio I have a desire to 
make war ; fipc^aeicc^ Esurio, I long to eatf^ 
And so much for the Inceptive Tenses. 

The two last orders of Tenses which 
remain, are those we called*^*^ the Mid- 
dle Tenses (which express Time as ex- 



^'^ As all Beginnings have reference to what is future, 
hence we see how properly these Verbs are formed, the 
Greek ones from a future Verb, the Latin from a future 
Participle. From ttoXeiiiicfo and f^paxTtj come Tro\iixr]auix) 
and (5p(iJ(Tdoj ; from Bellaturus and Esurus come Bellatu- 
rio and Esurio, See Macrobius, p. 691. Ed. Var. s wavv 
yi fXE vvv St) TEAASEIONTA iTrotr^crac yeXacrai. Plato 
in Phaedone. 

^*^ Care must be taken not to confound these middle 
Tenses with the Tenses of those Verbs, which bear the same 
name amon^ Grammarians. 



1S8 HERMES. 

tended Siud passing) and the Perfect or 
Completive, which express its Complex 
Hon or End, 

Now for these the authorities are many. 
They have been acknowledged already 
in the ingenious Accidence of Mr. Hoadly^ 
and explained and confirmed by Dr. 
Samuel Clarke^ in his rational edition of 
Homers Iliad, Nay, long before either of 
these we find the same scheme in Scaliger 
and by him'^^'' ascribed to 'fGrocinus, as its 



^^^Ex his perctpimus Grocinum acute admodum Tempora 
divisisse, sed minus commode. Tria enim constituit, ut nos, 
sed qua bifariam secat, Perfectum, et Imperfectum : sic, 
Prateritum imperfectum, Amabam : Preeteritum perfectum 
Amaveram. Rede sane. Et Prasens imperfectum, Amo. 
Recte hactenus ; continuat enim amorem, neque absolvit. At 
Praesens perfectum, Amavi : quis hoc dicat? — De Futuro 
autem ut non male sentit, ita controversum est. Futurum, 
inquit, imperfectum, Amabo : Perfectum, Araavero. Non 
male, inquam : significat enim Amavero, amorem futurum 
et ahsoluium iri : Amabo perfectlonem nullam indicat. De 
Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 113. 

"I* His name was William Grocin, an Englishman, con- 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VII. 1^9 

author. The learned Gaza (who was him- 
self a Greeks and one of the ablest restor- 
ers of that language in the western world) 
characterizes the Tenses in nearly the same 
manner.'^'"^ What A poUonius hints, is exactly 
consonant/"^ Priscian^ too, advances the 

temporary with jEra*mM5, and celebrated for his learning. 
He went to Florence to study under Landm, and was 
Professor at Oxford, Spec. Lit. Flor. p, 205. 

(m) rpjjg Present Tense (as this author informs us in 
his excellent Grammar) denotes rb hvs'^aiuLevov i^ dreXlg 
that which is now Instant and incomplete ; the Perfectum 
TO TrapiXriXvOoQ aprt, i^ IvreXeg ts £V£<5'wroc, that which fs 
now immediately past, and is the Completion of the Present ; 
THE Imperfect UM, to irapaT£Taiuiho\> itf areXlc ts 
TTagi^Xr\fxiv8, the extended and incomplete part of the Past; 
and the Plusquam-perfectum, to wap^XriXvObg iraXai, 
^ IvTeXlg T8 TrapaKU}dv8, that which is past long ago, and 
is the completion of the prateritum. Gram. L. IV. 

^"^ 'EvrtvOtv Se irtSo^tQa, otl s Trapif)\rifxiv8 rrvvTiXeiav 
<yr\fiaLvu 6 iraQaKHfi^vog, Tr\v je firjv Ive'stjcrav — Hence we 
are persuaded that the Perfectum doth not signify the com- 
pletion of the Past, but present Completion. Apollon. 
L. III. c. 6. The Reason, which persuaded him to this 
opinion, was the application and use of the Particle av, of 
which he was then treating, and which, as it denoted 
Potentiality or Contingence, would assort (he says) with 
any of the passing, extended, and incomplete Tenses, but 

K 



ISO HERMES. 

same doctrine from the Stoics, whose 
authority we esteem greater than all the 
rest, not only from the more early age 
when they lived, but fi'om their superior 
skill in Philosophy, and their peculiar 
attachment to Dialectic, which naturally 
led them to great accuracy in these Gram^ 
matical Speculations.' 



(0) 



never with this Pervectum, because this implied such a 
complete 'dindi indefeasible existence, as never to be qualified 
into the nature of a Contingent. 

^"^ By these Philosophers the vulgar present Tense was 
called THE Imperfect Present, and the vulgar Pra- 
terituMy THE Perfect Present, than which nothing can 
be more consonant to the system that we favour. But let 
us hear Priscian, from whom we learn these facts — Pr^e- 
Sens tempus proprie dicitur, cujus pars jam praeteriit, 
par^fiitura est. Cum enim Tempus, Jiuvii more, instahili 
volvatur cursu, vix punctum habere potest in prcesenti, hoc 
est, in instanti. Maxima igitur pars ejus (sicut dictum est) 
velprateriit velfuturaest. Unde STOicijwre hoc tem- 
pus PRiESENs etiam imperfectfm vocabant (^ut dictum^ 
est) eo quod prior ejus pars, qua prueteriit, transacta est , 
deest autem sequent, id est, futura. Ut si in medio versu 
dicam scribo versum, priore ejus parte script a ; cut adhuc 
deest extrema pars, prasenti utor verbo, dicenda, scribo 
versum : sed imperfkctum est, quod deest adhuc versui^ 
quod scnbatur -Ex eodem igitur Prasenti nasciiur etiam 



BOOK I.-^CHAP. VII. 131 

Before we conclude, we shall add a 
few miscellaneous observations, which will 
be more easily intelligible from the hypo- 
thesis here advanced, and serve withal to 
confirm its truth. 

And first, the Latins used their Pr<^^6r- 
itum Perfectum in some instances after a 
very peculiar manner, so as to imply the 
very reverse of the verb in its natural sig- 
nification. Thus, VixiT, signified, is 
DEAD ; FuiT, signified, now is not, is 
NO MORE. It was in this sense that Cicero 
addressed the people of Rome^ when he 
had put to death the leaders in the Catali- 
narian Conspiracy. He appeared in the 

Perfectum. Si enim adjinem pervemat inceptum, statim 
utimur PK^TERiTO PERFECTO ; coTitinuo enim, scripto ad 
Jinem versu, dico, scrips! versum. — And soon after speaking 

of the Latin Perfectum, he says sciendum tamen, quod 

Romani Pr.eterito Perfecto no n solum in re modo 
comp/eta utuntur, fin quo vim habet ejus, qui apud Gracos 
irapaKEif^iBvog vacatur, quern Stoici TEAEION ENES- 
TQiTA nominaverunt J sed etiam pro 'AoptVs accipitur, <^c. 
Lib. VIII. p. 812, 813, 814. 

K 2 



132 HERMES. 

Fotum, and cried out with a loud voice, 
*VixERUNT. — So Virgil, 

"t FuiMus Troes, Fu IT Ilium et ingens 

Gloria Dm^danidum--—^ Mu, II. 

And again, 

-Locus Ardea quondam 



* So among the Romans, when in a Cause all the Plead- 
ers had spoken, the Cryer used to proclaim Dixebunt, i. e, 
they have done speaking, Aseon. Paed. in Verr. II. 

f So Tihullus speaking of certain Prodigies and evil 
Omens. 

HeEc fuerint oUm, Sed tu, Jam mitts, Apollo, 
Prodigia indomitis merge sub aquoribus* 

Eleg. II. 5. ver. 19. 
Let these events have been in days of old; — by Implica- 
tion therefore — But hencefobth let them be no more. 

So ^neas in Virgil prays to Phoebus. 

Hac Trojana tenus £\ieiit fort una secuta. 
Let Trojan Fortune (that is, adverse, like that of Troy, 
and its inhabitants) have so far followed us. By im- 
plication therefore, but let it follow us no farther. Here let 
it end, Hie sit Finis, as Servius well observes in the place* 

In which instances, by the way, mark not only the 
force of the Tense, but of the Mood, the Pbecative or 
Imperative, not in the Future but in the Past. Seep. 
154,155,156. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VII. 133 

Dictus avis, et nunc magnum manet Ardea 

nomen, 
^ Sedfortuna fuit — Ma. VII, 

The reason of these significations is 

derived from the Completive Power 

of the Tense here mentioned. We see 

that t^e periods of Nature, and of human 

affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal 

succession of Contraries. It is thus with 

Calm and Tempest; with Day and Night; 

with Prosperity and Adversity : with 

Glory and Ignominy ; with Life and 

Death. Hence, then, in the instances 

above, the completion of one contrary is 

put for the commencement of the other, and 

to say, HATH LIVED, or HATH BEEN, has 

the same meaning with, is dead, or, is 

NO MORE. 



' * Cerius in hospitihus non est amor ; errat, ut ipsi : 
Cumque nihil speres Jirmius esse, fuit. 

Epist. Ovid. Helen. Paridi. ver. 190. 
Sive erimusy seu nos Fata fuisse voknt. 

TibuU. III. 5. 32. 



IS4 HERMES. 

It is remarkable in * Virgil that he 
frequently joins in the same sentence this 
complete and perfect Present with the ea:- 
tended and passing Present ; which proves 
that he considered the two, as belonging 
to the same species of Time, and therefore 
naturally formed to co-incide with each 
other. 

-Tibijam brachia contrahit ardens 



Scorpius, et ccelijustd plus parte reliquit. 

G. I. 
Terra tremit; ingere ferce — G.I. 

Prcesertim si tempestas a vertice sylvis 
Incubuit, glomeratque/ere;2,s incendiaventus. 

G. 11. 

ilia noto citiuSf volucrique sagittd, 

Ad terram fugit, et portu se condidit alto, 

Mn. V. 

In the same maner he joins the same 
two modifications of Time in the Past^ that 

* See also Spenser s Fairy Queen, B. I. C. 3. St. 19. 
C. 3. St. 39. C. 8. St. 9. 
He hath his Shield redeem'd, and forth his Sword he draws 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VII. VS5 

is to sajj the complete and perfect Past with 
the extended and passing. 

Innierant Danai, et tectum omne tenebant. 

.En. IL 

Tres imbris torti radios, tres nubis aquosce^^ 
Addiderant rutili tres ignis, et alitis aiistri, 
Fulgores nunc teiYificos, sonitumque metumque 
MiscehB.nt ope)i,Jiammisque sequacibus irasS^^ 

iEn. VIII. 

As to the Imperfectum, it is sometimes 
employed to denote what is usual and 
customary. Thus surgehat and scribebat 
signify not only, he was risings he was 



^^"^ The intention of Virgil may be better seen, in render- 
ing one or two of the above passages into English. 

Tibijam brachia contrahit ardens 

Scorpius et cxlijustd plus parte reliquit. 
For thee the scorpion is now contracting his claws, and 
HATH ALREADY LEFT thee more than a Just portion of 
Heaven, The Poet, from a high strain of poetic adulation, 
supposes the scorpion so desirous of admitting Augustus 
among the heavenly signs, that though he has already made 
him more than room enough, yet he still continues to 



136 HERMES. 

writings but upon occasion they signify, he 
USED to me, he used to write. The reason 
of this is, that whatever is customary must 
be something which has been frequently 
repeated. But what has been frequently 
repeated^ must needs require an Extension 
of Time past^ and thus we fall insensibly 
into the Tense here mentioned. 

Again, we are told by Pliny (whose 
authority likewise is confirmed by many 
gems and marbles still extant) that the 

be making him more. Here then we have two acts, one 
perfect, the other pending, and hence the use of the two 
different Tenses. Some editions read relinquit; but reli- 
quit has the authority of the celebrated Medkean manu- 
script, 

Ilia noto citius, volucrique sagittd. 

Ad terram fugit, et porta se condidit alto. 
The ship, quicker than the wind, or a swift arrow, conti- 
nues FLYING to land, and is hid within the lofti/ harbour. 
We may suppose this Harbour (like many others) to have 
been surrounded with high Land. Hence the Vessel, im- 
mediately on entering it, was completely hid from those 
spectators who had gone out to see the Ship-race, but yet 
might still continue sailing towards the shore within. 



BOOK I.-CHAP. VIL 137 

ancient painters and sculptors, when they 
fixed their names to their works, did it 
pendenti titulo^ in a suspensive kind of In- 
scription^ and employed for that purpose 
the Tense here mentioned. It was ATTf A- 
Aii5 iTTOiSi^ Apelles faciebat, UoKvKXsiToq 
iiFofsi, Polycletus faciebat, and never eTTOWS 
or fecit. By this they imagined that they 
avoided the shew of arrogance, and had in 
case of censure an apology (as it were) 
prepared, since it appeared from the work 
itself, that it was once indeed in hand, but 
no pretension that it was ever finished^ 

It is remarkable that the very manner, 
in which the Latins derive these Tenses 



Inruerant Danat, et tectum omne tenebant. 

The Greeks had entered and were then possessing 
the whole house ; as mnch as to say, they had entered and 
that was over, but their Possession continued still, 

f^^ Plin. Nat, Hist. L, L The first Printers (who 
were most of them Scholars and Critics) in imitation of 
the antient Artists used the same Tense. Excudebat U, 



im HERMES. 

from one another, shews a plain reference 
to the system here advanced. From tha 
passing Present come the passing Past, 
and Future. Scribo^ Scribebam, Scribam. 
IpTOiji the perfect Present come the perfect 
Past^ and FutnYe.—Scripsi^ Scripseram^ 
Scripsero And so in all instances, even 
where the verbs are irregular, as from Fero 
come Ferebam and Feram ; from Tuli come 
Tuler am and Tulero. 

, We shall conclude by observmg, that 
the Oedeh of the Tenses, as they stand 
ranged by the old Grammarians, is not a 
fortuitous Order, but is consonant to our 
perceptions, in the recognition of Time, 
according to what we have explained 
already.^*"'' Hence it is, that the Present 



Stephanus. Epccudehat GuiL Morelius. Ahsolvehat Joan, 
Benenatus, which has been followed by Dr. Tai/lor in his 
late valuable edition of Demosthenes* 

^^^ See before p. 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. Scahger's 
observation upon this occasion is elegant.-r-Or(/o autem 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VII. 1S9 

Tense stands first ; therf the Past Tenses ; 
and lastly the Future. 

And now, having seen what authorities 
there are for Aorists, or those Tenses which 
denote Time indefinitely ; and what for 
those Tenses, opposed to Aorists, which 
mark it definitely (such as the Inceptive, 
the Middle, and the Completive), we here 
finish the subject of Time and Tenses, 
and proceed to consider the Verb in 
OTHER Attributes, which it will be 
necessary to deduce from other principles. 



{Temporum sciL) aliter est, quam natura eorimi* Quod 
entm praterut, prius est, quam quod est, itaque prww loco 
debere poni videbatur. Verum, quod primo quoque tempore 
offertur nobisy id creat primas species in animo : quamebrem 
Frasens Tempus primum locum occupavit ; est enim com^ 
mune omnibus animxilibus. Prateritum autem its tantum, 
quae memorid prtedita sunt* Futurum vero etiam pau^iori- 
busf quippe quibus datum est prudentia officium. De Caus- 
Ling. Lat. c. 113. See also Seneca Epist. 124. Mutum 
animal sensu comprehendit pnesentia^ prateritorum, ^c 



140 -HERMES. 

CHAP. VIII. 

Concerning Modes. 

We have observed already ^*^ that the 
Soul's leading powers are those of Percep- 
tion and those of Volition^ which words we 
have taken in their most comprehensive 
acceptation. We have observed also, that 
all Speech or Discourse is a publishing or 
exhibiting some part of our soul, either a 
certain Perception or a certain Volition. 
Hence, then, according as we exhibit it 
either in a different part, or after a different 
manner^ hence I say the variety of Modes 
or MooDs/*^ 



^•^ See Chap. II. 

^*) Gasa defines a Mode exactly consonant to this doc- 
trme. He says it is — j^sXrifia, cit' sv TraSrjfxa "^v-xjig ^id 
(pwvrig crrjjuatvo/x£vov — a Volition or Affection of the Soul, 
signified through some Voice or Sound articulate. Gram. 
L. IV; As therefore this is the nature of Modes, and 
Modes belong to Verbs, hence it is Apollonius observes — 



BOOK I,— CHAP. VIII. HI 

If we simply declare^ or indicate some- 
thing to be, or not to be (whether a Per- 
ception or Volition it is equally the same), 
this constitutes that Mode called the De- 
clarative or Indicative. 

A Perception. 

— No SCO crines, incanaque menta 

Regis Romani Virg. iEn. VL 

A Volition. 

In nova fert animus mutatas dicereformas 
Corpora Ovid Metam. I. 

If we do not strictly assert, as of some- 
thing absolute and certain, but as of some- 
thing possible only, and in the number of 
Contingents^ this makes that Mode, which 



ToTc pvfiaaiv k^aipeTWQ irapaKeiTui -q \pv\iKri SiaBecng — the 
SouUs disposition is in an eminent degree attached to Verbs. 
De Synt. L. III. c. 13. Thus too Priscian : Modi sunt 
diverse inclinationes Animi, quas varia consequitur 

DECLINATIO VERBI. L. VIII. p. 821. 



1¥Z HERMES. 

Grammarians call the Potential ; and 
which becomes on such occasions the 
leading Mode of the sentence. 

Sed tacitus pasci si posset Corvus, Haberet 
Plus dapisy S^c. Hor, 

Yet sometimes it is not the leading 
Mode, but only subjoined to the Indicative. 
In such case, it is mostly used to denote 
the Endy ov final Cause ; which End, as in 
human Life it is always a Contingent, and 
may never perhaps happen, in despite of 
all our foresight, is therefore exprest most 
naturally by the Mode here mentioned. 
For example, 

ITt JuGULENT homines, surgunt de node latrones, 

Hor. 
Thieves rise by night, that they may cut men's 
throats. 

Here that they rise^ is positively asserted 
in \hQ Declarative or Indicative Mode; 
but as to their cutting men's throats^ this is 



BOOK I.-^CHAP. VIII. 14^ 

only delivered potentially^ because how 
truly soever it may be the End of their 
rising, it is still but ?i Contingent^ that may 
never perhaps happen. This Mode, as 
often as it is in this manner subjoined, is 
called by Grammarians not the Potential, 
but the Subjunctive. 

But it so happens, in the constitution 
of human affairs, that it is not always suffi- 
cient merely to declare ourselves to others- 
We find it often expedient, from a con- 
sciousness of our inabiUty, to address them 
after a manner more interesting to our- 
selves, whether to have some Perception in-- 
formed or some Volition gratified. Hence 
then new Modes of speaking ; if we interro- 
gate^ it is the Interrogative Mode; if 
vfQrequire^ it is the Requisitive. Even 
the Requisitive itself hath its subordinate 
Species : With respect to inferiors, it is an 
Imperative Mode; with respect to 



lU H E RM E S. 

equals and superiors, it is a Precative 
or Optative.* 



And thus have we estabUshed a variety 
of Modes; the Indicative or Decla- 
rative, to assert what we think certain; 
the PoTENTiAL,/br the Purposes of what- 
ever we think Contingent ; the Interro- 
gative, when we are doubtful^ to procure 
us information ; and the Requisitive, 
to assist us in the gratification of our Foli^ 
tions. The Requisitive too appears under 
two distinct species, either as it is Impera- 
tive to inferiors, or Precative to supe- 
riors/*^^ 



* It was the confounding of this Distinction, that gave 
rise to a Sophism of Protagoras, Homer (says he) in 
beginning his Iliad with — Sing, Muse, the Wrath, — When 
he thinks to pray, in reality commands* £vx£(rOaL olofuievog, 
iTTtraTTH. Aristot. Poet. c. 19. The solution is evident 
from the Division here established, the Grammatical form 
being in both cases the same. 

^'^^ The Species of Modes in great measure depend on the 



BOOK I.-~CHAP. VIII. 145 

As therefore all these several Modes 
have their foundation in nature, so have 



Species of Sentences. The Stoics increased the number of 
Sentences far beyond the Peripatetics^ Besides those men. 
tioned in Chapter II. Note ^*>> they had many more, as may 
may be seen in Ammonius de Interpret, p. 4. and Diogenes 
Laertius, L. VII. 66. The Peripatetics (and it seems too 
with reason) considered all these additional Sentences as 
included within those which they themselves acknowledged, 
and which they made to be five in number, the Vocative, 
the Imperative, the Interrogative, the Precative, and the 
Assertive. — There is no mention of a Potential Sentence, 
which may be supposed to co-incide with the Assertive or 
Indicative. The Vocative (which the Peripatetics called 
the el^og kXtjtikov, but the Stoics more properly Trpoo-ayo- 
psvTiKov) was nothing more than the Form of address m 
point of names, titles, and epithets, with which we apply 
ourselves one to another. As therefore it seldom included 
any Verb within it, it could hardly contribute to form a 
verbal Mode. Ammonius and Boetldus, the one a Greek 
Peripatetic, the other a Latin have illustrated the Species 
of Sentences from Homer and Virgil, after the following 
manner. 

'AXXa TH Aoy8 irivre ciSwv, r« re KAHTIKOY, u>Q 

TOf^'Qi fiatcap 'Arpct^rj 

itf Ts nPOSTAKTIKOY, wc to, 



146 HERMES. 

certain marks or signs of them been intro- 
duced into languages, that we maj be 



itf r« 'EPQTHMATIKOY, wc rh. 

Tig, TToOev tig avdptjv ; r 

i^ T8 *EYKTIKOY, wg rh, 

Af yap Zev r£ Trarep 

^ lirl Tsroig, th 'AIIG^ANTIKOY, m^' ov airotpaivofiSa 
wepX oTovsv Twv irpayiuLaTiDV, oiov 

— — 0£ot Si re TTCLVTa iaaaiv 



8 7r£pi iravTog, S^c Eic to TTfpt 'Epju. p. 4}. v 

Boethius's Account is as follows. Perfectarum vero 
Orationum partes quinque sunt : Deprecativa, ut, 
Jupiter ommpotens, precihus siflecteris ullis^ 
Da deinde auxilium^ Pater j atque hcec ominajirma. 

Imperativa, ut, 

Vade age, Nate, voca Zephyros, et latere pennis, 

Inteerogativa, ut, 

Die mihi, Danrnta, cujum pecus ? — *- 

Vocativa, uty 

O ! Pater, O ! hominum rerumque aterna potestas. 

Enuntiativa, in qua Veritas vel Falsitas invenitur, ut, 
Principio arhoribus varia est natura creandis. 

Boeth. in Lib. de Interp. p. 291. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VIII. 147 

enabled by our discourse to signify them 
one to another. And hence those various 
Modes or Moods, of which we find in 
common Grammars so prohx a detail, and 
which are in fact no more than " so many 
" literal Forms, intended to express these 
" natural Distinctions.''^''^ 



In Milton the same sentences may be found, as follows. 
The Precative, 

— Universal Lord! he bounteous still 
To give us only Good 

The Imperative, 

Go, then, Thou mightiest, in thy Father^ s might. 

The Interrogative, 

Whence and what art thou, execrable Shape ? 

The Vocative, 

Adam, earth's hallowed Moldy 

Of God inspir''d — 

The Assertive or Enunciative, 

The conquer'^d also and enslaved by war 
Shall, with their Freedom lost, all virtue lose. 

^'^^ The Greek Language, which is of all the most elegant 
and complete, expresses these several Modes, and all dis- 

L 2 



{ 



148 HERMES. 

All these Modes have this in common., 
that they exhibit some way or other the 
Soul and its Affections. Their PecuU- 



tinctions of Time likewise, by an adequate number of 
Variations in each particular Verb. These Variations 
may be found, some at the beginning of the Verb, others 
at its ending, and consist for the most part either in multi- 
jplying or diminishing the number of Syllables, or else in 
lengthening or shortening their respective Quantities, which 
two methods are called by Grammarians the Syllahic and 
the Temporal, The Latin, which is but a species of Greek 
somewhat debased, admits in like manner a large portion 
of those variations, which are chiefly to be found at the 
Ending of its Verbs, and but rarely at their Beginning. 
Yet in its Deponents and Passives, it is so far defective, 
as to be forced to have recourse to the Auxiliar, sum. The 
modern Languages, which have still fewer of those Varia- 
tions, have been necessitated all of them to assume two^ 
Auxiliars at least, that is to say, those which express in 
each Language the Verbs, Have, and Am. As to the 
English Tongue, it is so poor in this respect, as to admit 
no Variation for Modes, and only one for Time, which we 
apply to express an Aorist of the Past. Thus from Write 
Cometh Wrote ; from Give, Gave ; from Speak, Spake, <Sfc. 
Hence to express Time, and Modes, we are compelled to 
employ no less than seven AuxiHars, viz. Do, Jim, Have, 
Shall, Will, May, and Can ; which we use sometimes 
singly, as when we say, I am writing, I have written ; 



BOOK I.~CHAP. VIII, 149 

arities and Distinctions are in part as 
follows. 



The Requisitive and Interroga- 
tive Modes are distinguished from the 
Indicative and Potential, that whereas 
these last seldom call for a Return, to the 
t\YO former it is alzoar/s necessary. 

If we compare the Requisitive Mode 
with THE Interrogative, we shall 
find these also distinguished, and that not 
only in the Betitrn, but in other Peculi- 
arities, 

The Return to the Requisitive i"^ sometimes 



sometimes two together, as I have been writing, I should 
have written ; sometimes no less than three, as I might have 
been lost, he could have been preserved. But for these, 
and all other speculations, relative to the Genius of the 
English Language, we refer the reader, who wishes for the 
most authentic information, to that excellent Treatise of 
the learned Dr. Lowth, intitled, A short Introduction to 
English Grammar, 



150 HERMES. 

made ia Words^ sometimes in Deeds, To 

the request of Dido to Eneas — 

a prima die, hospes, origine nobis 



Insidias Dandum- 



the proper Return was in Words, that is, in 
an historical Narrative. To the Request 

of the unfortunate Chief date obolum 

Belisario — the proper Return was in a 
Deed, that is, in a charitable Relief. But 
with respect to the Interrogative, the He- 
turn is necessarily made in Words alone, in 
Words, which are called a Response or 
Answer, and which are always actually or 
by implication some definitive assertive 
Sentence. Take Examples. Wliose Verses 
are these ? The Return is a Sentence — 
These are Verses of Homer, Was Brutus 
a worthy Mail ? — The Return is a Sentence 
— Brutus was a worthy Man. 

And hence (if we may be permitted to 
digress) we may perceive the near affinity 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VIII. 151 

of this Interrogative Mode with the Indi- 
cative^ in which last its Response or Return 
is mostly made. So near, indeed, is this 
Affinity, that in these two Modes alone the 
yerb retains the same Form/'^ nor are they 
otherwise distinguished, than either by the 
Addition or Absence of some small par- 
ticle, or by some minute change in the 
collocation of the words, or sometimes 
only by a change in the Tone or Ac- 
centy^ 



^'^ "Hye sv TrpoKei/mivr] 6pt~iKri eyKXicrig, t^v l')KUjiivr]v 
KaTa(pa(nv airoj^aWscTa, jueOi^arai r5 KoXuadaL bpi'^iKr} — 
avaTTXripwOataa ^l Trig Karacparrecog, vTTO-rpc^ft elg to elvm 
bpL'SLKY). The Indicative Mode, of which we speak, bi/ lay- 
ing aside that Assertion, ivhich hy its nature it implies, 
quits the name of Indicative — when it reassumes the Assertion 
it returns again to its proper Character, Apoll. de Synt. 
L. III. c. 21. Theodore Gaza says the same, Introd. 
Gram. L. IV. 

'^ It may be observed of the Interrogative, that as 
often as the Interrogation is simple and definite, the Re- 
sponse may be made in almost the same Words, by con- 
verting them into a sentence affirmative or negative, ac- 



m HERMES. 

But to return to our comparison be- 
tween the Interrogative Mode and the 
Requisitive. 

The Interrogative (in the language 
of Grammarians) has all Persons of both 



cording as the truth is, either one or the other. For ex- 
ample — j^re these Verses o/* Homer ? — Response- — These 
Verses are of Homer. Are those Verses of Virgil ? — 
Response — 2'hose are not Verses of Virgil. And here the 
Artists of Language, for the sate of brevity and dispatch 
have provided two Particles, to represent all such Responses ; 
Yes, for all the affirmative ; No, for all the negative. 

But when the Interrogation is complex, as when we say 
— Are these Verses of Homer, or of Virgil? — much 
more, when it is indefinite, as when we say in general — 
Whose are these Verses ? - We cannot then respond after 
the manner above mentioned. The Reason is, that no 
Interrogation can be answered by a simple Yes, or a simple 
JVb, except only those, which are themselves so simple, as 
of two possible answers to admit only one. Now the least 
complex Interrogation will admit of four Answers, two 
affirmative, two negative, if not, perhaps of more. The 
reason is, a complex Interrogation cannot subsist of less 
than two simple ones ; each of which may be separately 
affirmed and separately denied. For instance — Are these 



BOOK I.—CHAP. VIII. I5S 

numbers. The Requisitive or Im- 
perative has no first Person of the 
singular^ and that from this plain reason, 
that it is equally absurd in Modes for a 



Terses Homer's or Virgil's? (1.) They are Homer's— 
(2 ) They are not Homer's— {^Y They are Virgil s — 
(4.) They are not VirgiVs — we may add They are of 
neither. The indefinite Interrogations go still farther ; 
for these may be answered by infinite affirmatives, and in- 
finite negatives. For instance — Whose are these Verses? 
We may answer affirmatively — They are Virgil's They 
are Horace's, They are Ovid's, &c. — or negatively — They 
are not Virgil's, They are not Horace's They are not Ovid's 
and so on, either way, to infinity. How then should we 
learn from a single Yes, or a single No, which particular 
is meant among infinite Possibles ? These therefore are 
Interrogations which must be always answered by a Sen- 
tence. Yet even here Custom has consulted for Brevity, 
by returning for Answer only the single essential character- 
istic Word, and retrenching by an Ellipsis all the rest 
which rest the Interrogator is left to supply from himself. 
Thus when we are asked — How many right angles equal 
the angles of a triangle ? — we answer in the short mono- 
syllable, Two ; w^hereas, without the Ellipsis, the answer 
would have been — Two right angles equal the angles of a 
triangle. 

The i\ncients distinguished these two Species of Inter- 



154 HERMES. 

person to request or give commands to him- 
self,, as it is in Pronouns^ for the speaker 
to become the subject of his own address.^ 

Again, we may interrogate as to all 
Times, both Present, Past, and Future. 
Who WAS Founder of Rome? Who is 
King of China? JVho will discover 
the Longitude ? — But Intreating and Com- 
manding (which are the Essence of the 
Requisitive Mode) haye a necessary respect 
to the Futurd^^ only. For indeed what 



rogation by different names. The simple they called 
'Ef>a»r?]jua, Interrogatio ; the complex, Trvarjuaj Percontatio. 
Ammonius calls the first of these 'Epwrrjortc ^iuX^ktikj] ; 
the other, 'Epwrrjctc TrvafxaTLKt). See Am. in. Lib. de In- 
terpr. p. 160. Diog. Laert. VII. 66. Quintil. Inst. IX. % 

* Sup. p. 74, 75. 

^^^ Jpollonius's Account of the Future, implied in all 
Imperatives, is worth observing. 'Etti yap firj yivofiivoig 
in firi ysyovomv r} IIPO STASIS* ra Se ^rj yLvofXiva rj firj 
yey ovoTa, £7rtrij§€toT?jra ^e g'xovra dg ro irrecrOai, ME A- 



BOOK I.-CHAP. VIII. 155 

have they to do with the present or the 
past, the natures of which are immutable 
and necessary ? 



AGNTOS c-ot. A Command has respect to those things 
which either are not doing, or have not yet been done. But 
those things, which being not now doing, or having not yet 
been done, have a natural aptitude to exist hereafter, may be 
properly said to appertain to the Future. De Syntaxi, 
L. I. c. 36. Soon before this he says — "Airavra to, irpo- 
'^OKTiKCL eyKHfxivriv exH Trjv rs fiiWovTOQ diaOemv — \ridbv 
yap Iv 'i(7t^ l^\ rh, 'O TYPANNOKTONHSAS 
TIMASea, rtj TIMHGHSETAI, Kara tyiv xpovs ewotav* 
Tf} EKicXto'et ^ir]Xka-)(og, kuBo to fxlv trpo'^aKTiKOV, to §e 
opL'^iKov. All Imperatives have a disposition within 
them, which respects the Future — with regard therefore 
to Time, it is the same thing to say. Let him, that 
KILLS A Tyrant, be honoured, or, he, that kills 
ONE, SHALL BE HONOURED ; the difference being only in 
the Mode, in as much as one is Imperative, the other 
lisJDiCATiv E or Declarative, ApoU. de Syntaxi. L. I. c. 35. 
Priscian seems to allow Imperatives a share of Present Time, 
as well as Future. But if we attend, we shall find his Pre- 
sent to be nothing else than an immediate Future, as op- 
posed to a more distant one. Imperativus vero Prasens et 
Futurum \Tempus'\ naturali quddam necessitate videtur 
posse accipercs Ea etenim imperamus, qua vel in prasenti 
statim volumus fieri sine aliqud dilatione, vel in futuro. 
Lib. VIII. p. 806. 



156 HERMES. 

It is from this connection of Futurity 
with Commands^ that the Future Indicative 
is sometimes used for the Imperative and 
that to say to any one. You shall do 
THIS, has often the same force with the 
Imperative, Do this. So in the Deca- 
logue ^ThOU SHALT NOT KILL ThOU 



It is true the Greeks in their Imperatives admit certain 
Tenses of the Past, such as those of the Perfectum, and of 
the two Aorists, But then these Tenses, when so applied, 
either totally lose their temporary Character, or else are 
used to insinuate such a Speed of execution, that the deed 
should be (as it were) done in the very instant when com- 
manded. The same difference seems to subsist between 
our English Imperative, Be gone, and those others of, 
Go, or Be going. The first (if we please) may be stiled 
the Imperative of the Perfectum as calling in the very 
instant for the completion of our Commands : the others 
may be stiled Imperatives of the Future, as allowing a 
reasonable time to begin first, and finish afterwards. 

It is thus ApoUonius in the Chapter first cited, distin- 
guishes between arjcaTrreVw rag afnriXsg, Go to digging 
the Vines, and (jKWpdTw rag ajuLTTEXsg, Get the Vines dug. 
The first is spoken (as he calls it) tig Traparamv, hy way 
of Extension, or allowance of Time for the work ; the 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VIII. 157 

SHALT NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS^— 

which denote (we know) the strictest and 
most authoritative Commands. 

As to the Potential Mode, it is dis- 
tinguished from all the rest, by its subordi- 
nate or subjunctive Nature. It is also 
farther distinguished from the Requisitive 
and Interrogative, by implying a kind of 
feeble and weak Assertion, and so becoming 
in some degree susceptible of Truth and 



second etc (JvvTiXddxnv , with a view to immediate Comple- 
tion. And in another place, explaining the difference 
between the same Tenses, S/caTrre and SKai/zov, he says of 
the last, 8 fiovov to firi yevofievov TrgOGraaau, aXka icf to 
yivofievov Iv iraoaTCLfju cnrayopsvei, that it not only com- 
mands something which has not been yet done, but forbids 
also that which is now doing in an Extension, that is to 
say, in a slow and lengthened progress. Hence, if a man 
has been a long while writing, and we are willing to hasten 
him, it would be wrong to say in Greek rPA<l>E, Write 
for that he is now^ and has been long doing) but FPA^ON 
Get YOUR Writing done; make no delays. See 
ApoU. L. III. c. 24. See also Macrobius de Diff. Verb, 
Grac. et Lat. p. 680. Edit. Varior, Latini non astima- 
verunt, &c. 



158 HERMES. 

Falsehood. Thus, if it be said potentially. 
This may be, or This might have been, we 
may remark without absurdity. It is true^ 
or It is false. But if it be said, Do this, 
meaning. Fly to Heaven, or Can this be 
done ? meaning, to square the Circle, we 
cannot say in either case, it is true or it is 
false, though the Command and the Ques- 
tion are about things impossible. Yet still 
the Potential does not aspire to the Indi- 
cative, because it implies but a, dubious and 
conjectural Assertion, whereas that of the 
Indicative is absolute, and without re- 
serve. 

This therefore (the Indicative I 
mean) is the Mode, which, as in all Gram- 
mars it is the first in order, so is truly first 
both in dignity and use. It is this 
which publishes our sublimest perceptions, 
which exhibits the Soul in her purest 
Energies, superior to the Imperfections of 
desires and wants : which includes the 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VIII. 159 

whole of Time^ and its minutest distinc- 
tions ; which, in its various Past Tenses, 
is employed by History, to preserve to us 
the remembrance of former Events ; in 
its Futures is used by Prophecy, or (in 
default of this) by wise Foresight, to 
instruct and forewarn us, as to that which 
is coming ; but above all in its Present 
Tense serves Philosophy and the Sciences 
by just Demonstrations to establish neces- 
sary Truth; that Tiiuth, which from 
its nature only exists in the Present ; which 
knows no distinctions either of Past or 
of Future, but is every where, and always 
invariably one/^^ 



^'•^ See the quotation, IS'ote ^'^^ Chapter the Sixth. Cum 
enim dicimus, Deus est, noneum dtcimus nunc esse, sed, Sfc, 

Boethius, author of the sentiment there quoted, was by 
birth a Roman of the first quality ; by religion, a Chris- 
tian ; and by philosophy a Platonic and Peripatetic ; 
which two Sects, as they sprang from the same Source, 
were in the latter ages of antiquity commonly adopted by 
the same Persons, such as Themistius^ Porphyry, lambli- 



160 HERMES. 

Thro DO H all the above Modes, with 
their respective Tenses, the Verb being 
considered as denoting an Attribute 
has always reference to some Person, or 
Substance. Thus if we say, We7it, or, 
Go, or Whither goeth, or. Might have gone, 
we must add a Person or Substance, to 
make the Sentence complete. Cicero 
went; Caesar might have gone; Whither 
goeth the Wind? Go; Thou Traitor! But 
there is a Mode or Form, under which 



chus^ Ammonius, and others. There were no Sects of 
Philosophy, that lay greater Stress on the distinction 
between things existing in Time and not in Time, than 
the two above-mentioned. The Doctrine of the Peripa- 
tetics on this Subject (since it is these that Boethius here 
follows) may be partly understood from the following 
Sketch. 

'• The things that exist in Time, are those 
'^ whose Existence Time can measure. But if their 
" Existence may be measured by Time, then there may 
" be assumed a Time greater than the Existence of any 
" one of them, as there may be assumed a number 
*' greater than the greatest multitude that is capable of 



BOOK I.~CHAP. VIII. 161 

Verbs sometimes appear, where they have 
no reference at all to Persons or Sub- 
stances. For example — To eat is pleasant. 



** being numbered. And hence it is that things temporari/ 
*' have their Existence, as it were, limited by Time ; that 
*' they are confined within it, as within some bound ; and 
" that in some degree or other they all submit to its 
*' poziJcr,' according to those common Phrases, that Time 
^^ is a destroyer ; that things decay through Time ; that 
'^ men forget in Time, and lose their abilities, and seldom 
" that they improve, or grow young, or beautiM. The 
*' truth indeed is, Time always attends Motion, Now the 
" natural effect of Motion is to put something, which now 
" is, out of that state, in which it now is, and so far there- 
" fore to destroy that state. 

" The reverse of all this holds with things that 
** EXIST ETEENALLY. Thesc cxist uot in Time, because 
*' Time is so far from being able to measure their Exist- 
*' encc, that no Time can be assumed, which their Exist- 
'* ence doth not surpass. To which we may add, that they 
^^feel none of its effects, being no way obnoxious either to 
" damage or dissolution. 

" To instance in examples of either kind of Being. 
" There are such things at this instant, as Stonehenge 
** and the Pyramids. It is likewise true at this instant, 
** that the Diameter of the Square is commensurable with 
*' its bide. What then shall we say ? Was there ever 

M 



162 H E R M E S. 

but to fast is wholesome. Here the Verbs, 
To eatf and To fast, stand alone by them- 
selves, nor is it requisite or even practic- 
able to prefix a Person or Substance. Hence 
the Latiji and modern Grammarians have 
called Verbs under this Mode, from this 
their indefinite nature, Infinitives. 
Sanctius has given them the name of Im- 
personals ; and the Greeks that of 'Att^- 



*' a Time, when it was not incommensurahk, as it is certain 
*' there was a Time, when there was no Stonehenge, or 
'' Pyramids ? or is it daily growing less incommensurable, 
^* as we are assured of Decays in both those massy Struc- 
^'turesf" From these unchangeable Truths, we may 
pass to their Place, or Region ; to the unceasing Intellec- 
tion of the Universal Mind, ever perfect, ever full, knowing 
no remissions, languors, &c. See A^at, Ausc. L. IV. c. 
19. Metaph. L. XIV. c. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. Edit. Du Val. 
and Vol. I p. 262. Note VII. The following Passage 
may deserve Attention: 

ToO yap Nov 6 fi\v vouv 7ri<pVKev, i^ firj vowv* 6 Si ^ 
7ri<l>VKe, i^ voa. aXXa ^ ovTog ovito) reXeog, av ju?) TrpotrOrjg 
avT(^ TO itf voEiv aa, icj iravTa voi7v, ^ fJirt aXXort aX\a» 
oiTc dri av IvreXt'^aTOc 6 voiov aa /^ Tiai^ra, i^ a/j,a. Max, 
Tyr. Diss. XVII. p. 201. Ed. Lond. 



BOOK I.~CHAP. VIII. 163 

p6fJL(pciTXy from the same reason of their 
not discovering either Person or Num- 
ber. 

These Infinitives go farther. They 
not only lay aside the character of Attri- 
butives, but they also assume that of Swi- 
stantives, and as such themselves become 
distinguished with their several Attributes. 
Thus in the instance above. Pleasant is 
the Attribute attending the infinitive 
To Eat; TVholesome the attribute attend- 
ing the Infinitive, To Fast, Examples in 
Greek and Latin of like kind are innumer- 
able: 

Duke et decorum est pro pair ia mori. 
Scire tuum nihil est — 



^'^It is from the Infinitive thus participating the 
nature of a Noun or Substantive, that the best Gram- 
marians have called it sometimes "Ovofxa p-nfxaTiKOv A 

IM 2 



164 HERMES. 

The Stoics^ in their grammatical inqui- 
ries, had this Infinitive in such esteem, 
that they held this alone to be the genuine 
PHMA or Verb, a name which they 
denied to all the other Modes. Their rea- 
soning was, they considered the true ver- 



VERBAL Noun ; sometimes "Ovojua ^^juarocj the Verb's 
Noun. The Reason of this Appellation is in Greek 
more evident, from its taking the prepositive Article 
before it in all cases ; to 7pa(^fti/, ts ypa^tiv, ri^ 
ypa^eiv. The same construction is not unknown in 
English, 

Thus Spencer, 

For not to have been dipt in Lethe lake, 
Could save the Son of Thetis from to die — 

airo TH ^avELv. In like manner we say, He did it, to be 
rich, where we must supply by an Ellipsis the Preposition, 
For. He did it, for to be rich, the same as if we had 

said, He did it for gain avEKa ra TrXsrav, I'vejca ts 

Kipdsg in French pour s'enrichir. Even when we 

speak such Sentences as the following, / choose to phi- 
losophize, rather than to be rich, to ^tXotro^ai/ 
/SsXojuai, jiTTep TO irXsTelv, the Infinitives are in nature as 
much Accusatives, as if we were to say, / choose philo- 
sophy rather than Riches, ttjv (l>i\o(TO(f>iav ^sXofiai, 
riTTsp Tov ttXstov, Thus too Priscian, speaking of Infini- 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VIII. 165 

bal character to be contained simple and 
unmixed in the Infinitive only. Thus the 
Infinitives, YlsfL'nciTshy Amhulare^ To Walk, 
mean simply that energy, and noiJiing 
more. The other Modes, besides express- 
ing this energy, sitperadd certain Affections 
which respect persons and circumstances. 
Thus Amhulo and Amhula mean not simply 
To walk, but mean, I walk, and. Walk 
Thou. And hence they are all of them 
resolvable into the Infinitive, as their Proto- 
type, together with some sentence or word, 
expressive of their proper Character. Am- 



tijjes — CuRUERE eni'm est CuRSUS ; et Scribere, Scrip- 
TURA ; et Legere Lectio. Itaque frequenter et Nomi- 
nibus adjunguntur, et aliis casualtbus, more Nominum ; 
ut Persiusy 

Sed pulcrum est digito monstrari, et dicier , hie est. 

And soon after — Cum enim dico, Bonum est legere, 
nihil aliud significo, nisi, Bona est lectio. L. XVIIL 
p. 1130. See also Jpoll. L. I. c. 8. Gaza Gram. L. 
IV. To St aTraQtfi<l)aTov, ovofia trt fnifxaTog k- t. X. 



166 HERMES. 

hulo^ I walk ; this is, Indico me ambulare, I 
declare myself to walk* Ambula^ Walk 
Thou ; that is Impero te ambulare^ I com- 
mand thee to walk ; and so with the Modes 
of every other species. Take away there- 
fore the Assertion^ the Command, or what- 
ever else gives a Character to any one 
of these Modes, and there remains no- 
thing more than the mere Infinitive 
which (as Priscian says) significat ipsam 
rem, qiiam continet VerbumJ^^ 

The appHcation of this Infinitive is 
somewhat singular. It naturally coalesces 



^*^ See Apollon, L. III. 13. KaOoXs irav itapriyjxivov 
airo Tivoc K. r. X. See also Gaza, in the note before. 
Igitur a Constructione quoque Vim rei Verborum (^id est 
Nominis, quod significat ipsam rem) habere Infinitivum 
possumus d/gnoscere ; res autem in Personas distributa 
Jacit alios verbi motus. — Itaque omnes modi inhunc, idesty 
Infinitivum, transumuntur sive resolvuntur. Frisc. L. 
XVIII. p. 1131. Erom these Fiinci^les JpoUonius calls 
the Infinitive 'P»jjua yiviKwrarov, and Prisciaii, Verbum 
generate. 



BOOK I.—CHAP. VIII. 167 

Tvith all those Verbs, that denote any Ten- 
dence. Desire^ or Volition of the Soul, but 
not readily with others. Thus it is sense 
as well as syntax, to say (h^KoyLdL Ipiv, 
Cupio vivere, I desire to live ; but not to 
say 'Ea^ioo^yjv, Edo vivere, or even in Eiig- 
lish, I eat to live, unless by an Ellipsis, 
instead of I eat for to live ; as we say 
evsKOL t5 ^wv, or pour vivre. The reason 
is, that though different Actions may unite 
in the sa??ie Subject, and therefore be 
coupled together (as when we say, He 
walked and discoursed) yet the Actions 
notwithstanding remain separate and dis- 
tinct. But it is not so with respect to 
Volitions, and Actions. Here the coales- 
cence is often so intimate, that the Volition 
is unintelligible, till the Action be exprest. 
Cupio, Volo, Desidero — I desire, I am 
willingy I want — What? — The Sentences, 
we see, are defective and imperfect. We 
must help them then by Infinitives, which 
express the proper Actions to which they 



168 HERMES. 

tend. Cupio legere^ Volo discere^ Desidero 

videre, I desire to ready I am willing to learn, 

I zmnt to see. Thus is the whole rendered 

complete, as well in sentiment as in 

syntax/^^ 

And so much for Modes, and their 
several Species. We are to attempt to 
denominate them according to their most 
eminent characters, it may be done in the 
following manner. As every necessary 
truth, and every demonstrative syllogism 
(which last is no more than a combination 
of such truths) must always be exprest 
under positive assertions, and as positive 
assertions only belong to the Indicative^ we 

^^^ Priscian calls these Verbs, which naturally precede 
Infinitives, Verba Voluntativa ; they are called in Greek 
Trpoatpertica. See L. XVIII. 1129, but more particularly 
see Apollonius^ L. III. c. 13, where this whole doctrine 
is explained with great Accuracy. See also Macrobius dc 
Dtff, Verb, Gr. et LaL p. 685. Ed. Var. 

— Nee omne awaptufaTov cuicunque Verbo, Sfc. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. VIII. 169 

may denominate it for that reason the 
Mode of Science/'"^ Again, as the 
Potential is only conversant about Contin- 
gent s^ of which we cannot say with cer- 
tainty that they will happen or not, we 
may call this Mode, the Mode of Con- 
jecture. Again, as those that are ignor- 
ant and would be informed, must ask of 
those that already know, this being the 
natural way of becoming Proficients ; hence 
we may call the Interrogative^ the Mode 
of Proficiency. 

Liter amcta leges, et percontabere doctos, 
Qua ratione queas traducere leniter cevuniy 
Quid pure tranquillety S^c* Hor. 

Farther still, as the highest and most ex- 
cellent use of the Requisitive Mode is legis- 
lative command, we may stile it for this 
reason the Mode of Legislature. Ad 



^"•^ Ob nobilitatem pr<sivit Indicativcts, solus Modus 
aptus Scientiis, solus Pater Veritatis. Seal, de Caus. L« 
Lat. c. 116. 



170 HERMES. 

Divos adeunto cast^, says Cicero in the cha- 
racter of a Roman law-giver ; Be it there- 
fore enacted^ say the laws of England ; and 
in the same Mode speak the laws of every 
other nation. It is also in this Mode that 
the geometrician, with the authority of a 
legislator, orders lines to be bisected, and 
circles described, as preparatives to that 
science which he is about to establish. 

There are other supposed affections of 
Verbs, such as Number and Person. But 
these surely cannot be called a part of 
their essence, nor indeed are they the 
essence of any other Attribute, being in 
fact the properties, not of Attributes, but 
of Substances. The most that can be said 
is, that Verbs in the more elegant languages 
are provided with certain terminations, 
which respect the Number and Ferson of 
every Substantive^ that we may know with 
more precision, in a complex sentence, 
each particular substance, with its attend- 



BOOK I.~CIIAP. VIII. 171 

ant verbal Attributes. The same may be 
said of Sex with respect to Adjectives. 
They have terminations which vary, as 
they respect Beings male or female, tho' 
Substances past dispute are alone suscep- 
tible of sex.^"^ We therefore pass over 
these matters, and all of like kind, as being 
rather among the elegancies, than the es- 
sentials ^°^ of language, which essentials are 

^"^ It is somewhat extraordinary, that so acute and rational 
a Grammarian as Sanctius, should justly deny Genders, or 
the distinction of Sex to Adjectives, and yet make Persons 
appertain, not to Substantives but to Verbs. His com- 
mentator Perizonuis is much more consistent, who says — 
At vero si rem recte consideres, ipsis Nominibus et Prono' 
minibus vel maiime, imb unice inest ipsa Persona ; et Ver- 
ba se habent in Personarum ratione ad Nomina plane sicuti 
Adjectiva in ratione Generum ad Substantiva, quibus solis 
autor (Sanctius scil. L. I. c. 7) et recte Genus adscribit, 
exclusis Adj'ectivis. Sanct. Minerv. L. I. c. 12. There is 
indeed an exact Analogy between the Accidents of Sex and 
Person. There are but two Sexes, that is to say, the Male 
and the Female ; and but two Persons (or Characters essen- 
tial to discourse) that is to say, the Speaker and the Party 
addressed. The third Sex and third Person are improperly 
so called, being in fact but Negations of the other two. 
'"' Whoever would sec more upon a subject of importance 



m HERMES. 

the subject of our present inquiry. The 
principal of these now remaining is the 
Difference of Verbs, as to their 
SEVERAL Species, which we endeavour 
to explain in the following manner. 



referred to in many parts of this treatise, and particularly 
in note ^^^ of this chapter, may consult Letters concerning 
Mind, an Octavo Volume published 1750, the Author Mr. 
John Petvin, Vicar of Ihington, in Devon, a person who 
though from his retired situation little known, was deeply 
skilled in the Philosophy both of the Antients and Modems 
and, more than this, was valued by all that knew him for 
his virtue and worth. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. IX. ITB 



CHAP. IX. 

Concerning the Species of Verbs, and their 
other remaining properties. 

All Verbs, that are strictly so called, 
denote ^"^ Energies. Now as all Energies 
^re Attributes, they have reference of course 
to certain energizing Substances, Thus it 
is impossible there should be such Energies, 
as To love, to jly, to wound, SfC, if there 
were not such beings as Men, Birds, 
Swords, Sfc, Farther, every Energy doth 
not only require an Energizer, but is neces- 
sarily conversant about some Subject, For 
example, if we say, Brutus loves — we must 



^'^^ We use this word Energy, rather than Motion, 
from its more comprehensive meaning ; it being a sort of 
Genus, which includes within it both Motion and its Pri- 
vation. See before, p. 94", 95. 



174 HERMES. 

needs supply — loves Cato^ Cassius, Portia^ 
or some one. The Sword wounds — i. e. 
wounds Hector^ Sarpedon, Priam, or some 
one. And thus is it, that every Energy 
is necessarily situate between two Substan- 
tives, an Energizer which is active, and a 
Subject which is passive. Hence, then, 
if the Energizer lead the sentence, the 
Energy follows its character, and becomes 
what we call a Verb active. — Thus we 
say Brutus amat, Brutus loves. On the 
contrary, if the passive Subject be prin- 
cipal, it follows the character of this too, 
and then becomes what we call a Verb 
PASSIVE. — Thus we say, Portia amatur, 
Portia is loved. It is in like manner that 
the same Road between the summit and 
foot of the same mountain, with respect 
to the summit is Ascent, with respect to 
the foot is Descent. Since then every 
Energy respects an Energizer or a passive 
Subject ; hence the Reason why every 
Verb, whether active or passive, has in Ian- 



BOOK I.— CHAP. IX. 175 

guage a necessary reference to some Noun 
for its Nominative CaseJ^^ 

But to proceed still farther from what 
has been already observed. Brutus loved 
Portia — Here Brutus is the Energizer; 
loved^ the Energy ; and Portia, the Subject* 
But it might have been Brutus loved Cato 
or Cassius, or the Roman Republic ; for the 
Energy is referable to Subjects infinite. 
Now among these infinite Subjects^ when 
that happens to occur which is the Ener- 
gizer also, as when we say Brutus loved 
himself, slew himself, ^c. in such Case the 
Energy hath to the same being a double Re- 
lation both active and passive. And this 



^*^ The doctrine of Impersonal Verbs has been justly 
rejected by the best Grammarians, both anlient and modern. 
^ceSancL Miiu L. I. c. 12. L. III. c. 1. L. IV, c. 3. 
Priscianl.. XVIIl. p. 1134. Apoll. L. III. sub fin. 
In which places the reader will sec a proper Nominative 
supplied to all Verbs of this supposed Character. 



176 HERMES. 

it is which gave rise among the Greeks to 
that species of Verbs, called Verbs middle 
^'^ and such was their true and original use, 
however in many instances they may have 
since happened to deviate. In other lan- 
guages the Verb still retains its active 
Form, and the passive Subject (se or him- 
self) is expressed like other accusatives. 

Again, in some Verbs it happens that 
the Energy always keeps within the Ener- 
gizer, and never passes out to any foreign 
extraneous Subject. Thus when we say, 
Ccesar walketh, Ccesar sitteth^ it is impossi- 



^*^^ Ta yap KaXs/uieva jufdorrjroc xr]fiara (TVveuTrTuxjLV 
ctvfSf^aro IvepyeriKYig ^ iraOriTiKrig ^laOitrecjg. 2 he Verbs 
called Verbs middle, admit a Coincidence of the active and 
passive Character. . Apollon. L. III. c. 7. He that would 
see this whole Doctrine concerning the power of the 
MIDDLE VERB explained and confirmed with great Inge- 
nuity and Learning, may consult a small Treatise of that 
able Critic Kuster, entitled, De vero Usu Verborum Medi- 
orum. A neat edition of this scarce piece has been lately 
published. 



BOOK I.-CHAP. IX. 177 

ble the Energy should pass out (as in the 
case of those Verbs called by the Gram- 
marians Verbs transitive) because 
both the Energizer and the Passive Sub^ 
ject are united in the saine Person. For 
what is the cause of this walking or sit- 
ting ? — It is the Will and Vital Powers be- 
longing to CcBsar. And what is the sub- 
ject, made so to move or to sit? — It is the 
Body and Limbs belonging also to the same 
Ccesar, It is this then forms that species 
of Verbs, which grammarians have thought 
fit to call Verbs neuter, as if indeed 
they were void both of Action and Passion, 
when perhaps (like Verbs middle) they may 
be rather said to imply both. Not however 
to dispute about names, as these Neuters 
in their Energizer always discover their 
passive Subject, ^'^ which other Verbs cannot. 



'''-' This Character of Neuters the Greeks very happily 
express by the Terms, AvToiraBeia and 'ihoTraOeia, which 
Priscian renders, qua ex se in seipsdjit intrinsecus Passio, 
L. VIII. 790 Consentii Ars apud Putsch, p. 2051. 



17?^ HERMES. 

their passive Subjects being infinite ; hence 
the reason why it is as superfluous in these 
Neuters to have the Subject expressed, as 
in other Verbs it is necessary, and cannot 
be omitted. And thus it is that we are 
taught in common grammars that Verbs 



It may be here observed, that even those Verbs, called 
Actives, can, upon occasion, lay aside their transitive charac- 
ter, that is to say, can drop their subsequent Accusative, 
and assume the Form of Neuters, so as to stand by them- 
selves. This happens, v^^hen the Discourse respects the 
mere Energy or Affection only, and has no regard to the 
Subject, be it this thing or that. Thus we say, 8»c oT^cv 
avayivu)(SKHv sroc. This Man knows not how to read, 
speaking only of the Energy in which we suppose him de- 
ficient. Had the Discourse been upon the Subjects of 
reading, we must have added them ; sk oWsv avayivtvcrKHv 
ra 'OjULTipSf He knows not how to read Homer, or Virgil, or 
Cicero, (^c. 

Thus Horace, 

Qui CUPIT aut WETUiTjjuvat ilium sic domus aut res, 
Ut lippum picta tabulae 

He that DESIRES or fears (not this thing in particular, 
nor that, but in general he within whose breast these affec- 
tions prevail) has the same joy in a House or Estate, as the 



BOOK I.-CHAP. IX. 179 

Active require anAcccusative, while Neuters 
require none. 

Of the above species of Verbs, the 
Middle cannot be called necessary, because 
most languages have done without it. The 
Species of Verbs, therefore, remaining 
are the Active, the Passive and the 
Neuter, and those seem essential to all 
languages whatever/''^ 



Man with had Eyes has in fine Pictures. So Casar in his 
celebrated Laconic Epistle of, Veni, Vidi, Vici, where 
two Actives we see follow one Neuter in the same detached 
Form, as that Neuter itself. The Glory it seems was in 
the rapid Sequel of the Events. Conquest came as quick 
as he could come himself, and look about him. Whom he 
saw, and whom he conquered, was not the thing of which 
he boasted. See Jpoll. L. Ill c. 31. p. 279- 

''^^ The Stoics, in their logical view of Verbs, as making 
part in Propositions, considered them under the four follow- 
ing Sorts. 

When a Verb, co-inciding with the Nominative of some 
Noun made without farther help a perfect assertive Sen- 
tence, as Swicparrjc TTfptTrartt, Socrates walketh ; then as 

N 2 



ISO HERMES. ^ 

There remains a remark or two farther 
and then we quit the Subject of Verbs. It 
is true in general that the greater part of 
them denote Attributes of Energy and 



the Verb in such case implied the Power of a perfect Pre- 
dicate, they'called it for that reason Karrjyopi^iua, a Pre- 
dicahle ; or else, from its readiness avjuLfiaiveiv, to co-incide 
with its Noun in completing the Sentence ^ they called it 
SvjujSajiia, a Co-incider. 

When a Verb was able with a Noun to form a perfect 
assertive Sentence, yet could not associate with such Noun 
but under some oblique Case, as ^{jjK^aju iiera^iXu, So- 
cratem poenitet : Such a Verb, from its near approach to 
just Co-incidence and Predication, they called Uapaavfi- 
pjfxa or UapaKaTYiyoprfiLia, 

When a Verb, though regularly co-inciding with a 
Noun in its Nominative, still required, to complete the 
Sentiment, some other Noun tinder an oblique Case, as 
HXcLTiov (pikei Aiiova, Plato loveth Dio (where without 
Dio or some other, the Verb loveth would rest indefinite), 
such Verb, from this Defect, they called ^ttov rj avfij^ajua, 
or rj KaTY}y6pr}iJ.a, something less than a Co-incider, or less 
than a Predicable. 

Lastly, when a Verb required two Nouns in oblique 
Cases, to render the Sentiment complete ; as when we say 



BOOK I.— CHAP. IX. 181 

Motion, But there are some which appear 
to denote nothing more, than a mere simple 
Adjective^ joined to an Assertion. Thus 
i(7X^€i in G reeky and Equalleth in English 
mean nothing more than iaoq ec;i, is equal. 
So Albeo, in Latin, is no more than albus 
sum. 

Cajnpique ingentes ossibus albent. Virg. 

The same may be said of Tumeo. Mons 



'S.wKpcLTH 'AXKt/3m§8c julXft, Tadct me Vita, or the like : 
Such Verb they called i^rrov, or aXarrov rj irupaavfi^anat 
or r\ irapaKarriyopYijia, something less than an imperfect 
Co-incider, or an imperfect Fredicable. 

These were the Appellations which they gave to Verbs, 
when employed along with Nouns to the forming of Pro- 
positions. As to the Name of 'FHMA? or Verb, they 
denied it to them all, giving it only to the Infinitive, as 
we have shewn already. See page 164. See also Ammon, 
in Lib. de Interpret, p. 37. Apollon. de Sj/ntaa-i, L. I. c. 
8. L. III. c. 31. p. 279. c. 32. p. 295. Tkeod. Gaza Gram, 
L. IV. 

From the above Doctrine it appears, that all Verbs Neuter 
are Si/ju]3a/uara ; Verbs Active rjrrova r) avfif^afiara. 



183 HERMES. 

tumet^ i. e. tumidus est^ is tumid. To ex- 
press the Energy in these instances, we 
must have recourse to the Inceptives. 

Fluctus uti primo ccepit cum albescere Vento, 

Virg. 

Fi^eta ponti 

Incipiunt agitata Tumescere. Virg. 

There are Verbs also to be found which 
are formed out of Nouns. So that as in 
Abstract Nouns (such as Whiteness from 
White, Goodness from Good) as also in the 
Infinitive Modes of Verbs, the Attributive 
is converted into a Substantive; here the 
Substantive on the contrary is converted into 
an Attributive. Such are Kvvi^sivfTouiHXioc^^ 
to act the part of a Dog, or be a Cynic ; 
^tXiTSTti^SDi from ^(Xmi^oq^ to Philippize 
or favour Philip; Syllaturire from Sylla^ 
to meditate acting the same part as Sylla 
did. Thus too the wise and virtuous Em- 
peror, by way of counsel to himself — 



BOOK I.—CHAP. IX. 18$ 

opoL ix^ OLTroHXKTXpoo^yig^ beware thou beest not 
bec^sar'd ; as though he said, Beware, 
that by being Emperor, thou dost not dwindle 
into A MERE CiESAR/''' In Hke manner 
one of our own witty Poets, 

Sternhold himself he Out-Stern holded. 

And long before him the facetious Fuller, 
speaking of one Morgan, a sanguinary 
Bishop in the Reign of Queen Mary, says 
of him, that he out-bonner^d even Bon- 
ner himself.^ 

And so much for that Species of At- 
tributes, called Verbs IN THE STRICT- 
EST Sense. 



«'' Marc, Antonin. L. VI. § 30. 
* Church Hist. B. VIII. p. 21- 



184 H E R M E S. 



CHABc X. 

Co7icerning those other Attributives, Parti- 
ciples and Adjectives. 

The nature of Verbs being understood, 
that of Participles is no way difficult. 
Every complete Verb is expressive of an 
Attribute; of Time; and of an Assertion, 
Now if we take away the Assertion, and 
thus destroy the Verb, there will remain the 
Attribute and the Time, which make the 
essence of a Participle. Thus take 
away the Assertion from the Verb, Tf(i(psi^ 
Writeth, and there remains the Participle, 
rpoL(p(^v, Writing, which (without the Asser- 
tion) denotes the same Attribute, and the 
same Time, After the same manner, by 
withdrawing the Assertion, we discover 
Typci'^.otg in "Eypa^^s^ FpoL-^^oov in TpoL^i^SL 



BOOK I.— CHAP. X. 185 

for we chuse to refer to the Greeks as being 
of all languages the most complete, as well 
in this respect as in others. 

And so much for Participles/''^ 



^"^ The Latins are defective in this Article of Participles. 
Their Active Verbs, ending in or (commonly called De- 
ponents), have Active Participles of all Times (such as 
Loquens, Locutus, Locuturus), but none of the Passive. 
Their Actives ending in 0, have Participles of the Present 
and Future (such as Scrihens and Scripturus but none of 
the Past. On the contrary, their Passives have Participles 
of the Past (such as Scriptus) but none of the Present or 
Future, unless we admit such as Scribendus and Docendus 
for Futures, which Grammarians controvert. The want 
of these Participles they supply by a Periphrasis — for 
ypdil^ag they say cum scripsisset — for ypatpo/devog, dum 
scrihitur^ S^c. In English we have sometimes recourse 
to the same Periphrasis; and sometimes we avail our- 
selves of the same Auxiliars which form our Modes and 
Tenses. 

The English Grammar lays down a good rule with re- 
spect to its Participles of the Past, that they all terminate 
in D, T, or N. This Analogy is perhaps liable to as few 
Exceptions as any. Considering therefore how little 
Analogy of any kind we have in our Language, it seems 



186 HERMES. 

The nature of Verbs and Participles 
being understood, that of Adjectives 
becomes easy. A Verb implies (as we 
have said) both an Attribute^ and Time^ 
and an Assertion ; a Participle only implies 
an Attribute^ and Time; and an Adjec- 
tive only implies an Attribute; that is to 
say, in other Words, an Adjective has 
no Assertion^ and 07ily denotes such an Attri- 
bute as has not its essence either in Motion 
or its Privation. Thus in general the At- 
tributes of quantity, quality, and relation 
(such as many and feWy great and little^ 
black and white^ good and bad^ double 



wrong to annihilate the few Traces that may be found. 
It would be well, therefwe, if all writers who endeavour 
to be accurate, would be careful to avoid a corruption, 
at present so prevalent, of saying, it was wrote, for, it was 
written ; he was drove, for, he was driven ; I have 
wentf for, / have gone, Sfc, in all which instances 
a Verb is absurdly used to supply the proper Parti- 
ciple, without any necessity from the want of such 
Word. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. X. 187 

treble^ quadruple^ Sfc) are all denoted by 
Adjectives. 

It must indeed be confessed, that some- 
times even those Attributes, which are 
wholly foreign to the idea of Motion^ as- 
sume an assertion, and appear as Verbs. 
Of such we gave instances before, in albeo^ 
tumeo, i(7(i^(^, and others. These however, 
compared to the rest of Verbs, are but few 
in number, and may be called if thought 
proper, Verbal Adjectives, It is in like 
manner, that Participles insensibly pass too 
into Adjectives. Thus doctus in Latin^ and 
learned in English^ lose their power, as 
Participles, and mean a Person possessed 
of an habitual Quality. Thus Vir eloquens 
means not a man now speaking, but a man, 
who possesses the habit of speaking, whether 
he speak or no. So when we say in English 
he is a thinking Man, an wider staiidifig 
Man, we mean not a person, whose mind 
is in actual Energy^ but whose mind is en- 



188 HERMES. 

riched with a larger portion of those powers. 
It is indeed no wonder, as all Attributives 
are homogeneous, that at times the several 
species should appear to interfere, and the 
difference between them be scarcely per- 
ceptible. Even in natural species, which 
are congenial and of kin, the specific differ- 
ence is not always to be discerned, and in 
appearance at least they seem to run into 
each other. 

We have shewn already ^*^in the In- 
stances of O/A/TTTr/^fiv, Sj/llaturire, ' ATtoKOLi- 
coLp(j:)^^vcii^ and others, how Substantives may 
be transformed into Verbal Attributives. 
We shall now shew, how they may be con- 
verted into Adjectives. When we say the 
party of Pompey, the stile oi Cicero, the 
philosophy of Socrates, in these cases the 
party, the stile, and the philosophy spoken 



(*) 



Sup. p. 182, 18S. 



BOOK I.~CHAP. X. 189 

of, receive a stamp and character from the 
persons whom they respect. Those per- 
sons therefore perform the part of Attri- 
butes, that is, stamp and characterize their 
respective Subjects. Hence then they 
actually pass into Attributes^ and assume, 
as such, the form of Adjectives. And thus 
it is we say, the Pompeian party, the Cice- 
ronian stile, and the Socratic philosophy. 
It is in like manner for a trumpet of Brass 
we say a brazen Trumpet ; for a Crown of 
Gold, ?i golden Cvo\Nx\i &c. Even Pro/zo- 
minal Substantives admit the like mutation. 
Thus instead of saying, the Book of Me, 
of Thee, and of Him, we say, My Book, 
Thy Book and His Book; instead of say- 
ing, the Country of lis, o/Fow, and of 
Them, we say. Our Country, Your Country, 
and Their Country, which Words may be 
called so many Pronominal Adjectives. 

It has been observed already, and must 
needs be obvious to all, that Adjectives, 



190 HERMES. 

as marking Attributes, can have no sex/'^ 
And yet their having terminations conform- 
able to the sex, number, and case of their 
Substantive, seems to have led grammari- 
ans into that strange absurdity of ranging 
them with Nouns, and separating them 
from Verbs, though with respect to these 
they are perfectly homogeneous ; with re- 
spect to the others quite contrary. They 
are homogeneous with respect to Verbs, as 
both sorts denote Attributes; they are he- 
terogeneous with respect to Nouns, as never 
properly denoting Substances. But of this 
we have spoken before/*^^ 

The Attributives hitherto treated, that 
is to say, Verbs, Participles, and Ad- 
jectives, may be called Attributives 



(c) 



Sup. p. 171. 



^'^ Sup. C. VI. Note ''-). See also C. III. p. 28. 



BOOK I.—CHAP. X. 191 

OF THE FIRST Order. The reason of 
this name will be better understood, when 
we have more fully discussed Attribu- 
tives OF THE SECOND OrDER, tO which 

we now proceed in the following chapter. 



192 HERMES. 

CHAP. XL 

Concerning Attributives of the second Order. 

As the Attributives hitherto mentioned 
denote the Attributes of Substances^ so 
there is an inferior class of them, which 
denote the Attributes only of Attributes, 

To explain by examples in either kind 
— when we say, Cicero and Pliny were both 
of them eloquent ; Statius and Virgil both 
of them wrote ; in these instances the Attri- 
butives e/og'Mewf and wrote^ are immediately 
referable to the substantives, Cicero^ Virgil^ 
^c. As therefore denoting the Attri- 
butes of Substances, we call them At- 
tributives OF THE FIRST OrDER. But 
when we say, Pliny was moderately eloquent, 
but Cicero exceedingly eloquent ; Statius 
wrote indifferently, but Virgil z^rote admir^ 



BOOK I.->CHAP. XI. 193 

ahly ; in these instances, the Attributives, 
Moderately, Exceedingly^ Indifferently , Ad- 
mirably, are not referable to Substantives, 
but to other Attributives, that is, to the 
words, Eloquent, and Wrote. As there- 
fore denoting Attributes of Attributes, we 
call them Attributives of the se- 
cond ORDER. 

Grammarians have given them the 
Name of 'ET^ippi^fjiciTCi^ Adverbia, Ad- 
verbs. And indeed if we take the word 
^PJJjOtiX, or. Verb, in its most comprehensive 
Signification, as including not only Verbs 
properly so called, but also Participles and 
Adjectives [an usage, which may be justi- 
fied by the best authorities ^''^'] we shall find 



^"^ Thus Aristotle in his Treatise de Inter pretatione, in- 
stances "AvOpwTTOc as a Noun, and AevKog as a Verb. So 
Ammonius — Kara thto to aYifiaivofxevov, to fAv KAAOS Kf 
AIKAIOS icf ucTci Tomura— 'PHMATA Xiytadai i^ sk 
'ONOMATA. According to this Signification (that is of 



194 HERMES. 

the name, EmppyjfJLOL, or Adverb, to be 
a very just appellation, as denoting a 
Part of Speech, the natural Ap- 
pendage OF Verbs. So great is this 
dependence in Grammatical Syntax, that 
an Adverb can no more subsist without its 
Verb, than a Verb can subsist without its 
Substantive, It is the same here as in cer- 
tain natural Subjects. Every Colour for 
its existence as much requires a Superfi- 
cies, as the Superficies for its existence re- 
quires a solid body/*'' 



denoting the Attributes of Substance and the Predicate in 
Propositions) the words^ Fair, Just, and the like, are 
called Verbs, and not Nouns. Am. in lihr, de Jnterp. 
p. 37. b. Arist. de Interp. L. I. c. i. See also of this 
Treatise, c. 6. Note ("> p. 87. 

In the same manner the Stoics talked of the Participle. 
Nam Participium connumerantes Verbis, Participiale 
Yerbtjm. vocabant vel Casxjal:e. Priscian. L.I. p. 574." 

^*^ This notion of ranging the Adverb under the same 
Genus with the Verb (by calling them both Attributives) 
and of e^vplaining it to be the Verb's Epithet or Adjective 



BOOK L— CHAP. XI. 195 

Among the Attributes of Substance are 
reckoned Quantities, and Qualities. Thus 
we say, a white Garment^ a high Mountain. 
Now some of these Quantities and Quali- 
ties are capable of Intension, and Remis- 
sion. Thus we say, a Garment^ exceed- 
ingly white; a Mountain tolerably 
high, or MODERATELY high. It is plain 



(by calling it the Attributive of an Attributive) is conform- 
able to the best authorities. Theodore Gaza defines an Ad- 
verb, as follows — jJitgoQ \6ys aTrrdyrov, Kara prjfjLaTOQ 
Xiyofxevov, rj iTriXEjo/Jievov pi^fiari, kj olov iTriOerov 
prifxaTog. A Part of Speech devoid of. Cases, predicated 
of a Verb, or subjoined to it, and being as it were the 
VerFs Adjective. L IV. (where by the way we may 
observe, how properly the Adverb is made an Aptote, since 
its principal sometimes has cases, as in Valde Sapiens ; 
sometimes has none, as in Valde amat.) Priscian's defi- 
nition of an Adverb is as follows — Adverbium est pars 
orationis indeclinabilis, ctij'us significatio Verbis adjicitur. 
Hoc enim perficit Adverbium Verbis additum, quod adj'ec- 
tiva nomina appellativis nominibus adjuncta ; ut prudens 
homo; prudenter egit ; felix Vir ; feliciter 2;ii)iY. L. XV. 
p. 1003. And before, speaking of the Stoics, he says 
— Etiam Adveubia Nominibus vel Verbis connume- 
RABANT, et quasi adjectiva V^rborum 7iominabant, 
L. I. p. 574. See also JpolL de Synt. L. I. c. 3. sub fin. 
o 2 



196 HERMES. 

therefore that Intension and Remission are 
among the Attributes of such Attributes. 
Hence then one copious Source of secon- 
dar}^ Attributives, or Adverbs, to denote 
these two, that is. Intension^ and Remission. 
The Greeks have their ^oLVixdcSig^ (xotXiqa^ 
wdvVymiqoLi the Latins, their valde, vehe- 
ment er, maxime, satis y mediocriter ; the 
English, their greatly, vastly, extremely, 
sufficiently, moderately, tolerably, indiffer- 
ently, &c. 

Farther than this, where there are 
different Intensions of the same Attribute, 
they may be compared together. Thus if 
the Garment A be exceedingly White, 
and the Garment B be moderately 
White, we may say, the Garment A is 
more white than the Garment B. 

In these instances the Adverb More 
not only denotes Intension, but relative 
Litension. Nay, we stop not here. We 



BOOK I.— CHAP. XL 197 

not only denote Intension merely relative^ 
but relative Intension^ than which there is 
none greater. Thus we not only say the 
Mountain A is more high than the Moun- 
tain B, but that it is the most high of all 
Mountains. Even Verbs^ properly so called, 
as they admit simple Intensions, so they 
admit also these comparative ones. Thus 

in the following Example Fa7ne he 

LovETH MORE than Riches, but Virtue of 
all things he loveth most — ^the Words 
MORE and MOST denote the different com- 
parative Intensions of the Verbal Attribu- 
tive, Loveth. 

And hence the rise of Comparison, 
and of its different Degrees; which can- 
not well be more than the two Species 
above mentioned, one to denote Simple 
Excess, and one to denote Superlative. 
Were we indeed to introduce more degrees 
than these, we ought perhaps to introduce 
infinite, which is absurd. For why stop 



198 H E R M E S. 

at a limited Number, when in all subjects, 
susceptible of Intension, the intermediate 
Excesses are in a manner infinite? There 
are infinite degrees of more White, be- 
tween the first Simple White^ and the Su- 
perlative^ Whitest ; the same may be said 
oi more Great, more Strong, more MinutCj 
^c. The Doctrine of Grammarians about 
three such Degrees, which they call the 
Positive, the Comparative, and the Super- 
lative, must needs be absurd ; both because 
in their Positive there isf no Comparison 
at all, and because their Superlative is a 
Comparative, as much as their Comparative 
itself. Examples to evince this may be 
found every where. Socrates was the most 
WISE of all the Athenians — Homer was the 
most sublime of all Poets — 

— Cadit et Ripheus, Justissimus unus 
Quifuit in Teucris — Virg. 

•f- Qui (sell. Gradus PositivisJ quoniam perfectus est, a 
quibusdam in numero Graduum non computatur. Con- 
sentii Ars apud Putsch, p. 20SS. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. XI. 199 

It must be confessed these Comparatives, 
as well the simple as the superlative^ seem 
sometimes to part with their relative Na- 
ture, and only retain their intensive. Thus 
in the Degree, denoting simple Excess, 

Tristior, et lacrumis oculos suffusa niteiites, Virg. 
Rusticior j?r/w/o est — Hor, 

In the Superlative this is more usual. 
Vir doctissimus, Vir fortissimiis, a most learn^ 
ed Man, a most brave Man, — that is to say, 
not the bravest and 7nost learned Man that 
ever existed, but a man possessing those 
Qualities in an eminent Degree* 

The Authors of Language have con- 
trived a method to retrench these Compa- 
rative Adverbs, by expressing their force in 
the Primary Attributive. Thus instead of 
More fair, they say Fairer; instead of 
Most fair. Fairest, and the same holds 
true both in the Greek and Latin, This 
Practice however has reached no farther 



goo HERMES. 

than to Adjectives, or at least to Participles, 
sharing the nature of Adjectives, Verbs 
perhaps were thought too much diversified 
already, to admit more Variations without 
perplexity. 

As there are some Attributives, which 
admit of Comparison, so there are others, 
which admit of none. Such for example 
are those, which denote that Quality of 
Bodies arising from their Figure ; as when 
we say, a Ci7xular Table, a Quadrangular 
Court, a Conical Piece of Metal, ^c. The 
reason is, thai a million of things, partici- 
pating the same Figure, participate it equal- 
ly, if they participate it at all. To say there- 
fore that while A and B are both quadran- 
gular, A is 9nore or less quadrangular than 
B, is absurd. The same holds true in all 
Attributives, denoting definite Quantities^ 
whether continuous or discrete, whether ab- 
solute or relative. Thus the two-foot Rule 
A cannot be more a two foot Rule, than any 



BOOK I.— CHAP. XI. 201 

other of the same length. Twenty Lions 
cannot be more twenty^ than twenty Fhes. 
If A and B be both triple^ or quadruple to 
C, they cannot be more triple^ or more qua- 
druple^ one than the other. The reason of 
all this is, there can be no Comparison with- 
out Intension and Remission ; there can be 
no Intension and Remission in things al- 
ways definite; and such are the Attribu- 
tives, which we have last mentioned. 

In the same reasoning we see the cause, 
why no Substantive is susceptible of these 
Comparative degrees. A Mountain cannot 
be said more to Be, or to Exist, than 
a Mole-hilly but the More and Less must be 
sought for in their quantities. In like 
manner, when we refer many Individuals 
to one Species, the Lion A cannot be 
called more a Lion^ than the Lion B, but 
if more any thing, he is more fierce^ more 
speedy^ or exceeding in some such Attribute. 
So again, in referring many Species to one 



20S HERMES. 

Genus, a Crocodile is not more an Ani- 
mal, than a Lizard ; nor a Tiger, more than 
a Cat, but if any thing, they are more 
bulky^ 7nore strongs &c. the Excess, as 
before, being derived from their Attri- 
butes. So true is that saying of the acute 
Stagirite — that Substance is not suscep- 
tible of More and Less/'^^ But this by 
way of digression, to return to the subject 
of Adverbs. 

Of the Adverbs, or secondary Attribu- 
tives already mentioned, these denoting 
Intension or Remission may be called Ad- 
verbs o^ Quantity continuous ; Once, Twice, 
Thrice, are Adverbs of Quantity discrete-; 
More and Most, Less and Least, to vi^hich 
may be added Equally, Proportionally, <^c. 

^'^ 8IC av liridixoLTO r] saia ro fxaWov itf to tittov, 
Categor. c. 5. See also Sanctius, L. I. c. 11. L. II. 
c. 10, 11. where the subject of Comparatives is treated 
in a very masterly and philosophical manner. See also 
Friscian, p. 598. Derivantur igitur Comparatwa a No- 
minibus Adjectivis, &c. 



BOOK I.— CHAP. XI. 

are Adverbs of Relation, There are others 
of Quality, as when we say, Honestly 
industrious, Prudently brave, they fought 
BRAVELY, he painted finely, a Portico 
formed Circularly, a Plain cut Trian- 
gularly, ^c. 

And here it is worth while to observe, 
how the same thing, participating the 
same Essence, assumes different gramma- 
tical Forms from its different relations. 
For example, suppose it should be asked, 
how differ Honest, Honestly, and Honesty, 
The Answer is, they are in Essence the 
same, but they differ, in as much as Ho- 
nest is the Attributive of a Substantive; 
Honestly, of a Verb ; and Honesty, being 
divested of these its attributive Relations, 
assumes the Power of a Substantive, so as 
to stand by itself. 

The Adverbs, hitherto mentioned, are 
common to Verbs of every Species; but 



m4< HERMES. 

there are some, which are peculiar to Verbs 
properly so called, that is to say, to such as 
denote Motion or Energy, with their Pri- 
vations, All Motion and Rest imply 
Time and Place, as a kind of necessary 
Coincidents, Hence, then, if we would 
express the Place or Time of either, we 
must needs have recourse to the proper 
Adverbs ; of Place, as when we say, he 
stood THERE ; he went hejstce; he travelled 
PAR, ^c. of Time, as when we say, he 
stood then; he we7it afterward; Jie 
travelled formerly, ^c. Should it be 
asked— — why Adverbs of Time, when 
Verbs have Tenses? The Answer is, though 
Tenses may be sufficient to denote the 
greater Distinctions of Time, yet to de- 
note them all by Tenses would be a per- 
plexity without end. What a variety of 
Forms, to denote Yesterday, To-day, To- 
morror^. Formerly, Lately, Just now. Now, 
Immediately, Presently, Soon, Hereafter, 
Sec. It was this then that made the Ton- 



BOOK I.— CHAP. XI. 205 

poral Adverbs necessary, over and above 
the ^Tenses. 



To the Adverbs just mentioned may be 
added those which denote the Intensions 
and Remissions peculiar to Motion^ such as 
speedily^ hastily^ swiftly^ slowly^ &c. as also 
Adverbs of Place, made out of Prepositions^ 
such as oivoo and mrcf^ from olvol and kxtx, 
in English upward and downward, from 
up and down. In some instances the Pre- 
position suffers no change, but becomes 
an Adverb by nothing more than its Ap- 
phcation, as when we say, circa equitaf, 
he rides about; prope cecidit, he was 
i^EAR falling ; Verum ne post conferas 
culpam in me. But do not after lay the 
blame on me/'^^ 



^"^^ Sosip. Charisu Inst, Gram. p. 170. Tercnt. Eun. 
Act. II. Sc. 3. 



•206 HERMES. 

There are likewise Adverbs of Interro- 
gation^ such as Where, Whence, Whither, 
How ; of which there is this remarkable^ 
that when they lose their Interrogative 
power, the J assume that of a 'Relative, so 
as even to represent the Relative or Sub^ 
junctive Pronoun, Thus Ovid 

Et Seges est, ubi Trojafuit — 
translated in our old English Ballad, 

And Corn doth grow, where Troy town stood. 

That is to say, Seges est in eo loco, in quo 
^c. Cor?i groweth in that place, in which 
^c. the power of the Relative, being im- 
plied in the Adverb. Thus Terence, 

Hujusmodi mihi res semper comminiscere, 
Ubi me e.vcarnufices — Heaut. IV. 6. 

where ubi relates to res, and stands for 
quibus rebus* 



BOOK I.— CHAP. XI. S>07 

It is in like manner that the Relative 
Pronoun upon occasion becomes an Inter- 
rogative^ at least, in Latin and English. 
Thus Horace^ 

QuEM Virum aut Heroa lyra^ vel acri 
Tibia sumes celebrare, Clio ? 

So Milton, 

Who Jirst seduc'dthem to that foul revolt 1 

The reason of all this is as follows. 
The Pronoun and Adver^bs here mentioned 
are all alike, in their original character, 
Relatives. Even when they become 
Interrogatives, they lose not this character, 
but are still Relatives, as much as ever. 
The difference is, that without an Interro- 
gation, they have reference to a Subject 
which is antecedent, definite and known; 
with an Interrogation, to a Subject which 
is subsequent, indefinite, and unknown^ and 
which it is expected that the Answer should 
express and ascertain. 

Who first seducd them'? — 



^208 HERMES. 

The very Question itself supposes a Se- 
ducer, to which though unknown^ the Pro- 
noun, Who, has a reference. 



TK infernal Serpent- 



Here in the Answer we have the Subject^ 
which was indefinite^ ascertained ; so that 
the Who in the Interrogation is (we see) 
as much a 'Relative^ as if it had been said 
originally, without any interrogation at all. 
It was the Infernal Serpent, w no first 
seduced them. 

And thus is it that Interrogatives and 
Relatives mutually pass into each other. 

And so much for Adverbs, peculiar to 
Verbs properly so called. We have already 
spoken of those which are common to all 
Attributives. We have likewise attempted 
to explain their general Nature, which we 
have found to consist in being the Attri- 



BOOK I.— CHAP. XI. S09 

butes of Attributes. There remains only to 
add, that Adverbs may be derived from 
almost every part of Speech ; from Pre- 
positions, as when from After we derive 
Afterwards — from Participles, and 
through these from Verbs^ as when from 
Know we derive Knowings and thence 
Knowingly ; from Scio Sciens^ and thence 
Scienter — from Adjectives, as when from 
Virtuous and Vicious, we derive Virtu- 
ously and Viciously — from Substantives 
as when from Tli^mog, an Ape, we derive 
Ui^msiov liXsTTsiv^ to look Apishly : from 
Afcov, a Lion, A£ov7co5co^^ Leoninely — nay 
even from Propeii Names, as wlien from 
Socrates and Demosthenes, we derive Socra- 
tically and Demosthenically. It was Socra^ 
tically reasoned, we say ; it was Demosthe- 
nically spoken.^ Of the same sort are 
many others, cited by the old Gramma- 

* Aristotle has KujcXoTTiKwc Cyclopically, from KukXwi/^ 
a Cyclops. Eth. Nic. X. 9. 



210 HERMES. 

rians, such as Catiliniter from Catilina^ 

Sisenniter from Sisenna^ TuUiand from 

Tullius, SccJ'^ 

- f 

♦" 
Nor are they thus extensive only in De- 
rivation, but in Signification also. Theodore 
Gaza in his Grammar informs us/^ that 
Adverbs may be found in every one of 
the Predicaments, and that the readiest 
way to reduce their Infinitude, was to refer 
them by classes to those ten universal 
Genera. The Stoics too called the Ad- 
verb by the name of Umhsiiiviq^ and 
that from a view to the same multiform 
Nature. Omnia in se capit quasi collata 
per satiram^ concessd sibi rerum varid potes- 
tate. It is thus that Sosipater explains the 



<^^ See Prise. L. XV. p. 1022, Sos. Charts. 161, 
Edit. Putschii. 

W — gt^ g^ ^ afiuvov icFwg ^SKa i^tiov eTrippr^inaTtJV yivri 
3"€cr0at sKcTva, s(Tiav, irqibv, woabv, irpog ti,k.t. X. Gram. 
Introd. L. II. 



BOOK L~CHAP. XI. 211 

Word/^'' from whose authority we know it 
to be Stoical. But of this enough. 

And now having finished those princi- 
pal Parts of Speech, the Substantive 
and the Attributive, which are signi- 
ficant WHEN ALONE, WC prOCCcd tO 

those AUXILIARY PARTS, which are only 

SIGNIFICANT WHEN ASSOCIATED. But 

as these make the Subject of a Book by 
themselves, we here conclude the first Book 
of this Treatise. 

^^^ Sostp: Char. p. 175. Edit. Putschit. 



p 2 



HERMES 



OE 

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 

CONCERNING 

UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. 



BOOK II. 

CHAP. L 

Concerning Definitives, 

"W^HAT remains of our Work, is a matter 
of less difficulty, it being the same here, as 
in some Historical Picture ; when the prin- 
cipal Figures are once formed, it is an easy 
labour to design the rest. 

Definitives, the Subject of the pre- 
sent Chapter, are commonly called by 
Grammarians, Articles, A RTicuLi Ap^poL 
They are of two kinds, either those pro- 
perly and strictly so called, or else the Pro- 



S14 HERMES. 

nominal Articles^ such as This^ That^ Any 

4'C. 

We shall first treat of those Articles 
more strictly so denominated^ the reason 
and use of which may be explained, as 
follows. 

The visible and individual Substances 
of Nature are infinitely more numerous, 
than for each to admit of a particular 
Name. To supply this defect, when any 
Individual occurs, which either wants a 
proper Name, or whose proper Name is 
not known, we ascertain it, as well as we 
can, by referring it to its Species ; or, if 
the Species be unknown, then at least to 
some Genus. For example — a certain 
Object occurs, with a head and limbs, and 
appearing to possess the powers of Self- 
motioa and Sensation. If we know it not 
as an Individual, we refer it to its proper 
Species, and call it Dog^ or Horse, or Lion 



BOOK II.— CHAP. I. 215 

or the like. If none of these Names fit, 
we go to the Genus and call it, AnimaL 

But this is not enouoh. The Thino^, 
at which we are looking, is neither a Spe- 
cies, nor a Genus. What is it then .^ An 
Individual. — Of what kind .^ Known or 
unknown ? Seen no\v for the first time or 
seen before^ and now remembered ? — It is 
here we shall discover the use of the two 
Articles (A) and (The.) (A) respects our 
primary Perception, and denotes Individu- 
als as unknown ; (The) respects our second- 
ary Perception and denotes individuals as 
known. To explain by an example. I see 
an object pass by, which I never saw till now. 
What do I say ? — There goes a Beggar with 
A long Beard. The Man departs, and re- 
turns a week after. What do I say then ? 
— There goes the Beggar with the long 
Beard, The Article only is changed, the 
rest remains un-altered. 



S16 HERMES. 

Yet mark the force of this apparently 
minute Change. The Individual, once 
vagiie^ is now recognized as something 
known, and that merely by the efHcacy of 
this latter Article, which tacitly insinuates 
a kind oi previous acquaintance, by refer- 
ring the present Perception to a like Per- 
ception already past/''^ 

The Truth is, the Articles (A) and 
(The) are both of them Definitives, as 
they circumscribe the latitude of Genera 
and Species, by reducing them for the most 
part to denote Individuals. The diifer- 
ence however between them is this ; the 
Article (A) leaves the Individual itself 
unascertained, whereas the Article (The) 
ascertains the Individual also, and is for 
that reason the more accurate Definitive of 
the two. 

^«^ SeeB. I. C.5. p. m.Qi^. 



BOOK IL— CHAP. I. 217 

It is perhaps owing to the imperfect 
manner, in which the Article (A) defines, 
that the Greeks have no ^Article corres- 
pondent to it, but supply its place, by a 
negation of their Article ^O. ^O avSpoo- 
TTog ETTsasVy The man fell — avOpcoTTo^ iTT^crfv, 
A Man fell, without anything prefixed, 
but only the Article withdrawn/*^ Even 
in English, where the Article (A) cannot 
be used, as in plurals, its force is exprest 



^ ^ Ta yap, aopt'S'wSwc ttote vosfxeva, 17 t5 apOps irapa- 
OeaiQ v-nb opicrfiov ra -npoaoma ayu. Those things, which 
are at times understood indefinitely, the addition of the 
Article makes to he definite as to their Person. Apoll. L. 
IV. c. I. See of the same author, L. I. c. 6, 36. irottX 
(^To ''ApOpov sc.) ^' avaTToXtjCTiv npocyvijJCFfjLivs rS Iv r^ 
(Twra^EC olov d ^Iv Xiyoi rig, ANGPOIIOS HKE, 
a^rjXov riva avOpwirovXtyei, el ^l O ANGPOflGS, ^riXov, 
7rpoEyvw(Tfi.ivov yap riva avOptoTTOv Xiyn. Thto ce avTo 
(SsXovTai itf 01 (pa(TKOVT8Q T upQpov (Jt^fiavTiKov TTpwrrjc 
yvu)(Te(i)Q Kf ^evripac;. The Article causes a Review within 
the Mind of something known before the texture of the 
Discourse. Thus if any one says "AvOpwiror nice, Man 
CAME (which is the same as when we say in l^nglish a man 



218 HERMES. 

by the same Negation. Those art the 
MeUy means those are individuals, of which 
we possess some previous Knowledge. 
Those are Men^ the Article apart, means no 
more than that they are so many vague 
and uncertain Individuals, just as the 
Phrase, A Man, in the singular, implies 
one of the same number. 

But though the Greeks have no Article 
correspondent to the Article (A), yet 
nothing can be more nearly related, than 
their 'G, to the Article The. /O (iddiXsvq, 
The King; TO %ov, The Gift, <5c. Nor 
is this only to b6 proved by parallel ex- 



carm) it is not evident, of whom he speaks But if he says 
6 avOpwnoQ ^K£ The man came, then it is evident; for 
he speaks of some Person known before. And this is what 
those mean, who say that the Article is expressive of the 
First and Second Knowledge together, Theod. Gaza. 
L. IV, 



BOOK IL—CHAP. I. 219 

amples, but by the Attributes of the Greek 
Article, as they are described by ApoU 
lonius, one of the earliest and most acute 
of the old Grammarians, now remain- 
ing. 

Eqiv ^v m^o ml iv cUxKoig oLTrscp^voLixe^oLy 

ihov apSpcov yj GLvoL(popik^ v\ iqi wpomjsiXsyfjLSv^ 

wfOdo^Tt^ wapoLCOLTiavj. — ISIow the peculiar 
Attribute of the Article as we have shown 
elsewhere^ is that Reference, which implies 
some certain Person already mentioned. Again 

Ov yocp Ivjys rd ovofjioLTOi i^ ocOtwv oLvaCpopxv 
TTxpiqmiVy 61 iJLVi (rvfJCTroLpay^oL^oisv TO oip^pov, « 

iloLipsTog iciv v\ OLvoL(pop(i, For Nouns of them- 
selves imply not Reference, unless they take 
to them the Article, whose peculiar Character 
is Reference. Again- — To oip^pov wpov(p6qi^(70Lv 
yvSi(7iv 5viAor — The Article indicates a pre-^ 
established acquaintanceJ'^ 



CO 



JpolL dc Synt. L. I. c. 6, 7. His account of Re- 



no H E RM E S. 

His reasoning upon Proper Names is 
worth remarking. Proper Names (he tells 
us) often fall into Homonymie, that is, dif- 
ferent Persons often go by the same Name. 
To solve this ambiguity, we have recourse 
to Adjectives or Epithets^ For example 
— there were two Grecian chiefs who bore 
the name of Ajax. It was not therefore 
without reason, that Menestheiis uses Epi- 
thets, when this intent was to distinguish 
the one of them from the other. 

Horn. 

If both Ajaxes (says he) cannot be spared, 

at least alone 

Let mighty Telamonian Aja.v come, 

Apollonius proceeds Even Epithets 



FERENCE is as follows — 'l^iw/ULa avacpopag TrpoKareiXey- 
julvs TTpofTMWs SevTEpa yvwaig. The peculiar character of 
Reference is the second or repeated Knowledge of some 
Person already mentioned, L. II. c. 3. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. L S21 

themselves are diffused through various 
Subjects, in as much as the same Ad- 
jective may be referred to many Substan- 
tives. 

In order therefore to render both Parts 
of Speech equally definite, that is to say 
the Adjective as well as the Substantive, 
the Adjective itself assumes an Article be- 
fore it, that it may indicate a Reference to 
some single Person only^ fjLOvahm dvcKpopoc^ 
according to the Author's own Phrase. 
And thus it is we say, Tpucpoov 6 FpotiJiiJiXTi' 
Koq^Trypho the Grammarian ; AttoAAoSco- 
poq Kvpyimloq^ Apollodorus the Cyrenean, 
^c. The Author's Conclusion of this 
Section is worth remarking. Afovrco^ kfOL 
mi KdLTOL TO TOibTOv vj wfiOdkaiq iqi 7& oip^p^^ 
(nrjihoL^^aa to stti^stikov tco Kup/co ovofjLXTi — 
It is with reason therefore that the Article 
is here also added, as it brings the Adjec- 



%^ HERMES. 

ime to an Individuality^ as precise as the 
proper NameJ'^^ 

We may carry this reasoning farther, 
and shew, how by help of the Article even 
common Appellatives come to have the 
force of proper Names, and that unassist- 
ed by epithets of any kind. Among the 
Athenians TiKohv meant Ship; 'EvdsKOLy 
Eleven ; and "Av9pco7ro$, Man. Yet add 
but the Article, and To TlKoTov^ the Ship 
meant that particular Ship, which they sent 
annually to Delos ; O/ 'Ev^skol^ the ele- 
VEis:, meant certain officers of Justice ; and 
^O AvfipcoTTO?, THE MAN, meant their puh^ 
Uc Executioner. So in English, City 
is a Nanie common to many places ; 
^nd Speaker, a name common to many 



^'^^ See Apoll. L. I. c. 12. where by mistake Memiaus is 
put for Menesthem, 



BOOK IL—CHAP. I. 

Men. Yet if we prefix the Article, the 
City means our Metropolis; and the 
Speaker, a high Officer in the British 
Parliament. 

And thus it is by an easy transition, 
that the Article, from denoting Reference^ 
comes to denote Eminence also ; that is to 
say, from implying an ordinary pre-acquain- 
tance, to presume a kind of general and 
universal Notoriety, Thus among the 
Greeks 'O Uoi^y^g, the poet, meant Ho- 
mer f^ and ^O ^TouysipiTvig, the stagirite 
meant Aristotle ; not that there were not 
many Poets, beside Homer ; and many 
Stagirites, beside Aristotle; but none 



^'^ There are so few exceptions to this Observation, that 
we may fairly admit it to be generally true. Yet Aristotle 
twice denotes Euripides by the Phrase 6 7roir}Trig, once at 
the end of the seventh Book of his Nichomachian Ethics 
and again in his Phi/sics, L. II. 2. Plato also in his 
tenth Book of Laws (p. 901. Edit, S err.) denotes ^csiW 
after the same manner. • v ' ' 



224 HERMES. 

equally illustrious for their Poetry and 

Philosophy. 

It is on a like principle that Aristotle 
tells us, it is by no means the same thing 
to assert — sFvcii tviv vjhvviv aryx^ov^ or, TO 
OLyoL^ov — that, Pleasure is a Good, or The 
Good. The first only makes it a common 
Object of Desire^ upon a level with many 
others, which daily raise our wishes ; the 
last supposes it that supreme and sovereign 
Good, the ultimate Scope of all our Actions 
and Endeavours/-^^ 

But to pursue our Subject. It has been 
said already that the Article has no mean- 
ing, but when associated to some other 
word. — To what words then may it be as- 
sociated ? — ^To such as require defining for 



(/■) 



Analyt. Prior. L. I. c. 40. 



BOOK II.-CHAP. I. 225 

it is by nature a Definitive, — And what 
Words are these ? — Not those which already 
are as definite^ as may be. Nor yet those, 
which, being indefinite^ cannot properly be 
made otherwise. It remains then they 
must be those^ which though indefinite, are 
yet capable^ through the Article^ of becom- 
ing definite. 

Upon these Principles we see the rea- 
son, why it is absurd to say, O EFQ, The 
I, or O 2T, The Thou, because nothing 
can make those Pronouns more definite^ 
than they are/^^ The same may be asserted 



^3^ Apollonius makes it part of the Pronoun's Definition, 
to refuse co-alescence with the Article. 'EkeTvo 8v 'Avrw- 
vvfiia, TO jiETCL Sfi^EWC y\ avacjiopag avTOvofxa^ofievov, i^t s 
(Tvv^'^L TO apOpov. That therefore is a Pronoun, which 
with Indication or Reference is put for a Noun, and with 
WHICH THE Article doth not Associate. L. II. 
c. 5. So Gaza, speaking of Pronouns— Ilavrrj Sc— hjc 
iTTL^ix^vTm (iqO^ov. L. IV. Priscian says the same. 
Jure igitur apud Gracos prima et secunda persona pro- 

Q 



HERMES, 
of Proper Names, and though the Greeks 
say 6 ^ooKpir^g, vi H^vd/TTTTH, and the like, 
yet the Article is a mere Pleonasm, unless 
perhaps it serve to distinguish Sexes. By 
the same rule we cannot say in Greek 
OI AM*OTEPOI, or in English, The 
BOTH, because these Words in their own 
nature are each of them perfectly defined, 
so that to define them farther would be 
quite superfluous. Thus if it be said, I 
have read BOTH Poets, this plainly indicates 
u definite pair, of whom some mention 
has been made already ; Auiij syvooaixm, a 
known Duad, as ApoUonius expresses him- 
self,''''^ when he speaks of this Subject. 
On the contrary, if it be said I have read 



nominum, quad sine dubio demonstrative sunt, articulis 
adjungi non possunt ; nee tertia, quando demonstrativa est, 
L. XII. p. 938. — In the beginning of the same Book, he 
gives the true reason of this. Supra omnes alias partes 
orationis finit personas Pronomen. 



w 



Apollon, L. I. c. 16. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. I. 2^7 

Two Poets, this may mean a7iy Pair out 
of all that ever existed. And hence this 
Numeral, being in this Sense indefinite (as 
indeed are all others, as well as itself) is 
forced to assume the Article, whenever it 
would become definite,* And thus it is, 
The Two in English, and OI ATO in 
Greek, mean nearly the same thing, as 
Both or AM*OTEPOL Hence also it 
is, that as Two, when taken alone, has 
reference to some primary and indefinite 
Perception, while the Article, The, has 
reference to some secondary and definite;-]' 
hence I say the Reason, why it is bad 
Greek to say ATO OI AN0Pf2nOI, and 
bad Eiiglish, to say Two the Men. Such 



* This explains Servius on the XI I"' a^neid. v. 511. 
where he tells us that Duorum is put for Amhorum. In 
English or Greek the Article would have done the busi- 
ness, for the Two, or toXv SvoTv are equivalent to Both or 
ajU(/)orepwv, but not so Duorum, because the Latins have 
no Articles to prefix. 



t Sup. p.215, 21G. 



Q 2 



HERMES. 

Syntax is in fact a Blending of Incompati- 
bles, that is to say of a defined Substantive 
with an undefined Attributive. On the 
contrary to say in Greek AM$OTEPOI 
OI AN0Pi^nOI, or in English, Both 
THE Men, is good and allowable, because 
the Substantive cannot possibly be less apt, 
by being defined, to coalesce with an At- 
tributive, which is defined as well as it- 
self. So likewise it is correct to say, OI 
ATO ANGPQnOI, The Two Men, 
because here the Article, being placed 
in the beginning, extends its Power as 
well through Substantive as Attributive, 
and equally contributes to dejine them 
both. 

As some of the words above admit of 
no Article, because they are by Nature as 
definite as may be, so there are others, 
which admit it not, because they are not 
to be defined at all. Of this sort are all 
Interrogatives. If we question about 



BOOK II.— CHAP. I. 229 

Substances, we cannot say O TI2 OT- 
TOS, The who is this; but TI2 
OTTOS, Who is this?^^^ The same as 
to Qualities and both kinds of Quantity. 
We say without an Article nOIOS, nO- 
SOI HHAIKOS, in English, what 

SORT OF5 HOW MANY, HOW GREAT. Thc 

Reason is, that the Articles ^O, and the 
respect Beings, already known ; Interroga- 
tives respect Beings, about which zi)e are ig- 
norant ; for as to what we know, Interro- 
gation is superfluous. 

In a word, the natural Associators with 
Articles, are all those commo/i Appellatives, 
which denote the several Genera and Spe- 
cies of Beings. It is these, which, by as- 
sun)ing a different Article, serve either to 
explain an Individual upon its first being 

^'^ Apollonius calls TIS, IvavTidyrarov tljv apOptov, 
a Part of Speech, ^nost contrary, most averse to Articles. 
L. IV. c. 1. 



230 HERMES. 

perceived, or else to indicate, upon its re- 
turn, a Recognition, or repeated Know- 
ledge/^^ 

We shall here subjoin a few Instances 
of the Peculiar Power of Articles. 

Every Proposition consists of a Subject ^ 
and a Predicate. In English these are dis- 
tinguished bj their Position, the Subject 
standing jftrst, the Predicate last. Happi- 
ness is Pleasure — Here Happiness is the Sub- 
ject ; Pleasure the Predicate. If we change 
their order, and say, Pleasure is Happiness; 
then Pleasure becomes the' Subject^ and 
Happiness the Predicate, In Greek these 
are distinguished not by any Order or Po- 
sition, but by help of the Article, which 
the Subject always assumes, and the Predi- 



^*^ What is here said respects the two Articles, which 
we have in English. In Greek, the article does no more, 
than imply a Recognition, See before p. 216, SIT, 218. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. I. 231 

cate in most instances (some few excepted) 
rejects. Happiness is Pleasure — ;^^cv'/) yj su- 
^xi(xovfci — Pleasure is Happiness — >j ij^ovvj sv- 
^oLifJLOvix — 'Fine things are difficult — 'x^oCks'nx 
70L KdKoL — Difficult things arejine — tol ^ci- 

In Greek it is worth attending, how in 
the same Sentence, the s^dm^ Article, by 
being prefixed to a different Word, quite 
changes the whole meaning. For example 
— ^O UtoXsijloli oq yvyDiddioLfx/idOLq iTLyLVi^yi 
— Ptolemy^ having presided over the Games^ 
was publicly . honoured. The Participle 
yvfJLmdioLfx^dCLq has here no other force, 
than to denote to us the Time^ when Ptole- 
my was honoured, viz, after having pre- 
sided over the Games. But if, instead of 
the Substantive^ we join the Participle to 
the Article, and say, ^O yvyLmaiafX/i^J^q 
UroXsixoLiog iriiJLVjl}'^^ our meaning is then — 
The Ptolemy, who presided over the Gaines, 



232 HERMES. 

was honoured. The Participle in this case, 
being joined to the Article, tends tacitly to 
indicate not one Ptolemy but many, of 
which number a particular one partici- 
pated of honour/^^ 

In English likewise it deserves remark- 
ing, how the Sense is changed by chang- 
ing of the Articles, though we leave every 
other Word of the Sentence untouched — 
And Nathan said unto David, Thou art 
THE Man.* In that single, the, that 
diminutive Particle, all the force and effi- 
cacy of the Reason is contained. By that 
alone are the Premises applied, and so 
firmly fixed, as never to be shaken. It is 
possible this Assertion may appear at first 
somewhat strange ; but let him who doubts 
it, only change the Article, and then see 
what will become of the Prophet and his 

^'^ Apollon, I.. I.e. SS, S4f, 
* SY EI 'O ANHP. BadiX. B'. k£^. fj3'. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. I. 2^3 

reasoning. — And Nathan said unto David, 
Thou art a Man. Might not the King 
well have demanded upon so impertinent 
a position, 

Non dices hodie, qtiorswn hcec tarn putida te7ida7it? 

But enough of such Speculations. The 
only remark, which we shall make on 
them, is this; that "minute Change in 
" Principles, leads to mighty Change in 
" Effects ; so that well are Principles 
" intitled to our regard, however in appear- 
" ance they may be trivial and low.'' 

The Articles already mentioned are 
those strictly so called ; but besides these 
there are the Pronominal Articles, 
such as This, That, Any, Other, Some, All, 
No, or None, &c. Of these we have spoken 
already in our chapter of Pronouns,''"*^ 



^"•^ See B. L c. 5. p. 72, 73. It seems to have been 
some view of words, like that here given, which induced 
Quinltltan to say of the Latin tongnc— Noster scrmo 



^34 HERMES. 

where we have shown, when they may be 
taken as Pronouns, and when as Articles. 
Yet in truth it must be confessed, if the 
Essence of an Article be to define and ascer- 
tain^ they are much more properly Arti- 
cles than any thing else, and as such should 
be considered in Universal Grammar. 
Thus when we say. This Picture I ap^ 
prove^ but that I dislike^ what do we per- 
form by the help of these Definitives, but 
bring down the common Appellative to 
denote two Individuals, the one as the more 



Articulos non desiderat ; ideoque in alias partes orationii 
sparguntur. Inst. Orat. L. I. c. 4. So Scaliger. His 
declaratis^ satis constat Gr^corum Articulos non neglectoa 
a nobis y sed eorum usum super jiuum. Nam uhi aliquid 
prcEscribcndum est, quod Gneci per articuhim efficiunt 
(sXf^ey 6 ^sXog) expletiir a Latinis per Is ant Ille; Is, 
aut^ Ille servus dixit, dc quo servo antea facta vientio sit, 
aut qui alio quo pacto jwtus sit. Additur enim Articulus 
ad rei memoriam retiovandam, ctijus antea non nescii iumus, 
aut ad prcescribendam intellectionem, qua latiiis patere 
queat ; veluti cum dicimusy C. Csesar, Is qui postea dic- 
tator fult. Nam alii fuere C. Casares. Sic Grace 
}^ai<Tap 6 avTOKparijjf). De Caus. Ling. Lat; c. 161. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. I. 235 

7?ear the other as the more distant ? So whep. 
we say, Some men are virtuous^ but All 
men are mortal^ what is the natural Effect 
of this All and Some, but to define 
that Universality^ and Particularity , which 
would remain indefinite, were we to take 
them away ? The same is evident in such 
Sentences, as — Some substances have sensa- 
tion ; OTHERS want it — Chuse any way of 
acting, and some meii will find fault, &c. 
For here some, other, and any, serve 
all of them to define different Parts of a 
given Whole; Some, to denote a definite 
Fart; Any, to denote an indefinite; and 
Other, to denote the remaining Part, 
when a Part has been assumed already. 
Sometimes this last Word denotes a large 
indefinite Portion, set in opposition to some 
single, definite, and remairiing Part, which 
receives from such Opposition no small 
degree of heightening. Thus Virgil, 

Excudent alii spirantia molliiis cera ; 

(Credo equidcm) vivos ducent de marmore vultus ; 



SS6 HERMES. 

Orahunt causas melius, ccelique meatus 
Describent j^adio, et surgentia sidera dicent : 
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento, 
Sec. Mn. VI. 

Nothing can be stronger or more sub- 
lime, than this Antithesis ; one Act set as 
equal to maiiy othet^ Acts taken together ^ 
and the Roman singly (for it is Tu Rom^ane, 
not Vos Romani) to all other Men ; and yet 
this performed by so trivial a cause, as the 
just opposition of Alii to Tu. 

But here we conclude, and proceed to 
treat of Connectives. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. II. 



CHAP. II. 

Concerning Connectives^ and first those 
called Conjunctions, 

Connectives are the subject of what 

follows ; which, according as they connect 
either Sentences or JVords, are called by 
the different Names of Conjunctions, or 
Prepositions. Of these Names, that of 
the Preposition is taken from a mere acci- 
dent, as it commonly stands in connection 
before the Part which it connects. The 
name of the Conjunction, as is evident, has 
reference to its essential character. 

Or these two we shall consider the Con- 
junction first, because it connects, not 
AVords, but Sentences, This is conform- 
able to the Analysis, with which we be- 



238 HERME S. 

gan this inquiry,* and which led us, by 
parity of reason, to consider Sentences them- 
selves before words. Now the Definition 
of a Conjunction is as follows — a Part 
of speech, void of Signification itself, but so 
formed as to help Signification, by making 
TWO or more significant Sentences to be one 
significant Sentence/"^ 



* Sup. p. 11, 12. 

^"^ Grammarians have usually considered the Con- 
junction as connecting rather single parts of Speech, than 
whole Sentences, and that too with the addition of like 
with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, 
Case with Case, (^c. This Sanctius justly explodes. 
Conjunctio neque casus, neque alias partes orationis (ut im- 
periti docent) conjungit, ipsa enim partes inter se conjun- 
guntur — sed conjunctio Orationes inter se conjungit. 
Miner. L. III. c. 14. He then establishes his doctrine 
by a variety of examples. He had already said as much, 
L. I. c. 18. and in this he appears to have followed 
Scaliger, who had asserted the same before him. Con- 
junctionis autem notionem veteres paullo inconsultiils prodi- 
dere ; neque enim, quod aiunt, partes alias conjungit (ipsa 
enim partes per se inter se conjunguntur J — sed Conjunctio 
est, qu€e conjungit Orationes plures. De Caus. Ling, Lat. 
c. 165. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. 11. S39 

This therefore being the general Idea of 
Conjunctions, we deduce their Species 



This Doctrine of theirs is confirmed by Jpollonius^ 
who in the several places, where he mentions the Con- 
junction, always considers it in Syntax as connecting Sen- 
tejices and not Words, though in his works now extant he 
has not given us its Definition. See L. I. c. 2. p. 14. 
L. II. c. IS. p. 124. L. III. c. 15. p. 2S4. 

But we have stronger authority than this to support 
Scalicrer and Sanctius^ and that is Aristotle s Definition, 
as the Passage has been corrected by the best Critics and 
Manuscripts. A Conjunction, according to him, is ^wv?/ 
aarifiOQ, Ik TrXtioywv filv ^wvwv }Jllclq, (TT) fxavTiKtJv cl, 
TTOiEiv TrEcpvKvTa fiiav (pijjvriv (jt] fjLavTLKr}v. An articulate 
Sounds devoid of signification, which is so formed as to 
make one significant articulate Sound out of several arti- 
culate Sounds, which are each of them significant. Poet, 
c. 20. In this view of things, the one significant articu- 
late Sound, formed hy the Conjunction, is not the Union 
of two or more Syllables in one simple Word, nor even 
of two or more Words in one simple Sentence, but of 
two or more simple Sentences in one complex Sentence, which 
is considered as one, from that Concatenation of Mean- 
ing effected by the Conjunctions. For example, let us 
take the Sentence which follows. If Men are h\j nature 
social, it is their interest to be just, though it were not so 



^40 H E R M E S. 

in the following manner. Conjunctions, 
while they connect sentences^ either connect 



ordained hy the Law$ of their Country. Here are three 
Sentences. (1.) Men are hy nature social. (2.) It is 
Man's Interest to be just. (3.) It is not ordained hy the 
Laws of every Country that Man should he just. The 
first two of these Sentences are made One by the Con- 
junction, If; these. One with the third Sentence, by 
the Conjunction, Tho'; and the three, thus united, make 
that ^(jjvrj fiia (tt} fjiavTiKri, that one significant articu- 
late Sound, of which Aristotle speaks, and which is the 
result of the conjunctive Power. 

This explains a passage in his Rhetoric, where he 
mentions the same Subject. 'O yap GvvdacriuLog tv iroiei 
TO, TToWu' W'^€ lav k^aipeOy, d'qXov on rsvavTiov e'^ai 
TO tv TToXXa. The Conjunction makes many, one ; so 
that if it he taken away, it is then evident on the contrary 
that one will he many. Rhet. III. c. 12. His instance 
of a Sentence, divested of its Conjunctions, and thus 
made many out of one, is, rjiXOov, airiivrriffa, edeofxr^v, 
venif occurri, rogavi, where by the way the three Sen- 
tences, resulting from this Dissolution (for riXOov, 
airrivTrjcFa, and e^EOfxriv, are each of them, when uncon- 
nected, so many perfect Sentences), prove that these 
are the proper Subjects of the Conjunction's connective 
faculty. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. II. 241 

also their meanings^ or not. For example : 
let us take these two Sentences — Kome 
was eiislaved — Ccesar was ambitious — and 
connect them together by the Conjunction, 
Because. Rome was enslaved because 
CcEsar was ambitious. Here the Meanings^ 
as well as the Sentences^ appear to be con- 
nected. Bnt if I say, — Manners must be 
reformed^ or Liberty will be lost — here the 
Conjunction, or, though it join tha Sen- 



Ammonius's account of the use of this Part of Speech 
is elegant. Ato itf twv Xoywv 6 fxlv virag^Lv fiiav crj- 
IJLaivcjv, 6 KvpL(i)g eig, avaXoyoQ av tlr} tio firjoiTro) rtT" 
fxrifxiv^) SvXtt), i^ dia tsto Ivi Xeyo/iiivtj)' 6 ^e TrXdovag 
virdp^Eig SrjXwv, *iva (lege dia) tlvcl SI avvdetrfxov rivtJcT- 
Oai TTwc Sofcwv, avaXoyil ry vrjt ry Ik iroWiov avyKEL- 
/ulvp ?vXwv, vno dl tCjv yofjKJiwv ^atvojutvrjv Ix^t^V ^^^ 
tvuymv. Of Sentences y that which denotes one Existence 
simply y and which is strictly one, may he considered as 
analogous to a piece of Timber not yet severed, and called 
on this account One, That which denotes several Exist- 
ences, and which appears to he made one hy some Conjunc- 
tine Particle, is analogous to a Ship made up of many 
pieces of Timber, and which by means of the nails has an 
apparent Unity. Am. in Lib. de Interpret, p. 54, 6. 

R 



Mn HEEMES. 

fences, yet as to their respective Meanings, 
is a perfect Disjunctive, And thus it ap- 
pears, that though all Conjunctions conjoin 
Sentences, yet with respect to the Sense, 
some are Conjunctive, and some Dis- 
junctive; and hence ^^^ it is that we 
derive their different Species. 

The Conjunctions which conjoin both 
Sentences and their Meanings, are either 
Copulatives or Continuatives. The 
principal Copulative in English is, And. 
The Continuatives are. If, Because, 
Therefore, That, &c. The Difference 
between these is this— The Copulative does 
no more than barely couple Sentences, aild 
is therefore appUcable to all Subjects, 
whose Natures are not incompatible. Con^- 
tinuatives, on the contrary, by a more inti- 
mate connection, consolidate Sentences 

^^^ Thus Scaliger. Aut ergo Sensum conjungunt, ac 
Verba; aut Verba tantum conjungunt, Sensum vero rfiV- 
jungunt, De C. L. Lat. c. 167. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. II. S4S 

into one continuous Whole, and are there- 
fore applicable onl}^ to Subjects, which 
have an essential Co-incidence, 

To explain by examples — It is no way 
improper to say, Lysippus was a Statuary, 
AND Priscian was a Grammarian — The 
Sun shineth, and the Sky is clear— hecsiu^e 
these are things that may co-exist, and yet 
imply no absurdity. But it would be ab- 
surd to say, Lysippus z^as a Statuary, be- 
cause Priscian was a Grammarian; though 
not to say, the Sun shineth, because the 
Sky is clear. The Reason is, with respect 
to the first, the Co-incidence is merely ac- 
cidental; with respect to the last, it is es- 
sential, and founded in nature. And so 
much for the Distinction between Copu- 
latives and ContinuativesJ'^ 



^'^ Cepidativa est, qua copulat tarn Verba, quant Sen- 
sum» Thus Priscian, p. 1026. But Scaliger is more 

R 2 



J^M HERMES. 

.. As to ContinuativeSj they are either Sitp-* 
FostTivE, such as. If ; or Positive, such 
as, Because, Therefore, As, &c. Take 
Examples of each — yoic will live happily, 
IF you live honestly — you will live happily, 
BECAUSE you live honestly. The differ- 
ence between these Continuatives is this 
- — ^The Suppositives denote Connection, but 
assert not actual Existence; the Positives 
imply both the one and the other J'^^ 



explicit — si Sensum conjungunt (conjunctiones sc) aut ne- 
cessarid, aut non necessario ; et si non necessarid, turn fiuni 
CopuIativcB^ &c. De C. Ling. Lat. c. 167. Priscian's 
own account of Continuatives is as follows. Continua- 
ttvae sunt, qu^s continuationem et consequentiam rerum signi- 
ficant — ibid. Scaliger's account is^-causam ant prtesti- 
tuunt, aut subdunt. Ibid. c. 168. The Greek name for 
tiie Copulative was SuvSeo-juoc (rujUTrXefcnicoc ; for tbe 
Continuative, (jvvaiTTiKog ; the Etymologies of which 
words justly distinguish their respective characters. 

^'^^ The old Greek Grammarians confined the name 
^vvaTTTiKoi, and the Latins that of Continuatives^ to those 



BOOK II.— CHAP. II. 245 

Farther than this, the Positives above 
mentioned are either Causal, snch as, 
Because, Since, As, &c. or Collec- 
tive, such as. Therefore, Where* 
FORE, Then, Sec, The Difference be- 
tween these is this — the Catisals subjoin 
Causes to Effects — The Sun is in Eclipse, 



Conjunctions, which we have called Suppositwe or Con- 
ditional, while the Positive they called TraparrvvairTiKoi, 
or Subcontinuativce. They agree however in describing 
their proper Characters. The first according to Gaza 
are, ol virap^iv fxlv s, ciKoXsOiav St riva i^ rd^iv Srj- 
Xtivrer — L. IV. Prisdan says, they signify to us, qua- 
ils est ordinatio et natura rerum, cum duhitatione aliqud 
essentia rerum — p. 1027. And Scaliger says, they con- 
join sine suhsistentid necessarid ; potest enim subsistere et 
non subsistere ; utrumque enim admittunt. Ibid. c. 168. 
On the contrary of the Positive, or TragaavvaTrriKoi (to 
use his own name) Gaza tells us, on icj vira^^iv fiira 
Tu^ewg av^fiaivsaiv Iroiye — And Priscian says, causam 
continualionis oslendunt consequentem cum essentia rerum — 
And Scaliger, non ex hypothesi, sed ex eo, quod subsistit, 
conjungunt. Ibid. 

It may seem at first somewhat strange, why the Posi- 



246 HERMES. 

BECAUSE the Moon intervenes — The Collec- 
tives subjoin Effects to Causes — The Moon 
intervenes^ therefore the Sun is in 
Eclipse. Now we use Causals in those 
instances, where, the effect being con- 
spicuous, we seek its Cause ; and Colkc- 
tives^ in Demonstrations^ and Science pro- 
perly so called^ where the Cause being 



tive Conjunctions should have been considered as Subordi- 
nate to the Suppositwe, which by their ancient Names 
appears to have been the fact. Is it, that the Positive 
are confined to what actually/ is ; the Suppositive extend 
to Possibles, nay evfen as far as to Impossibles f Thus it is 
false to affirm, As it is Dai/, it is Light, unless it actually 
be Day. But we may at midnight affirm, If it be Day, 
it is Light, because the. If, extends to Possibles also. 
Nay we may affirm, by its help (if we please), even Im- 
possibles. We may say. If the Sun be cubical, then is the 
Sun angular ; If the Sky fall, then shall we catch Larks, 
Thus too Scaliger upon the same occasion — amplitudi- 
nem Continuativa percipi ex eo, quod etiam impossibile alt- 
quando prtesupponit. De C. L. Lat. C. 168, In this 
sense then the Continuative, Suppositive or Conditional 
Conjunction is (as it were) superior to the Positive, as 
being of greater latitude in its application. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. II. 247 

known first, by its help we discern conse- 
quences/'^ 

All these Continuatives are resolvable 
into Copulatives. Instead of Because it 
is Day^ it is lights we may say. It is Day, 
AND it is Light. Instead of, If it be Day, 
it is Light, we may say, It is at the same 
time necessary to he Day, and to he Light; 
and so in other Instances. The Reason is, 
that the Power of the Copulative extends 
to all Connections, as well to the essential, 
as to the casual ov fortuitous. Hence there- 
fore the Continuative may be resolved into 
a Copulative and something more, that is to 
say, into a Copulative implying an essential 
Co-incidence ^^ in the Subjects conjoined. 

^'^ The Latins called the Causals, Causales or Cau- 

sativa ; the Collectives, Collective or Illativde : The 

Greeks called the former AWioXoyLKoi, and the latter 
^v\Xoyi<^iKoi. 

^ Resolvuntur autem in Copulalivas omnes hce, prop- 
terea quod Causa cum Effectu Sudpte naturd conjuncta est. 
Seal, de C. L. Lat. c. 169. 



248 HiBRMES. 

As to the Ca?/5a/ Conjunctions (of which 
we have spoken already) there is no one 
of the four Species of Causes, which they 
are not capable of denoting : for example, 
THE Material Cause — The Trumpet 
sounds^ BECAUSE it is made of Metal — ^The 
FORMAL — The Trumpet Sounds^ because 
it is long and hollow — The efficient— 
The Trumpet sounds^ because an Artist 
blows it — The final — The Trumpet 
sounds, that it may raise our courage. 
Where it is worth observing, that the three 
first Causes are exprest by the strong af- 
firmation of the Indicative Mode, because 
if the Effect actually be, these must of 
necessity be also. But the last Cause has 
a different Mode, namely, the Contingent 
or Potential. The Reason is, that the 
Final Cause, though it may be ^rst in 
Speculation, is always last in Event. That is 
to say, however it may be the End, which 
set the Artist first to work, it may still be 
an End beyond his Power to obtain, and 



BOOK II.— CHAP. II. 249 

which, like other Contingents, may either 
happen, or notJ^^ Hence also it is con- 
nected by Conjunctions of a peculiar kind, 
such as, That, m^ Ut, &c. 

The Sum is, that all Conjunctions 
which connect both Sentences and their 
Meanings, are either Copulative, or Con- 
tinuative; the Continuatives are either 
Conditional or Positive ; and the Positives 
are either Causal or Collective, 

And now we come to the Disjunctive 
Conjunctions, a Species of Words, 
which bear this contradictory Name, be- 
cause while they disjoin the Sense, they con- 
join the SentencesJ^'^ 



'"^ Sec B. I, c. 8. p. 142. See also Vol. I. Note VIII. 
p. 271. For the four Causes, see Vol. I. Note XVII. p. 
280. 

^^^ Ot ^£ ^LaZ,ivKTLKOL TO. ^m^fvy/XEVtt (rvvTiOiaaij icj tJ 
vpayna ano irpayfxaTOi', i] 7r()oo'W7roi^ otto TrpoacoTrs Sia- 



250 HERMES. 

With respect to these we may observe, 
that as there is a principle of Union dif- 
fused throughout all things, by which this 
Whole is kept together, and preserved 
from Dissipation ; so there is a Principle 
of Diversity diffused in like manner, the 
Source of Distinction, of Number, and of 



Zevyvvvreg, r^v (ppamv lirKTvvdsmv* Gazte Gram. L. IV. 
Disjunctive sunt, qua, quamvis dictiones conjungant, sensum 
tamen disjunctum hahent. Prise. L. XVI. p. 1029. And 
hence it is, that a Sentence, connected by Disjunctives, has 
a near resemblance to a simple negative Truth. For though 
this, as to its Intellection be disjunctive (its end being to 
disjoin the Subject from the Predicate) yet as it combines 
Terms together into one Proposition, it is as truly synthe- 
tical, as any Truth, that is affirmative. See Chap. I. Note 
(^^p. 3. 

^*^ The Diversity which adorns Nature, may be said 
to heighten by degrees, and as it passes to different Sub- 
jects, to become more and more intense. Some things 
only differ, when considered as Individuals, but if we recur 
to their Species, immediately lose all Distinction : such for 
instance are Socrates and Plato. Others differ as to Species, 
but as to Gejius are the same : such are Man and Lion, 
•There are others again, which differ as to Genus, and co- 



ll I 



BOOK II.-CHAP. II. 351 

Now it is to express in some degree the 
Modifications of this Diversity^ that Dis- 
junctive Conjunctions seem first to 
have been invented. 

Of these Disjunctives, some are 
Simple, some Adversative — Simple, 
as when we say, either it is Day, or it 



incide only in those transcendental Comprehensions of Ens, 
Being, Existence, and the like : such are Quantities and 
Qualities^ as for example an Ounce, and the Colour, White. 
Lastly ALL Being whatever differs, as Being, from Non- 
being. 

Farther, in all things different, however moderate their 
Diversity, there is an appearance of Opposition with 
respect to each other, in as much as each thing is itself, 
and not any of the rest. But yet in all Subjects this 
Opposition is not the same. In Relatives, such as 
Greater and Less, Double and Half, Father and Son, 
Cause and Effect, in these it is more striking, than in or- 
dinary Subjects, because these always shew it, hy necessarily 
inferring each other. In Contraries, such as Black 
and White, Even and Odd, Good and Bad, Virtuous and 
Vicious, in these the Opposition goes still farther, because 
these not only differs but are even destructive of each other. 



252 HERMES. 

is Night — Adversative as when we say. It 
is not Day^ but it is Night. The Differ- 
ence between these is, that the simple do 
no more, than merely disjoin; the Adversa- 
tive disjoin, with ?Ln Opposition concomitant. 
Add to this, that the Adversative are defi- 
nite ; the Simple, indefinite. Thus when 
we say. The Number of Three is not an even 
Number^ but an odd, we not only disjoin 



But the most potent Opposition is that of ''AvTi(j)amg, or 
Contradiction, when we oppose Proposition to Proposi- 
tion, Truth to Falsehood, asserting of any Subject, either 
it is, or it is not. This indeed is an Opposition which 
extends itself to all things, for every thing conceivable 
must needs have its Negative, though multitudes by nature 
have neither Relatives, nor Contraries. 

Besides these Modes of Diveesity, there are others 
that deserve notice : such for instance, as the Diversity 
between the Name of a thing, and its Definition ; between 
the various Names^ which belong to the same thing, and 
the various things, which are denoted by the mme Name ; 
all which Diversities upon occasion become a Part of our 
Discourse. i\nd so much, in short, for the Subject of 
Diversity. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. II. 253 

two opposite Attributes, but we definitely 
afFirm one, and deny the other. But when 
we say, The Number of the Stars is ei.ther 
eve7i OR odd, though we assert one Attribute 
ta be, and the other not to be, yet the Alterna- 
tive notwithstanding is left indefinite. And 
so much for simple Disjimctives/^^ 

As to Adversative Disjunctives, it has 
been said already that they imply Oppo- 



^*^ The simple Disjunctive r}, or Fe/, is mostly used 
indefinitely, so as to leave an Alternative. But when it is 
used definiteh/, so as to leave no Alternative, it is then a 
perfect Disjunctive of the Subsequent from the Previous 
and has the same force with i^ s, or, Et non. It is thus 
Gaza explains that Verse of Homer. 

finXofx lyoj Xaov goov f/UjU£vat, rj airoXtcrOaL. 

IX. A. 

That is to say, / desire the people should be saved, and 
NOT be destroj/ed, the Conjunction 17 being avaipsTiKogy 
or sublatwe. It must however be confest, that this Verse is 
otherwise explained by an Ellipsis, either of fiaXXov, or 
uvTic, concerning which sec the Commentators. 



254 HERMES. 

siTioN. Now there can be no Opposition 
of the same Attribute^* m the same Subject ^ 
as when we say Nireus was beautiful ; but 
the Opposition must be either of the same 
Attribute in different Subjects^ as when we 
say Brutus was a Patriot but Caesar was 
not — or of different Attributes in the same 
Subject^ as when we say, Georgias was a 
Sophist^ BUT not a Philosopher — or of dif- 
ferent Attributes in different Subjects, as 
when we say, Plato was a Philosopher, but 
Hippias was a Sophist. 

The Conjunctions used for all these pur- 
poses nvay be called Absolute Ai>vEiiSA- 

TIVES. 

But there are other Adversatives, besides 
these; as when we say, Nireus was more 
beautiful than Achilks — Virgil was as 
great a Poet as Cicero was an Orator. The 
Character of these latter is> that they go 
farther than the former^ by marking not 



BOOK II.~CHAP. II. '255 

onl}^ Opposition^ but that Equality or Ex- 
cess^ which arises among Subjects from 
their being compared. And hence it is 
they may be called Adversatives of 
Comparison. 

Besides the Adversatives here men- 
tioned, there are two other Species, of 
which the most eminent are unless and 
ALTHo\ For example — Troy will be 
taken unless the Palladium he preserved — 
Troy will he taken altho' Hector de- 
fend it. The Nature of these Adversatives 
may be thus explained. As every Event 
is naturally allied to its Cause, so by parity 
of reason it is opposed to its Preventive, 
And as every Cause is either adequate <^^ or 
in^adequate (in-adequate, when it endea- 
vours, without being effectual) so in like 

^'^ This Distinction has reference to common Opinion, 
and the form of Language, consonant thereto. In strict 
metaphysical truth, No Cause, that is not adequate, is anj/ 
Cause at all. 



^56 HERMES, 

manner is every Preventive. Now adequate 
Preventives are exprest by such Adversa- 
tives, as unless — Troy will be taken, un- 
less the Palladium be preserved; that is 
This alone is sufficient to prevent it. The 
in-adequate are exprest by such Adversa- 
tives as alt ho' — Troy will be taken 
ALTHo' Hector defend it; that is, ifec- 
tors Defence will prove in-effectual. 

The Names given by the old Grammar- 
ians to denote these last Adversatives, 
appear not sufficiently to express their 
Natures/""^ They may be better perhaps 
called Adversatives Adequate and 
In-adequate. 

And thus it is that all Disjunctives, 
that is Conjunctions, which conjoin Sen- 



^"*''They called them for the most part, without suffici- 
ent Distinction of their Species, Adversativa, or 'Evavn^ 
wjuariKOi. 



BOOK II.—CHAP. II. 257 

tences, but not their meanings^ are either 
Simple, or Adversative; and that all 
Ad VERS ATI VES are either Absolute or Com" 
parative; or else Adequate or In-adequate, 

We shall finish this Chapter with a few 
miscellany Observations. 

In the first place it may be observed, 
through all the Species of Disjunctives, 
that the same Disjunctive appears to have 
greater or less force, according as the Sub- 
jects, which it disjoins, are more or less 
disjoined by Nature. For example, if 
w^e say, Every Number is even^ or odd — . 
Every Proposition is true^ o^ false — nothing 
seems to disjoin more strongly than the 
Disjunctive^ because no things are in Na- 
ture more incompatible than the Subjects. 
But if we say, That Object is a Triangle, 
OR Figure contained under three right lines 
— the (or) in this case hardly seems to 
disjoin, or indeed to do more, than dis- 



558 HERMES. 

iinctly to express the Thing, first by its 
Name^ and then by its Definition. So if we 
say. That Figure is a Sphere^ or a Globe, 
OE a Ball — the Disjunctive in this case, 
tends no farther to disjoin, than as it dis- 
tinguishes the several Nafues^ which belong 
to the same ThingJ''^ 

Again — the Words, When and Where^ 
and all others of the same nature, such as, 
Whence, Whither, Whenever, Wherever, ^c, 
may be properly called Adverbial Con- 
junctions, because they participate the 
nature both of Adverbs and Conjunctions 
— of Conjunctions, as they conjoin Sen- 



''"^ The Latins had a peculiar Particle for this occasion, 
which they called Suhdisjunctiva, a Subdisjunctive ; and 
that was Sive. Alexander sive Paris ; Mars she 
Mavors, The Greek E'/r sv seems to answer the same 
end. Of these Particles, Scaliger thus speaks — Et sane 
nomen Suhdisjunctwarum rede acceptum est, neque enim 
tarn plane disjungit, guam Disjunctive. Nam Disj'unc- 
tiva sunt in Contrariis — Suhdisjunctiva autem etiam in non 
Contrariis, sed Dtversis tantum ; ut, Alexander sive Parts. 
De C. L. Lat. c. 170. 



BOOK II. -CHAP. II. ^39 

tences; of Adverbs, as they denote the 
Attributes either of Time, or oi Place. 

Again — these Adverbial Conjunctions^ 
and perhaps most of the Prepositions (con- 
trary to the Character of accessory Words, 
which have strictly no Signification, but 
when associated with other words) have a 
kind of obscure Signification, when taken 
alone, by denoting those Attributes of 
Time and Place. And hence it is, that 
they appear in Grammar, like Zoophytes 
in Nature; a kind of^'^ middle Beings, 
of amphibious character, which, by shar- 
ing the Attributes of the higher and the 
lower, conduce to link the Whole toge- 
ther/^^ 



^"^ rioXXa^ou yaf) i) fjtvaiq St}Xr} yivirm Kara juiKpov 
fiiTuj^aivbaa, wze Ufi(^ia^r]THGdaL Im rivav, ttoteoov 
?wov n <l)VTov. Themist. p. 74. Ed. Aid. See also 
An'st. de Animal. Part. p. 9i3. 1. 10. Ed. Syll. 

''''^ It is somewhat surprizing that the politest and most 
elegant of the AUk Writers, and Plato above all the rest, 

s 2 



HERMES. 

And so mueh for Conjunctions, their 
Genus, and their Species. 



should have their works filled with Particles of all kinds, 
and with Conjunctions in particular ; while in the modern 
p>lite works, as well of ourselves as of our neighbours, 
scarce such a Word as a Particle, or Conjunction is to be 
flou'd. Is it, that where there is Connection in the Mean- 
ing, there must be Words had to connect ; but that where 
the Connection is little or none, such Connectives are of 
little use ? That Houses of Cards, without cement, may 
well answer their end, but not those Houses, where one 
would chuse to dwell ? Is this the Cause ? or have we 
attained an Elegance, to the Antients unknown ? 

Venimus ad summamfortuna, Sfc» 



BOOK II.— CHAP. III. 261 

CHAP. III. 

Concerning those Connectives called 
Prepositions. 

Prepositions by their name ex^ 

press their Place, but not their Character. 
Their Definition will distinguish them 
from the former Connectives. A Pre- 
position is a Part of Speech, devoid itself 
of Signification, but so formed as to unite 
two Words {hat are significant, and that re- 
fuse to co-alesce or unite of themselves/"^ 



^'^ The Stoic Name for a Preposition was UpoBe- 
TLKOQ SvvSctTjuoc, PvcEpositwa CoTijunctio, a Prepositive 
Conjunction. iic /^^v 8v i^j Kara rag aWag TrapaOc- 
aeig al TrpoOiaeig (TuvSeo-jutKfjc frvvra^ewg yivovrm irap^fx- 
fj>aTiKai, XtXetcraL r]}xiv' l^ wv /^ a<l)OpiJ.rj fuprjrat irapa 
Tolg SrtuticoTc th KaXugdat avrag TlpoOeTiKsg ^vvSia/uisc* 
Now in what manner even in other applications (besides 
the present) Prepositions give proof of their Conjunctive 
Syntax, we have mentioned already ; whence too the Stoics 



26^ HERMES. 

This connective Power (which relates to 
Words only, and not Sentences), will be 
better understood from the following 
Speculations. 

Some things co-alesce and unite of 
themselves ; others refuse to do so without 
help^ and as it were compulsion. Thus in 
Works of Art, the Mortar and the Stone 
Qo-alesce of themselves ; but the Wainscot 
and the Wall not without Nails and Pins. 
In nature this is more conspicuous. For 
example ; all Quantities, and Qualities co- 
alesce immediately with their Substances. 
Thus it is we say, a fierce Lion, a vast 
Mountain; and from this Natural Concord 
of Subject and Accident, arises the Gram- 



took occasion to call them Pjiepositive Conjunctions. 
Jpollon. L. IV. c. 5. p. 313. Yet is this in fact rather 
a descriptive Sketch, than a complete Definition, since 
there are other Conjunctions, which are Prepositive as 
well as these. See ^az.Li IV. de Praeposit, Prise, L. 
XIV. p. 983. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. III. 263 

matical Concord of Substantive and Adjective, 
111 like manner Actions co-alesce with their 
Agents, and Passions with their Patients. 
Thus it is we say, Alexander conquers ; Da- 
rius is conquered. Nay, as every Energy 
is a kind of Medium between its Agent 
and Patient, the whole three. Agent, 
Energy^ and Patient, co-alesce with the 
same facility ; as when we say, Alexander 
conquers Darius, And hence, that is fron^ 
these Modes of natural Co-alescence^ arises 
the Grammatical Regimen of the Verb by 
its Nominative^ aiid of the Accusative by its 
Verb. Farther than this, Attributives them- 
selves may be most of them characterized ; 
as when we say of such Attributives as ran, 
beautiful,, learned, he ran swiftly, she was 
very beautiful, he was moderately learned^ 
^*c. And hence the Co-alescence of the 
Adverb with Verbs, Participles, and Adjec- 
tives, 

The general Conclusion appears to be 



264 HERMES. 

this. " Those Parts of Speech unite 

" OF THEMSELVES IN GrAMMAR, WHOSE 

" ORIGINAL Archetypes unite of 
"themselves in Nature/' To which 
we may add, as following from what has 
been said, ihnt the great Objects of Natural 
Union are Substance and Attribute. 
Now though Substances naturally co-incide 
with their Attributes^ yet they absolutely 
refuse doing so, one with another J^^ And 
hence those known Maxims in Physics, 
that Body is impenetrable ; that two Bodies 
cannot possess the same place ; that the same 
Attribute cannot belong to different Sub- 
stances , ^c. 

From these Principles it follows, that 
when we form a Sentence, the Substantive 



^^^ Causa, propter quam duo Suhstantiva non ponuntur 
sine copula, e Philosophid petenda est : neque enim duo sub- 
stantialiter unum esse potest^ sicut Substantia et Accidens ; 
itaque non di'cas, C.^sah, Cato pugnat. Seal, de Cans. 
Ling. Lat. e. 177. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. III. ^65 

without difficulty co-incides with the Verb, 
from the natural Co-incidence of Substance 
and Energy — ^The Sun warmeth. So 
likewise the Energy with the Subject^ on 

which it operates warmeth the 

Earth. So likewise both Substance and 
Energy with their proper Attributes. — 
The Splendid Sun, — genially warm- 
eth — THE fertile Earth. Butsuppose 
we were desirous to add other Substantives, 
as for instance. Air or Beams. How would 
these co-incide, or under what Character 
could they be introduced ? Not as Nomi- 
natives or Accusatives^ for both those places 
are already filled ; the Nominative by the 
Substance, Sun ; the Accusative by the 
Substance, Earth. Not as Attributes to 
these last, or to any other thing ; fov Attri- 
butes by nature they neither are^ nor can 
be made. Here then we perceive the Rise 
and Use of Prepositions. By these we 
connect those Substantives to Sentences, 
which at the time are unable to co-alesce 



^266 HERMES. 

of themselves. Let us assume for instance 
a pair of these Connectives, Thro' and 
With, and mark their Effect upon the 
Substances here mentioned. The splendid 
Sun WITH his Beams genially z^armeth 
thro' the air, the fertile Earth. The 
Sentence, as before, remains intire and one; 
the Substantives required are both intro- 
duced; and not a Word, which was there 
before, is detruded from its proper place. 

It must here be observed that most, if 
not all Prepositions seem originally formed 
to denote the Relations of Place.^'^^ The 
reason is, this is that grand Relation, which 
Bodies ov natural Substances maintain at 
all times one to another, whether they are 



^"^ Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit : quare opus 
fuit aliqud notd, qua TO HOY signijicaret, sive esset inter 
duo extrema^ inter quae motusjit, sive esset in altero extre- 
moruni) in quibusjit quies. Hinc eliciemus Prapositionis 
essentialem definitionem. Seal, de Cans. Ling. Lat. c. 
15S. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. III. 267 

i 

contiguous or remote, whether in motion, 
or at rest. 

It may be said indeed that in the Con- 
tinuity of Place they form this Universe 
or VISIBLE Whole, and are made as 
much One by that general Comprehension 
as is consistent with their several Natures, 
and specific Distinctions. Thus it is we 
have Prepositions to denote the contiguous 
Relation of Body, as when we say, Caius 
walked with a Staff; the Statue stood 
VFON a Pedestal ; the River ran over a 
Sand ; others for the detached Relation, as 
when we say. He is going to Italy ; the 
Sun is risen above the Hills; these Figs 
came from Turkey, So as to Motion and 
Rest^ only with this difference, that here 
the Preposition varies its character with 
the Verb. Thus if we say, that Lamp 
hangs FROM the Ceiling, the Preposition, 
From, assumes a Character of Quiescence. 
But if we say, that Lamp is falling trom 



S68 HERMES. 

the Ceilings the Preposition in such case 
assumes a Character of Motion, So in 
Milton, 

— To support uneasie Steps 
Over the burning Marie — Par. L. I. 

Here over denotes Motion. 

Again — 

— He — with looks of cordial Love 
Hung OVER her enamour' d — Par. L. IV. 

Here over denotes Rest. 

But though the original use of Preposi- 
tions was to denote the Relations of Place 
they could not be confined to this Office 
only. They by degrees extended them- 
selves to Subjects incorporeal, and came to 
denote Relations, as well intellectual as 
local. Thus, because in Place he, who is 
above, has commonly the advantage over 
him, who is below, lieuce we transfer over 
and UNDER to Dominion and Obedience; 
of a king we say, he ruled over his People ; 



BOOK II.— CHAP. III. S69 

of a common Soldier, he served under 
such a General, So too we say, with 
Thought ; without Attention ; thinking 
over a Subject ; under Anxiety ; from Fear ; 
out of Love ; through Jealousy, &c. All 
which instances, with many others of like 
kind, shew that the first Words of Men^ 
like \X\m first Ideas, had an immediate re- 
ference to sensible Objects, and that in after 
days, when they began to discern with their 
Intellect, they took those Words, which 
they found already made, and transferred 
them by metaphor to intellectual Concep- 
tions. There is indeed no Method to ex- 
press new Ideas, but either this of Meta- 
phor, or that of Coinirig nezo Words, both 
which have been practised by Philosophers 
and wise Men, according to the nature, 
and exigence of the occasion. ^'^'' 

•■^^ Among the Words new coined we may ascribe to Anax- 
agoras 'OfioiOfiipEia ; to Plato Ilotorrjc ; to Cicero, Quali- 
tas ; to Aristotle ''EvTiXix'^ia ; to the Stoics, Ovng, Keparic 
and many others.— Among the Words transferred by Me- 



570 H E R M E S. 

In the foregoing use of Prepositions, 
we have seen how they are applied holtx 

taphor from common to special Meanings, to the Platonics 
we may ascribe 'I^ea ; to the Pythagoreans and Peripa- 
tetics, Karriyopia, and Karr^yopav ; to the Stoics, Kara- 
\ri\pig, virokri^ig, KaOijKOv ; to the Pyrrhonists, *'£?€«?£, 

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends 
to discuss the Sentiments of any one of these Philosophers 
or even to cite and translate him (except in trite and ob- 
vious Sentences) without accurately knowing the Greek 
Tongue in general ; the nice differences of many Words 
apparently synonymous ; the peculiar Stile of the author 
whom he presumes to handle ; the new coined Words, and 
new Significations given to old Words, used by such 
Author, and his Sect ; the whole Philosophy of such Sect, 
together with the Connections and Dependencies of its 
several Parts, whether Logical, Ethical, or Physical ;— He, 
I say, that, without this previous preparation, attempts 
what I have said, will shoot in the dark ; will be liable 
to perpetual blunders : will explain, and praise, and censure 
merely by chance ; and though he may possibly to Fools 
appear as a wise Man, will certainly among the wise ever 
pass for a Fool. Such a Man's Intellect comprehends 
antient Philosophy, as his eye comprehends a distant 
Prospect. He may see perhaps enough, to know Moun- 
tains frflnj Plains, and Seas from Woods ; but for an 
accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, 
this without farther helps, it is impossible he should attain. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. III. 271 

7:xp(i^S(7iVy by way of Juxta-position^ that is 
to say, where they are prefix t to a Word, 
without becoming a Part of it. But they 
may be used also n^rk (7{a/^6(7iVj by way of 
Composition, that is, they may be prefixt 
to a AVord, so as to become a real Part of 
it/'^ Thus in Greek we have 'Emcoi^rhi, 
in Latiii^ Intelligere, in English, to Under- 
stand. So also, to foretel, to overact, to 
undervalue, to outgo, i^c. and in Greek and 
Latin, other instances innumerable. In 
this case, the Prepositions commonly trans- 
fuse something of their own meaning into 
the Word, with which they are compound- 
ed ; and this imparted Meaning in most 
instances will be found ultimately resolv- 
able into some of the Relations of Place,*^^ 
as used either in its proper or metaphorical 
acceptation. 

^'^ See Gaz. Gram. L. IV. Cap. de Praepositione. 

^ For example, let us suppose some given Space. E 



^n HERMES. 

Lastly, there are times, when Prepo- 
sitions totally lose their connective Nature, 



and F signify out of that Space ; Per, through it, from 
begining to end; In, within it; Sub, under it. Hence 
then E and Per in composition augment; Enormis, some- 
thing not simply big, but big in Excess ; something got 
out of the rule, Sindi beyond the measure; Dico, to speak; 
Edico, to speak out; whence Edictum, an Edict, something 
so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all 
to obey. So Terence, 

Dico, Edico vobis —-Bmi. V. 5. SO. 

which (as Donatus tells us in his Comment) is an Av^rimg* 
Fart, to speak ; Effari, to speak out — hence Effatum, an 
Axiom, or self-evident Proposition, something addressed 
as it were to all men, and calling for universal Assent. 
Cic. Acad. II. 29. Permagnus, Perutilis, great through- 
out, useful through every part. 

On the contrary, In and Sub diminish and lessen. 
Injustus, Iniquus, unjust, inequitable, that lies within 
Justice and Equity, that reaches not so far, that fails 
short of them ; Subniger, blackish ; Subrubicundus, red- 
dish ; tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under 
the standard, and below perfection. 

Emo originally signified to take away ; hence it came 
to signify to buy, because he who buys, takes away 
his purchase. Inter, Between, implies Discontinuance, 



BOOK II.— CHAP. III. 273 

being converted into Adverbs, and used in 
Syntax accordingly. Thus Horner^ 

— And Earth smWd all around, 

IX. T. 3Q<2. 

But of this we have spoken in a preceding 
Chapter/^^ One thing we must however 
observe, before we finish this Chapter, 
which is, that whatever we may be told of 
Cases in modern Languages, there are in 
fact no such things ; but their force and 
power is exprest by two Methods, either 



for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. 
From these two comes, Interimo, to kill, that is to say, to 
take a Man away in the midst of Life, by making a Dis- 
continuance of his vital Energy. So also Perimo, to kill 
a Man, that is to say, to take him away thoroughly ; for 
indeed what more thorough taking away can well be sup- 
posed ? The Greek Verb, 'Ai/atptty, and the Englitih Verb, 
To take off, seem both to carry the same allusion. And 
thus it is, that Prepositions become Parts of other Words. 

<^^ See before, p. 205. 



27* HERMES. 

by Situation^ or by Prepositions ; the Nomi- 
native and Accusative Cases by Situation ; 
the rest by Prepositions. But this we shall 
make the subject of a Chapter by itself, 
concluding here our Inquiry concerning 
Prepositions. 



BOOK II.— CHAP, IV. n5 



CHAP. IV. 

Concerning Cases, 

As Cases, or at least their various 
Powers, depend on the knowledge partly 
of Nouns^ partly of Verbs, and partly of 
Prepositions ; they have been reserved, till 
those Parts of Speech had been examined 
and discussed, and are for that reason made 
the Subject of so late a Chapter as the 
present. 

There are no Cases, in the modern 
Languages, except a few among the pri- 
mitive Pronouns, such as I, and Me ; Je, 
and MoY ; and the English Genitive, form- 
ed by the addition of s, as when from 
Lion, we form Lions; from Ship, Ship's. 
From this defect, Iiowever, we may be 
T 2 



!276 HERMES. 

enabled to discover in some instances what 
a Case is, the Periphrasis^ which suppHes 
its place, being the Case (as it were) un- 
folded. Thus Equi is analyzed into Du 
Cheval, Of the Horse ; Equo into Au Che- 
'Val, To the Horse, And hence we see 
that the Genitive and Dative Cases 
imply the joint Power of a Nou7i and a 
Preposition^ the Genitive's Preposition be- 
ing A^ De, or E^, the Dative's Preposition 
being Ady or Versus. 

We have Hot t4iis assistance as to the 
Accusative, which in modern Languages 
(a few instances excepted) is only known 
from its position, that is to say, by being 
subsequent to its Verb, in the collocation 
of the words. 

The Vocative we pass over from its 
little use, being not only unknown to the 
modern Languages^ but often in the an- 
tient being supplied by the Nominative. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. IV. 277 

The Ablative likewise was used by 
the Romans only ; a Case they seem to 
have adopted to associate with their 
Prepositions, as they had deprived their 
Genitive and Dative of that privilege; a 
Case certainly not necessary, because the 
Greeks do as well without it, and because 
with the Romans themselves it is frequently 
undistinguished. 



There remains the Nominative, which 
whether it were a Case or no, was much 
disputed by the Antients. The Peripate- 
tics held it to be no Case, and likened the 
Noun, in this its primary and original Form, 
to a perpendicular Line, such, for example, 

as the line AB, 

BCD 




The Variations from the Nominative, they 
considered, as if AB were to fall from its 



S78 HERMES. 

perpendicular, as for example, to AC, or 
AD. Hence then they only called these 
Variations, HTOSEIS, Casus, Cases, or 
Fallings* The Stoics on the contrary, 
and the Grammarians with them, made 
the Nominative a Case also. Words they 
considered (as it were) to fall from the 
Mind or Discursive Faculty. Now when a 
Noun fell thence in its primary Form, they 
then called it nXQSIS OP0H,, Casus 
itECTUs, AN ERECT, or uprightCase or 
Falling, such as AB, and by this name 
they distinguish the Nominative. When it 
fell from the Mind under any of its varia- 
tions, as for example in the form of a Geni- 
tive, a Dative, or the like, such variations 
they called nXfiSEIS nAAFIAI, Ca- 
sus OBLIQUI, OBLIQUE CaSES, Or SIDE- 
LONG Fallings (such as AC, or AD) in 
opposition to the other (that is AB) which 
was erect and perpendicular.^''^ Hence 



(a) 



Sec Ammon. iu Libr. dc Intcrpr. p. 35. 



BOOK IL— CHAP. IV. 279 

too Grammarians called the Method of 
enumerating the various Cases of a Noun, 
KAI2I2, Declinatio, a Declensiojst, 
it being a sort of progressive Descent from 
the Noun's upright Form thro' its various 
declining Forms, that is, a Descent from 
AB, to AC, AD, &c. 

Of these Cases we shall treat but of 
four, that is to say, the Nominative, the 
Accusative, the Genitive and the 
Dative. 

It has been said already in the preced- 
ing Chapter, that the great Objects of na- 
tural Union are Substance and Attri- 
bute. Now from this Natural Concord 
arises the Logical Concord of Subject 
and Predicate, and the Grammatical 
Concord o/* Substantive and Attribu- 
tive/*'* These Concords in Speech 

^^> Sec before p. 264. 



280 HERMES. 

produce Propositions and Sentences, 
as that previous Concord in Nature 
produces natural Beings. This being 
admitted, we proceed by observing, that 
when a Sentence is regular and orderly, 
Natures Substance, the Logicians Subject, 
and the Grammarian's Substantive, are all 
denoted by that Case, which we call the 
Nominative. For example, C^sar 
pugnat, Ms Jingitur, Domus cedijicatur. 
We may remark too by the way, that the 
Character of this Nominative may be learnt 
from its Attributive. The Action implied 
in pugnat, shews its Nominative C^sar 
to be an Active efficient Cause ; the Passion 
imphed in Jingitur, shews its Nominative 
Ms to be a Passive Subject, as does the 
Passion in cedificatur prove Domus to be 
an Effect. 

As therefore every Attribute would as 
far as possible conform itself to its Sub- 
stantive, so for this reason, when it has 



BOOK II —CHAP. IV. 281 

Cases, it imitates its Substantive, and ap- 
pears as a Nominative also. So we find it 
in such instances as — Cicero est elo- 
QUENs ; ViTiuM est turpe; Homo est 
ANIMAL, &c. When it has no Cases (as 
happens with Verbs) it is forced to content 
itself with such assimilations as it has, those 
of Number and Person ;* as when we say, 
Cicero loquitur; nos loquimur; 
Homines loquuntur. 

From what has been said, we may make 
the following observations — that as there 
can be no Sentence without a Substantive^ 
so that Substantive, if the Sentence be 
regular^ is always denoted by a Nomina-' 
five — that on this occasion all the Attribu- 
tives^ that have Cases, appear as Nomina- 
tives also — that there may be a regular 
and perfect Sentence without any of the 



* What sort of Number and Person Verbs have, see 
before, p. 170. 171. 



^2 HERMES. 

other Cases, but that without one Nomina- 
tive at least, this is utterly impossible. 
Hence therefore we form its Character 
and Description — the Nominative is 
that Case, without - which there can be no 
regular^'^ and perfect Sentence. We are 
now to search after another Case. 

When the Attributive in any Sentence 
is some Verb denoting Action, we may be 
assured the principal Substantive is some 
active efficient Cause. So we may call 
Achilles and Lysippus in such Sentences as 
Achilles vulneravit, Lysippus fecit. But 
though this be evident and clearly under- 
stood, the Mind is still in suspence^ and finds 
its conception incomplete. Action, it well 
knows, not only requires some Agent, but 

^''^ We have added regular as well as perfect, because 
there may be irregular Sentences, which may be perfect 
without a Nominative, Of this kind are all Sentences, 
made out of those Verbs, called by the Stoics Dapacru/t- 
jdajxaTa or napaKarrj'yop)7juara, such as SwKprtrct /ufra/xcXcf, 
Socratem pmnitet, ^c. Sec before, p. 180. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. IV. 9SS 

it must have a Subject also to work on, and 
it must produce some Effect. It is then to 
denote one of these (that is, the Subject 
or the Effect) that the Authors of Lan- 
guage have destined the Accusative. 
Achilles vulneravit He c to rem— here the 
Accusative denotes the Subject. Lysippus 

fecit STATU AS- here the Accusative 

denotes the Effect. By these additional 
Explanations the Mind becomes satisfied, 
and the Sentences acquire a Perfection, 
which before they wanted. In whatever 
other manner, whett^er figuratively, or 
with Prepositions, this Case may have 
been used, its first destination seems to 
have been that here mentioned, and hence 
therefore we shall form its Character and 
Description — the Accusative is that 
Case, which to an efficient No?ninative and 
a Verb of Action, subjoins either the Effect 
or the passive Subject. We have still left 
the Genitive and the Dative, which we 
investio;ate as follows. 



^84 HERMES. 

It has been said in the preceding Chap- 
ter /'''' that when the Places of the Nomi- 
native and the Accusative are filled by 
proper Substantives, other Substantives are 
annexed by the help of Prepositions. Now, 
though this be so far true in the modern 
Languages, that (a very few instances ex- 
cepted) they know no other method ; yet 
is not the rule of equal latitude with re- 
spect to the Latin or Greek, and that from 
reasons which we are about to offer. 

Among the various Relations of Sub- 
stantives denoted by Prepositions, there 
appear to be two principal ones ; and these 
are, the Term or Point, which something 
commences from, and the Term or Point, 
which something tends to. These Rela- 
tions the Greeks and Latins thought of so 
great importance, as to^ distinguish them, 



(rf) 



See before, p. ^65. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. IV. 285 

when they occurred, hy peculiar Termina- 
tions of their ow7i, which exprest their force, 
without the help of a Preposition, Now 
it is here we behold the Rise of the 
antient Genitive and Dative, the Geni- 
tive being formed to express all Relations 
commencing prom itself; the Dative, 
all Relations tending to itself Of this 
there can be no stronger proof, than the 
Analysis of these Cases in the modern 
Languages, which we have mentioned 
already/'^ 

It is on these Principles that they say in 
Greek— ^60fJL0Ll SOT, g/Jco^t/ SOI, Of 
thee I ask. To thee I give. The reason 
is, in requests the person requested is one 
whom something is expected from ; in 
donations, the person presented, is one 
whom something passes to. So again — 



■'J See before, p. 275. 27G. 



g86 HERMES. 

^^Tl&noivircii A/d», it is made of Stone, Stone 
was the passive Subject, and thus it ap- 
pears in the Genitii>e^ as being the Term 
from^ or out of which. Even in Latin, 
where the Syntax is more formal and strict, 
we read — 

Implentur veteris Bacchiy pinguisque f evince, 

Virg. 

The old Wine and Venison were the funds 
or stores, of ov from which they were filled. 
Upon the same principles, H/vco t^ vhcuroq^ 
is a Phrase in Greek; and, Je bois de Veau, 
a Phrase in French, as much as to say, I 
take some or a certain part, from or out 
or a certain whole. 

When we meet in Language such Ge- 
nitives as the Son of a Father; the Father 
of a Son ; the Picture of a Fainter ; the 



^^ XpvcTOv 7r£7rot»?jU£voc, itf iXtcjiavTog, made of Gold and 
Ivorj/. So says Pausanias of the Olympian Jvpiter, L. 
V. p. 400. See also Horn. Iliad, S. 574. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. IV. 287 

Painter of a Picture, S^-c. these are all 
Relatives, and therefore each of them 
reciprocally a Term or Point to the other, 
FROM or OUT OF which it derives its Es- 
sence, or at least its Intellection!^^ 

The Dative, as it implies Tendency to, 
is employed among its other uses to denote 
the Final Cause, that being the Cause 
to which all Events, not fortuitous, may be 
said to tend. It is thus used in the follow- 
ing instances, among innumerable others. 

Tib I suaveis dcedala tellus 

Submittit flares — Lucret. 



^^^ All Relatives are said to reciprocate, or mutually 
infer each other, and therefore they are often exprest 
by this Case, that is to say, the Genitive. Thus Aristotle, 
liavTa Se to, ttqoq tl irgog avTi'^peipovTa XeyeTm, dlov 
6 ^sXoQ dacnroTs SsXoc? t^ o SeorTroTijg SSXs BeairoTrig 
XiyaraL iivai, i^ to ^LTrXaaiov rifxiawg ^nr\a(TioVt 9 ro 
riiuLLav dnrXaaiH rifiKJv. Omnia vero, qua. sunt ad aliquid, 
referuntur ad ea, qua. reciprocantur. Ut servus dicitur 
domini servus ; et dominus, servi dominus ; necnon duplum, 
dimidii duplum ; et dimidium, dupli dimidium, Categor. 
C. VII. 



288 HERMES. 

— — Tib I hrachia contrahit ardens 
Scorpius — . Virg. G. L 

Tib I serviat ultima Thule, Ibid, 

And so tnucli for Cases, their Origin 
and Use; a sort of Forms, or Termina- 
tions, which we could not well pass over, 
from their great importance ^^^ both in the 
Greek and Latin Tongues: but which, 
however, not being among the Essentials 
of Language, and therefore not to be 
found in many particular Languages, can 
be hardly said to fall within the limits of 
our Inquiry. 



^*^ Annon et illud observatione dignum (licet nobis mo- 
dernis spiritus nonnihil redundat) antiquas Linguas pie- 
nas declinationuTTif casuum^ conjugationurtiy et similium fu- 
isse ; modernas, his fere destitutas, plurima per praposi- 
tiones et verba auxiliaria segniter expedire ? Sane facile 
quis conjiciat futcunque nobis ipsi placeamus) ingenia pri- 
orum seculorum nostris fuisse multo acutiora et subtiliora. 
Bacon, de Augm, Sient. VI. i. 



BOOK II.—CHAP. V. S89 



CHAP. V. 



Concerning Interjections — Recapitulation — 
Conclusion. 

Besides the Parts of Speech before 
mentioned, there remains the Interjec- 
tion. Of this Kind among the Greeks are 
*f2, Ofu, A/^ &c. among the Latins, Ah ! 
Heu ! Hei ! Sfc. among the English^ Ah ! 
Alas ! Fie ! SfC. These the Greeks have 
ranged among their Adverbs ; improperly, 
if we consider the Adverbial Nature, which 
always co-incides with some Verb, as its 
Principal, and to which it always serves 
in the character of an Attributive. Now 
Interjections co-incide with no Part of 
Speech, but are either uttered alone, or else 
thrown into a Sentence, without altering its 
Form, either in Syntax or Signification, The 
Latins seem therefore to have done better 



S90 HERMES. 

in*j^ separating them by themselves, and 
giving them a name by way of distinction 
from the rest. 

Should it be ask'd, if not Adverbs, 
what then are they ? It may be answered 
not so properly Parts of Speech, as adven- 
titious Sounds; certain Voices of Na- 
ture, rather than Voices of^Art, express- 
ing those Passions and natural Emotions, 
which spontaneously arise in the human 
Soul, upon the View or Narrative of in- 
teresting Events/^^ 



f Vid. Servium in ^neid, XII. v. 486. 

^"^ Interjectiones a Gracis ad Adverbia referuntur, 
atque eos sequitur etiam Boethius. Et recte quidem de its, 
quando casum regunt. Sed quando orationi solum inse^ 
.runtur, ut nota affectits^ velut suspirii aut metus^, vix 
videntur ad classem aliquam pertinere^ ut ^m^c naturales 
sint NOTi^ ; non, aliarum vocum instar, ex instituto s^ig- 
nificant. Voss. de Anal. L. I. c. i. Interjectio e^i 
Vox affectum mentis signi/icans, ac citra verbi opem sen- 
tentiam complens. Ibid. c. 3. Restat classium extrema, 
Interjectto. ffujiis appellatio non similiter ae huhet 



I 



BOOK I L— CHAP. V. ^91 

" And thus we have found that all 
" Words ARE EITHER significant by 

" THEMSELVES, OR ONLY SIGNIFICANT 

" WHEN Associated — that those signi- 



ac Conjunctionis Nam cum hdc dicatur Conjunction quia 
conjungat ; Inierjectio tameji, non quia interjacet, sed quia 
interjicitur, nomen accepit. Nee tamen de scri^ ejus est, ut 
interjiciatur ; cum per se compleat sententiam, nee raro ah 
ed incipiat oratio. Ibid. L. IV. c. 28. Interjectiotnem 
non esse partem Orationis sic ostendo: Quod naturale eaf, 
idem est apud omnes : Sed gemitus et signa latitia idem 
sunt apud omnes : Sunt igitur naturales. Si vero natu- 
rales, non sunt partes Orationis. Nam ea paries, secun- 
dum Aristotelem, ex instituto, non naturd, dehent eonstare. 
Interjectionem Grceci Adverhiis adnumerant ; sed falso. 
Nam neque, &c. Sanct. Miner. L. I. c. 2. Interjec- 
tionem Graci inter Adverbia ponunt, quoniam hac 
quoque vel adjungitur verbis, vel verba ei suhaudiuntur, 
Ut si cZtcawi— Papae ! quid video ? — vel per se — Papae ! — 
etiamsi non addatur^ Miror ; habet in se ipsius verbi sig- 
nificationem. Qua res maxime fecit Romanarum artium 
Scriptores separatim hanc partem ah Adverhiis accipere ; 
quia videtur affectum habere in sese Verbi, et plenam motiis 
animi significaiionem, etiamsi non addalur Verbum, demon- 
strare, Inierjectio tamen non solum ilia, qua dicuni Graci 
(TXtTKiaafiov, signijicat ; sed efiam voces, qua cuj'uscunque 
passionis animi pulsu per exclamationem interjiciuntur. 
Prise. L. XV. 

U 2 



292 HERMES. 

'\ficant by themselves denote either Svb- 
" STANCES or Attributes, a7id are called 
^^ for that reason Substantives and At- 
" TRiBUTiVES — that the Substantives are 
" either Nouns or Pronouns — that the 
" Attributives are either Primary or 
" Secondary — that the Primary Attri- 
butives are either Verbs, Participles, 
or Adjectives; the Secondary^ Ad- 
verbs — Again, that the Parts of Speech, 
" only significant when associated, are either 
" Definitives or Connectives — that 
" the Definitives are either Articular, 
" or Pronominal — and that the Connec- 
" tives are either Prepositions or Con- 
** junctions/^ 

And thus have we resolved Language, 
AS a Whole into its constituent 
Parts, which was the first thing, that we 
proposed, in the course of this Inquiry/*^ 

^*^ See before, p. 7. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. V. 293 

But now, as we conclude, methinks I 
hear some objector, demanding with an 
air of pleasantry, and ridicule — " Is there 
*' no speaking then without all this trouble ? 
*^ Do we not talk, evety one of us^ as well 
*^ unlearned as learned; as well poor Pea- 
" sants^ as profound Philosophers ?'' We 
may answer by interrogating on our part 
— Do not those same poor Peasants use 
the Lever and the Wedge, and many 
other Instruments, with much habitual 
readiness ? And yet have they any con- 
ception of those Geometrical Principles, 
from which those Machines derive their 
Efficacy and Force ? And is the Ignorance 
of these Peasants a reason for others to re- 
main ignorant ; or to render the Subject a 
less becoming Inquiry ? Think of Ani- 
mals, and Vegetables, that occur every 
day — of Time, of Place, and of Motion 
— of Light, of Colours, and of Gravita- 
tion — of our very Senses and Intellect, 
by which we perceive every thing else— 



g04 HEJIMES. 

That they are, we all know, and are 
perfectly satisfied — What they are, is 
a Subject of much obscurity and doubt. 
Were we to reject this last Question, be- 
cause we are certain of the first, we should 
banish all Philosophy at once out of the 
world /'^ 

But a graver Objector now accosts us. 
*' What (says he) is the Utility ? 
" Whence the Profit, where the Gainf 
Every Science whatever (we may answer) 
has its Use. Arithmetic is excellent for 
the gauging of Liquors; Geometry, for 



^"■^ 'AXX* cVt iroWa tCov 6vt<ov, a ttjv juev virap^v t^ct 
yvu)^LfX(i}Tarr\v, ayvw^orat^v Sc ttjv stjiav wtnrfp tjtje 
KivYiaig, i^ 6 TOTTocj tri Sc fxaWov 6 ^povog. 'Ekci'S'S yap 
TBTtJV TO fxlv tlvai yviiypifiov i^ avafi(j)l\eKTOv' rig Se irori 
i^iv avTiJV ri ticria, twv xaXsirojrarajv opaOrfvai. "E^t Si 
Si4 TL tCjv T0i8T(i)v 1^ 1? '4jv\i]' TO fxlv yap ilvai tl Trjv 
^v)(rtVi yvuypifJiwTaTOv i^ (pavepMrarov' ri ^l ttotI t'^iv, « 
pamov KaTafxaOnv. AXc^wi^S* A(ppoS. IlepX ipv\tig, B'. p. 
142. 



BOOK II.— CHAP. V. 295 

the measuring of Estates ; Astronomy, for 
the making of Almanacks; and Granmiar, 
perhaps, for the drawing of Bonds and 
Conveyances. 

Thus much to the Sordid — If the 
Liberal ask for something better than this, 
we may answer and assure them from the 
best authorities, that every Exercise of 
the Mind upon Theorems of Science, 
like generous and manly Exercise of the 
Body, tends to call forth and strengthen 
Nature's original Vigour. Be the Sub- 
ject itself immediately lucrative or not, 
the Nerves of Reason are braced by the 
mere Employ, and we become abler Ac- 
tors in the Drama of Life, whether our 
Part be of the busier, or of the sedater 
kind. 

Perhaps too there is a Pleasure even in 
Science itself, distinct from any End, to 
which it may be farther conducive. Are 



S96 HERMES. 

not Health and Strength of Body desirable 
for their own sakes, tho' we happen not 
to be fated either for Porters or Draymen? 
And have not Health and Strength of 
Mind their intrinsic Worth also, tho' not 
condemned to the low drudgery of sordid 
Emolument? Why should there not be 
a Good (could we have the Grace to re- 
cognize it) in the mere Energy of our In- 
tellect, as much as in Energies of lower 
degree ? The Sportsman believes there is 
Good in his Chace ; the Man of Gaiety, 
in his Intrigue ; even the Glutton, in his 
Meal. We may justly ask of these, why 
they pursue such things ; but if they an- 
swer, they pursue them, because they are 
Good, it would be folly to ask them far- 
ther, WHY they PURSUE what is Good. 
It might well in such case be replied on 
their behalf (how strange soever it may 
at first appear) that if there was not some- 
thing Good, which was in no respect use- 
ful, even things useful themselves could not 



BOOK IL—CHAP. V. 297 

possibly have existence. For this is in fact 
no more than to assert, that some things 
are Ends, some things are Means, and 
that if there were no Ends, there could be 
of course no Means. 

It should seem then the Grand Question 
was, WHAT IS Good — that is to say, what 
is that which is desirable^ not for something 
else, but for itself; for whether it be the 
Chace, or the Intrigue, or the Meal, may 
be fairly questioned, since Men in each 
instance are far from being agreed. 

In the mean time it is plain from daily 
experience, there are infinite Pleasures, 
Amusements, and Diversions, some for 
Summer, others for Winter; some for 
Country, others for Town; some easy, 
indolent, and soft; others boisterous, ac- 
tive, and rough ; a multitude diversified to 
every taste, and which for the time are 



<^8 HERMES. 

enjoyed as perfect Good, without a 
thought of any Endy that may be farther 
obtained. Some Objects of this kind are at 
times sought by all Men, excepting alone 
that contemptible Tribe, who, from a love 
to the Means of life wholly forgetting its 
End, are truly for that reason called 
Misers^ or Miserable. 

If there be supposed then a Pleasure, a 
Satisfaction, a Good, a Something valu- 
able for itself without view to any thing 
farther, in so many Objects of the sub- 
ordinate kind ; shall we not allow the same 
praise to the subliinest of all Objects ? Shall 
THE Intellect alone feel no pleasures 
in its Energy y when we allow them to the 
grossest Energies of Appetite, and Sense ? 
Or if the Reahty of all Pleasures and Goods 
were to be controverted, may not the In- 
tellectual Sort be defended, as rationally as 
?my of then] ? Whatever may be urged in 



BOOK II.--CHAP. V. 299 

behalf of the rest (for we are not now 
arraigning them) we may safely affirm of 
Intellectual Good, that it is " the 
" Good of that Part, which is most ex- 
" cellent within us ; that it is a good ac- 
" commodated to all Places and Times ; 
" which neither depends on the will of 
" others nor on the affluence of external 
'^ Fortune ; that it is a Good, which de- 
*' cays not with decaying Appetites, but 
'* often rises in vigour, when those are no 
'' mover ('' 

There is a Difference, we must own, 
between this Intellectual Yirtue, and Moral 
Virtue. Moral Virtue, from its Em- 
ployment, may be called more Human, 
as it tempers our Appetites to the pur- 
poses of human Life. But Intellec- 



^'') See Vol. I. p. 119, 120, &c. 



800 ' H E RM E S. 

TUAL Virtue may be surely called more 
Divine, if we consider the Nature and 
Sublimity of its End. 

Indeed for Moral Virtue^ as it is al- 
most wholly conversant about Appetites, 
and Affections, either to reduce the natural 
ones to a proper Mean, or totally to expel 
the unnatural and vitious, it would be im- 
pious to suppose THE Deity to have oc- 
casion for such an Habit, or that any work 
of this kind should call for his attention. 
Yet God Is, and lives. So we are as- 
sured from Scripture itself. What then 
may we suppose the Divine Lite to be? 
Not a Life of Sleep, as Fables tell us of 
Endpnion. If we may be allowed then to 
conjecture with a becoming reverence, what 
more likely, than A pehpetual Energy 
OF the purest Intellect about the 
first, all-comprehensive Objects 
of Intellection, which Objects are 



BOOK II CHAP V SOI 

NO OTHER THAN THAT INTELLECT IT- 
SELF? For in pure Intellection it 
holds the reverse of all Sensation, that 

THE PERCEIVER AND ThING PER- 
CEIVED are always one and the 
same/'^ 

It was Speculation of this kind con- 
cerning the Divine Nature, which in- 



^'^ El bv HTWQ €u I'^^et, wq viieig ttote, 6 Qeog ad, ^av 
lia'^ov' u §£ iiaXkov, iVe ^'avjuaartwrtpov* f^ct Si t58e, /^ 
?(oi7 St -ye vira^-^^u" 17 70/0 NS Ivi^yua, Zwri, 'EkeTvoc Se, 
ri kvlpyaa' Ivipyeia de ri KaO' avrriv, Ikslvs Ztorj api'^ri i^ 
aiSiog. ^a^lv Se tov Oeov uvat Z(oov ai^tov, apL<^ov' 
tt)^€ Zijjri Kf aiwv (Tvvsxng 1^ ai^iog virap\H t(o Qeif' 
TOYTO yap OEOS* Twv /u£ra ra t^vg' A'. ?'• It is 
remarkable in Scripture that God is peculiarly charac- 
terized as A Living God, in opposition to all false and 
imaginary Deities, of whom some had no pretensions to 
Life at all ; others to none higher than that of Vegetables 
or Brutes ; and the best were nothing better than illustri- 
ous Men, whose existence was circumscribed by the short 
period of Humanity. 



« 



302 HERMES. 

duced one of the wisest among the Anti- 
ents to beUeve— " That the Man, who 
" could live in the pure enjoyment of his 
Mindy and who properly cultivated that 
" divine Principle, was happiest in himself , 
" and most beloved by the Gods. For if the 
" Gods had any regard to what past among 
" Men (as it appeared they had) it was 
" probable they should rejoice in that 
" which was most excellent^ and by nature 
" the most nearly allied to themselves ; and, 
" as this was Mind, that they should 
" requite the Man, who most loVed and 
*' honoured This^ both from his regard to 
" that which was dear to themselves, and 



^Q the jiassage above quoted, may be added another, 
which immediately precedes it. Avtov SI vou 6 V8g Kara 
fXiToXi/fXJjiv r« voriTs' voriTog yap yiverai, ^lyyavuyv i^ vou)v 
&^£ TAYtON N6y:S ItAI NOHTON. 



ft 



BOOK II.->CHAP. V. 303 

" from his acting a Part, which was laud- 
« able and right/' ^ 

And thus in all Science there is some- 
thing valuable for itself because it contains 
within it something which is divine. 



^^ ^lAdiK' NtKOjuax* TO K'. k£^. r?. 



End of the Second Book 



HERMES 



OR 

A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 



CONCERNING 



UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR. 
BOOK III. 

CHAP. I. 

Introduction — Division of the Subject into 
its principal Parts, 

Some things the Mind performs thro' 
the Body ; as for example the various 
Works and Energies of Art. — Others it 
performs without such Medium ; as for 
example, when it thinks, and reasons, 
and concludes. Now tho' the Mind, in 
either case, may be called the Principle 
or Source, yet are these last more properly 
its own peculiar Acts, as being immediately 

X 



306 H E n M E S. 

referable to its own innate Powers. And 
thus is Mind ultimately the Cause of all ; 
of every thing at least that is Fair and 
Good, 

Among those Acts of Mind more im- 
mediately its own, that of mental Sepa- 
ration may be well reckoned one. — Corpo- 
real Separations, however accurate other- 
wise, are in one respect incomplete, as 
they may be repeated without end. The 
smallest Limb, severed from the smallest 
Animalcule (if we could suppose any in- 
strument equal to such dissection) has still 
a triple Extension of length, breadth, and 
thickness ; has a figure, a colour, with 
perhaps many other qualities ; and so will 
continue to have, tho' thus divided to 
infinity. But ^"^ the Mind surmounts all 



^"^ Itaque Natura facienda est prorsus Solutio cj- Sepa- 
ratio; non per Ignem certe, sed per Mentem, tanquam 
ignem divinum. Bacon. Organ. Lib. II. 16. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. I. 307 

power of Concretion^ and can place in the 
simplest manner every Attribute by itself, 
convex without concave; colour without 
superficies ; superficies without Body ; and 
Body without its Accidents ; as distinctly 
each one, as tho^ they had never been 
united. 

And thus it is, that it penetrates into 
the recesses of all things, not only dividing 
them, as Wholes^ into their more conspicu- 
ous Parts^ but persisting, till it even sepa- 
rate those Elemenfari/ Principles, which, 
being blended together after a more mys- 
terious manner, are united in the minutest 
Part, as much as in the mightiest WholeJ^^ 

Now if Matter and Form are among 
these Elements, and deserve perhaps to be 
esteemed as the principal among them, It 
may not be foreign to the Design of this 

^'^ See below, p. 312. 
X 2 



308 HERMES. 

Treatise, to seek whether these^ or any 
thing analogous to them, may be found in 
Speech or Language/'^ This therefore 
we shall attempt after the following method. 



^'^ See before, p. S. 7. Matter and Form (in Greek 
YAH and EI AGS) were Terms of great import in the 
days of antient Philosophy, when things were scrutinized 
rather at their beginning than at their End. They have 
been but little regarded by modern Philosophy, which 
almost wholly employs itself about the last order of Sub- 
stance, that is to say, the tangible, corporeal or concrete, 
and which acknowledges no separations even in this, but 
those made by mathematical Instruments, or Chemical 
Process. 

The original meaning of the Word YAH, was Sylva, 
a Wood. Thus Homer, 

Tp£jU£ S' spm juaicpa ft) YAH, 

Ilo(T(TLv VTT aOavaTOKTi TiocrsidcLiOvog lovTog. 

As Neptune past, the Mountains and the Wood 
Trembled beneath the God's immortal Feet. 

Hence as Wood was perhaps the first and most useful 
kind of Materials, the Word"YX?), which denoted it, came 
to be by degrees extended, and at length to denote Mat- 
ter or Materials in general. In this sense Brass was 
called the"YXr) or Matter of a Statue : Stone, the"YXi| or 



BOOK III.—CHAP. I. 809 

Every thing in a manner, whether 
natural or artificial, is in its constitution 



Matter of a Pillar ; and so in other instances.— The 
Platonic Chalcidius and other Authors of the latter Latinity 
use Sylva under the same extended and comprehensive 
Signification. 

Now as the Species of Matter here mentioned (Stone, 
Metal, Wood, &c.) occur most frequently in common life, 
and are all nothing more than natural Substances or Bodies, 
hence by the Vulgar, Matter and Body have been 
taken to denote the same thing ; Material to mean Cor- 
poreal; Immaterial, Incorporeal^ ^'c. But this was not 
the Sentiment of Philosophers of old, by whom the Term 
JMatter was seldom used under so narrow an acceptation. 
By these, every thing was called YAH, or Matter, whe- 
ther corporeal or incorporeal, which was capable of becom- 
ing something else, or of being moulded into something else, 
whether from the operation of Art, of Nature, or a higher 
Cause. 

In this sense they not only called Brass the "YXrj of a 
Statue, and Timber, of a Boat, but Letters and Syllables 
they called the "YXat of Words ; Words or simple Terms, 
the "YXai of Propositions ; and Propositions themselves 
the "YXat of Syllogisms.^ The a^^ oiC5 held all things out 
of our own power (ju sk l<f nijuv) such as Wealth and 
Poverty, Honour and Dishonour, Health and Sickness, 



310 HERMES. 

compounded of something Common, 
and something Peculiar; of something 



Life and Death, to be the "Y\at or Materials of Virtue or 
Moral Goodness, which had its essence in a proper conduct 
with respect to all these (Vid. Arr. Epict. L. I. c. 29. 
Also Vol, the first of these miscellaneous treatises, p, 187> 
309. M. Ant. XII. S9. VII. 29. X. 18, 19. where 
the 'YXikov and AlruoSeg are opposed to each other). The 
Peripatetics f the' they expressly held the Soul to be 
cLGLoixuroq, or Incorporeal, yet still talked of a N5c 'TXejcoc* 
a material Mind or Intellect. — This to modern Ears may 
possibly sound somewhat harshly. Yet if we translate the 
words, Natural Capacity, and consider them as only 
denoting that original and native Power of Intellection, 
which being previous to all human Knowledge, is yet 
necessary to its reception ; there seems nothing then to 
remain, that can give us offence. And so much for the 
Idea of YAH, or Matter. See Ale.v. Jphrod. de Jnim, 
p. 144. b. 145. Arist. Metaph. p. 121, 12S, 141. Edit, 
Si/lb. Prod, in Euclid, p. 22, 23. 

As to EIAOS, its original meaning was that of Form 
or Figure, considered as denoting visible Symmetry, and 
Proportion ; and hence it had its name from El^w, to see, 
Beauty of person being one of the noblest and most excel- 
lent Objects of Sight. Thus Euripides, 

UpioTov /ilv EtSoc a^iov rvpavvi^og^ 

Fair Form to Empire gave the first pretence. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. I. 311 

Common^ and belonging to many other 
things ; and of something Peculiar, bj 



Now as the Form or Figure of visible Beings tended prin- 
cipally to distivguish them, and to give to each its Nanae 
and Essence ; hence in a more general sense, whatever of 
any kind (whether corporeal or incorporeal), was peculiar, 
essential, and distinctive, so as by its accession to any 
Beings, as to its 'YXrj or Matter, to mark them with a 
Character, which they had not before, was called by the 
Antients EIA02 or Form. Thus not only the Shap^ 
given to the Brass was called the Eldog or Form of the 
Statue ; but the Proportion assigned to the Drugs was the 
Et^oc or Form of the Medicine ; the orderly Motion of 
the human Body was the El^oc or Form of the Dance ; 
the just Arrangement of the Propositions, the ET^oc or 
Form of the Syllogism. In like manner the rational and 
accurate Coriduct of a wise and good man, in all the 
various Relations and Occurrences of life, made that Et^oc 
or Form, described by Cicero to his Son, — Formam 
(juidam ipsam, Marce Jili, et tanquam faciem Honest i 
vides : qua, si oculis cemeretur, mirahiles amores (ut ait 
Plato) excilaret sapienii^c, <5-c. De Offic. I. 

We may go farther still — the Supreme Intelligence, 
which passes thro' all things, and which is the same to our 
Capacities, as Light Is to our Eyes, this Supreme Intelli- 
gence has been called EIA02 EIAQN, the Form of 
Forms, as being the Fountain of all Symmetry, of all 
Good, and of all Truth ; and as imparting to every 



312 HERMES. 

which it is distinguished, and made to be 
its true and proper self. 



Being those essential and distinctive Attributes, which 
make it to be itself, and not any thing else. 

And so much concerning Form, as before concerning 
Matter. We shall only add, that it is in the uniting 
of these, that every thing generable begins to exist ; in 
their separating, to perish, and be at an end — that while 
the two co-exist, they co- exist not by juxta-position, like 
the stones in a wall, but by a more intimate Coincidence^ 
complete in the minutest part — that hence, if we were to 
persist in dividing any substance (for example Marble) to 
infinity, there would still remain after every section both, 
Matter and Form, and these as perfectly united, as before 
the division began — lastly, that they are both pre-existent 
to the Beings, which they constitute ; the Matter being 
to be found in the world at large ; the Form, if artificial, 
pre-existing within the Artificer, or if natural, within the 
Supreme Cause, the Sovereign Artist of the Universe, 

— Pulchrum pulcherrimus ipse 

Mundum mente gerens, similique in imagine firmans. 

Even without speculating so high as this, we may see 
among all animal and vegetable Substances, the Form pre- 
existing in their immediate generating Cause ; Oak being 
the parent of Oak, Lion of Lion, Man of Man, &c. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. I. S13 

Hence Language, if compared ac- 
cording to this notion to the murmurs of a 
Fountain, or the dashings of a Cataract, 
has in common this, that like them, it is a 
Sound. But then on the contrary it has 

Cicero's account of these Principles is as follows. 

Matter. 

Sed suhjectam putani omnibus sine ulla specie, atque ca- 
rentem omni ilia qualitate (faciamus enim tractando usi- 
tatius hoc verbum et tritius) matekiam quandam, ex qua 
omnia expressa atque efficta sint (qua tota omnia accipere 
possit, omnibusque modis mutari atque ex omni parte): 
eoque etiam inter ire^ non in iiihilum, <§t. — Acad. I. 8. 

Form. 

Sed ego sic statuo, nihil esse in ullo genere tarn pulchrum, 

quo non pulchrius id sit^ unde illud, ut ex ore aliquo, quasi 

imago, exprimatur, quod neque oculis, neque aiiribus, neque 

ullo sensu percipi potest : cogitatione tantilm et mente com- 

plectimur. Has kerum formas appellat Ideas ilk 

non inielligendi solum, sed etiam diccndi gravissijuus auctor 
et magister, Plato: easque gigni negat, et ait semper esse, 
ac ratione et intelligentia contineri: catera nasci, occidere, 
Jluere, labi ; nee diutiils esse uno et eodem statu. Quidquid 
est igitur, de quo ratione et via disputetur, id est ad ulti- 
mam sui generis Formam speciemque ridigendum. Cic. ad 
M. Brut. Orat. 



314 HERMES. 

in peculiar this, that whereas those Sounds 
have 710 Meaning or Signification^ to Lan- 
guage a Meaning or Signification is 
essentiaL — Again, Language^ if compared 
to the Voice of irrational Animals, has in 
common this, that hke them, it has a Mean- 
ing, But then it has this m peculiar to 
distinguish it from them, that whereas the 
Meaning of those Animal Sounds is de- 
rived fro?n Nature, that of Language 
is derived, not from Nature, but from 
Compact/''^ 



'■'^^ The Peripatetics (and with just reason) in all their 
definitions as well of Words as of Sentences, made it a 
part of their character to be significant Kara (TvvOmnv, hy 
Compact, See Aristot. de Interp. c. 2. 4. Boethius 
translates the Words Kara (jvvOnKr]v, ad placitum, or se- 
cundum placitum, and thus explains them in his comment 
— Secundum placitum vero est, quod secundum quandam 
positiouem, placitumque ponentis aptatur ; nullum enim 
nomen naturaliter consiitutum est, ncque unquam, sicut 
suhjecta res a naturd est, ita qnoque a natiird veniente 
vocabulo nuncupatur. Sed hominum genus, quod et rati- 
one, et oratione vigeret, nomina posuit, eaque quihus 



BOOK IIL—CHAP. I. 315 

From hence it becomes evident, that 
Language, taken in the most compre- 
hensive view, implies certain Sounds^ having 
certain Meanings ; and that of these two 
Principles, the Sound is as the Matter, 
common (like other Matter) to many 
different things; the Meaning as that 
pecuUar and characteristic Form, by which 
the Nature or Essence of Language be- 
comes complete. 



libuit Uteris syllahisque conjungens, singulis subjectarum 
rerum substantiis dedit. Boelh. in Lib. de Interpret. 
p. 308. 



3ia HERMES. 

CHAP. II. 

Upon the Matter or cojnnion Subject of 
Language, 

The TAH 6x Matter or Language 
comes first to be considered, a Subject, 
which Order will not suffer us to omit, but 
in which we shall endeavour to be as con- 
cise as we can. Now this TAH or Matter 
is Sound, and Sound is that Sensation 
peculiar to the Sense of Hearings when the 
Air hath felt a Pei^cussion^ adequate to the 
producing such Effect J''^ 



^*^^ This appears to be PrisciarCs Meaning when he says 
of a Voice, what is more properly true of Sound in gene- 
ral, that it is — suum sensible aurium^ id est, quod proprie 
auribus accidit. Lib. I. p. 537. 

The following account of the Stoics, which refers the 
cause of Sound to an Undulation in the Jir propagated 
circularly, as when we drop a stone into a Cistern of 
water, seems to accord with the modern Hypothesis, and 
to be as plausible as any — ' Akovuv St, ts fitra^i) rs re 



BOOK III.— CHAP. 11. tni 

As the Causes of this Percussion are 
various, so from hence Sound derives the 
Variety of its Species. 

Farther, as all these Causes are either 
Animal or Inanimate, so the two grand 
Species of Sounds are likewise Animal or 
Inanimate. 

There is no peculiar Name for Sound 
Inanimate ; nor even for that of Animals, 
when made by the trampling of their Feet, 
the fluttering of their Wings, or any other 
Cause, which is merely accidental. But 
that, which they make by proper- Organs, 
in consequence of some Sensa-tion or inward 



(jujjvovvTOQ i^ T8 ciKsovTog uipoQ 7rXr]rTOjulv8 (T(l)aipoeiSu)g, 
tlra KVfiarovfxivs, icf toTq uKoaig TrpoGTriiTTOVTog, wg 
KViiaTHTai TO Iv ry ce'^ajuLev^ v^wp Kara KVKXovg vtto t5 
ifijdXriOivTog XiOs — Porro audtre, cum is, qui mecUus inter 
loquentem, et audientem est, air verheralur orbicular iter, 
deinde agitalus, aurihus influit, quemadmodum et cisterna 
aqua per orhes injccto agitatur lapide. Diog. Laert. VII. 



318 HERMES. 

Impulse^ such Animal Sound is called a 
Voice. 



As Language therefore implies that 
Sound called Human Voice ; we may 
perceive that to know the Nature and 
Powers of the Human Voice, is in fact to 
know THE Matter or common Subject of 
Language. 

Now the Voice of Man, and it should 
seem of all other Animals, is formed by 
certain Organs between the Mouth and 
the Lungs, and which Organs maintain 
the intercourse between these two. The 
Lungs furnish Air, out of which the 
Voice is formed; and the Mouth, when 
the Voice is formed, serves to publish it 
abroad. 

What these Vocal Organs precisely 
are, is not inall respects agreed by Phi- 
losophers and Anatomists. Be this as 



BOOK III.— CHAP. II. 819 

it Avill, it is certain that the mere pri- 
mary and simple Voice is completely formed^ 
before ever it reach the Mouthy and 
can therefore (as well as Breathing) find 
a Passage thro' the Nose, when the 
Mouth is so far stopt, as to prevent the 
least utterance. 

Now pure and simple Voice, being 
thus produced, is (as before was ob- 
served) transmitted to the Month. Here 
then, by means of certain different Or- 
gans, which do not change its primary 
Qualities, but only superadd others, it 
receives the Form or Character of Arti- 
culation. For Articulation is in 
fact nothing else, than that Form or Cha- 
racter^ acquired to simple Voice, by means 
of the Mouth and its several Organs, the 
Teeth, the Tongue, the Lips, S^c. The 
Voice is not by Articulation made more 
grave or Acute, more loud or soft (which 
are its primary Qualities) but it acquires 



J320 HERMES. 

to these Characters certaui others additional^ 
which are perfectly adapted to exist along 
with themJ^^ 



^^^ The several Organs above mentioned not only serve 
the purposes of Speech, but those very different ones 
likewise of Mastication and Respiration ; so frugal is 
Nature in thus assigning them double duty, and so 
careful to maintain her character of doing nothing in 
vain. 

He, that would be informed, how much better the 
Parts here mentioned are framed for Discourse in Man, 
who is a Discursive Animal, than they are in other Ani- 
mals, vrho are not so, may consult Aristotle in his Trea- 
tise de Animal Part, Lib. II. c. 17. Lib. HI. c. 1. 3. 
De Jnimd. L. IL c. 8. § 23, &c. 

And here by the way, if such Inquirer be of a Genius 
truly modern, he may possibly wonder how the Philoso- 
pher, considering (as it is modestly phrased) the Age in 
which he lived, should know so much, and reason so well. 
But if he have any taste or value for antient literature, 
he may with much juster cause wonder at the Vanity of 
his Contemporaries, who dream all Philosophy to be the 
Invention of their own Age, knowing nothing of those 
Antients still remaining for their perusal, tho' they are 
so ready on every occasion to give the preference to 
themselves. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. II. 321 

The simplest of these new Characters 
are those acquired thro' the mere Open- 



The following account from Ammonius will show whence 
the Notions in this chapter are taken, and what authority 
we have to distinguish Voice from mere Sound; and 

ARTICULATE VoiCE from SIMPLE VoiCE. 

Kat ^O^OS juiiv l^L TrXriyri ai^og alaOriTri aKoy' $QNH 
c£, xpo^og l^ kiJi\pv-)(8 yiv6fjL£vog, orav dia rrig (TV^oXrig T8 
^(jjpaKog l/c0Xtj3ojLt€voc airb t5 irvivfxovog 6 sKnrvevSeic 
arjp TrpornriTTTy a0p6(i)g ry KaXsjiivy Tpa\uq. aprriplq., ^ 
Ty vTTCpwa, rjrot T(^ yapyapeiovi, Itf 8ta Trig TrXrjyJ)? o,ivoTEk^ 
Tiva l^\ov alaOriTbvf Kara Tiva opfxrjv Trjg ;/^v^f)c* onep £7rl 
Twv Ifxirvev^iijv irapa roXg fismKoXg KaXs/zlvwv opydvwv 
(TUfjLJ^aivei, oiov avXwv i^ crvpiyyuyv' rrig yXiLrT-qg, i^ twv 
oSovrwv, {^ x"^^'^^' 'Tp^c julv THN AIAAEKTON 
avayKaiijjv ovtojv, Trpog §£ THN 'AHAQS ^ONHN 8 
TravTwg (Tv/i(5aXXofxiv(t)v. — Estque SoNUS, ictus aeris qui 
auditu sentitur : \ox autem est sonus, quern animans edit, 
cum per thoracis compressionem aer attractus a pulmone, 
elisus simul lotus in arteriam, quam asperam vocant, et 
palatum, aut gurgulionem impingit, et ex ictu sonum quen- 
dam sensibilem pro animi quodam impetu perjicit. Id quod 
in instrumentis qua quia injlant, ideo IfiTTvevsa a musicis 
dicuntur, usu venit, ut in tibiis, ac Jistulis contingit, cum 
lingua, denies, labiaque ad loquelam necessaria sint, ad 
vocem vero simplicem non omnino confer ant. Ammon. in 
Lib. de Interpr. p. 25. b. Vid. etiam Boerhaave Institut. 
Medic. Sect. 626. 630. 

Y 



$n HERMES. 

ings of the Mouth, as th^se Openings differ 
in giving the Voice a Passage. It is the 
Variety of Configurations in these Openings 
only, which gives birth and origin to the 
several Vowels ; and hence it is they 
derive their Name, by being thus emi- 
nently Vocal,^'^ and easy to be sounded of 
themselves alone. 

There are other articulate Forms, which 
the Mouth makes, not by mere Openings, 
but by different Contacts of its different 
parts ; such, for instance, as it makes by 



It appears that the Stoics (contrary to the notion of the 
Peripatetics) used the word ^QNH to denote Sound in 
general. They defined it therefore to be — To tSfov ata-^i7- 
Tov dicon^, which justifies the definition given by Priscian^ 
in the Note preceding. Animal Sound they defined to 
be — 'Aj7p, mro Qpfiric TrswXriyiuiivog, Air struck (and so 
made audible) h/ some animal impulse; and Human or 
Rational Sound they defined— "Evap^^oc i^ aVo 
Snavoiag iKTrefnrojJLivt], Sound articulate and derived from 
the discursive faculty. Diog, Laert, VII. 55. 

^•^ ^ONHENTA. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. II. 3^S 

the Junction of the two Lips, of the 
Tongue with the Teeth, of the Tongue 
with the Palate, and the hke. 

Now as all these several Contacts, un- 
less some Opening of the Mouth either 
immediately precede^ or immediately fol- 
low, would rather occasion Silence, than 
to produce a Voice ; hence it is, that with 
some such Opening, either previous or sub- 
sequent, they are always connected. Hence 
also it is, that the Articulations so pro* 
duced are called Consonant, because they 
sound not of themselves, and from their 
own powers, but at all times in company 
with some Auxiliary VowelJ^^ 

There are other subordinate Distinc- 
tions of these primary Articulations, which 
to enumerate would be foreign to the 
design of this Treatise, 



('^^ SYM<|)flNA. 
Y 2 



QU HERMES. 

It is enough to observe, that they are 
all denoted by the common Name of 
Element/'^ in as much as every Arti- 
culation of every other kind is from them 
derived, and into them resolved. Under 
their smallest Combination they produce a 
Syllable; Syllables properly combined 
produce a Word; Words properly com- 
bined produce a Se/ztozce; and Sentences 
properly combined produce an Oration or 
Discourse. 



'*^ The Stoic Definition of an Elemenit is as follows— 
"E-s-i 0£ '^otx^'iov, 1% ov TTQWTS jiverm to, yivofiEva itf ug o 
ia^aTov dvaXveTai. An ELEMENT is that, out of which, 
as their first Principle, things generated are made, and 
into which, as their last rsmains, they are resolved. Diog. 
Laert. VII. 176. What Aristotle says upon Elements 
with respect to the Subject here treated, is worth attending 
to — ^(jjvrig '^oL')(Ha, l^ a)v ovyviUTaL h (jxjjvrj, i^ slg a 
ctaipHTai £<TKara* Ikhvu o£ jut^kIt' dg aXXag (jxjjvag hspag 
rtj) ei^ei avTtJv. The Elements of Articula.te Voice 
are those things, out of which the Yoicjl is compounded, and 
into which, as its last remains, it is divided : the Elements 
themselves being no farther divisible into other articulate 
Voices, differing in Species from them, Metaph. V. c. 3. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. U. S'25 

And thus it is that to Principles appa- 
rently so trivial/^ as about twenty plain 
elementary Sounds, we owe that variety 
of articulate Voices, which have been 



^^ The Egyptians paid divine Honours to the Inventor 
of letters, and Regulator of Language, whom they called 
Theuth. By the Greeks he was worshipped under 
the Name of Hermes, and represented commonly by a 
Head alone without other Limbs, standing upon a quadri- 
lateral Basis. The Head itself was that of a beautiful 
Youth, having on it a Petasus, or Bonnet, adorned with 
two Wings. 

There was a peculiar reference in this Figure to the 
'EPMHS AOnOS, THE Hermes of Language or 
Discourse. He possessed no other part of the human 
figure but the Head, because no other was deemed regui- 
site to rational Communication, Words at the same time, 
the medium of this Communication, being (as Hom^r well 
describes them) ETrea Trrf^otvra, Winged Words, were re- 
presented in their Velocity by the Wings of his Bonnet. 

Let us suppose such a Hermes, having the Front of 
his Basis (the usual place for Inscriptions) adorned with 
some old Alphabet, and having a Veil flung across, by 
which that Alphabet is partly covered. Let a Youth be 
seen drawing off this Veil; and a Nymph, near the 
Youth, transcribing what She there discovers. 



3^6 HERMES. 

sufficient to explain the Sentiments of so 
innumerable a Multitudej as all the pre- 
sent and past Generations of Men. 



Such a Design would easily indicate its Meaning. The 
Youth we might imagine to be the Genius of Man 
(Natura Deus humaniB, as Horace stiles himj ; the 
Nymph to be MNHMGSYNH, or Memory ; as much as 
to insinuate, that "Man, for the Preservation of his 
" Deeds and Inventions^ was necessarily/ obliged to have 
*' recourse to Letters ; and that Memory, being con- 
^' scious of her own Insufficienci/ , was glad to avail herself 
" of so valuable an Acquisition."" 

Mr. Stuart, well known for his accurate and elegant 
Edition of the Antiquities of Athens, has adorned this 
Work with a Frontispiece agreeable to the above Ideas, 
and that in a taste truly Attic and Simple, which no one 
possesses more eminentljT than himself. 

As to Hermes, his History, Genealogy, Mythology, 
Figure, &c. Vid. Platon. Phileb. T. II. p. 18. E^it. 
Serran. Diod. Sic. L. I. Horat. Od. X. L. 1. Hesiod. 
Theog, V. 937. cum Comment. Joan, Diaconi. Thucid 
VI. 27. et Scholiast, in loc. Pighium apud Gronov. 
Thesaur. T. IX. p. 1164. 

For the value and importance of Principles, and the 
difficult;!/ in attaining them, see Aristot, de Sophist, 
Elench c. 34. 



BOOK TIL— CHAP. II. 327 

It appears from what has been said, 

that THE Matter or common Subject 

OF Language is that Species of Sounds 

called YoicBS articulate. 

What remains to be examined in the 
following Chapter, is Language under its 
characteristic and peculiar Form, that is 
to say. Language considered, not with 
respect to Sounds but to Meanings 



The following Passage, taken from that able Mathe- 
matician Tacquet, will be found peculiarly pertinent to 
what has been said in this chapter concerning Elementary 
Sounds, p. 324. 325. 

Mille milliones scriptorum mille annorum millionihus non 
scribent omnes 24 litterarum alphaheti permutationes, licet 
^inguli quotidie absolverent 40 paginas, quarum unaquoeque 
contineret diversos ordines literarum 24. Tacquet Aritk* 
metica Theor. p. 381. Edit. Antverp. 1663. 



328 II E RM E S. 



CHAP. III. 

Upon the Forrn^ or peculiar Character of 
Language. 

vy HEN to any articulate Voice there 
accedes by compact a Meaning or Significa- 
tion, such Voice by such accession is then 
called A Word ; and many Words, pos- 
sessing their Significations (as it were) 
under the same Compact ^^""^ unite in consti- 
tuting A PARTICULAR LANGUAGE. 



^-^ See before Note ^'^ p. SI 4. See also Vol. I. Treatise 
II. c. 1. Notes ^"^ and.^^> 

The following Quotation from Ammonius is remarkable 
— Ka^aTTcp 8v to fxtv Kara tottov KiveXcrOai, (^vcru, to St 
6p\£L<y9ai, ^i(T£i itf KaTa (TVv6nKr}v, i^ to /jlIv ^vXov, (pvaei, 

7} 0£ ^Vpa, ^i(TU' 8Ta> itf TO fllv ^WVeTv, (^VaEt, to 0£ 06* 

ovoficLTWv rj pr}fxaT(i)v (Tr^fiaivsiv, ^iaei — i^ eoiKt Trjv filv 
<l>(ji)vii]TLKriv dvvaniv, opyavov ^(rav twv ^pv^iKiov Iv rifxXv 



BOOK III.— CHAP. III. 329 

It appears from hence, that a Word 
may be defined a Voice, articulate^ and 
significant by Compact — and that Lan- 
guage may be defined a System of such 
Voices^ so significant. 

It is from notions hke these concern- 
ing Language and Words, that one may 



^vvafiEiov yvtJ^iKtJVf rj opeKTLKLJV, Kara <j>v(Tiv tx^etv 6 
avOptjJiTOQ TrapairXritjiwg Totg aXoyoig Zuyoig' to dl 6v6- 
fiamv, rj priij.a(nvy rj Tolg Ik tstiov crvy KSifiivoig Xoyoig 
XpificTOai irpog Trjv (TYifiacTlav (sicert <l>v<TeL smv, aXXa ^iaei) 
i^aipETOV e'x^^v irpog to. aXoya ^wa, diori itf fxovog tCjv 
^VTjrwv avTOKivrirs fxere^^et }pv)(rig, i^ rz\vLKCjg evspyuv 
^vvufievrig, *lva i^ Iv avTt^ T(^ (jxjjvhv ri T£\viKrj avT^g 
^laKpivriTaL Bvvafiig' deXscn Se ravra ot elg KoWog (rvvri- 
OifiEvoL \6yoL fxeTCL jLtlrpwv, 17 avev jjLETptJv. In the same 
manner therefore, as local Motion is from Nature, but 
Dancing is something positive; and as Timber exists in 
Nature, but a Door is something positive ; so is the power 
of producing a vocal Sound founded in Nature, but that of 
explaining ourselves by Nouns, or Verbs, something posi- 
tive. And hence it is, that as to the simple power of pro- 
ducing vocal Sound (which is as it were the Organ or 
Instrument to the SouVs faculties of Knowledge or Volition) 
as to this vocal power I say, Man setms to possess it from 



650 HERMES. 

be tempted to call Language a kind of 
Picture of the Universe, where the 
Words are as the Figures or Images of all 
particulars. 

And jet it may be doubted, how far 
this is true. For if Pictures and Images 



Nature, in like manner as irrational animals : but as to the 
emploi/ing of Nouns, or Verbs, or Sentences composed out 
ofthem^ in the explanation of our Sentiments (the thing thus 
emploj/ed eing founded, not in Nature, but in Position) 
this he seems to possess by way of peculiar eminence, because 
he alone of all mortal Beings partakes of a Soul, which 
can move itself, and operate artificially ; so that even in the 
Subject of Sound his artificial Power shows itself; as the 
various elegant Compositions both in Metre, and without 
Metre, abundantly prove. Ammon, de. Interpr. p. 51, a. 

It must be observed, that the operating artificially, 
(Iv^gyuv f£)(yiKU)g) of which Ammonius here speaks, and 
which he considers as a distinctive Mark peculiar to the 
Hum<in Soul, means something very different fi-om the 
mere producing works of elegance and design ; else it could 
never be a mark of Distinction between Man, and many 
other Species of Animals, such as the Bee, the Beaver, 
the Swallow, &c. See Vol. I. p. 8, 9, 10, 158, 159, &c. 



BOOK IlI.—CHAP. III. 381 

are all of them Imitations, it will follow, 
that whoever has natural faculties to know 
the Original, will by help of the same 
faculties know also its Imitations. But it 
by no means follows, that he who knows 
any Being, should know for that reason 
its Greek or Latin Name. 

The Truth is, that every Medium 
through which we exhibit any thing to 
another's Contemplation, is either derived 
from Natural Attributes, and then it is 
an Imitation ; or else from Accidents 
quite arbitrary, and then it is a Symbol/*^ 



'■^^ Aia(l>ipH gf TO OMOIOMA tS SYMBOAOY, KaOo- 
aov TO fJLiv oixoitofia rriv (ftvaiv avrrjv r5 Trpay/iaTo^ Kara 
TO ^vvaTov aireiKOviZ^aOai jSsXerat, 19 8k i^LV £^' rj/jXv avTo 
/jLiTUTrXcKjai' TO yap Iv Ty iiKOVt yiypafXfxivs rS ^WKpaTnq 
ofioiu}fxa, £t fxri i^ to (paXaKpov, icf to (Tifxbv ^ to i^w^^aX- 
fiov e\u T8 "SiWKpaTug, skIt av avrs \iyoiTO tivai bfioltiifia* 
TO §£ yt avfiP>o\ov, tJtoi (rrj/LieTov {afK^OTipa yap 6 (piXo- 
ao((>og avTo ovo}mZ,u), to cXov i<f r]fx'iv c'x^^^ "^^ *^ ^'^ 
fiovr^g ixfurafxevov tviq r'tfitTtpag iirivoiag' olov, rw noTt cu 



332 HERMES. 

Now, if it be allowed that in far the 
greater part of things, not any of their 
natural Attributes are to be found in arti- 
culate Voices, and that yet through such 
Voices things of every kind are exhibited, 
it will follow that Words must of necessity 
be Symbols, because it appears that they 
cannot be Imitations. 

But here occurs a Question, which 
deserves attention — " Why, in the com- 
" mon intercourse of men with men, have 
" Imitations been neglected, and Symbols 



avfi^aXkuv aXXrjXotc tsq TroXe/iSvrac^ ^vvarai avpij5o\ov 
tivai ^ (ToXiriyyog aTrrixe<7ig, i^ Xa/niradog phfjig, Kaddrng 
^y\g\v 'EvpiTTidrig, 

'EtteI S' d^eiOrt irvpaog, wg rvpcrriviKrjg 
^aXiriyyog ^x^^f (Trjina- (j)0iVL0v fia\r\g* 
AvvaraL di rig viroOscyQaL i^ ^oparog dvaramv, i^ jSfXsc 
a<l>e(nv, /^ aXXa jULVpia. — A REPRESENTATION or RE- 
SEMBLANCE differs from a Symbol, in as much as the 
Resemblance aims as far as possible to represent the very 
nature of the thing, nor is it in our power to shift or vary 
it. Thus a Representation intended for Socrates in a 
Picture, if it have not those circumstances peculiar, to 



/ 



BOOK IIL-CHAP. III. 3SS 

*^ preferred, although Symbols are only 
" known by Habit or Institution, while 
" Imitations are recognized by a kind of 
" natural Intuition ?" To this it may be 
answered, that if the Sentiments of the 
Mind, like the Features of the Face, were 
immediately visible to every beholder, the 
Art of Speech or Discourse would have 
been perfectly superfluous. But now, 
while our Minds lie enveloped and hid, 
and the Body (like a Veil) conceals every 
thing but itself, we are necessarily 



Socrates, the bald, the fiat-nosed, and the Eyes projecting, 
cannot properly he called a Representation of him. But a 
Symbol or Sign (for the Philosopher Aristotle uses both 
names) is wholly in our own power, as depending singly for 
its existence on our imagination. Thus for example, as to 
the time when two armies should engage, the Symbol or Sign 
may be the sounding of a Trumpet, the throwing of a 
Torch (according to what Euripides says. 

But when the fuming Torch was hurVd, the sign 
Of purple fight, as when the Trumpet sounds, ^c.) 
or else one may suppose the elevating of a Spear, the dart- 
ing of a Weapon, and a thousand ways besides. Amnion. 
in Lib, de Interp. p. 17. b. 



334 HERMES. 

compelled, when we communicate our 
Thoughts, to convey them to each other 
through a Medium which is CorporeaV^ 
And hence it is, that all Signs, Marks, 
Imitations, and Symbols must needs be 
sensible^ and addressed as such to the 
SensesJ^^ Now the Senses, we know, 
never exceed their natural Limits; the 
Eye perceives no Sounds ; the Ear per- 
ceives no Figures nor Colours. If there- 
fore we were to converse, not by Symbols 



^"^ At ^i^X"^ ^* rifLiiTepai, yvfjLval fxlv scrai riov ffWjuarwy, 
Ti^vvavTo ^L avTiov Th)v voYifiariov (rrtjuiaiviiv aXXrjXatc ^« 
irpayjuLara' ^ETretSri Si frtLfiaat mjv^idBvrat, ^Uriv vitpsg 
TnpiKaXvTTTsmv avTtov to voepov, l^eriOr}(Tav tu)v ovofULartJVy 
di u)v (Trtfiaivsmv dWriXaig ra Trpa-y/xara. Anivii nostri a 
corporis compage secreti res vicissim animi conceptionihus 
significare possent : cum autem corporihus involute sint, 
perinde ac nebula ipsorum intelligendi vis obtegitur : quocirca 
opus CIS fuit nomimbus, guibus res inter se significarent. 
Ammon, in Praedicam. p. 18, a. 

^^^ Quidquid scindi possit in differentias satis numerosas, 
ad notionum varietatem explicandam (modo differentia: ilia 
sensui perceptibiles sint) fieri potest vehiculum cogitationum 
de homine in hominem. Bacon, de Augm. Sclent. VI. 1. 



BOOK III.—CHAP. Ill 335 

but by Imitations^ as far as things are 
characterized by Figure and Colour, our 
Imitation would be necessarily thro' Figure 
and Colour also. Again, as far as they 
are characterized by Sounds, it would for 
the same reason be thro' the Medium of 
Sounds. The like may be said of all the 
other Senses, the Imitation still shifting 
along with the Objects imitated. We see 
then how complicated such Imitation would 
prove. ' / 

If we set Language therefore, as a 
Symbol^ in opposition to such Imitation ; 
if we reflect on the Simplicity of the one, 
and the Multiplicity of the other; if we 
consider the Ease and Speed with which 
Words are formed (an Ease which knows 
no trouble or fatigue ; and a *Speed, 
which equals the Progress of our very 
Thoughts) if we oppose to this the diffi- 

* Ettco Trrfpotvra — See before, p. 325. 



336 HERMES. 

culty and length of Imitations ; if we re- 
member that some Objects are capable of 
no Imitations at all, but that all Objects 
universally may be typified by Symbols ; 
we may plainly perceive an Answer to the 
Question here proposed, *^Why, in the 
" common intercourse of men with men, 
" Imitations have been rejected, and Sym- 
" bols preferred ?" 

Hence too we may perceive a Reason, 
why there never was a Language^ nor indeed 
can possibly be framed one^ to express the 
Properties and real Essences of things^ as 
a Mirrour exhibits their Figures and their 
Colours. For if Language of itself imply 
nothing more, than certain Species of 
Sounds with certain Motions concomitant ; 
if to some Beings sound and Motion are 
no Attributes at all ; if to many others, 
where Attributes, they are no way essen- 
tial (such as the Murmurs and Waving^ of 
a Tree during a storm) if this be true— it is 



BOOK III.— CHAP. III. 357 

impossible the Nature of such Beings 
should be expressed, or the least essential 
Property be any way imitated, while be- 
tween the Medium and themselves there is 
nothing connatural/'-' 

It is true, indeed, when Primitives were 
once established, it was easy to follow the 
Connection and Subordination of Nature, 
in the just deduction of Derivatives and 
Compounds. Thus the Sounds, Water and 
jFire, being once annexed to those two 
Elements, it was certainly more natural 
to call .Beings participating of the first, 
Watery^ of the last. Fiery ^ than to com- 
mute the Terms, and call them by the 
reverse. But why, and from what natu- 
ral Connections the Primitives themselves 
might not be commuted, it will be found, I 
believe, difficult to assign a Reason, as well 
in the instances before us, as in most others. 

''■> See Vol. I. Treatise II. c. 3. p. 70. 
Z 



6S8 H E R M E S. 

We jnay here also see the Reason, why all 
Language is tounded in Compact, 
and not in Nature ; for so are all Symbols, 
of which Words are a certain Species. 

The Question remains if Words are 
Symbols, then Symbols of WHATp^—If 
it be answered, of things, the Question 
returns, of what Things? — If it be 
answered, of the several Individuals of 
Sense, the various particular Beings which 
exist around us — to this, it is replied, may 
be raised certain Doubts. In the first 
place every Word will be, in fact, a proper 
Name. Now if all Words are proper 
Names, how came Lexicographers, whose 
express business is to explain Words, either 
wholly to omit proper Names, or at least 
to explain them, not from their own Art, 
but from History .? ; 

Again, if all Words are proper Names, 
then in strictness no Word can belong to 
more than one Individual. But if so, 



BOOK III.— CHAP. III. 839 

then, as Individuals are infinite, to make a 
perfect Language, Words must he infinite 
also. But if infinite, then incomprehen- 
sible, and never to be attained by the wisest 
Men ; whose labours in Language upon 
this Hypothesis would be as idle as that 
study of infinite written Symbols, which 
Missionaries (if they may be credited) 
attribute to the Chinese. 

Again*, if all Words are proper NameSy 
or (which is the same) the Symbols of 
Individuals; it will follow, as Individuals 
are not only infinite, but ever passings that 
the Language of those, who lived ages 
ago, will be as unknown now, as the very 
Voices of the Speakers. Nay the Lan- 
guage of every Province, of every Town, of 
every Cottage, must be every where differ- 
ent, and every where changing, since such is 
the Nature of Individuals, which it follows. 

Again, if all Words are proper Names, 
z % 



34« HERMES. 

the Symbols of Lidividuals, it will follow 
that in Language there can be no general 
Proposition, because upon the Hypothesis 
all Terms are particular ; nor any Affirma-- 
tive Proposition, because no one Individual 
in nature is another. It remains, there can 
be no Propositions, but Particular Nega- 
tives, But if SO5 then is Language inca- 
pable of communicating General Affirmative 
Truths — If so, then of communicating De- 
monstration — If so, then of communicating 
Sciences, which are so many Systems of 
Demonstrations — If so, then of communi- 
cating Arts, which are the Theorems of 
Science applied practically — If so, we shall 
be little the better for it either in Specula- 
tion or in Practice.^'^ And so much for 
this Hypothesis; let us now try another. 

^^^ The whole of Euclid (whose Elements inay be called 
the basis of Mathematical Science) is founded upon 
general Terms, and general Propositions, most of which 
are affirmative. So true are those Verses, however bar- 
barous as to their stile, 

Syllogizari non est ex Particulari, 
Neve Negativis, recte conchdere si vis. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. III. 341 

If Words are not the Symbols of eo?- 
ternal Particulars^ it follows of coarse, they 
must be the Symbols of our Ideas : 
For this is evident, if they are not Symbols 
of things without, they can only be Sym- 
bols of something e^^xV Am. 

Here then the Question recurs, if Sym- 
bols OF Ideas, then of what Ideas? 
— Of sensible Ideas. — Be it so, and 
what follows ? — Every thing in fact, which 
has followed already from the supposition 
of their being the Symbols of external 
Particulars ; and that from this plain and 
obvious reason, because the several Ideas, 
which Particulars imprint, must needs be as 
infinite and mutable as they are themselves. 

If then Words are neither the Symbols 
of external Particulars, nor yet of particu^ 
lar Ideas, they can be Symbols of nothing 
else, except of general Ideas, because 
nothing else, except these, remains. — And 



34S HER ME S. 

what do we mean by general Ideas? — 
We mean such as are common to many 
Individuals; not only to Individuals 
which exist now, but which existed in ages 
pa^t, and will exist in ages future; such 
for example, as the Ideas belonging to the 
Words, Man, Lion, Cedar, — Admit it, and 
what follows? — It follows, that if Words 
are the Symbols of such general Ideas^ 
Lexicographers may find employ, though 
they meddle not with proper Names. 

It follows that one Word may be, not 
homonymously, but truly and essentially com- 
mon to many Particulars, past, present, and 
future ; so that however these Particulars 
may be infinite, and ever fleeting, yet Lan- 
guage notwithstanding may be definite and 
steady. But if so, then attainable even by 
ordinary Capacities, without danger of in- 
curring the Chinese Absurdity.* 

* See p. 838, 339. 



BOOK in.— CHAP. III. 

Again, it follows that the Language 
of those, who lived ages ago, as far as it 
stands for the same general Ideas, may be as 
intelligible now, as it was then. The like 
may be said of the same Language being 
accommodated to distant Regions, and 
even to distant Nations, amidst all the va- 
riety of ever new and ever changing Objects. 

Again, it follows that Language may 
be expressive o^ general Truths; and if so, 
then of Demonstration, and Sciences, and 
Arts; and if so, become subservient to 
purposes of every kind.^^ 

Now if it be true " that none of these 
" things could be asserted of Language, 
" were not Words the Symbols of general 
" Ideas — and if it be further true, that these 
" things may be all undeniably asserted 
" of Language'' — it will follow (and that 

^^ See before, Note ^'\ 



3M HERMES. 

necessarily) that Words are the Sym 
BGLS OF GENERAL Ideas. 

And yet perhaps even here may be an 
Objection. It may be urged, if Words are 
the Symbols of general Ideas^ Language 
may answer well enough the purpose of 
Philosophers, who reason about general 
and abstract Subjects— but what becomes 
of the business of ordinary Life ? Life we 
know is merged in a multitude of Particu- 
lars^ where an Explanation by Language 
is as requisite, as in the highest Theorems. 
The Vulgar indeed want it to no other End. 
How then can this End in any respect be 
answered, if Language be expressive of 
nothing further than general Ideas ? 

To this it may be answered, that Arts 
surely respect the business of ordinary 
Life ; yet so far are general Terms from 
being an Obstacle here, that without them 
no Art can be ationally explained. How 



BOOK III.— CHAP. III. 345 

for instance should the measuring Artist 
ascertain to the Reapers the price of their 
labours, had not the first through general 
Terms learnt those general Theorems^ that 
respect the doctrine and practice of Men- 
suration ? 

But suppose this not to satisfy a perse- 
vering Objector — suppose him to insist, 
that, admitting this to be true, there were 
still a multitude of occasions for minute par* 
ticularizingy of which it was not possible for 
mere Generals to be susceptible — suppose, 
I say, such an Objection, what should we 

answer? That the Objection was Just ; 

that it was necessary to the Perfection and 
Completion of Language, that it should 
be expressive of Varticvlaus^ as well as 
0/ Generals. We must, however, add, 
that its general Terms are by far its most 
excellent and essential Part, since from 
these it derives '' that comprehensive 
*' Universality^ that just proportion of 



346 HERMES. ^ 

" Precision and Permanence^ without which 
" it could not possibly be either iearnt, or 
" understood, or applied to the purposes 
" of Reasoning and Science ;'' — that par- 
ticular Terms have their Utility and End, 
and that therefore care too has been taken 
for a supply of these. 

One Method of expressing Particulars, 
is that of Proper Names. This is the 
least artificial, because proper Names being 
in every district arbitrarily applied, may 
be unknown to those, who know the Lan^ 
guage perfectly well, and can hardly there- 
fore with propriety be considei^ed as parts 
of it. The other and more artificial Method 
is that of Definitives or Articles,^^^ 
whether we assume the pronominal^ or those 
more strictly so called. And here we can-* 
not enough admire the exquisite Art of 



U) 



See befOTe p. 72, &c. i22l3, &c. 



BOOK III.--CHAP. III. 347 

Language, which, without wandering into 
injinitudey contrives how to denote things 
infinite; that is to say in other words, 
which, by the small Tribe of Definitives 
properly applied to general Terms, knows 
how to employ these last, tho^ in number 
finite, to the accurate expression of infinite 
Particulars. 

To explain what has been said by a 
single example. Let the general Term be 
Man. I have occasion to apply this Term 
to the denoting of some Particular. Let 
it be required to express this Particular, 
as unknozon ; I say, a Man — known ; I say, 
THE Man — indefinite; ah^y Man — definite; 
A CERTAIN Man — present and near ; this 
Man — present and distant; that Ma?i — 
like to some other ; such a Man — an inde^ 
finite Multitude; many Men— a definite 
Multitude; a thousand Men — the dnes 
of a Multitude, taken throughout; every 
Man — the same ones, taken with distinction ; 



348 HERMES. 

EACH Man— taken in order ; first Man, 
SECOND Man^ ^c.—the whole Multitude 
of Particulars taken collectively ; all Men 
—the Negation of this Multitude ; no Man. 
But of this we have spoken already, when 
we inquired concerning Definitives. 

The Sum of all is, that Words are 
THE Symbols of Ideas both general 
AND particular; yet of the gene- 
ral, PRIMARILY, essentially, AND 

immediately; of the particular, 

only secondarily, ACCIDENTALLY, 
AND MEDIATELY. 

Should it be asked, "why has Lan- 
" guage this double Capacity ?" — May we 
not ask, by way of return, Is it not a kind 
of reciprocal Commerce, or Intercourse of 
our Ideas? Should it not therefore be 
framed, so as to express the whole of our 
Perception ? Now can we call that Per- 
ception intire and whole, which implies 



> 



BOOK IIL—CHAP. III. 349 

either Intellection without Sensation^ 
or Sensation without Intelleciion? If 
not, how should Language explain the 
whole of our Perception, had it not Words 
to express the Objects, proper to each of 
the two Faculties ? 

To conclude — As in the preceding 
Chapter we considered Language with a 
view to its Matter, so here we have con- 
sidered it with a view to its Form. Its 
Matter is recognized, when it is consi- 
dered as a Voice ; its Form, as it is signifi- 
cant of our several Ideas ; so that upon the 
whole it may be defined — A system of 

ARTICULATE VoiCES, THE SyMBOLS OF 

OUR Ideas, but of those principally 

WHICH AR^; general OR UNIVERSAL. 



^50 E E H M E S. 

CHAP. IV. 

Concerning general or universal Ideas. 

JVlIUCH having been said in the pre- 
ceding Chapter about general or uni- 
versal Ideas, it may not perhaps be 
amiss to inquire, by what process we come 
to perceive them^ and what hind of Beings 
they are; since the generality of men think 
so meanly of their existence, that they are 
commonly considered, as little better than 
Shadows. These Sentiments are not un- 
usual even with the Philosopher now a 
days, and that from causes much the same 
with those which influence the Vulgar. 

The Vulgar merged in Sense from 
their earliest Infancy, and never once 
dreaming any thing to be worthy of pur- 
suit, but what either pampers their Appe- 
tite, or fills their Purse, imagine nothing 
to be realy but what may be tasted^ or 



BOOK III.— CHAP. IV^. 351 

iouched. The Philosopher, as to these 
matters, being of much the same Opinion, 
in Philosophy looks no higher, than to 
experimental Amusements, deeming nothing 
Demonstration, if it be not made ocular. 
Thus instead of ascending from Sense to 
Intellect (the natural progress of all true 
Learning) he hurries, on the contrary, into 
the midst of Sense, where^he wanders at 
random without any end, and is lost in a 
Labyrinth of infinite Particulars. Hence 
then the reason why the sublimer parts of 
Science, the Studies of Mind, Intellec- 
tion, and INTELLIGENT PRINCIPLES, 

are in a manner neglected ; and, as if the 
Criterion of all Truth were an Alembic or 
an Air-pump, what cannot be proved by 
Experiment, is deemed no better than mere 
Hypothesis. 

And yet it is somewhat remarkable, 
amid the prevalence of such Notions, that 
there should still remain two Sciences in 



S52 HERMES. 

fashion, and these having their Certainty 
of all the least controverted, which are not 
in the minutest article depending upon JExpe- 
riment. By these I mean Arithmetic 
and Geometry/''^ But to come to our 
Subject concerning general Ideas- 



^*^ The many noble Theorems (so useful in h*fe, and so 
admirable in themselves) with which these two Sciences 
so eminently abound, arise originally from Principles 
THE MOST OBVIOUS IMAGINABLE; Principles, so little 
wanting the pomp and apparatus of Experiment, that 
they are self-evident to every one possessed of common 
sense. I would not be understood, in what I have here 
said, or may have said elsewhere, to undervalue Experi- 
ment ; whose importance and utility I -freely acknowledge, 
in the many curious Nostrums and choice Receipts, with 
which it has enriched the necessary Arts of life. Nay, I 
go farther — I hold all justifiable Practice in every kind of 
Subject to be founded in Experience, which is no more 
than the result of many repeated Experiments. But 
I must add withal, that the man who acts from Experi- 
ence alone, tho' he act ever so well, is but an Empiric or 
Quack, and that not only in Medicine, but in every other 
Subject. It is then only that we recognize Art, and that 
the Empiric quits his name for the more honourable 
one of Artist, ^when to his Experience he adds 



BOOK III.— CHAP. IV. 353 

Man^s first Perceptions are those 
of the Senses, in as much as they com- 
mence from his earhest Infancy. These 
Perceptions, if not infinite, are at least 
indefinite^ and more fleeting and transient 
than the very Objects which they exhibit, 
because they not only depend upon the 



\ 



Science, and is thence enabled to tell us, not only, what 
is to he done, but why it is to be done; for Art is a 
composite of Experience and Science, Experience providing 
it Materials, and Science giving them a Foum. 

In the mean time, while Experiment is thus neces- 
sary to all PRACTICAL Wisdom, with respect to pure and 
SPECULATIVE SciENCE, as wc have hinted already, it has 
not the least to do. For who ever heard of Logic, or Geo- 
metry, or Arithmetic being proved experimentalbj ? It is 
indeed by the application of these that Experiments are 
rendered useful ; that they are assumed into Philosophy, 
and in some degree made a part of it, being otherwise 
nothhig better than puerile amusements. But that these 
Sciences themselves should depend upon the Subjects on 
which they work, is, as if the Marble were to fashion the 
Chizzle, and not the Chizzle the Marble. 

2 A 



354 HERMES. 

existence of those Objects, but because 
they cannot subsist, without their imme- 
diate Presence, Hence therefore it is, that 
there can be no Sensation of either Fast or 
Future^ and consequently had the Soul no 
other Faculties than the Senses, . it never 
could acquire the least Idea of Time/*^ 

But happily for us we are not deserted 
here. We have in the first place a Faculty, 
called Imagination or Fancy, which 
however as to its energies it may be subse- 
quent to Sense, yet is truly prior to it both 
indignity ^ud use. This it is which re- 
tains the fleeting Forms of things, when 
Things themselves are gone, and all Sensa- 
tion at an end. 

That this Faculty, however connected 
with Sense, is still perfectly different, may 



«*^ See before, p, 105. See also, p. 112. Note, 



(/) 



BOOK III.-CHAP. IV. 355 

be seen from hence. We have an Imagi- 
nation of things, that are gone and extinct; 
but no such things can be made objects of 
Sensation. We have an easy command 
over the Objects of our Imagination^ and 
can call them forth in almost what manner 
vire please ; but our Sensations are neces- 
sary, when their Objects are present, nor 
can we controul them, but by removing 
either the Objects, or ourselves.^'^ 



^'^ Besides the distinguishing of Sensation from Ima- 
gination, there are two other Faculties of the Soul, 
which from their nearer alliance ought carefully to be 
distinguished from it, and these are MNHMH, and 
ANAMNESIS, Memory, and Recollection. 

When we view some relict of sensation reposed within 
us, without thinking of its rise, or referring it to any 
sensible Object, this is Phansy or Imagination. 

When we view some such relict, and refer it withal to 
that sensible Object, which in time past was its cause and 
original, this is Memory. 

,2 A 2 



S5e H E R M E S. 

As the Wax would not be adequate to 
its business of Signature, had it not a 
Power to retain^ as well as to receive ; the 
same holds of the Soul, with respect to 



Lastly, tht Road, which leads to Memory through a 
series of Ideas, however connected, whether rationally or 
casually, this is Recollection. I have added casually, 
as well as rationally, because a casual connection is often 
sufficient. Thus from seeing a Garment, I think of its 
Owner ; thence of his Habitation ; thence of Woods ; 
thence of Timber ; thence of Ships, Sea-fights, Admirals, 
&c. 

If the Distinction between Memory and Phansy be not 
sufficiently understood, it may be illustrated by being 
compared to the view of a Portrait. _When we contem- 
plate a Portrait, without thinking of whom it is the Por- 
trait, such Contemplation is analogous to Phansy. 
When we view it with reference to the Original, whom 
it represents, such Contemplation is analogous to Me- 
mory. 

We may go farther. Imagination or Phansy may 
exhibit (after a manner) even things that are to come. It 
^s here that ^ope and i^ear paint all their pleasant and 
all their painful Pictures of Futurity. But Memory is 
confined in the strictest manner to the past. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. IV. 357 

Sense and Imagination. Sense is its re- 
ceptive Power; Imagination, its reten- 
tive. Had it Sense without Imagination, 
it would not be as Wax, but as Water, 
where tho' all Impressions may be instantly 
made, yet as soon as made they are as 
instantly lost. 

Thus, then, from a view of the two 
Powers taken together, we may call Sense 
(if we please) a kind of transient Imagina- 
tion; and Imagination on the contrary 
a kind of permanent Sense J'^^ \ 



What we hiave said may suffice for our present pur- 
pose. He that would learn more, may consult Arutot. 
de Am'md, L. III. c. 3, 4. and his Treatise de Mem. et. 
Reminisc. 

^^■^ Ti TOLvvv i~\v 17 ^avracTia w^e av yv^picraijuLBv' Set 
votXv iv r)UA.v a~o tCov Iv^nyniov rdv "iVthX ra m(j\Jr\Ta, 
oiov TuTTTOv {lege TVTTOv) Tivu itj ava^i»ypaf^if]^a Iv^li} 
7rpwrc|j ata-Qrjrtjoitjj, iyjcaraXet/X/ua ti ri/c ^^tto rs a\aOt\T^ 
yivofjLivrig KLv-ficrewc, B i^ fxriKhTL rs aia^nrS nupovrog, 



Sm HERMES. 

Now as our feet in vain venture to walk 
upon the River, till the Frost bind the 
Current, and harden the yielding Surface ; 
so does the Soul in vain seek to exert its 
higher Powers, the Powers I mean of 
Reason and Intellect, till Imagina- 
tion first fix the fluency of Sense, and 
thus provide a proper Basis for the support 
of its higher Energies. 



virofiivH tI ^ iTtLZBTai, ov uXTirsp eikwv tiq avrs, o i^ rijc 
fiVYifiriQ riiMV o-w^OjUEvov ainov yiveTaC to toistov kyKard^ 

Xsiflfia, /^ TOV T018T0V llxTTTep TVTTOV, ^ANTASIAN 

KoXScriv. Now what Phansy or Imagination iSy we 
may explain as follows. We may conceive to be formed 
within us, from the operations of our Seiises about sensible 
Siibjects, some Impression (as it tcere) or Picture in our 
original Sensorium, being a relict of that motion caused 
within us by the external object ; a relict, ivhich when the 
external object is no longer present^ remains and is still 
preserved, being as it were its Image, and which, by being 
thus preserved, becomes the cause of our having Memory. 
Now such a sort of relict and (as it were) Impression they 
call Phansy or Imagination. A/ejc, Jphrod. dt 
^nimd, p. 135. b. Edit. Aid. 



BOOK III.--.CHAP. IV. 359 

After this manner, in the admirable 
CEconomy of the Whole, are Natures subor- 
dinate made subservient to the higher. 
Were there no Things external^ the Senses 
could no"^ operate ; were there 7io Sensa- 
tions, the Imagination could not operate ; 
and were there no Imaginationy there could 
be neither Reasoning nor Intellection, such 
at least as they are found in Man, where 
they have their Intensions and Remissions 
in alternate succession, and are at first 
nothing better, than a mere Capacity or 
Power. Whether every Intellect begins 
thus, may be perhaps a question ; espe- 
cially if there be any one of a nature more 
divine, to which " Intension and Remis- 
" sion and mere Capacity are unknown .'^'''^ 
But not to digress. 



f" See p. 162. The Life, Energy, or Manner of Man's 
Existence is not a little different from that of the Deity. 
The Life of Man has its Essence in Motion. This 



S60 HERMES. 

It is then on these permanent Phan- 
tasms that THE HUMAN Mind first works, 
and by an Energy as spontaneous and 



is not only true with respect to that lower and subordinate 
Life, which he shares in common with Vegetables, and 
which can no longer subsist than while the Fluids circulate, 
but it is likewise true in that Life, which is peculiar to 
him as Man. Objects from without first move our facul- 
ties, and thence we move of ourselves either to Practice or 
Contemplation. But the Life or Existence of God (as 
far as we can conjecture upon so transcendent a Subject) is 
riot only complete throughout Eternity, but complete in 
every Instant, and is for that reason immutable and 

SUPEIHOR TO ALL MoTION. 

' It is to this distinction that Aristotle alludes, when he 
tells us — Ov yap ^xovov Kivn<je(jj^ h'^iv Ivipyeia, aWa i^ 
aKLVTfiaiag' ^ r)dovrj juaWov Iv r}peiJ,iq^ Mv^ rj Iv KLvr\(TU' 
fjLETa^oXrj §£ iravTuyv 'yXvKv, Kara tov 7rot»|rrjv, dia 
7rovr}piav Tiva. loaireQ yap avOpijjTrog €i;jU€ra/3oXoc 6 
TTovrjpog, icf i) (pvijig r} dwfiivr} jU£raj3oX^c* « yap aTrXF/, 
ouS' iiri^iK-ng. For there is not onlj/ an Energy of 
Motion, 62*^ q/" Immobility ; and Fiaiahvre or Feli- 
city exists rather in Rest than in Motion ; Change of 
all things being sweet (according to the Poet) from a prin- 
ciple of Pravity in those who believe so. For in the same 



BOOK III.-~CHAr. IV. 361 

familiar to its Nature, as the seeing of 
Colour is familiar to the Eye, it discerns 



i 



manner as the bad man is one fickle and changeable, so is 
that Nature bad that requireth Variety, in as much as such 
Nature is neither simple nor even. Eth. Nicom. VII. 14. 
and Ethic. Eudem. VI. sub. fin. 

It is to this UNALTERABLE NaTURE OF THE DeiTY 

that Boethius refers, when he say in those elegant verses, 
Tempus ab u^vo 



Irejubes stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri. 

From this single principle of Immobility, may be derived 
some of the noblest of the Divine Attributes ; such as that 
of Impassive, Incorruptible, Incorporeal, &c. Vide 
Aristot. Physic. VIII. Metaphys. XIV. c. 6, 7, 9, 10. 
Edit. Du Val. See also Vol. I. of these Treatises, p. 262 
to 266 — also p. 295, where the Verses of Boethius are 
quoted at length. 

It must be remembered, however, that though we are 
not Gods, yet as rational Beings we have within us some- 
thing Divine, and that the more we can become superior 
to our mutable, variable, and irrational part, and place 
our welfare in that Good, which is immutable, permanent. 



362 HERMES, 

at once what in many is one; what in 
things DISSIMILAR and different is 
SIMILAR and the same/-^^ By this it 



and rational, the higher we ^hall advance in real Hap- 
piness and Wisdom. This is (as an antient writer says) 
— Ojj,oi(jjmg rtTJ Qeto Kara to dwarov, the becoming like 
to God, as far as in our power. ToXg filv yap ^eoTq irag 
6 j5iog jutaKapiog' rotg S' avOpojiroig, k(f ocrov ofiouofid ri 
Trig ToiavTr]g Ivspyeiag virapx^i. For to the Gods (as 
says another antient) the whole of life is one continued hap- 
piness ; hut to Men, it is so far happy ^ as it rises to the 
resemblance of so divine an Energy. See Plat, in Theae- 
tet. Jrist. Eth. X. 8. 

^•^ This CONNECTIVE AcT of the Soul, by which it 
views ONE IN MANY, is perhaps one of the principal Acts 
of its most excellent part. It is this removes that impene- 
trable mist, which renders Objects of Intelligence invisible 
to lower faculties. Were it not for this, even the sensible 
World (with the help of all our Sensations) would appear 
as unconnected, as the words of an Index. It is certainly 
not the Figure alone, nor the Touch alone, nor the Odour 
alone, that makes the Rose, but it is made up of all these, 
and other attributes united ; not an unknown Constitu- 
tion of insensible Parts, but a known Constitution of sen- 
sible Parts, unless we chuse to extirpate the possibility of 
natural Knowledge. 



BOOK III.—CHAP. IV. 

comes to behold a kind of superior Objects; 
a new Race of Perceptions, more compre- 



\ 



What then perceives this Constitution or Union ?— 
Can it be any of the Senses ? — No one of these, we know, 
can pass the limits of its own province. Were the Smell 
to perceive the union of the Odour and the Figure, it 
would not only be Smell, but it would be Sighi also. It 
is the same in other instances. We must necessarily 
therefore recur to some higher collective Power, to 
give us a prospect of Nature, even in these her subordi- 
nate Wholes, much more in that comprehensive Whole, 
whose Sympathy is universal, and of which these smaller 
Wholes are all no more than Parts. 

But no where is this collecting, and (if I may be al- 
lowed the expression) this unifying Power more conspicu- 
ous, than in the subjects of pure Truth. By virtue of 
this power the Mind views One general Idea, in many 
Individuals; One Proposition, in mani/ general Ideas; 
One Syllogism in many Propositions ; till at length, by 
properly repeating and connecting Syllogism with Syllo- 
gism, it ascends into those bright and steady regions of 
Science. 

Quas neque concutiunt vend, neque nnhila nimbis 
Adspergunf, <^c. Lucr. 



364 H E RM E S. 

hensive than those of Sense; a Race of 
Perceptions, each one of which may he found 



Even negative Truths and negative Conclusions cannot 
subsist, but by bringing Terms and Propositions together, 
so necessary/ is this uniting Power to every Species of 
Knowledge. See p. 3. 250. 

He that would better comprehend the distinction be- 
tween SENSITIVE Perception, and intellective, may- 
observe that, when a Truth is spoken, it is heard by_ our 
Ears, and understood by our Minds. That these two 
Acts are different, is plain, from the example of such as 
hear the sounds, without knowing the language. But to 
show their difference still stronger, let us suppose them to 
concur in tire same Man, who shall both hear and under- 
stand the Truth proposed. Let the Truth be for example, 
The Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles, 
That this is one Truth, and not two or maiii/ Truths, I 
believe none will deny. Let me ask then, in what manner 
does this Truth become perceptible (if at all) to Sens a 
TioN ? — The Answer is obvious ; it is by successive por- 
tions of little and little at a Time. When the first Word 
is present, all the subsequent are absent; when the last 
Word is present, all the previous are absent ; when any of 
the middle Words' are present, then are there some absent, 
as well of one sort as the other. No more exists at once 



I 



BOOK III.— CHAP. IV. 365 

intire and whole in the separate individuals 
of an infinite and fleeting Multitude, with- 



than a single Syllable, and the Remainder as much is not 
(to Sensation at least) as tho' it never had been, or never 
was to be. And so much for the perception of Sense, 
than which we see nothing can be more dissipated, fleeting, 
and detached. — And is that of the Mind similar ? — Admit 
it, and what follows ? — it follows, that one Mind would no 
more recognize one Truth, by recognising its Terms sue- 
cessively and apart, than many distant Minds would re- 
cognize it, were it distributed among them, a different part 
to each. The case is, every Truth is one, tho"* its 
Terms are many. It is in no respect true, by parts at a 
time, but it is true of necessity at once, and in an instant. 
— What Powers therefore recognize this Oneness or 
Unity ? — Where even does it reside, or what makes it ? 
— Shall we answer with the Stagirite, To §£ EN IIOIOYN 
THTo 6 NOYS LKa^ov — If this be allowed, it should seem, 
where Sensation and Intellection appear to concur, 
that Sensation was of Many, Intellection was of One ; 
that Sensation was temporary, divisible, and successive ; 
Intellection, instantaneous, indivisible, and at once. 

If we consider the Radii of a Circle, wc shall find 
at the Circumference that they arc many ; at the Centre 
that they are one. Let us then suppose Sense and 
Mind to view the same Radii, only let Sense view them 



366 HERMES. 

out departing from the unity and perma- 
nence of its own nature. 



at the Circumference ; Mind at the Center ; and hence 
we may conceive, how these Powers differ, even where 
they jointly appear to operate in perception of the same 
object. 

There is another Act of the Mind, the very re- 
verse of that here mentioned ; an Act, by which it per- 
ceives not one in many^ but many i"N one. This is that 
mental Separation, of which we have given some account 
in the first Chapter of this Book; that Resolution or 
Analysis which enables us to investigate the Cavses, and 
Principles, and Elements of things. It is by Virtue of 
this, that we are enabled to abstract any particular Attri- 
bute, and make it hi/ itself the Subject of Philosophical 
Contemplation. Were it not for this, it would be diffi- 
cult for particular Sciences to exist; because otherwise 
they would be as much blended, as the several Attri- 
butes of sensible Substances. How, for example, could 
there be such a Science as Optics, were we necessitated 
to contemplate Colour concreted with Figure, two Attri- 
butes which the Eye can never view, but associated? I 
mention not a multitude of other sensible qualities, some of 
which still present themselves, whenever we look on any 
coloured Body. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. IV. 367 

And thus we see the Process by which 
we arrive at general Ideas ; for the 



Those two noble Sciences, Arithmetic and Geome- 
TEY, would have no Basis to stand on, were it not for this 
separative Power. They are both conversant about Quan- 
tity ; Geometry about continuous Quantity, Arith- 
metic^ about Discrete. Extension is essential to con- 
tinuous Quantity, Monads, or Units, to Discrete. By 
separating from the infinite Individuals, with which we 
are surrounded, those infinite accidents, by which they 
are all diversified, we leave nothing but those simple and 
PERFECTLY SIMILAR Units, which being combined 
make Number, and are the Subject of Arithmetic. — 
Again, by separating from Body every possible subordinate 
Accident, and leaving it nothing but its triple Exten- 
sion of Lengthy Breadth, and Thickness (of which were 
it to be deprived, it would be Body no longer) we 
arrive at that pure and unmixed Magnitude, the con- 
templation of whose properties makes the Science of 
Geometry. 

By the same analytical or separate Power, we inves- 
tigate Definitions of all kinds, each one of which is a 
' developed Word, as the same Word is an inveloped Defi- 
nition. 

To conclude — In Composition and Division con- 
sists THE WHOLE OF SciENCE I COMPOSITION MAKING 



368 HERMES. 

Perceptions here mentioned are in fact no 
other. In these too we perceive the 
objects of Science and real Know- 
ledge, which can by no means be, but 
of that which is general^ and definite, and 
jixtJ^^ Here too even Individuals^ how- 



Affirmative Truth, axd shewing us things 

UNDER their SIMILARITIES AND IDENTITIES ; DIVI- 
SION MAKING Negative Truth, and presenting 

THEM TO us under THEIR DISSIMILARITIES AND 

Diversities. 

And here, by the way, there occurs a Question.— If all 
Wisdom be Science, and it be the business of Science 
as well to compound as to separate, may we not say that 
those Philosophers took Half of Wisdom for the Whole,' 
who distinguished it from Wit, as if Wisdom only sepa- 
rated, and Wit only brought together ? — Yet so held the 
Philosopher of Malmeshuri/, and the Author of the Essay 
on the Human Understanding. 

^'^ The very Etymologies of the Words EHISTHMH, 
Scientia, and Understanding, may serve in some 
degree to shew the nature of these Faculties, as well as of 
those Beings, their true and proper Objects. EniSTHMH 
wvojuaTac, dia to EIII STASIN i^ bpov rdv irpayfjidTiJV 



BOOK III.-CHAP. IV. S69 

ever of themselves unknowable, become 
objects of Knowledge, as far as their 



ayeiv ripxiq Tr\q aoQi^iag icj jusrajSoXijc ^wv Inl juLEpsg aitd- 
ysaa' r) yap liri^Yiixr] ir^gi ra KaBoXs Itj afiETaTTTiOTa Kara- 
ylveraL' Science (EIIISTHMH) has its name from bring- 
ing us (EniSTASIN) TO SOME Stop and Boundary of 
things, taking us away fo^om the unbounded nature and 
mutability of Particulars ; for it is conversant about Sub- 
jects, that are general, and invariable. NIceph. Blem. 
Epit. Logic, p. 21. 

This Etymology given by Blemmides, and long before Jiim 
adopted by the Peripatetics, came originally from Plato, 
as may be seen in the following account of it from his 
Craiylus. In this Dialogue Socrates, having first (accord- 
ing to the Heraclitean Philosophy, which Cratylus favour- 
ed) etymologized a multitude of Words with a view to 
that Flow and unceasing Mutation^ supposed by Heraclitus 
to run thro' all things, at length changes his System, and 
begins to etymologize from another, which supposed 
something in nature to be permanent and fixed. On this 
principle he thus proceeds S/coTrw/isy ^//, l^ avrCjv avaXa- 

(56vT£r^ TTpwrOi; filv 7HT0 TO OVOjia TYIV EIIISTHMIIN, WQ 

afirpifioXov £Tt, /^ juaXXov toiKE av)/j.cuv6v tl on ISTH- 
SIN rjuCov Em Tolg TrpuyfxacFi Ttjv \pvxnv, rj on au/UTre- 
pi<pip£Tai. Let us consider, then (says he) some of the very 
Words aheady examined ; and in the first place, the Word 

2 B 



370 HERMES. 

nature will permit. For then only may 
any Particular be said to be known, when 
by asserting it to^ be a Man, or an Animal^ 



Science; how disputable is this (as to its former Ety- 
mology) how muck more naturalli/ does it appear to sig- 
nify, that it Stops the Soul a^ things, than that it is 
carried about with them. Plat. Cratyl. p. 437. Edit. Serr. 
The disputable Etymology, to which he here alludes, 
was a strange one of his own making in the former part of 
the Dialogue, adapted to the flowing System of Heraclitus 
there mentioned. According to this notion, he had 
derived EHISTHMH from "iire^Oai and juivEtv, as i£\t kept 
along with things, by perpetually following them in their 
motions. See Plato as before, p. 412. 

As to Scientia, we are indebted to Scaliger for the 
following ingenious etymology. Ratiocinatio motus 
quidam est: Scientia, qules : unde et nomen, turn apud 
Gracos, turn etiam nostrum. Ilapa to EIII 12TAS6AI, 
EniSTHMH. Sistitur enim mentis agitatio, etjit species 
in animo. Sic Latinum Scientia, 6tl ylvaraL SXESIS 
TOY ONTOS. Nam Latini, quod nomen entis simplex 
ah usu ahjecerunt atque repudiarunt, omnibus activis par- 
iicipiis idem adjunxerunt. Audiens^ ciksojv lov, Sciens^ 
a^iov &v. Seal, in Theophr. de Causis Plant. Lib. I. p. 17. 

The English Word, Understanding, means not so 



BOOK III.~-CHAP. IV. 371 

or the like, we refer it to some such com- 
prehensive^ or general Idea, 



properly Knowledge as that Faculty of the Soul, where 
Knowledge resides. Why may we not then imagine, that 
the framers of this Word intended to represent it as a kind 
of firm Basis J on which the fair Structure of Sciences was 
to rest, and which was supposed to stand under them, 
as their immoveable Support. 

Whatever may be said of these Etymologies, whether 
they are true or false, they at least prove their Authors to 
have considered Science and Understanding, not as 
fleeting powers of Perception, like Sense, but rather as 
steady, permanent, and durable Comprehensions. — But 
if so, we must somewhere or other find for them certain 
steady, permanent, and durable Objects ; since if Per- 
ception OF ANY KIND BE DIFFERENT FROM THE THING 
PERCEIVED (whether it perceive straight as crooked, or 
crooked as straight ; the moving as fixed, or the fixed as 
moving) such perception must of necessity be 
ERRONEOUS AND FALSE. The following passage from a 
Greek Platonic (whom we shall quote again hereafter) 
seems on the present occasion not without its weight — 
Et £=:t yvtjaig UKpif^sripa Trig a\aQr)(Xiwg, ui] av i^j yvw^a 
aXr)0£Tfpa tu)v alcrOriTUJV. If there be A Knowledgk 
more accurate than Sensation there muU be certain 

2 B 2 



S7f HERMES. 

Now it is of these comprehensive 
and PERMANENT Ideas, the genuine 
Perceptions of pure Mind, that 
Words of all Languages, however differ- 
ent, are the Symbols. And hence it is, 
that as the Perceptions include^ so do 
these their Symbols express^ not this oi' 
that set of Particulars only^ hut all indiffer- 
ently^ as they happen to occur. Were, 



OBJECTS of such knowledge more true than objects 

OF Sense. 

The following, then, are Questions worth considering, 
— What these Objects are? — Where they reside? — And 
how they are to be discovered? — Not by experimental 
Philosophic it is plain ; for that meddles with nothing, but 
what is tangible, corporeal, and mutable — nor even by the 
more refined and rational speculation of Mathematics ; £ox 
this, at its very commencement, takes such Objects for 
granted. We can only add, that if they reside in our own 
Minds (and who, that has never looked there, can affirm 
they do not ?) then will the advice of the Satirist b^ no 
ways improper, 

—NEC Te QU^SIVERIS EXTRA. 

Pers. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. IV. 373 

therefore, the Inhabitants of Salisbury to be 
transferred to York, tho' new particular 
objects would appear on every side, they 
would still no more want a new Language 
to explain themselves, than they would 
want new Minds to comprehend what they 
beheld. All, indeed, that they would want, 
Avould be the local proper Names ; which 
Names, as we have said already,* are 
hardly a part of Language, but must 
equally be learnt both by learned and un- 
learned, as often as they change the place 
of their abode. 

It is upon the same principles we may 
perceive the reason, why the dead Lan- 
guages (as we call them) are 7iow intelli- 
gible; and why the Language of modern 
England is able to describe antient Home ; 
and that of antient Rome to describe 



Sup. p. 345, 346. 



S74 HERMES. 

inodern England/'^ But of these matters 
we have spoken before. 

§2. And now having viewed the Pro- 
cess^ by which we acquire general Ideas^ let 
us begin anew from other Principles, and 
try to discover (if we can prove so fortu- 
nate) zohence it is that these ideas originally 
come. If we can succeed here, wx may 
discern perhaps, what kind of Beings they 
are^ for this at present appears somewhat 
obscure. 



^*^ As far as Human Nature ^ and the pri'marj/ Genera 
both of Substance and Accident are the same in all places, 
and have been so thro' all ages ; so far all Languages share 
one common Identity. As far as peculiar species of 
Substance occur in different regions ; and much more, as 
far as the positive Institutions of religious and civil Polities 
are every where different ; so far each Language has its 
peculiar Diversity. To the Causes of Diversity here 
mentioned, may be added the distinguishing Character and 
Genius of every Nation, concerning which we shall speak 
hereafter. 



BOOK III.-CHAP. IV. S76 

Let us suppose any man to look for 
the first time upon soine work of Art, as 
for example upon a Clock ; and having 
sufficiently viewed it, at length to depart. 
Would he not retain, when absent, an Idea 
of what he had seen? — And what is it, to 
retain mch Idea? — It is to have a Form 
INTERNAL Correspondent to the ex-ter- 
^^al; only with this difference, tliat the 
Internal Form is devoid of the Matter; the 
External is united zdth it; being seen in 
the metal, the wood, and the like. 

Now if we suppose this Spectator to 
view many snch Machines, and not siuiply 
to view, but to consider every part of 
them, so as to comprehend how these parts 
all operate to one End, he might be then 
said to possess a kind of intelligible 
Form, by which he would not only under- 
stand, and know the Clocks, which he 
had seen already, but every Work also of 



876 HER M E S. 

like Sort, which he might see hereafter. — 
Should it be asked, " which of these Forms 
" is prior ^ the External and Sensible^ or the 
"' Internal and Intelligible ;" the Answer 
is obvious, that the prior is the Sensible. 

Thus then we see, there are intel- 
ligible Forms which to the Sensi- 
ble ARE subsequent. 

But farther still — If these Machines be 
allowed the Work, not of Chance, but of 
an Artist, thej must be the Work of one, 
who knew ziDhat he was about. And what 
•is it, to work and knozo what one is about ? — 
It is to have an Idea of what one is doing ; 
to possess A Form internal, correspond- 
ing to the external, to which external it 
serves for an Exemplar or Archetype. 

Hkre then we have an intelligible 
Form, which is prior to the sen- 



BOOK III.— CHAP. IV. 377 

siBLE Form; which^ being truly prioi^ as 
well in dignity as in time^ can no more be- 
come subsequent^ than Cause can to Effect. 

Thus then, with respect to Works of 
Art, we may perceive, if we attend, a 
TRIPLE Order or Forms ; one Order, 
intelligible and previous to these Works ; 
a second Order, sensible and concomitant ; 
and a thirds again, intelligible and subsequent. 
After the first of these Orders the Maker 
may be said to work; thro' the Second, the 
Works themselves exist, and are what they 
are ; and in the third they become recog- 
nized, as mere Objects of Contemplation. 
To make these Forms by different Names 
more easy to be understood ; thejirst may 
be called the Maker's Form ; the second, 
that of THE Subject; and the third, that 

of THE CoNTEMPLATOR. 

Let us pass from hence to Works of 
Nature, Let us imagine ourselves view- 



S7a HERMES. 

ing some diversified Prospect ; " a Plain, 
"for example, spacious and fertile; a 
" river winding thro' it ; by the banks of 
" that river, men walking, and cattle 
"grazing; the view terminated with dis- 
" tant hills, some craggy, and some 
'" covered with wood/' Here it is plain 
we have plenty of Forms natural. And 
could any one quit so fair a Sight, and 
i^etain no traces of what he had beheld ? — 
And' what is it, to retain traces of zi)hat one 
has beheld? — It is to have certain Forms 
INTERNAL correspondent to the exter- 
nal, and resembling them in every thing, 
except the being merged in Matter, And 
thus, thro' the same retenti-oe and collective 
Powers, the Mind becomes fraught with 
Forms natural, as before with Forms arti-^ 
JiciaL — Should it be asked, " which of these 
" natural Forms are prior, the External 
" ones vitwed by the Senses, or the Internal 
" existing in the Mind?'' the Answer is 
obvious, that the prior arc the External, 



BOOK III.— CHAF. IV. S79 

Thus therefore in Nature, as well 
as ill Art, there are intelligible 
Forms, which to the sensible are 
SUBSEQUENT. Hence then we see the 
meaning of that noted School Axiom, Nil 
est in In telle CTU qtiod non prius fuit in 
Sensu ; an Axiom, which we must own 
to be so far allowable, as it respects the 
Ideas of a mere Contemplator, 

But to proceed somewhat farther — Are 
natural Productions made by Chance, 
or BY Design ? — Let us admit % Design, 
not to lengthen our inquiry. They are 
certainly* more exquisite than any Works 
of Art, and yet these we cannot bring 
ourselves to suppose made by Chance, — 
Admit it; and what follows ? — We must of 
necessity admit a Mind also, because De- 
sign implies Mind, z^herever it is to be 



* Arist. dt Part. AnimaL L. I. c. 1. 



S80 HERMES. 

found. Allowing therefore this, what do 
we mean by the Term, Mind ? — We mean 
somethings whichy when it actSy knows what 
it is going to do ; something stored zmth 
Ideas of its intended Works, agreeably to 
which Ideas those Works are fashioned. 

That such Exemplars, Patterns, 
Forms, Ideas (call them as you please), 
must q/" necesszVj/ be, requires no proving, 
but follows of course, if we admit the 
Cause of Nature to be a Mind, as above 
mentioned. For take away these, and 
what a Mind do we leave without them ! 
Chance surely is as knowing, as Mind 
WITHOUT Ideas ; or rather Mind with- 
out Ideas is no less blind than Chance. 

The Nature of these Ideas is not diffi- 
cult to explain, if we once come to allow a 
possibility of their Existence. That they 
are exquisitely beautful, various, and 
orderli/, is evident Irom the exquisite 



BOOK III.— CHAP. IV. 881 

Beauty, Yariet}^ and Order, seen in natu- 
ral Substances, which are but their Copies 
or Pictures, That they are mental is plain, 
as they are of the Essence of Mind, and 
consequently no Objects to any of the 
Senses^ nor therefore circumscribed either 
by Time or Place, 

Here, then, on this System, we have 
plenty of Forms intelligible, which 

ARE TRULY PREVIOUS TO ALL FoRMS 

SENSIBLE. Here too we see that Nature 
is not defective in her triple Order, 
having (like Art) her Forms previous, 
HER Concomitant, and her Subse- 
quent/'^ 



^'^ Simplicius, in his commentary upon the Predica- 
ments, calls the Jirst Order of these intelligible Forms, ra 
irpo Trig /leOi'^ewg, those previous to Participation, and at 
other times, ri t^r/pr^ju^vrj icotvorrjc, the transcendent Uni- 
versality or Sameness ; the second Order he calls ra Iv 
fiSi^H, those which exist in Participation^ that is, those 
merged in Matter; and at otlier times, he calls them 



382 HERMES. 

That the previous may be justly so 
called is plain, because they are essentially 



7) KaraT^TayfiLvri KOfvorrjc, the subordinate Universality or 
Sameness ; lastly, of the third Order he says, that they 
have no independent existence of their own, hut that — 
rinuq acpeXovTBg avra ev TaXg 7}iJ,eTipaig evvoiaig, jcaa' 
kavra vri^'^^Gafxiv^ we ourselves abstracting them in our own 
Imaginations, have given them bi/ such abstraction an exist- 
ence as of themselves. Simp, in Praedic. p. 17. In 
another place he says, in a language somewhat mysterious, 
yet still conformable to the same doctrine — MriirorE 8V 

rpiTTOV A^TTTtOV TO KOLVOV, TO fllv l^r}pr]jULEVOV TWV KttO* 

iKU'^a, itf aiTLOv TY\g kv avroXg KOivoTY^Tog, Kara rrjv fdiav 
mvTs ^v(Tiv, lOGiTEp kf Trig ^iCKpopOTrjTog Kara Trjv TroXvEidri 
irpoXri^Lv—^evTepov St lari to koivov, to airo kolvs oltls 
Totg ^La^opoig eldemv ev^t^oiuevov, i^ lvv7rap)(0v avTolg — 
TpiTov dh, TO Iv ratg rijULETipatg diavoiaig 1^ ai^mpitJEuyg 
v^f <Tra/x£ I/O V, vGTEpoytvlg ov — Perhaps therefore we must 
admit a TRivL-E Order of what is Universal and 
THE Same ; that of the first Order y transcendent and supe- 
rior to Particulars, which thro its uniform nature is the 
cause of that Sameness existing in them, as thro'' its multi- 
form j^re-conception it is the cause of their Diversity/ — that 
of the second Order, what is infused from thefrst universal 
Cause into the various Species of Beings, and which has its 
existence in those several Species — that of the third Order, 
what subsists by abstraction in our own UnderstandingSy 
being of subsequent origin to the other two. Ibid. p. 21, 



BOOK III.—CHAP. IV. 583 

prior to all things else. The whole 
VISIBLE World exhibits nothing more, 



To SimpUcius we shall add the two following Quota- 
tions from Ammonius and Nicephorus Blemmides, which 
we have ventured to transcribe, without regard to their 
uncommon length, as they so fully establish the Doctrine 
here advanced, and the works of these authors are not easy 
to be procured. 

EvvodaOii) roivvv ^aKTvXioc ric iKrvTTUjfxa t\ii}Vj h 
Tv\oi, ^A^iXXiwg, /^ Kr}pia TroXXa Trapaicgt/icva* 6 Ss Saic- 
TVALog GtppayiZirix) rsg KY^psg Travrag' v^epov di tiq elaeX' 
uujv itf ^eacTdjuLtvoQ tu KrjpLaf lTn^i]aag on iravra fs ^vog 
iicTiv ^KTyrrw/uiUTog, ^X^^^ irap' avri^) rb iKTinrtJ/ia ry 
ciavoia. 'H roivvv (Tcppaylg i) Iv n^ ^a/cruXtqj Xiyerat 
nPO TON nOAAQN uvai' v ^t ev roXg Kvpioig, EN 
TOIS nOAAOIS* 17 St Iv rrj Ciavoia ts airofjia^afxiv^y 
EIII TOIS nOAAOIS, fc/ v'^Epoyevrig- T«ro sv IvvoeitrOio 
i^ IttX tu)v yfywv ^j h^Cjv' 6 70^ £^r\fii^pyog , TroiCJv 
irdvTa, E)(^EL Trap laoru) to. Trdvrijjv TrapaddyiiaTa' oTov, 
TTouov avupioTTov, t^Et TO H^og Trap' caurcj rs dvOpujTPs, 
TTobg o d(l>op(ov, irdvTag ttoih. Et Se Tig tvcait} Xlycov, 
wg 8IC ettrt rrapa rt^ Ari/Jiispyi^ ra tidri, clksItu) ravra, uyg b 
^ripti^pybg ^Tifjiispyu, rj elduyg rd W avrs ^■nfiispy^fi^va, rj 
KK Hdwg. 'A\X tl fXQv fxri h'^ujc, 8k av d)ifU8pyri(Tei. Tig 
ydp, iniWwv TroiTjfTiiv n, dyvotX o jUEAXct ttoiUv j « T«p» 



g84 H E R M E S. 

than so many passing Pictures of these 
immutable Archetypes, Nay thro\ these 



wc 1? ^VffiQf aXoytj) dt/vafiei ttoih' {66ev J^ iroiu 17 ^vmg, 
SIC l<^L'^avii<7a jvoj'^iKwg rt^ yiyvofiivc^^ Et di tl KaO' 'i^iv 
XoyiKrjv TTOiei, oi^eirs iravrcjg to yiyvofx^vov vir avrs. 
Et Toivvv fxri yu^ov^ ri Kara av^^aiirov 6 Oebg ttoih, olS^ 
TO tfir avTs jiyvofxzvov' u Si otStv o Trota avto^i S^Xov, 
wg %'^iv Iv rt^ Ar^jUfspyw to. eidrj, "E<?i ^£ to Ei^og tv tl^ 
ArifiL8py(^ log 6 Iv rcj daKTvXito Tvirog' itf XiysTai tsto to 
H^og nPO TQN nOAAQN /^ x^P^^^v Trig vXr^g, "E^t 
^£ TO etdog ts avOptJirs i^ ev ToXg KaO* Ieku'^ov avOpwiroig,- 
wg TO. kv rote tcrjpoTg iKTVTnjjfxaTa" i^ XiysTai to, TOiavTa 
EN TOIS nOAAOIS uvai, itf ax(^pi<^a Trig vXtjc. 
QEacFajiievoi Si Tsg kutcl jULepog avO^MTTsg otl iravTag to 
avTo d^og T8 avOptjjTrs £)(8a'iv {u)g Itti ts v<^epov eXOovTogy 
i^ ^eacrafxevs to. KYipia) dv£iuia^aiJ.e9a avro ty rp Siavbta' i^ 
XiyeTUL T8T0 Eni TOIS nOAAOIS, riyovv fisTa to. 
TToXXa, /^ v^Epoyeveg. Intelligatur annulus, qui alicujusy 
utpote AchilliSy imaginem lyisculptam haheat : multee insi/per 
cera sint, et ah annulo imprimantur : veniat deinde qui&' 
piam, videatque ceras omnes unius annuli impressione for- 
matas, annulique impressionem in viente contineat : sigillum 
annulo inscidptum, ante multa diceiur : in cerulis im* 
pressum^ in multis : quod vero in illius, qui illo venerat 
intelUgentia remanserit, rosx multa, et posterius genitum 
dicetur. Idem in generihus et for mis intelligendum censeo ; 



BOOK III.— CHAP. IV. 385 

it attains even a Semblance of Immor- 



etenim ilk optimus procreator mundi Deus, omnium rerum 
formas, atque exempla habet apud se: ut si hominem 
efficere velit, in hominis formam, quam habet, intueatur, et 
ad illius exemplum cateros facial omnes. At si quis resti- 
terit, dicatque rerum formas apud Creatorem non esse: 
quaso ut diligenter attendat : Opife.v, qua facit, vel cog- 
noscit, vel ignorat : sed is, qui nesciet, nunquam quicquam 
faciei: quis enim id facer e aggredilur, quod facer e ignorat? 
Neque enim facuUate quddam rationis experte aliquid aget, 
prout agil nalura (ex quo conficitur, ut natura etiam agat, 
etsi qua facial non advertat) : Si vero ratione quadam 
aliquid facity quodcunque ab eo factum est omnino cognovit. 
Si igitur Deus non pejore ratione, quam homo, facit quid, 
qua fecit cognovit : si cognovit qua fecit, in ipso rerum 
formas esse perspicuum est. Forma autem in opifice sunt 
perinde ac in annulo sigillum, hacque forma ante mult a, 
et avulsa a materia dicitur, Atqui hominis species in 
unoquoque homine est, quemadmodum etiam sigilla in ceris ; 
et IN MULTis, nee avulsa a materia dicitur. At cum 
singulos homines animo conspicimus, et eandem in unoquoque 
formam atque ejigiem videmus, ilia effigies in mente nostra 
insidens post mult a, et posterius genita dicelur : veluti 
in illo quoque dicebamus, qui multa sigilla in cerd und et 
eodem annulo impressa conspexerat. Ammon. in Porphyr. 
Introduct. p. 29. b. 

AiyovTai ^l ra yivr) itj ra ulr] IlPO TON nOAAQN, 

2 c 



386 , HERMES. 

tality, and continues throughout ages to 



EN TOIS nOAAOIS, EDI TOIS nOAAGIS' oTov 
IvvodijOw ri (Kppayi'^rjpLOv, i)(Ov i^ iKTvirojfxa to tv^ov, 
£^ 8 KYipia TToXXa jueraXajSfTW rs iKTVirdjfJiaTOg, Kai Tig 
VTT* oipiv ayaylTit) TavTa, firj TrpOKartSwv jutjS' oXwg to 
a^payi'^{]piOv' ewpaKOjg Si tcl Iv olg to lKTviTii)fia, i^ £7rt<s-?)- 
aag otl iravTa ts avTs fx^Ti^saiv EKrvTTWjuaroc? i^ to, 
coKsvTa iroXXa t(^ Xoytj) (TvvaOpoi<jag dg tv €X^^^ tsto 
KaTOL Siavoiav, To fiev sv (T(j>payi'^r}piov ruwwjua Xeytrat 
nPO TfllN nOAAilN- t6 S' Iv Tolg Knpioig, EN TOIS 
nOAAGIS* TO Sf €? uvtCjv KaTaXrj(j)Olv, i^ KUTa Sidvoiav 
aiuXojg vTTO^av, EUl TOIS nOAAOIS. OvTtjg hv itf tcl 
yivt} i^ TCL aSi) IIPO T12N IIOAAQN fxiv ucnv Iv ti^ 
Arfjuiispyi^, Kara T8g iroiriTiKsg Xoysg' Iv ti^ Qei^ yap ol 
8Gi07roio\ XoyoL TU)v ovTwv kviaidjg 7Tpov^e'^riKa<Jif kuS* hg 
Xoysg 6 v7rep8(Tiog to. ovtu iravra itf TTpotopicre i^ irapri- 
yayEv' v^rj-^-r/fctvat §£ XiyovTm to. yivrj i^ to. u^rj EN 
TOIS nOAAOIS, diOTi Iv ToTg /cara fiipog avBpu)Troig to 
Ts avOpd>TT8 udog I'^i, itf Tolg KaTo. fxipog ^iinroig to rS 
tTTTTS £?Soc' Iv av6ph}7roig ^e, itf liriroig, i^ rote aXXoig 
ZwOLg TO ylvog svpigKeTai tCov toistujv eI^ljv, owtp M to 
^wov* Kav ToXg Zwoig bfX8 i^ Totg ^wo^urot? to KaOoXi- 
KutT^pov yivog, to aindriTLKOV, e^eTaZ^Tai' avva\divTwv St 
i^ raiy <j)VTU)v, ^ewptiTai to tfi^pv^ov' h Sc (tvv ToTg efiipv- 
XOiQ WiXei Tig iTriaKOTrtiv i^ tcl ix^v\a, to aC)fxa avjunrav 
KaT6\pETai' avvdpa/isatjv dl ToXg elprjfxivoig tCjv a<JU)fxaT<»)v 
«CTtt5v, TO TTpwrov yivog (jtavHTai i^ yeviKWTaTov* i^ bT<o 



BOOK III.—CHAP. IV. S87 

be SPECIFICALLY ONE, amid those infi- 



fxlv EN TOIS nOAAOIS vcphrjKe rd u^rj itf rd yivr\* 
KaraXajSwv ^1 tlq Ik twv kutcl fiipog avOptoiriov rrjv 
avTwv (pixTiv, ttIv dvOpiOTTorriTa, Ik de tmv Kard fxipog 
"inrtjv avT^v rrjv iTnroTrfra, ^ srw tov KaBoXs avOpwrrov, 
i^ TOV KaOoXs tTTTTOv hrivoYifTag* itf to KaOoXn Z^ov Ik Tutv 
KaOeKa'^a rto Xoytjj) crvvayaytjv' i^ to KaOoXs aKrOriTiKOv, i^ 
TO KaBoXs eidL\pv)(0v, i^ to KaBoXs cwjua, i^ Trjv KaBoXi- 
KioTCLTTiv 8(Tiav £? aTTCLVTUiv (TvXXoyirrdfiEvog f 6 TOi^Tog Iv 
ry kavTs ^lavola Ta yivr\ i^ rd eidrj dvXwg v7ri<^Y}(Tev EIIT 
TOIS nOAAOIS, TSTE^i, fUTd Td iroXXd ^ v<^r]poyEVMg. 
Genera vero et Species dicuntur esse ante multa, in 
iHULTis, POST MULTA. Ut puta, intelligatur sigillum, 
quamlihet Jiguram habens, ex quo multa cera ejusdem 
jigurtt sint participes, et in medium aliquis has prqferat, 
nequaquam proviso sigillo. Cum autem vidisset eas ceras 
in quihus Jigura exprimitur^ et animadvertisset omnes 
eandem Jiguram participare, et qua videhantur multa, 
ratione in unum coegisset^ hoc in mente teneat. Nempe 
sigillum dicitur esse species ant;e multa ; ilia vero in 
ceris, in multis ; qua vero ah its desumitur, et in mente 
immaterialiter subsisiit, post multa. Sic igitur et 
Genera et Species ante multa in Creatore sunt, secundum 
rationes efficientes. In Deo enim rerum effectrices rationes 
una et simpliciter pra-existunt ; secundum quas rationes 
ille supra- sub staniialis omnes res et pradestinavit et pro- 
duxlt, Existere autem dicuntur Genera et Species in 
multis, quoniam in singulis hominibus Iwminis Species, et 

2 c 2 



S88 H E R M E S- 

nite particular changes, that befal it every 



moment. 



(W 



in smgulis equis equi Species est. In hominibus ceque ac 
in equis et aliis animalibus Genus invenitur harum specie- 
rum, quod est animal. In animalibus etiam una cum 
Zoophj/tis mogis universale Genus, nempe sensitivum ex- 
quiritur. Additis vero plantis, spectatur Genus animatum. 
Si vero una cum animaiis quisquam velit perscrutari etiam 
inanimalaj totum Corpus perspiciet. Cum autem entia 
incorporea conjuncta fuerint iis modo tractatis, apparebit 
primum et generalissimum Genus. Atque ita quidem i^ 
MULTis sitbsistunt Genera et Species. Comprehendens vero 
quisquam ex singulis hominibus naturam ipsam humanam, 
et ex singulis equis ipsam equinam, atque ita universalem 
hominem et universalem equum considerans, et universale 
animal ex singulis ratione colligens, et universale sensitivum^ 
et universale animatum et universale corpus, et maxima 
universale ens ex omnibus colligens, hie, inquam, in sud 
mente Genera et Species immaterialiter constituit EIII TO IS 
nOAAOIS, hoc est, post multa, et posterius genita, 
Niceph. Blem. Log. Epit. p. 62. Vid. etiam Alcin. in 
Platonic. Philosoph. Introdue. C. IX. X. 

'^*^ The following elegant lines of Virgil are worth 
attending to, tho' applied to no higher a subject than Bees. 

Ergo ipsas quamvis angusti terminus avi 
Exeipiat ; (ncque enim plus septima ducitur atas) 
At Gei^us immortale manet. G. IV. 



BOOK III.-CHAP. IV. S89 

May we be allowed then to credit those 
speculative Men, w^ho tell iis, " it is in 
*' these permanent and comprehensive Forms 
" that THE Deity views at once, without 
" looking abroad^ all possible productions, 



The same Tmmortah'ti/, that is, the Immortality of the 
Kind, may be seen in all perishable substances, whether 
animal or inanimate ; for tho* individuals ] erish, the 
several k nds still remain. And hence, if we take Timk, 
as denoting the sj/stem of things temporari/, we may collect 
the meaning of that passage in the Timaus, where the philo- 
sopher describes Time to be — fiivovroQ uluivog ev ev\ Kar 
apid/iibv Iscrav aldjviov UKOva. ^ternitatis in vno perma- 
Jientis Imaginem quandam, certis numerorum ai ticulis pro- 
gredientem. Plat. V. III. p. 37. I'dit. Scrran. 

We have subjoined the following extract from Boethius, 
to serve as a commentary on this description of Ti.mk. — 
^TERNiTAS igitur eaty inlcrminahili s vita tota siniul el 
perfecta possessio. Quod ex collatione temporalium clarius 
liquet. Nam quid(juid vivit in tempore, id prasens a 
prceteritis in futura procedit : nihilquc est in tempore ita 
constitutum, quod tntum vita sua spatium pariler possit 
amplecti ; sed craslinum quidem nondum apprehendit, hes' 
ternum vero jam perdidif. In hodiernd quoqi<e vita iion 
amplius vivitis, quam in illo mobili Iran^ilorioque momanto* 



390 H E RM E S. 

" both present^ past^ and futnre-^that this 
" great arid stupendous View is but a View 
*' of himself^ where all things lie enveloped 
" in their Principles and Exemplars^ as 
^' being essential to the fulness of his univer- 
*' sal Intellection f — If so, it will be 
proper that we invert the Axiom before 



Quod igitur Temporis patitur conditwnem, licet illudy sicut 
de mundo censuit AristoteleSf nee coeperit unquam esse, nee 
desinat, vitaque ejus cum temporis infinitate tendatur, non- 
dum tamen tale est, ut leternum esse Jure credatur, Non 
enim totum simul infinite licet vitce spatium comprehendit, 
atque complectitur, sed futura nondum transacta Jam non 
habet. Quod igitur interminahilis vita plenitudinem totam 
par iter comprehendity ac possidet, cui nequefuturi quidquam 
absit, nee prateriti Jluxerit, id ^eternum esse Jure perhihe- 
tur t idque necesse est, et sui compos prasens sibi semper 
assistere, et in/lnitatem mobilis temporis habere prasentem. 
Unde quidam 7ion recte, qui cztm audiunt visum Platoni, 
mundum hune nee habuisse initium, nee habiturum esse de- 
fectum, hoe modo conditon conditum mundum fieri co-ater- 
numputant. Aliud est enim per interminabilem duci 
viTAM, (quod Mundo Plato tribuitj aliud interminabi- 

LIS VIT.E TOTAM PARITER COMPLEXAM ESSE PR^SEN- 

TIAM5 quod Divin<E Mentis proprium esse manifestum est. 



BOOK ril.—CHAP. IV. 391 

mentioned. We must now say Nil est 

in Sensu, quod non prius fuit in Intel- 
LECTu. For though the contrary may be 
true with respect to Knowledge merely 
human, yet never can it be true with 
respect to Knowledge universally, unless 
we give Precedence to Atoms and life- 



Neque enim Deiis conditis rebus antiquior videri debet tern- 
poris quantitate, sed simplicis pottus proprietate natura. 

HUNC ENIM VIT^ IMM03ILIS PRiESENT ARIUM STATUM, 
INFINITUS ILLE TEMPORALIUM RERUM MOTDS IMITATUR; 

cumque eum effingere, atque square non possit, ex immobili' 
tate deficit in motum ; ex simplicitate prczsentia decrescit in 
infinitam futuri ac preeteriti quantitatem ; et, cum iotampa- 
riter vita sua plenitudinem nequeat possidere, hoc ipso, quod 
aliquo modo nunquam esse desinil, illud, quod implere atque 
exprimere non potest ^ aliquatenus videtur amulari, alligans 
se ad qualemcunque prai>entiam hujus exigui volucrisquc 
momenti: qua, quoniam manentis illius pr^senti^e 

QUANDAM GESTAT IMAGINEM, qUlbusCUmqUC COJltigevit, 

idprastat, w^ esse videantur. Quoniam vero manere non 
potutt, infinitum Temporis iter arripuit ; eoque modo fac' 
turn est, ut contincjaret vitam eundo, cujus plenitudi- 
nem complecli non valuit permanendo. Itaque, &c. De 
Consolat. Philosoph. L. V. 



HERMES, 

LESS Body, making Mind, among other 
things, to be struck out by a lucky Con- 
course. 

% 3. It is far from the design of this 
Treatise, to insinuate that Atheism is the 
Hypothesis of our latter Metaphysicians. 
But yet it is somewhat remarkable, in 
their several Systems, how readily they 
admit of the above Precedence. 

For mark the Order of things, accord- 
ing to their account of them, — First comes 
that huge Body the sensible World, Then 
this and its Attributes beget sensible Ideas. 
Then out of sensible Ideas, by a kind of 
lopping and pruning, are made Ideas in- 
telligible, whether sp'ecijic or general. Thus 
should they admit that Mind was coeval 
with Body, yet till Body gave it Ideas, 
and awakened its dormant Powers, it 
could at best have been nothing more, 



BOOK III.—CHAP. IV. 893 

than a sort of dead Capacity ; for innate 
IDEAS it could not possibly have any. 

At another time we hear of Bodies so 
exceedingly fine^ that their very Exility 
makes them susceptible of sensation and 
knowledge ; as if they shrunk into Intellect 
by their exquisite subtlety, which ren- 
dered them too delicate to be Bodies any 
longer. It is to this notion we owe many 
curious inventions, such as subtle /Ether, 
animal Spirits, nervous Ducts, Vibrations, 
and the like; Terms, which modern Phi- 
losophy, upon parting with occult Quali- 
ties, has found expedient to provide itself, 
to supply their place. 

But the intellectual Scheme, which 
never forgets Deity, postpones every thing 
corporeal to the primary mental Cause, It 
is here it looks for the origin of intelligible 
Ideas, even of those, which exist in human 
Capacities. For tho* sensible Objects may 



S94 HERMES. 

be the destined medium, to awaken the 
dormant Energies of Mans Understanding, 
yet are those Energies themselves no more 
contained in Sense^ than the Explosion of 
a Cannon, in the Spark which gave it fire/'^ 



^'^ The following Note is taken from a Manuscript Com- 
mentary of the Platonic Oli/mpiodoriis (quoted before, p. 
371), upon the Fhado of Plato; which, tho' perhaps 
some may object to from inclining to the Doctrine of 
Platonic Rem'miscence, yet it certainly gives a better 
account how far the Senses assist in the acquisition of 
Science, than we can find given by vulgar Philosophers. 

Ou^£7ror£ ya^ ra X^*P^ '^ ^i^vrt^a a^^at r) alriai elcn 
Twv KpHTTOvojv' £1 ^£ SeX i^ Tolg lyKVKKlOLg l^rjyijtTecTL 
irdOEadai, i^ ap\r]v utteIv rrjv uiadr](nv Tr\g iTii'^r]ixr\g, 
Xi^ofXEv avrriv a^xrjv 8^ wg TroirjTiKriv, a\X wg epeOiZscrav 
rrjv i7jU£r£pav ipv^riv ilg avajUivridLV rdv KaOoXs — Kara 
ravTtiv de r^v kvvoiav eipriTai itf to kv Tifxaiw, ort ^i 
o^pE(t)g ^ CLKOi^g TO Trig 0tXo<ro^mc ETropicrafXEOa yivog, 
cioTL EK tCjv a\aBr\Ttt)v Eig dvafxvr\tyiv dtpiKv^jHEua. Those 
things^ which are inferior and secondary, are by no means 
the Principles or Causes of the more excellent : and though 
we admit the common interpretations, and allow Sknse to he 
a Principle o/* Science, we must, however, call it a Prrn- 
ciple, not as if it was the efficient Cause, but as it rouses 



BOOK 1II.-«CHAP. IV. 595 

In short, all Minds, that are, are 
Similar and Congenial; and so too 



our Soul to the Recollection of general Ideas — -According to 
the same way of thinking is it said in the Tim^us, that 
through the Sight and Hearing we acquire to ourselves 
Philosophy, because we pass from Objects of Sense to 
Reminiscence or Recollection. 

And in another passage he observes — ^ETTEi^rj ya^ Ttafi- 
/Liop^ov ayaXfia i'^Lv r] \pv)(ri, ttclvtwv tCjv ovtcjv 'i^sau 
Xo-ysc* Ipi^iZofiivYj VTTO rwv alaOrjTiov dvtaiiiiuLviiaKaTai Siv 
tv^ov ixEL \6y(j)v, itf tstsq TTpojSaXXcrat. I'or in as much 
as the Soul, by containing the Principles of all beings, is 
a sort of OMNiFORM Representation or Exemplar ; 
when it is roused by objects of Sense, it recollects those 
Principles, which it contains within, and brings them forth. 

Georgius Gemistus, otherwise called Pletho, writes upon 
the same subject in the following manner. Trfv ^vx^ijv 
^aciv OL TO. ei^T} TiOt/uiBvoL uvaXaii(5av»aav eayt Itt L'^i]ixr\v 
T8Q Iv toXq alaSriTo'ig Xoysg, aKpij^i'^Epov avT^g e^ovraQ ^ 
reXtwrcpov Iv tavry 'i(T\e(.v, rj ev ToTg alcrOriTo'ig i\8(n. To 
8v TeXewrepov rsro i^ aKpif^inpov sk av dwo rutv ala6r}TLJv 
1.a\iiv Trjv \pv)(riv, uye ju?) Imv ev avToXg. Ov S' av 
fir}^ajj.8 dWoSi ov avrriv e^ avrrig ^lavouadai' b ^l yap 
ire^vKivai rrfv ipv^^qv /irjSajitfj ov, ri ^lavouadaC rag yap 
\p(V^ug T(5v So^wv H)^i }iri ovrbyv aSX 6vt<jjv fitv, 
aWtJV St Kcir aXXojv uvoi ovvOiatig TLvag, i Kara to 



396 HERMES. 

are their Ideas^ or intelligible Forms, 
Were it otherwise, there could be no in- 



opSov yivofxivag, KuTTnadai Se a^' hipag rivog tpvaewg 
TToWcj %Ti KpEiTTOvog Ts ^ TsXEwripag a(^r\KUv Ty ^'^XV ^^ 
TEXeojTepov TSTO tCjv Iv rolg madr\roig Xoywv. Those who 
suppose Ideal Forms, say that the Soul, when she 
assumes, for the purposes of' Science, those proportions, 
which exist in sensible objects, possesses them with a superior 
accuracy and perfection, than that to which they attain in 
those sensible objects. iVb«' this superior Perfection or 
Accuracy the. soul cannot have from sensible objects, as it is 
in fact not in them ; nor yet can she conceive it herself as 
from herself without its having existence any where else. 
For the Soul is not formed so as to conceive that, which has 
existence no where, since even such opinions, as are false, 
are all of them compositions, irregularly formed, not of 
mere Non-Beings, but of various real beings, one with 
another. It remains therefore that this perfection, which 
is superior to the proportions existing in sensible objects, 
must descend to the Soul from some other Nature, 

WHICH IS BY MANY DEGREES MORE EXCELLENT AND 

PERFECT. Pleth. de AristoteL et Platonic. Philosoph. 
Diff. Edit. Pam 1541. 

The AOrOI or Proportions, of which Gemistius here 
speaks, mean not only those relative Proportions of 
Equality and Inequality, which exist in quantity (such 
AS double, sesquialter, &c.) but in a larger sense, they 



BOOK III.— CHAP. IV; 897 

tercourse between Man and Man, or (what 
is more important) between Man and God. 



may be extended to mathematical Lines, Angles^ Figures, 
4*c. of all which A0701 or Proportions, tho** we possess in 
the Mi7id the most clear and precise Ideas, yet it may be 
justly questioned whether any one of them ever existed in 
the sensible world. 

To these two authors we may add Boethius, who, after 
having enumerated many acts of the Mind or Intellkct, 
wholly distinct from Sensation, and independent of it, at 
length concludes, 

HcEC est efficiens magis, 
Longe caussa potentior, 
Quam qua vtatcrice modo 
Impressas patitur notas, 
Fracedit tamen excitans, 
Ac vires animi movens. 

Vivo in corpore passio. 
CUm vel lux oculosferit, 

Vel vox auribus instrepit ; 

Turn MENTIS VIGOR cxcitus, 

QUAS INTtlS SPECIES TENET, 

^d motus simileis vocans, 
Notis applicat exteris, 
Introusumque reconditis 
For MIS miscet imagines. 

De Consolat. Philosoph. L. V. 



S98 H E R M E S. 

For what is Convei^sation between Man 
and Man ? — It is a mutual intercourse of 
Speaking and Hearing, — ^To the Speaker, 
it is to teach ; to the Hearer, it is to learn. 
—To the Speaker, it is to descend from 
Ideas to Words; to the Hearer, it is to 
ascend from Words to Ideas, — If the Hearer, 
in this ascent, can arrive at no Ideas, then 
is he said woif to understand ; if he ascend 
to Ideas dissimilar and heterogeneous, then 
is he said to misunderstand, — What then is 
requisite, that he may be said to under^ 
stand ? — ^That he should ascend to certain 
Ideas, treasured up within himself^ corres- 
pondent and similar to those within the 
Speaker, The same may be said of a 
Writer and a Reader ; as when any one 
reads to-day or to-morrow, or here or in 
Italy^ what Euclid wrote in Greece two 
thousand years ago. 

Now is it not marvellous, there should 
be so exact an Identity of our Ideas, if they 



BOOK IlI.—CHAP. IV. 399 

were only generated from sensible Objects, 
infinite in number, ever changing, distant 
in Time, distant in Place, and no one Par- 
ticular the same with any other? 

Agaijst, do we allow it possible for God 
to signify his zmll to Men ; or for Men to 
signify their wants to God ? — In both 
these cases there must be an Identity of 
Ideas, or else nothing is done either one 
way or the other. Whence then do these 
COMMON Identic Ideas come? — Those 
of Men^ it seems, come all fron^ Sensation. 
And whence come God's Ideas? — Not 
surely from Sensation too ; for this we can- 
hardly venture to affirm, without giving ta» 
Body that notable Preceden<:e of being prior 
to the Intellection of even God himself, — 
Let them then be original; let them be 
connate^ and essential to the divine Mind, — 
If this be true, is it not a fortunate Event, 
thQ,t Ideas of corporeal rise^ and others of 
mental (things derived from subjects so 



400 H E R M E S. 

totally distinct) should so happily coincide 
in the same wonderful Identity ? 

Had we not better reason thus upon 
so abstruse a Subject ? — Either all Minds 
have their Ideas derived^ or all have them 
original; or some have them original, and 
some derived. If all Minds have them 
derived, they must be derived from some- 
thing, which is itself not Mind, and thus 
we fall insensibly into a kind of Atheism. 
If all have them original, then are all 
Minds divine, an Hypothesis by far more 
plausible than the former. But if this be 
not admitted, then must one Mind (at least) 
have original Ideas, and the rest have them 
derived. Now supposing this last, whence 
are those Minds, whose Ideas are derived, 
most likely to derive them ? — From Mind, 
or from Body? — From Mind, a thing 
homogeneous ; or from Body, a thing hete- 
rogeneous? From Mind, such as (from 
the Hypothesis) has original Ideas; or 



BOOK III.— CHAP. IV. 401 

from Body, which we cannot discover 
to have any Ideas at aW .^'^^^ — An Exa- 
mination of this kind, pursued with 
accuracy and temper, is the most pro- 
bable method of solving these doubts. 
It is thus we shall be enabled with more 
assurance to decide, whether we are to 
admit the Doctrine of the Epicurean Foet^ 

CoRPOREA NATURA animuin constare, 
animamque ; 

or trust the Mantuan Bard^ when he sings 
r in divine numbers, 

Igneus est ollis vigor, et CiELESTis origo 
Seminibm, 

But it is now time to quit these Specu- 



(i) NOYN §£ sSev 2I2MA ytvva' irwt: yap av to. 
ANOHTA NOYN ycvvrjoot ; No Body produces Mind : 
for how should Things devoid of Mind produce Mind? 
Sallust de Diis et Mundo, c. 8. 

2 D 



4(m HERMES. 

lations. Those, who would trace them 
farther, and have leisure for such studies, 
may perhaps find themselves led into 
regions of Contemplation, affording them 
prospects both interesting and pleasant. 
We have at present said as much as was 
requisite to our Subject, and shall there- 
fore pass from hence to our concluding 
chapter. 



1_ 



BOOK III.— CHAP. V. 40S 



CHAP. V, 



Subordination of Intelligence — Difference of 
Tdeas^ both in particular Men^ and in 
whole Nations — Different Genius of 
different Languages — Character of the 
English, the Oriental, the Latin, and 
the Greek Languages — Superlative Ex- 
cellence of the Last — Conclusion, 

Original Truth/'*^ having the most 
intimate connection with the Supreme In- 
telligence^ may be said (as it were) to 



^°^ Those Philosophers, whose Ideas of Being and 
Knowledge are derived from Body and Sensation, have a 
short method to explain the nature of Tuuth. It is a 
factitious thing, made by every man for himself; which 
comes and goes, just as it is remembered and forgot ; 
which in the order of things makes its appearance the last 
of any, being not only subsequent to sensible Objects, but 
even to our Sensations of them. According to this Hypo- 
thesis, there are many Truths, which have been, and are 

2 D 2 



404 HERMES. 

shine with unchangeable splendor, en- 
lightening throughout the Universe every 
possible Subject, by nature susceptible of 
its benign influence.— Passions and other 
obstacles may prevent indeed its efficacy, 
as clouds and vapours may obscure the 
Sun ; but itself neither admits Diminutioriy 
nor Change, because the Darkness respects 



no longer ; others, that will be, and have not been yet ; 
and multitudes, that possibly may never exist at all. 

But there are other Reasoners, who must surely have 
had very different notions ; those, I mean, who represent 
Tkuth not as the last, but the Jirst of Beings ; who call 
it immutable, eternal, omnipresent; Attributes, that all 
indicate something more than human. To these it must 
appear somewhat strange, how men should imagine, that 
a crude account of the method how they perceive Truth, 
was to pass for an account of Truth itself; as if to describe 
the road to London, could be called a Description of that 
Metropolis. 

For my own part, when I read the detail about Sensa- 
tion and Reflection, and am taught the process at large 
how my Ideas are all generated, I seem to view the human 
Soul in the light of a Crucible, where Truths are pro- 



r 



\ 



I 



BOOK III.— CHAP. V. 405 

only particular Percipients. Among these 
therefore we must look for ignorance and 
error, and for that Subordination of Intel- 
ligence^ which is their natural consequence. 

We have daily experience in the Works 
of Akt, that a partial Knowledge will 
suffice for Contemplation^ tho' we know 
not enough, to profess ourselves Artists. 
Much more is this true, with respect to 



duced by a kind of logical Chemistry. They may consist 
(for aught we know) oi natural materials, but are as much 
creatures of our own, as a Bolus or Elixir. 

If Milton by his Ueania intended to represent 
TfiUTH, he certainly referred her to a much more antient, 
as well as a far more noble origin. 

Heavenly born ! 

Before the hills appem^'d, or fountains flow'd, 
Thou with eternal Wisdom didst converse, 
Wisdom thy Sister ; and with her didst play 
In presence of th' almighty Father, pleas' d 
With thy celestial Song. V. L. VII. 

See Proverbs VIII. 22, &c. Jeremiah X. 10. Marc. 
Antonin. IX. 1. 



406 HERMES. 

Nature; and well for mankind it is found 
to be true, else never could we attain any 
natural Knowledge at all. For if the con- 
sHtutive Proportions of a Clock are so sub- 
tle, that few conceive them truly, but the 
Artist himself; what shall we say to those 
seminal Proportions, which make the 
essence and character of every natural 
Subject ? — Partial views, the Imperfections 
of Sense; Inattention, Idlenes"s, the turbu- 
lence of Passions ; Education, local Sen- 
timents, Opinions, and Belief, conspire in 
many instances to furnish us with Ideas, 
some too general^ some too partial, and 
(what is worse than all this) with many 
that are erroneous, and contrary to Truth. 
These it behoves us to correct as far as 
possible, by cool suspense and candid 
examination. 

And thus by a connection perhaps 
little expected, the Cause of Lettees, 



BOOK III.— CHAP. V. 407 

and that of Virtue appear to co-incide, 
it being the business of both to examine our 
Ideas, and to amend them by the Standard 
of Nature and of TruthJ^^ 

In this important Work, we shall be 
led to observe, how Nations, like single 
Men, have t\ie\x peculiar Ideas ; how these 
peculiar Ideas become the Genius of 
THEIR Language, ^mce the Symbol must 
of course correspond to its Archetype ;^'^ 



^*^ How useful to Ethic Science, and indeed to 
Knowledge in general, a Grammatical Disquisition 
into the Etymology and Meaning of Words was esteemed 
by the chief and ablest Philosophers, may be seen by 
consulting Plato in his Cratylus ; Xenoph. Mem. IV. 5, 
6. Arrian. Epict. I. 17. II. 10. Marc. Anton. III. 11. 
V. 8. X. 8. 

t'^ HGOYS XAPAKTHP fVt t ^vQgilyTTs AOFOS. 
Stob. Capiuntur Signa hand levia, sed observatu digna 
C quod for tasse quhpiam non putarit) de ingeniis et moribus 
populorum et nationum ex Unguis ipsorum. Bacon, de 
Augm. Scient. VI. 1. Vid. etiam. Quintil. L. XI. p. 
675. Edit. Capperon. Diog. L. I. p. 58. et Menag, 
Com, Tusc. Disp. V. 16. 



408 HERMES. 

how the wisest Nations, having the most 
and best Ideas^ will consequently have the 
best and most copious Languages ; how 
others, whose Languages are motley and 
compounded, and who have borrowed 
from different countries different Arts and 
Practices, discover by Words, to whom 
they are indebted for Things. 

To illustrate what has been said bj^ a 
few examples. We Britons in our time 
have been remarkable borrowers, as our 
multiform Language may sufficiently shew. 
Our terms in polite Literature prove, that 
this came from Greece; our terms in 
Music and Painting, that these came from 
Italy; our Phrases in Cookery and War, 
that we learnt these from the French ; and 
our Phrases in Navigation, that we were 
taught by the Flemings and Low Dutch. 
These many and very different Sources of 
our Language may be the cause, why it is 
so deficient in Regularity and Analogy. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. V. 409 

Yet we have this advantage to compensate 
the defect, that what we want in Elegance^ 
we gain in Copiousness^ in which last 
respect few Languages will be found 
superior to our own. 

Let us pass from ourselves to the 
Nations of the East. The ^^^ Eastern 
AVorld, from the earliest days, has been 
at all times the Seat of enormous 
Monarchy. On its natives fair Liberty 
never shed its genial influence. If at any 
time civil Discords arose among them 
(and arise there did innumerable) the 
contest was never about the Form of their 



^''^ Am -yap to ^sXiKwrtpoi tLvai to. riOrj ol filv Bapj5apoL 

TWV EWrjVtOV, OL 0£ TTSpl TTJV AtTLttV TU)V TTC^l TTJV Eupw- 
TTIJV, VTTOflivBm TrfV ^i(T7rOTLKriV apX^^» ^^^^ ^V(T)^£paL- 

vovTig. For the Barbarians, bj/ being more slavish in their 
Manners than the Greeks, and those of Asia than those of 
Europe, submit to despotic Government without murmuring 
or discontent. Arist. Polit. III. 4. 



410 HERMES. 

Govermnent ; for this was an object, of 
which the Combatants had no conception) ; 
it was all from the poor motive of, who 
should be their Master, whether a Cyrus 
or an Artaxtroces^ a Mahomet^ or a 
Mustapha. 

Such was their Condition, and what 
was the consequence? — ^Their Ideas be- 
came consonant to their servile State, and 
their Words became consonant to their 
servile Ideas. The great Distinction, for 
ever in their sight, was that of Tyrant and 
Slave ; the most unnatural one conceiv- 
able, and the most susceptible of pomp, 
and empty exaggeration. Hence they 
talked of Kings as Gods, and of them- 
selves, as the meanest and most abject 
Reptiles. Nothing was either great or 
little in moderation, but every Sentiment 
was heightened by incredible Hyperbole. 
Thus tho' they sometimes ascended into 



BOOK IIL—CHAP. V. 411 

the Great and Magnificent, <'^ they as fre- 
quently degenerated into the Tumid and 
Bombast, The Greeks too of Asia became 
infected by their neighbours, who were 
often at times not only their neighbours, 
but their masters ; and hence that Luxuri- 
ance of the Asiatic Stile, unknown to the 
chaste eloquence and purity of Athens. 
But of the Greeks we forbear to speak 
now, as we shall speak of them more fully, 
when we have first considered the Nature 
or Genius of the Romans. 

And what sort of People may we pro- 
nounce the Romans? — A Nation engaged 
in wars and commotions, some foreign, 
some domestic, which for seven hundred 
years wholly engrossed their thoughts. 



^'^ The truest Sublime of the East may be found in 
the Scriptures, of which perhaps the principal cause is the 
intrinsic Greatness of the Subjects there treated ; the 
Creation of the Universe, the dispensations of divine Pro- 
vidence, &c. 



4>n HERMES. 

Hence therefore their Language became, 
like their Ideas ^ copious in all Terms ex- 
pressive of things political^ and well adapt- 
ed to the purposes both of History and 
popular Eloquence. — But what was their 
Philosophy ? — As a Nation, it was none, 
if we may credit their ablest Writers. 
And hence the Unfitness of their Lan- 
guage to this Subject; a defect, which 
even Czcero is compelled to confess/ and 
more fully makes appear, when he writes 
Philosophy himself, from the number of 
terms, which he is obliged to invent/-^^ 



^^ See Cic, de Fin, 1. C. 1, 2, 3. III. C. I, 2, 4, &c. 
but in particular Tusc. Disp. I. 3. where he says, Philo- 
%ovvLi A jacuit usque ad hancatatem, nee uUumhahuit lumen 
LiTERARUM Latinarum ; qua illustranda et excitanda 
nobis est ; ut si, Sfc. See also Tusc, Disp, IV. 3. and 
Acad. I. % where it appears, that till Cicero applied 
himself to the writing of Fhilosophi/, the Romans had 
nothing of the kind in their Language, except some mean 
performances of Amafdnius the Epicurean, and others of 
the same sect. How far the Romans were indebted to 
Cicero for Philosophy, and with what ind^lstry, as well as 



BOOK III.— CHAP. V. 415 

Virgil seems to have judged the most 
truly of his Countrymen, when, admitting 
their inferiority in the more elegant 
Arts, he concludes at last with his usual 
majesty, 



eloquence, he cultivated the Subject, may 1)e seen not only 
from the titles of those Works that are now lost, but much 
more from the many noble ones still fortunately preserved. 

The Epicurean Poet Lucretius, who flourished nearly 
at the same time, seems by his silence to have overlooked 
the Za^m writers of his own sect ; deriving all his Philo- 
sophy, as well as Cicero, from Grecian Sources : and, like 
him, acknowledging the difficulty of writing in Philosophy/ 
in Latin, both from the Poverty of the Tongue, and from 
the Novelty of the Subject. 

Nee me animi fallit, Graiorum obscura reperta 
Difficile inlustrare Latinis versibus esse, 
(Multa novis rebus prasertim quod sit agendum, J 
Propter egestatem linguae et rerum novitatem; 
Sed tua me virtus tamen, et sperata voluptas 
Suavis amicitia quemvis prej'erre laborem 
Suadet Lucr. I. 137. 

In the same age, Varro, among his numerous works, 
wrote some in the way of Philosophy ; as did the Patriot 
Brutus, a Treatise concerning Virtue, much applauded 
by Cicero; but these Works are now lost. 

Soon after the writers above mentioned came Horace, 



414 HERMES. 

Tu REGERE jMPERio POPULos, Romanc, 

memento, 
(Ha tibi erunt artes) pacisque imponere 

morem, 
Parcere siibjectis, et debellare supei^bos. 



some of whose satires and epistles may be justly ranked 
amongst the most valuable pieces of Latin Philosoph/, 
whether we consider the purity of their Stile, or the great 
Address with which they treat the Subject. 

After Horace, tho' with as long an interval as from the 
days of Augustus to those of Nero, came the Satirist 
Persius, the friend and disciple of the Stoic Cornutus ; 
to whose precepts, as he did honour by his virtuous Life, 
so his works, tho' small, shew an early proficiency in the 
Science of Morals. Of him it may be said, that he is 
almost the single difficult writer among the Latin Classics, 
whose meaning has sufficient merit to make it worth while 
to Labour through his obscurities. 

In the same degenerate and tyrannic period lived also 
Seneca ; whose character both as a Man and a Writer, 
is discussed with great accuracy by the noble author of the 
Characteristics, to whom we refer. 

Under a milder dominion, that of Hadrian and the 
Antonines, lived Aulus Gellius, or (as some call him) 
Agellius, an entertaining writer in the miscellaneous way; 
well skilled in Criticism and Antiquity ; who, tho' he can 
hardly be entitled to the name of a Philosopher, yet 
deserves not to pass unmentioned here, from the curious 
fragments of Philosophy interspersed in his works. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. V. 415 

From considering the Romans let us 

pass to THE GREEKS. ThE GrECIAN 

Commonwealths, while they maintained 



With Aultis Gellius we range Macrobius, not because 
a Contemporary (for he is supposed to have lived under 
Honorius and Theodosius), but from his near resemblance, 
in the character of a Writer. His works, like the other's, 
are miscellaneous ; filled with Mythology and antient 
Literature, some Philosophy being intermixed. His 
Commentary upon the Somnium Scipionis of Cicero^ may 
be considered as wholly of the philosophical kind. 

In the same age with Aulus Gellius, flourished Apu- 
LEius of Madaura in Africa, a Platonic Writer, whose 
Matter in general far exceeds his perplexed and affected 
Stile, too conformable to the false Rhetoric of the Age 
when he lived. 

Of the same Country, but of a later Age, and a harsher 
Stile, was Martianus Capella, if Indeed he deserve not 
the name rather of a Philologist, than of a Philosopher. 

After Capella, we may rank Chalcidius the Platonic, 
tho' both his Age, and Country, and Religion are doubt- 
ful. His manner of writing is rather more agreeable than 
that of the two preceding, nor does he appear to be their 
inferior in the knowledge of Philosophy, his work being a 
laudable Commentary upon the Timaus of Plato. 



416 H E R M E S. 

their Liberty, were the most heroic Con- 
federacy that ever existed. They were 



The last Latin Philosopher was Boethius, who was 
descended from some of the noblest of the Roman Families, 
and was Consul in the beginning of the sixth Century. 
He wrote many philosophical Works, the greatest part in 
the Logical way. But his Ethic piece, On the Consolation 
of Philosoph^y and which is partly prose and partly verse, 
deserves great encomiums both for the Matter, and for 
the Stile ; in which last he approaches the Purity of a far 
better age than his own, and is in all respects preferable 
to those crabbed Africans already mentioned. By com- 
mand of Theodoricy king of the Goths, it was the hard fate 
of this worthy Man to suffer death ; with whom the Latin 
Tongue, and the last remains of Roman Dignity, may be 
said to have sunk in the western World. 

There were other Romans, who left Philosophical 
Writings ; such as Musonius Rufus, and the two Em- 
perors, Marcus Antoninus and Julian; but as these 
preferred the use of the Greek Tongue to their own, they 
can hardly be considered among the number of Latin 
Writers. 

And so much (by way of Sketch) for the Latin 
AuTHOES OF Philosophy ; a small number for so vast 
an Empire, if we consider them as all the product of near 
six successive centuries. 



BOOK III.— CHAP. V. 417 

tlie politest, the bravest, and the wisest of 
men. In the short space of Uttle more 
than a Century, they became such States- 
men, Warriors, Orators, Historians, Phy- 
sicians, Poets, Critics, Painters, Sculptors, 
Architects, and (last of all) Philosophers, 
that one can hardly help considering 
THAT Golden Period, as a Providen- 
tial Event in honour of human Nature, to 
shew to what perfection the Species might 
ascend /^^ 



^*' If we except 7/omer, Hesiod, and the Li/ric Poets, 
we hear of few Grecian Writers before the expedition of 
Xerxes. iVfter that monarch had been defeated, and the 
dread of the Persian power was at an end, the Efful- 
GKXCE OF Grecian Genius (if I may use the expres- 
sion) broke forth, and shone till the time o( Alexander the 
Macedonian^ after whom it disappeared, and never rose 
again. This is that Golden Period spoken of above. I 
do not mean that Greece had not many writers of great 
merit subsequent to that period, and especially of the 
philosophic kind; but the Great, the Striking, the 
Sublime (call it as you please) attained at that time to a 
height, to which it never could ascend in any after age. 

2 E 



418 HERMES. 

Now THE Language of these 
Greeks was truly like themselves, it was 
conformable to their transcendant and 



The same kind of fortune befel the people of Rome, 
When the Punic wars were ended, and Carthage their 
dreaded rival was no more, then (as Horace informs us) 
they began to cultivate the politer arts. It was soon after 
this, their great Orators, and Historians, and Poets arose, 
and Rome, like Greece, had her Golden Period, .which 
lasted to the death of Octavius Casar. 

I call these two Periods, from the two greatest Geniuses 
that flourished in each, one the Socratic Period, the 
other the Ciceronian. 

There are still farther analogies subsisting between 
them. Neither Period commenced, as long as solicitude 
for the common welfare engaged men's attentions, and 
su^h wars impended, as threatened their destruction by 
Foreigners and Barbarians. But when once these fears 
were over, a general security soon ensued, and instead of 
attending to the arts of defence and self-preservation, they 
began to cultivate those of Elegance and Pleasure. Now, 
as these naturally produced a kind of wanton insolence (not 
unlike the vicious temper of high-fed animals), so by this 
the bands of union were insensibly dissolved. Hence then 
among the Greeks that fatal Peloponnesian War, which 
together with other wars, its immediate consequence, broke 



BOOK III.— CHAP. V. 419 

universal Genius. Where Matter so 
abounded. Words followed of course, and 



the confederacy of their Commonwealths ; wasted their 
strength ; made them jealous of each other ; and thus 
paved a way for the contemptible kingdom of Macedon to 
enslave them all, and ascend in a few years to universal 
Monarchy. 

A like luxuriance of prosperity sowed discord among the 
JRomans ; raised those unhappy contests between the Senate 
and the Gracchi ; between Si/lla and Marius ; between 
Pompey and Casar ; till, at length, after the last struggle 
for Liberty by those brave Patriots Brutus and Cassius 
at Philippi, and the subsequent defeat of Anthony at 
Actium, the RoTnans became subject to the dominion of a 
Fellow-Citizen. 

It must indeed be confessed, that after Alexayider and 
Octavius had established their Monarchies, there were 
many bright Geniuses, who were eminent under their 
Government. Aristotle maintained a friendship and 
epistolary correspondence with Alexander, In the time 
of the same monarch lived Theophrastus, and the Cynic 
Diogenes. Then also Demosthenes and jEschines spoke 
their two celebrated Orations. So likewise in the time of 
Octavius f Virgil wrote his ASneid, and with Horace, 
Varius, and many other fine Writers, partook of his pro- 
tection and royal munificence. But then it must be re- 

2 E 2 



4^0 HEUMES. 

those exquisite in every kind, as the Ideas 
for which they stood. And hence it fol- 
lowed, there was not a subject to be 
found, which could not with propriety be 
expressed in GreeA:. 

Here were Words and Numbers for 
the Humour of an Aristophanes; for the 
native Elegance of a Philemon or Me- 
nander ; for the amorous Strains of a 



raembered, that these men were bred and educated in the 
p inciples of a free Government. It was hence they derived 
that high and manly spirit which made them the admira- 
tion of after-ages. The Successors and Forms of Govern- 
ment left by Alexander and Octavius, soon stopt the growth 
of any thing farther in the kind. So true is that noble 
saying 0^ Longimis — Opiipai tz yap iKavrj rd (l>povr}jLiara 
Tu>v fiEya\o(l>p6vu>v r\ EAEYGEPIA, i^ hrikiriGaii itf afxa 
duoOtiv TO irpoOvfiOv ri^g Trpog aXXriXsg eptSog, i^ rr\g Trepl 
rd irpbyTua ^iKoTiidag. It is JuIBEHTY that is formed to 
nurse the sentiments of great Geniuses; to inspire them 
with hope ; to push forward the propensity of contest one 
with another, and the generous emulation of being the first 
in rank. De SubL Sect. 44, 



BOOK III.^CHAP. V. 4S1 

Mimnermtis or Sappho ; for the rural Jays 
of a Theocritus or Bion ; and for the 
sublime Conceptions of a Sophocles or 
Homer, The same in Prose. Here Iso- 
crates was enabled to display his Art, in 
all the accuracy of Periods, and the nice 
counterpoise of Diction. Here Demos- 
thenes found materials for that nervous 
Composition, that manly force of unaffect- 
ed Eloquence, which rushed, like a tor- 
rent, too impetuous to be withstood. 

Who. were more different in exhibiting 
their Philosophy, than Xenophon, Plato^ 
and his disciple Aristotle ? Different, I 
say, in their character of Composition ; for 
as to their Philosophy itself, it was in 
reality the same. Aristotle, strict, me- 
thodic, and orderly ; subtle in Thought ; 
sparing in Ornament; with little address 
to the Passions or Imagination; but ex- 
hibiting the whole with such a pregnant 



42% HERMES. 

brevity, that in every sentence we seem to 
read a page. How exquisitely is this all 
performed in Greek ? Let those, who 
imagine it may be done as well in another 
Language, satisfy themselves, either by 
attempting to translate him, or by perus- 
ing his translations already made by men 
of learning. On the contrary, when we 
read either Xenophon or PlatOy nothing of 
this method and strict order appears. The 
Formal and didactic is wholly dropt. 
Whatever they may teach, it is without 
professing to be teachers ; a train of Dia- 
logue and truly polite Address, in which, 
as in a Mirrour, we behold human Life, 
adorned in all its colours of Sentiment 
and Manners. 

And yet though these differ in this 
manner from the Stagirite, how different 
are they likewise in character from each 
other? — Plato, copious, figurative, and 



BOOK 111.— CHAP, V. 

majestic ; intermixing at times the face- 
tious and satiric ; enriching his Works 
with Tales and Fables, and the mystic 
Theology of antient times. Xenophon^ the 
Pattern of perfect simplicity ; every where 
smooth, harmonious, and pure ; declining 
the figurative, the marvellous, and the 
mystic ; ascending but rarely into the 
Sublime; nor then so much trusting to the 
colours of stile, as to the intrinsic dignity 
of the Sentiment itself 

The Language in the mean time, in 
which He and Plato wrote, appears to 
suit so accurately with the Stile of both, 
that wheu we read either of the two, we 
cannot help thinking, that it is he alone, 
who has hit its character, and that it could 
not have appeared so elegant in any other 
manner. 

And tlius is tuk Gkhek ToNt^ui:, 



424 HERMES. 

from its propriety and universality^ made 
for all that is greats and all that is beau- 
tiful, in every Subject ^ and under every 
Form of writing. 

Graiis ingeniwn, Graiis dedit ore rotundo 
Musa loqiii. 

It were to be wished, that those 
amongst us, who either write or read, with 
a A^ew to employ their Hberal leisure (for as 
to such as do either from views more sordid, 
we leave them, like Slaves, to their destined 
drudgery), it were to be wished, I say, that 
the liberal (if they have a relish for letters) 
would inspect the finished Models of 
Grecian Literature ; that they would not 
waste those hours which they cannot re- 
call, upon the meaner productions of the 
French and English Press; upon that 
fungous growth of Novels and of Pam- 
phlets, where, it is to be feared, they rarely 



BOOK III.-CHAP. V. 425 

find any rational pleasure, and more rarely 
still, any solid improvement. 

To be competently skilled in antient 
learning, is by no means a work of such 
insuperable pains. The very progress 
itself is attended with delight, and re- 
sembles a Journey through some plea- 
sant Country, where every mile we ad- 
vance, new charms arise. It is certainly 
as easy to be a Scholar, as a Gamester, or 
many other Characters equally illiberal 
and low. The same application, the same 
quantity of habit will fit us for one, as 
completely as for the other. And as to 
those who tell us, with an air of seeming 
wisdom, that it is Men, and 7iot Books^ we 
must study, to become knowing ; this I 
have always remarked, from repeated 
Experience, to be the common consola- 
tion and language of Dunces. They shel- 
ter their ignorance under a few bright 



426 HER M E S. 

Examples, whose transcendent abilities, 
without the coaimon helps, have been 
sufficient of themselves to great and im- 
portant Ends. But alas ! 

Decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile — 

In truth, each man's Understanding, 
when ripened and mature, is a composite 
of natural Capacity^ and of superinduced 
Habit. Hence the greatest Men will be 
necessarily those, who possess the best 
Capacities, cultivated with the best Habits. 
Hence also moderate Capacitities, when 
adorned with valuable Science, will far 
transcend others the most acute by nature, 
when either neglected, or appUed to low 
and base purposes. And thus for the 
honour of Culture and good Learn- 
ing, they are able to render a Man^ if he 
will take the pains, intrijisically more excel- 
lent than his natural Superiors, 



BOOK III.— CHAP. V. 427 

And so much at present as to ge- 
neral Ideas; how we acquwe them; 
whence they are derived; what is their 
Nature ; aiid what their connection with 
Language, So much hkewise as to the 
Subject of this Treatise, Universal 
Grammar. 



BND OF THE THIRD BOOK. 



ADVERTISEMENT. 

X HE following Notes are either Trans- 
lations of former Notes, or Additions to 
them. The additional are chiefly Extracts 
from Greek Manuscripts, which (as the 
Author has said already concerning others 
of the same kind) are valuable both for 
their Rarity, and for their intrinsic Merit, 



I 






{ -^-n ) 



ADDITIONx^L NOTES. 



Page 95. to stop, &c.] The Quotation from 

Proclus in the Note may be thus rendered — That thing 

IS AT REST, which FOR A TIME PRIOR AND SUBSEaUENT 

IS IN THE SAME PLACE, both it se if and its Parts. 

P. 105. In the Note, for yiyvofXEvov read ysvoiJLzvov, 
and render the passage thus — For hy this faculty (namely 
the faculty of Sense) we neither know the Future, nor the 
Past, but the Present only, 

P. 106. Note ^^\^ The passage of Philoponus, here 
referred to, but by mistake omitted, has respect to the 
notion of beings corporeal and sensible, which were said 
to be nearly approaching to Non-Entitys. The Author 
explains this, among other reasons, by the following — 
liCoq §£ roXg firi Sat yHTVLaZu ; YlgCjrov filv, tTTffS?) Iv* 
ravSa to TrapsX^ov e^i i^ to fiiXXov, tuvtu Sf firj ovtW to 
IulIv yao rjcpdvLrai icj sk 'Iti £<s-i, to ^l httlj £^r (rvfJurapaOhi 
dl T(^ X9^^^'J ^" (l>v(nKa ttclvtu, /xaXXov ^l Trig K<vv}(Tfwc 
avTtjjv TrapaKoXbOrifxa cTl 6 ^povoQ. How therefore is it 
that they approach nearly to Non-Entity s ? In the first 
place, because here (where they exist) exists the Past 
and THE Future, and these are Nom-Entitys; for the 
one is vanished, and is no more, the other is not as yet. 
Now all natural Substances pass away along with Tim k, 
or rather it is upon their Motion that Time is an 
Attendant. 



4?.g ADDITIONAL NOTES, 

P. 119 — in the Note here subjoined, mention is made 
of the Real Now, or Instant, and its eflBcacy. To 
which we may add, that there is not only a necessary Con- 
nection between Existence and the Present Instant^ because 
no other Point of Time can properly be said to he, but 
also between Existence and Life^ because whatever limsy 
by the same reason necessarily Is, Hence Sophocles^ 
speaking of Time present , elegantly says of it — 

Xp6v(t) Tijj Z^VTl, ^ TTapOVTL VVV' 



The Living, and now present Time. 

Trachin. V. 1185. 

P. S^7.— The Passage in Virgil of which Servius here 
speaks, is a description of Turnus^s killing two brothers, 
Amycus and Diores ; after which the Poet says of him, 

curru abscissa Duorum 



Suspendit capita, 

This, literally translated, is — he hung up on his chariot 
the heads of Two persons, which were cut off, whereas 
the sense requires, o/" the Two persons, that is to say, 
o{ Amycus and Diores. Now this by Amhorum would 
have been exprest properly, as Amhorum means The 
Two ; by Duorum is exprest improperly, as it means only 
Two indefinitely. 

P. J^59. — The Passage in Note ^"^ from Themistius 
may be thus rendered — Nature in many instances appears 
to make her transition hy little and little, so that in some 
Beings it may be doubted, lohether they are Animal, or 

V^efj-elahle. 



ADDITIONAL NOTES. 433 

P. 294. — Note ^'^ — There are in the number of things 
many J which have a most known Existence, hut a most 
unknown Essence ; such for ejcample as Motion, Place, 
and more than either of them, Time. The Existence of 
each of these is known and indisputable, but what their 
Essence is, or Nature, is among the most difficult things 
to discern. The Soul also is in the same Class : that it is 
something, is most evident ; hut what it is, is a matter not 
so easy to learn. Alex, Aplirod. p. 142. 

P. 340— Language — incapable of communicating 
Demonsteation.] See Three Treatises, or Vol. I. p. 
220, and the additional note to the Words, The Source of 
infinite Truths, (§'c. 

P. 368 — in the Note— j/ei so held the Philosopher of 
Malmesbury, and the Author of the Essay, <^c.] 

Philoponus, from the Philosophy of Plato and Pytha- 
goras, seems to have far excelled these Moderns in his 
account of Wisdom or Philosophy, and its Attributes, 
or essential Characters. — "l^iov yap f^ikoaot^iag to Iv toIq 
TToWoXg £X*^<Tt Sm^opav dd^ai rrjv KOivoyviav, i^ to Iv toiq 
TToXXoTc t^scTL KOivijJVLav CH^di TLvi dia(j)l^8(nv' 8 yap 
vv(T)(^Eohj TO BhE,cu ^uTvr]fj {lege (puTTiig) itj TTtpf^fpac 
KOLVwviav {iravTl yao ttohtttov), a\X « (J^g^ otts) to 

^ia(f>0p0V TSTWV HTTtiv' «§£ KVVOQ ^ ITTTTS §ta0O()av, aAAd 

tl Koivov t'xsCTdv. It is the proper business of Phi- 
losophy TO shew in many things, -which have 
Difference, what is their Common Character; 
and IN MANY things, which have a Common Cha- 
racter, thro' what it is they differ. // is indeed 

2 F 



434 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 

no difficult matter to shew the common Character of a Wood- 
Pigeon and a Dove (for this is evident to everi/ one) , hut 
rather to tell where lies the Difference ; nor to tell the differ- 
ence between a Dog and a Horse, but rather to shew, what 
they possess in common, Philop. Com. MS. in Nicomach. 
Arithm. 

P. 379— THEY ARE MORE EXatJISITE THAN, &C.] The 

Words of Aristotle, here referred to, are these — juaXXoi^ 
§' ETt TO y fpfica itj to koXov Iv toIq Trig (pixr^wg epyoig, rj 
Iv Tolg Trig Tex^^^- The PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN and 
Beauty are more in the Works o/* Nature, than they are 
in those of Art. 

P. 379— WE MUST OF NECESSITY ADMIT A MiND, &C.] 

The following quotation, taken from the third Book of 
a manuscript Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides of 
Plato, is here given for the sake of those, who have curi- 
osity with regard to the doctrine of Ideas, as held by 
antient Philosophers. 

Et §£ du (TvvTOfiwg dTreiv T7)v alnavTrig tCov ISewv vTro- 
Oiattog, ^L rjv EKdvoig ijpcffe, pi)Tiov oti tavra wavTa otfa 
opaTa, spavia i^ virb (Te\r)vrlv, fj ctTrb TavfofxaTs l-s-iv, ij 
Kar' alTiav* a\X cnrb TavTOjiiaTS advvaTOv" I'^l yap ev toXg 
{f^ipotg TO. KpeiTTOva, vng, i^ \6yog, itf uiTia, itj tol alriagf 
^ STii) to. cnroteXicriuiaTa KpslTTto tCjv ap^wv, iTpbg t(o ^ o 
iprjmv 6 ^Api'^OTlXriC ^eT npb rwv kutu cri/jujSejSrjKOC aWiwv 
blvai TO. KaO^ avTOi, tstiov yap tKfiamg Tb kuto. (rvjufde^rjKog' 
WTfi fl aTTO Tdvrojuaf 8 wpi<r[ivTtpov av f/v to mr alT^€^v, 
it ^ &irh rovroftdr« ra 8«drar« ijv ruiv i^av^puiv* If 



ADDITIONAL NOTES. 435 

therefore we are to relate concisely the Cause, why the 
Hypothesis of Ideas pleased them f namely Parmenidesy 
Zeno, Socrates, Sfc.J we must begin by observing that all 
the various visible objects around us, the heavenly as well 
as the sublunary, are either from Chance, or according 
io a Cause. From Change is impossible ; /or then 
the more excellent things (such as Mind, and Reason, and 
Cause, and the Effects of Cause) will be among those 
things that come last, and so the Endings of things will be 
more excellent than their Beginnings. To which too may 
be added what Aristotle says ; that essential Causes 
ought to be prior to accidental, in as much as 
every accidental Cause is a deviation from 
them ; so that whatever is the effect of such essential Cause 
[as is indeed every work of Art and human Ingenuity] 
must needs be prior to that which is the effect of Chance^ 
even though we were to refer to Chance the most divine of 
visible objects [the heavens themselves]. 

The Philosopher, having thus proved a definite Cause 
of the World in opposition to Chance, proceeds to shew 
that from the Unity and concurrent Order of things, this 
Cause must be One. After which he goes on as fol- 
lows. 

Et filv 8v aXoYOv T8T0, aroTTOv' irai yap tl iraXiv 



TLjv v(TTtp(jjv Trig T8TIDV olTiag KptXrTOV, TO KUTu Aoyoi^ /§r 

yvioCTlV TTOISV, El(T(x) T« HuVTOg OU, ^ TH "OXw fXipOC;, O 

1(jt\v arf ULTiag uXoys toihto. Ei 8t \6yov 'tx^^» '^ avTo 
yivvjaKOv, otStv tauTo S?)7r8 rwv iravnov (htiov ov, t? thto 
ayvoHVi ayiforjan tyjv kavri (jtvcriv. Ei ^t oldwy on mr 
Mav l<jr\ r5 Travroc fitnov, rh U wpiJ^^vwc filS^C ^4^8* 

2 F 2 



436 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 

^ov, itf ^arepov oldev l^ avayKr}g, oi^ev apa i^ s'l'^Xv (jlltiov 
w^KTixivcog' oid^v sv ^ to TlaUp i^ iravra I? wv to Tlav, wv 
£^t i^ aiTiov. Kdt el rSro, r/rot elg kavTO apa jSXeTTOv, i^ 
mi)Tb yiVbJffKOV, otSe tcl fxeT avTo. Aoyoig apa itf el^emv 
avXoig oTSe Tsg KocrfxiKsg Aoysg, i^ Ta tl^r}, 1^ wv to Uav, 
^ h'^lv Iv avTio TO Tlav, vjg Iv aiTiii), x^P^C ^^^ vXt]^. — ■■ — 
Now IF THIS Cause be void of Reason, that indeed 
would be absurd; for then again there would he something 
among those things^ which came last in order , more excel- 
lent than their Principle or Cause. I mean by more excel- 
lent, something operating according to Reason and Know- 
ledge, and yet within that Universe, and a Part of that 
Whole, which is, what it is, from a Cause devoid of 
Reason. 



But if on the contrary, the Cause of the Uni- 
verse BE A CausEj havin® Reason and knowing itself, 
it of course knows itself to he the Cause of all things ; else, 
being ignorant of this, it would he ignorant of its own 
nature. But ifitknoiv, that from its very Essence it 
IS the Cause of the Universe, and if that, which 
knows one part of a Relation definitely, hiows also of neces- 
sity the other, it knows for this reason definitely the thing of 
which it is the Cause. It knows therefore the Uni- 
verse, and all things out of 'which the Universe is com- 
posed, of all zohich also it is the Cause. But if this he 
true, it is evident that by looking into itself, and by 
knowing itself, it knows what comes after 
itself, and is subsi-quent. It is, therefore, through 
certain Reasons and Forms devoid of Matter that it 
knows those mundane Reasons and Forms, out of which the 



ADDITIONAL NOTES. 437 

Universe is composed, and that the Universe is in it^ as in it 
Cause, distinct from and without the Matter, 

P. 380— AGREEABLE TO WHICH IdEAS THESE 

WoKKs ARE FASHIONED, &c.] It is upon these Prin- 
ciples that Nicomachus, in his Arithmetic, p. 7, calls the 
Supreme Being an Artist — Iv t§ ts ri\vLT8 Ges diavota, 
in Dei artificis mente. Where Philoponus, in his manu- 
script Comment, observes as follows — rcxviVrjv ^rjo-t rov 
Gfov, u)g TTCLVTwv rag tt pwra^ aiTiag icf Tsg Xoysg avrwv 
lt)(^ovTa. He calls God an Artist, as possessing within 
himself thefrst Causes of all things, and their Reasons or 
Proportions. Soon after speaking of those Sketches, after 
which Painters work and finish their Pictures, he subjoins 

wtTTTfo 8V rifxeig, ug to. roiavra aKiaypct(pr}fXUTci pAe- 

TTovrfCj woiHfJLEv To^i Ti, 8T(jj i^ 6 STj/xtspyoc^ TTpog EKtTva 

aTTOjSXfTTWV, TO. TTfjdt TTCLVTa K£KOO"jUT]K£V* d\X t^£OV, OTL TCL 

fxlv TY)^e aKtaypacpimara aTiXri dcriv, Ikhvol dl ot Iv tc^ 
Gf(J \6yoL dpyjTVTTOL icf TravrcXctot dcriv- As therefore 
we, looking upon such Sketches as these, make such and 
such particidar things, so also the Creator, looking at those 
Sketches of his, ha ih formed and adorned with beaut?/ all 
things here below. We must remember, however, that the 
Sketches here are imperfect ; but that the others, those 
Reasons or Proportions, which exist in God, are Aucile- 

TYJPAL and ALL-rERFECT. 

It is according to this Philosophy, that Milton repre- 
sents God, after he had created this visible World, con- 
templating 



438 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 



-how it showed 



In prospect from his throne, how good, how fair. 
Answering his great Idea. — - 

P. Lost, VII. 556. 

Proc/w5 proves the Existence of these General Ideas 

or Universal Forms by the following Arguments 

£t Toivvif £^iv mTia ts Travrbg avrt^ n^ uvai iroisffa, to Se 
avTb^ Ti^ eivat ttolsv drro rrig kavTs ttoih sertoc rSro I'S'i 
itpioTijjQ, oTTfp TO iroisfxsvov ^evTipwg itf o I'S't wptjjTiog, 
ciccjffL T(D TroiSfxivd) devTepMg* olov to nvp i^ SidojorL ^ep- 
fiOTYiTa aWwf icf £<^i ^spfxov, ri ipvxn ^(.^(octl ^wijv, i^ tx^t- 
(^^wrjv, ^ Itti lravT(x)v tSotc av dXriOrj tov Xoyov^ ocra avrio 
Tt^dvai TTOtH. i^ TO aiTiov 8v T8 TravTog avT(^ rw elvai 
TTOisv rSro h^t -nrpwTwg, oTTEp 6 K6(Tfxog devTipwg, d di) 6 
KO&iiog TrXripMiJLa elEwv £<?t TravTOiMv^ ht} av itf Iv tio aiTLd) 
T8 Kocrfjis TttVTa 7rp(x)T(jjg' to yap avTo cUtiov i^ ijXtov, i^ 
<f{Kr]VY\v, i^ avOpwrrov virt'^rio'e, i^ "ttttov, i^ oXoyg to. dSrj, 
Ta Iv T(jj TravTL. ravra apa irptJTMg l-^tv Iv ttj aiTia th 
TTavTog, aXXoc viXiog irapa tov lfX^avr\, i^ aWog avBptJ- 
TTog, i^ tojv ndtov ojiotwg €K:a<?ov. e'^iv apa tcl dSr) Trpo 
rwv alffOriTMv, i^ aiTLa avTtJV Ta drifiLspyiKa Kctra tov fipi]- 
fiivov Xoyov, Iv TYf fxia tS KOfffxs iravTog aiTia irpovrrap' 
XovTa, If therefore the Cause of the Universe be a 
cauise JvMch operates mereh/ bj/ existing^ and if that which 
operates merely by existing, operate from its own pr&per 
Essence, such cause is Primarily, what its Effect 
IS SEtiONDARiLY, and that which it is primarily, it giveth 
to its Effect secondarily. It is thus that Fire both giveth 
Warmth to something else, and is itself warm ; that the 



ADDITIONAL NOTES. 439 

Soul giveth Life, and possesseth Life ; and this reasoning 
you may perceive to he true in all things whatever, which 
operate merely by existing. It follows, therefore, that 
THE Cause of the Universe, operating after this manr 
ner, is that primarily, which the World is secon- 
darily. If therefore the World he the plenitude of 
Forms of all Sorts, these Forms must also be pri- 
marily IN the Cause of the World, for it was the 
same Cause, which constituted the Sun, and the Moon, and 
Man, and Horse, and in general all the Forms existing in 
the Universe, These therefore exist primarily in the Cause 
of the Universe ; another Sun hesides the apparent, another 
Man, and so with respect to every Form else. The Forms, 
therefore, previous to the sensible and external Forms, 
and which according to this reasoning are their active and 
efficient Causes, are to he found pre-existing in 
that One and common Cause of all the Uni- 
verse. Prodi Com. MS. in Plat. Parmenid. L. 3. 

We have quoted the above passages for the same reason 
as the former; for the sake of those, who may have a 
curiosity to see a sample of this antient Philosophy, which 
(as some have held) may be traced up from Flato and 
Socrates to Parmenides, Pythagoras, and Oipheus himself. 

If the Phrase, to operate merely by existing, should 
appear questionable, it must be explained upon a suppo- 
sition, that in the Supreme Being no Attributes are secon- 
dary, intermittent, or adventitious^ but all original, ever 
perfect, and essential, See p. 162, 359, 



440 ADDITIONAL NOTES. 

That we should not therefore think of a blind unconscious 
operation, like that of Fire here alluded to, the Author 
had long before prepared us, by uniting Knowledge with 
natural EfficacT/, where he forms the Character of these 
Divine and Creative Ideas. 

But let us hear him in his own Language. — aXX elirep 
WiXoifiev frjv l^iorrtTa avrwv (sc. idewv) d(popL(ja(TOcu cia 
r(iJv yvwptjuwrcpwv, dirb /nhv tuJv <f)VcnK(ov Xoyiov XapwfXiv 
TO avrio Tij^ eivai TroiriTiKOv, wv 017 itf ttoisctC awo ce T(Jjv 
TS-xyiKiov TO yvw^iKOVf wv 7roL8<nVj el ^ ju?) avTc^ t<^ elvui 
TTOisfTi, i^ TavTa kviLaravTeg ^wfxev alTiag uvai Tag loiag 
^YifiLspyiKcig afxa i^ voepdg navTcov twv Kara (pvcriv dwoTt" 
Xsfiivov* But if we should chuse to define the peculiar 
character of Ideas by things more known to us than them- 
selves, let us assume from natural Principles the 
Power of effecting, merely by existing, all the 
things that the^ ^ff^^l y and from artificial Principles 
THE Power of comprehending all that they effecty 
although they did not effect them merely by existing ; and 
then uniting those two, let us say that Ideas are at once 
the efficient and intelligent Causes of all things 
produced according to Nature. From book the second of 
the same Comment. 

The Schoolman, Thomas Aquinas, a subtle and acute 
writer, has the following sentence, perfectly corresponding 
with this Philosophy. Res omnes comjjarantur ad Divinum 
Jntellectum, sicut artificiata ad Artem. 

■ The Verses of Orpheus on this subject may be found 



ADDITIONAL NOTES. 441 

in the tract De Mundo, ascribed to Aristotle, p. 26. Edit, 
Sylburg, 

Zivg aporTjv yiveto, Zevg k. t, X. 

P. S91.— Where all things lie inveloped, &c.] 

— oaa TTtp l^i TA IIOAAA Kara Stj tlvu f.iepL(TfjLov, 
TO(TavTa icj TO EN eKEivo irpb ts fiipKTfis Kara to iravTri 
ajUEpIc' s yap ev, wg IXa;(i<s'ov, Ktt^aTTfp 6 ^irevminrog 
fSo^E \tyav ciXX EN QS IIANTA. As numerom as is 
THE Multitude of Individuals b^j Partition, so 
numerous also is that Principle of Unity hy universal 
Impartibility. For it is not One, as a minimum is one 
(according to what Speucippus seemed to say), hut it 
is One, as being all things. Damascius, Trcpl 
'Apxwv, MS. 

P. 408 — THE wisest nations— the most copious 

Languages.] It is well observed by Muretus Nulli 

unquam, qui res ignorarent, nomina, quibus eas exprime- 
rent, qucesierunt. \^, Lect. VI. 1. 

P. 411 But what was theifv Philosophy?] 

The same Muretus has the following passage upon the 

Roman Taste for Philosophy. Beati autem illi, 

et opulenliy tt omnium gentium victores Romani, in peten- 
dis hojioribus, et in prensandis civibus, et in exteris nationi- 
bus verbo componendis, re compilandis occupati, philoso- 
phandi curam servis aut Ubertis suis, et ' GracuHs esurien- 
tibus relinquebant. Ipsi, quod ah avaritia, quod ah awl- 



im ADDITIONAL NOTES. 

hiiione^ quod a voluptatibus reliquum erat temporis, ejus st 
partem aliquant aut ad audiendum Gracum quempiam philo- 
sophum, aut ad aliquem de philosopMa libellum ml legendum 
vet scribendum contuHssent, jam se ad eruditionis culmen 
pervenisse, jam victam a se et prqfltgatam j'acere Graciam 
somni'abant, Var, Lect. VI. 1. 



m 



INDEX. 

A. 

Adjective, how it differs from other Attribu- 
tives, such as the Verb and the Participle, 186. verbal, 
187. pronominal, 189. strictly speaking can have no 
Genders . . . . . . . . 190 

Adverbs, their character and use, 192 to 194. Ad^ 
verbs of Intension and Remission, 195. of Comparison^ 
196 to 199. of Time, and Place, and Motion, g04, 
205. made out of Prepositions, 205. Adverbs of In- 
terrogation, ^06. affinity between these last, and the 
Pronoun relative, 206 to 208. Adverbs derived from 
every Part of Speech, 209. found in every Predicament, 
210. called by the Stoics Uav^Urrig . . ibid. 

iEsCHINES . . . . . . . . 419 

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, 294, 310, 433. his Ac- 
count of Phansy or Imagination . . . . 357 

Alexander and Thais, 71. his influence upon the 
Greek Genius . . . , . . 419, 420 

Amafanius . . . . . . . 412 

Ammonius, his account of Speech, and its relations, 4. 
of the Progress of human Knowledge from Complex to 
Simple, 10. of the SouPs two principal Powers, 17. 
of the Species of Sentences, ibid, his notion of God, 
55. quoted, 59. his notion of a Verb, 87, 193. his 
notion of Time, 100. illustrates from Homer the Spe- 
cies of Modes or Sentences, 145. quoted, 154. his 
notion of conjunctive Particles, and of the Unity which 
they produce, 841. quoted, ^78, his account of Sound, 



I 



INDEX. 

Voice, Articulation, &c. 321, 3S8. of the distinction 
between a Symbol and a Resemblance, 331. what he 
thought the human Body with respect to the Soul, 334. 
his triple order of Ideas or Forms . . , . 382 
Jnah/sis and Synthesisy %, 3, 367. analysis of Cases 275, 

976, 285 

Anaxagoras . . / 269 

Anthologia Gr. . . . . . . 47, 50 

Antoninus . . . . 183, 310, 405, 407, 416 

Apollonius, the Grammarian, explains the Species of 
Words by the Species of Letters, 27. his elegant name 
for the Noun and Verb, 33. quoted, 63. his idea of a 
Pronoun, ^5, 67. quoted, 70. explains the Distinction 
and Relation between the Article and the Pronoun, 73, 
74. his two Species of Act^tc or Indication, 77. holds a 
wide difference between, the Prepositive and Subjunctive 
Articles, ^78. explains the nature of the Subjunctive 
Article, 80. corrects Homer from the doctrine of Encli- 
tics, 84, 85. his notion of that Tense called the Prater- 
itum perfectum, 129. holds the SouFs disposition pecu- 
liarly explained by Verbs, 141. his notion of the Indi- 
cative Mode, 151. of the Future, implied in all Impera- 
tives, 155. explains the power of those past Tenses, 
found in the Greek Imperatives, 156. his' idea of the 
Infinitive, 165. his name for it, 166. quoted, 168, 175. 
his notion of middle Verbs, 176. quoted 179, 181, 
195. explains the power and effect of the Greek Article, 
217 to 222. holds it essential to the Pronoun not to 
coalesce with it, 225 to 228. shews the different 
force of the Article when differently placed in the 
same Sentence, 231. quoted, 238, 239, his idea of the 
Preposition . . . . . . . . ^61 



INDEX. 

Apcjleius, short account of him . . . . 415 

AauiNAs, ThOxMASj quoted ... . , 440 

Argumeyit, a priori & a posteriori, 9, 10. which of the two 
more natural to Man . . . . . . ibid. 

Aristophanes . . . . . . 420 

Aristotle, his notion of Truth, 3. quoted, 8. his notion 
of the diflPerence between things absolutely prior, and 
relatively prior, 9, 10, quoted, 15. his Definition of a 
Sentence, 19, of a Word, 20. of Substance, 29. divides 
things into Substance and Accident, 30. how many 
Parts of Speech he admitted, and why, 32, 33, 34, &c. 
his notion of Genders, 42. his account of the metapho- 
rical use of Sex, 48^ quoted, 55, 56, 89. his Definition 
of a Verb, 96. his notion of a Now or Instant, 102. of 
Sensation limited to it, 104, 105, 431. of Time, 106, 
107. of Time's dependence on the Soul, 112. quoted, 
119, 193. his notion of Substance, 202. calls Euripides 
o 7rod)]ri7Cj 223. himself called the Stagirite^ why, ibid. 
a distinction of his, 224. his definition of a Conjunction^ 
239. a passage in his Rhetoric explained, 240. his 
account of Relatives, 286. his notion of the Divine 
Nature, 301. whom he thought it was probable the 
Gods should love, 302, his notion of Intellect and in- 
telligible Objects, ihid. held Words founded in Com- 
pact, 314, 315. quoted, 310, 320. his account of the 
Elements or Letters, 324. his high notion of Principles, 
325. quoted, 357, 379, 434. his notion of the differ- 
ence between moveable and immoveable Existence, 360. 
between intellectual or divine Pleasure, and that which 
is subordinate, ibid, quoted 361. his notion of the 
divine Life or Existence, compared with that of Man, 
362. of the difference between the Greeks and the 



INDEX. 

- Barbarians, 409. his character, as a Writer compared 
with Plato and Xenophon, 4S1. corresponds with 
Alexander , , . . . . . . 419 

Arithmetic, founded upon what Principles, 352. (See 
Geometry,) its subject, what, 367. owes its Being to 
the Mind, how . . . . . . ihid. 

Art, what, and Artist, who . . . . Ill, 352 

Articles, 31. their near alliance with Pronouns, 73. 
ef two kinds, 214. the first kind, 214 to 232. the 
second kind, 233 to 236. English Articles, their 
difference and use, 215. Greek Article, 219. Articles 
denote pre-acquaintance, 218, 220. thence eminence 
and notoriety, 222 to 224. with what words they 
associate, with what not, 224 to 229. Greek Article 
marks the Subject in Propositions, 230. Articles, 
instances of their effect, 231, 232; Articles prono-^ 
minal, 72, 73, 233, instances of their effect, 235, 236,' 
347. Subjunctive Article, see Pronoun relative or sub- 
junctive. 

Articulation, see Voice 

AscoNius . . . . . . . . 132 

Attributives, SO, 31. defined, 87. of the first order 
87 to 191. of the second order, 192 to 211. See Veeb, 
Participle, Adjective, Adverb. 

AuLUS Gellius, short account of him as a Writer 414 



Bacon, his notion of Universal Grammar, 2. of antient 
Languages and Geniuses, compared to modern, 288. 
of mmtal Separation or Division, 306. of Symbols, 
to convey puj: Thoughts, 384. of th^ Analogjr 



INDEX. 

between th© Geniuses of Nations and their Lan- 
guages : . . . . . . . 407 

Being or Existence, mutable, immutable, 90, 371. tempo- 
rary, superior to Time, 91, 9^. See Truthy God. 

Bellisarius . . . . . . . . 150 

Blemmides, Nicephorus, his notion of Time present, 
119. his Etymology of 'Eni'^rifxr}, 368. his triple order 
of Forms or Ideas . . . . . . 386 

Bodi/, Instrument of the Mind, 305. chief Object of 
modern Philosophy, 308. confounded with Matter, 3G9. 
human, the Mind's veil, 333. Body, that, or Mind, 
which has precedence in different Systems 392, 393 

BOERHAAVE ., .. .. .. 321 

BoETHius, how many Parts of Speech he admitted as 
necessary to Logic, 33. his idea of God's Existence, 
92, illustrates from Virgil the Species of Modes or 
Sentences, 146. quoted, 312. held Language founded 
in Compact, 315. refers to the Deity's unalterable 
Nature, 361. his notion of original, intelligible Ideas, 
397. of the difference between Time (however immense) 
and Eternity, 389. short account of his Writings and 
character . . . . . . . . 416 

Both differs from Two, how . . . . 227 

Brutus . . 413, 419 



Gesar, C. Julius, his Laconic Epistle , . 178 

CAESAR, OcTAvius, influence of his Government upon 

the Roman Genius . . . . . . 419, 420 

CalumachUs . , 52 

CAa£8| scarce any luoh thing in modern Languages^ S79 



INDEX. 

name of, whence, 277. Nominative, S79 to S82. Ac- 
cusative, 282, 283. Genitive and Dative, 284 to 287. 
Vocative, why omitted, 276. Ablative, peculiar to the 
Romans^ and how they employed it 276, 277 

Causes, Conjunctions connect the four Species of, with 
their effects, 248, final Cause, first in Speculation, but 
last in Event, ibid, has its peculiar Mode, 142. peculiar 
Conjunction, 248. peculiar Case , . . . 287 
Chalcidius, 301. short account of him .. 415 

Chance, subsequent to Mind and Reason 434, 435 

Charisius, Sosipater . . . . 205, 210 

CicEHo, 132, 170, 269, 272, 311, 313, 407, compelled 
to allow the unfitness of the Latin Tongue for Phi- 
losophy, 411. one of the first that introduced it into 
the Latin Language, 412. Ciceronean and Socratic 
Periods . . . . . . . . 418 

C%, Feminine, why . . . . . , 4S 

Clar;k, Dr. Sam 128 

CoMPARisoiQ, degrees of, 197 to 199. why Verbs admit 
it not, 200. why incompatible with certain Attributives, 
ibid, why with all Substantives . . . . 201 

Conjunction, 32, its Definition, 238. its two kinds 
240, 241. Conjunctions Copulative, 242. Continua- 
tive, ibid. Suppositive, Positive, 244.' Casual, Col- 
lective, 245, 246. Disjunctive Simple, 252. Adversa- 
tive, ibid. Adversative absolute, 254. of Comparison, 
^255. Adequate, ibid. Inadequate, 256. Subdisjunctive, 
258. Some Conjunctions have an obscure Signification, 
when taken alone . . . . . . 259 

Connective, 80, 31. its two kinds, 237. its first kind, 
ibid, to 266. its second, 261 to 274, See Conjunc-. 
TioN, Preposition. 



INDEX. 

CoNSENTius, his notion of the Neuter Gender, 43. of 

middle Verbs, 177. of the positive Degree 198 

Consonant, what, and why so called . . 323 

Contraries, pass into each other, 132. destructive of each 

other . . . . . . . . 251 

Conversation, what . . . . . . 898 

Conversion, of Attributives into Substantives, 38. of Sub- 
stantives into Attributives, 182, 189. of Attributives 
into one another, 187. of Interrogatives into Relatives, 
and 3)ice versa, 206, 207. of Connectives into Attri- 
butes .. , *. 205,272 

Corn. Nepos 212 

Country, Feminine, why . . . . . . 48 



D. 



Damascius, his notion of Deity . . . . 441 

Death, Masculine, why, 51. Brother to Sleep , . 52 

Declension, the name, whence . . . 278 

Definitive, 30, 31, 214. See Articles. 
Definitions, what . . . . . 367 

AelKtC . . . . . . . . 64, 76 

Demosthenes . . . . . . 49, 419, 421 

Derivatives more rationally formed than Primitives! 

why . . . . . . . . 336 

Design^ necessarily implies Mind . . 379, 434 

Diogenes, the Cynic . . . . . . 419 

Diogenes Laertius, 34, 145, 154, 317, 322, 324, 407 
DiONYsius of Halicarnassus . . . . 34, 35 

Diversity, its" importance to Nature, 250. heightens by 

degrees, and how . . . . ibid, to 252 

DoNATus . . . . . . 74, 272 

2 G 



INDEX. 

E. 

Earth, Feminine, why . . . . . . 47 

ECCLESIASTICUS . . . . . . 66 

Element, defined, 324. primary Articulations or Letters 
so called, why, ibid, their extensive application, 3^5. 
See Letters, 
Empiric, who . . . . . . . . 352 

Enclitics, among the Pronouns, their character 84, 85 
English Tongue, its rule as to Genders, 43. a peculiar 
privilege of, 58. expresses the power of contradistinctive 
and enclitic pronouns, 85. its poverty as to the expres- 
sion of Modes and Tenses, 148. its analogy in the for- 
mation of Participles, 185, 186. neglected by illiterate 
Writers, ibid, force and power of its Articles, 215 to 
233. shews the Predicate of the Proposition by position, 
as also the Accusative Case of the Sentence, 26, 274, 
276. its character, as a Language . . 408 

Epictetus . . . . . . 310, 407 

EiTL'^rifir], its Etymology . . . . . . 368 

Ether Masculine, why . . . . . . 46 

Euclid, a difference between him and Virgil, 69. his 
Theorems founded upon what . . . . 340 

Euripides . . . . . . 52, 310, 331 

Existence differs from Essence, how . . 294, 433 

Experience, founded on what . . . . 352 

Experiment, its utility, 352. conducive to Art, how, ibid, 
beholden to Science, tho* Science not to that 353 

F. 

Form and Matter, 2, 7. elementary Principles, 307. 
mysteriously blended in their co-existence^ iM. and 
312. Form, its original meaning, what, 310. trans- 



INDEX. 

■ ferred from lower things to the highest, 611. pre-ex» 
ktent, where, 31S. described by Cicero^ 311, 318, iii 
Speech, what, 315, 326, 327, &c. Form of Forms, 
312, triple order of Forms in Art, 374. in Nature, 
. 877. intelligible or specific Forms, their peculiar 
character 364, 365, 372, 380, 396, 436, 438. 

Fortune^ Feminine, why . . . . . . 57 

Fuller . . . . , . . . 183 

G. 

Gaza Theodohe, his Definition of a Word, 2L explains 
the Persons in Pronouns, 67. hardly admits the Sub- 
junctive for an Article, 78. his account of the TenseSj 
129. of Modes, 140. quoted, 151. calls the Infinitive 
the Verb's Noun, 165. quoted, 181. his definition of an 
Adverb, 195. arranges adverbs by classes according to 
the order of the Predicaments, 210. explains the power 
of the Article, 218. quoted, 225. explains the different 
powers of conjunctive Particles, 245. of disjunctive, 249. 
his singular explanation of a Verse in Homer, 253. 
quoted 262, 271 

Gemistus, Georgius, otherwise Pletho, his doctrine of 
Ideas or Intelligible Forms . . . . 395 

Genders, theiv origin, 4il. their natural number, 42. (See 
Sex) why wanting to the first and second Pronoun 69 

Genus and Species, why they (but not individuals) admit 
of Number . . . . . . . . 39 

Geometry, founded on what Principles, 352. that and 
Arithmetic independent on Experiment, ibid. (See 
Science.) its Subject, what, 367. beholden for it to 
the Mind, how . . . . . . ibid. 

God, expressed by Neuters, such as to ^hov, Numen, 4'^. 
2 G 2 



INDEX. 

why, 54), 55, as Masculine, why, ibid, immutable, and 
superior to Time and its distinctions, 92. allwise, and 
always wise, 301. immediate objects of his Wisdom, 
what, ibid, whom among men he may be supposed to 
love, 802. Form of Forms, sovereign Artist, 312, 313, 
437. above all Intensions and Remissions, 162, 359, 
439. his Existence different from that of Man, how, 
360, 362. his divine Attributes, 361. his Existence 
necessarily infers that of Ideas or exemplary Forms, 
379, 380, 436. exquisite Perfection of these divine 
Ideas or Forms, 380, 437. his stupendous view of all at 
once, 389, 390, 442. region of Truth, 162, 391, 403, 
405. in him Knowledge and Power unite 440 

Good, above all utility, and totally distinct from it, 297. 
sought by all men, 296, 298. considered by all as valu- 
able for itself, ibid, intellectual, its character, 299. See 
Science, God. 

GORGIAS . . . , . . . . 52 

Grammar, philosophical or universal, 2. how essential to 
other Arts, 6. how distinguished from other Gram- 
mars . . . . . . . . 11 

Grammarians, error of, in naming Verbs Neuter, 177. 
In degrees of Comparison, 198. in the Syntax of Con- 
junctions . . . . . . . . 238 

Greeks, their character, as a Nation, 415, &c. Asiatic 
Greeks, different from the other Greeks, and why, 410. 
Grecian Genius, its maturity and decay 417, <Sfc. 

Greek Tongue, how perfect in the expression of Modes 
and Tenses, 147. force of its imperatives in the past 
Tenses, 166. wrong in ranging Interjections with Ad- 
verbs, 289. its character, as a Language 418, 423 

Geocinus, his System of the Tenses . . 128 



IND EX. 

H. 

Heraclitus, Saying of, 8. his System of things, what, 

S69, 370 

Heemes, his Figure, Attributes, and Character, 324, 

325, 326. Authors who have writ of him 326 

Hesiod, called 6 Trofrjri^C) the Poet, by Plato 223 

Hoadly's Accidence . . . . . . 128 

Homer, 50, 52, 82, 84, 145, 149, 221, 223, 235, 25';^, 

273, 285, 308, 417, 421 
Horace, 57, 80, 125, 142, 163, 169, 178, 199, 207, 

232, 260, 413, 424, 425 

I. 

Ideas J of what. Words the Symbols, 341 to 347. if only 
particular were to exist, the consequence what, 337 
to 339. general, their importance, 341, 342. under- 
valued by whom, and why, 350. of what faculty the 
Objects, 360. their character, 362 to 366, 390. the 
only objects of Science and real Knowledge, why, 368. 
acquired, how, 353 to 374. derived, whence, 374, &c. 
their triple Order in Art, 376. the same in Nature, 381. 
essential to Mind, why, 379, 380. the first and highest 
Ideas, character of, 380, 440. Ideas, their different 
Sources, stated, 400. their real Source 434, 438 

Jeremiah . . . . . , . . 405 

Imagination, what, 354. differs from Sense, how, 355. 
from Memory and Kecolkction, how . . ibid. 

Individuals^ why so called, 39, 40. quit their character, 
how and why, 40, 41. their infinity, how expressed by 
afinitenumber of Words, 214 to 217, 234, 346. be- 
come objects of Knowledge, how . . . . 369 

Instant. See Now. 



INDEX. 

Intellect, See Mind. 

Interjections, their application and effect, 289. no dis- 
tinct Part of Speech with the Greeks, though with the 

Latins, 289- their character and description 290 

Interrogation, its species explained and illustrated, 151 to 

154. Interrogatives refuse the Article, why 228 

Johannes Grammat. See Philoponus. 

isocrates . . . . . . . . 421 

Julian , . . . , . . , . . 416 

K. 

KUSTER . . . , . . , . 176 

Knowledge, if any more excellent than Sensation, the con- 
sequence . . . . . . , 371, 372 

L. 

Language, how constituted, 327. defined, 329. founded 
in compact, S14, 527. (See Speech.) symbolic, not 
imitative, why, 332 to 355. impossible for it to express 
the real Essences of things, 335. its double capacity, 
why necessary, 348. its Matter, what, 349. its Form, 
what, ihid. its Precision and Permanence derived whence, 
345. particular Languages, their Identity, whence, 374. 
their Diversity, whence, ibid. See English, Greek, 
Latin, Oriental. 

Latin Tongue, deficient in Aorists, and how it supplies 
the defect, 125. its peculiar use of the Pneteriium Per- 
fectum, 131. has recourse to Auxiliars for some Modes 
and Tenses, 148. to a Periphrasis for some Participles, 
185. in what sense it has Articles, 233. the Ablative, 
a Case peculiar to it, 276. right in separating Interjec- 
tions from the other parts of Speech, 289, 290. its 



INDEX. 

character, as a Language, 411. not made for Philosophy, 
ibid, 412. sunk with Boethius . . . . 416 

Letters^ what Socrates thought of their Inventor, 325. 
divine honours paid him by the Egyptians^ ibid. See 
Element. 
Liberty J its influence upon Men's Genius . . 420 

Life, connected with Being . . SOO, 301, 482 

LiNN^us . . . . . . . . 44 

Literature, its cause, and that of Virtue, connected, how, 
407. antient, recommended to the Study of the liberal, 
424. its peculiar effect with regard to a man's character 

425, 426 
Logic, what . . . . . . . . 3, 4 

LoNGiNUSj noble remark of . . . . 420 

LuciAN . . . . . . . . . . 41 

LuciLius . . . . . . . . ibid. 

M. 

Mackobius, short account of him, 414. quoted, 127, 

157,168 

Man, rational and social, 1, 2. his peculiar ornament, 
what, 2. first or prior to Man, what, 9, 269. his Ex- 
istence, the manner of, what, 359. how most likely to 
advance in happiness, 362. has within him something 
divine, 302. his Ideas, whence derived, 393 to 401. 
Medium, through which he derives them, what, 359, 
393. his errors, whence, 406. to he corrected, how ibid. 

Manuscripts quoted, o£ Olymt\odorijs, 371, 894, 395 
of Philoponus, 431, 433, 4o7. of Proclus, 434, 435, 
488, 440. of Damascius . . . . 441 

Maecianus Capella, short account of him 415 

Master Artist, what forms his character . . Ill 



INDEX 

Matter joined with Form, 2, 7. its original meaning, con- 
founded by the Vulgar, how, 309- its extensive character 
according to antient Philosophy, ^08. described by 
Cicero, SIS. of Language, what, 315. described at 
large . , . . . . . . 316, &c. 

Maximus Tyrius, his notion of the Supreme Intellect 

162 

Memory and Recollection, what, 355. distinguished from 
Imagination or Phansy, how . . . . ibid. 

Metaphor, its use . . .". . . 269 

Metaphysicians Modern^ their Systems, what 392 

Milton, 13, 14, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 56, 59, 60, 112, 
124, 147, 207, 267, 268, 404, 437 

Mind (not Sense) recognizes time, 107 to 112. universal, 
162, 311, 312, 359. differs not (as Sense does) from the 
objects of its perception, 301. acts in Part through the 
body, in Part without it, 305. its high power of separa- 
tion, 306, 366. penetrates into all things, 307. Novc 
'YXtKoc, what, 310. Mind differs from Sense, how, 364, 

365. The source of Union by viewing One in Many, 
362 to 365. of Distinction by viewing Many in One, 

366. without Ideas, resembles what, 380. region of 
Truth and Science, 371, 372. that or Body, which has 
precedence, 392, &c. Mind, human, how spontaneous 
and easy in its Energies, 361, 362. all Minds similar 
and congenial, why . . . . . . 395 

Modes or Moods, whence derived, and to what end 
destined, 140. Declarative or Indicative, 141. Poten- 
tial, 142. Subjunctive, 143. Interrogative, ihid. Inqui- 
sitive, ihid. Imperative, 144. Precative or Optative, 
ibid, the several Species illustrated from Homer, Virgil, 
and Milton, 145 to 147. Infinitive Mode, its peculiar 



INDEX. 

character, 162, 163. how dignified by the Stoics, 164. 
other Modes resolvable into it, 166. its application and 
coalescence, 167. Mode of Science, of Conjecture, of 
Proficiency, of Legislature, 168 to 170. Modes com- 
pared and distinguished, 149 to 160. Greek Imperatives 
of the Past explained and illustrated 156, 157 

Moon, Feminine, why . . . . . . 45 

Motion, and even its privation, necessarily imply Time 95 
MuRETUS, quoted, 441, 442. his notion of the Romans 

ibid, 
MusoNius RuFus . . . . . . 416 

N. 

Names, proper, what the consequence if no other words, 
337 to 339. their use, 345. hardly parts of Language, 

346, 373 

Nathan and David . . . . . . 232 

Nature, first to Nature, first to Man, how they differ, 9, 
10, frugality of, 320. Natures subordinate subservient 
to the higher . . . . . . . . 359 

NiCEPHOfius. See Blemmides. 

NicoMAcus . . . . . . . . 437 

Noun, or Substantive, its three Sorts, 37. what Nouns 
susceptible of Number, and why, 39. only Part of Speech 
susceptible of Gender . . . . 41, 171 

A Now or Instant, the bound of Time, but no part of 
it, 101. 102. analogous to a Point in a geometrical 
Line, ibid, its use with respect to Time, 104. its 
minute and transient Presence illustrated, 117. by this 
Presence Time made present, 116, 117, 118. See 
Time, Place, Space. 

Number, to what words it appertains, and why 39, 40 





INDEX. 




Plutarch 


. • • • 


38 


Pottry^ what 


. . •^ 


.. 5,6 


Porphyry 


. . 


39 


Position, its force 


in Syntax 


26, 274, 276, 230 



Prepositions. 32. defined 261. their use, 265, their 
original Signification, 266. their subsequent and figu- 
rative, 2G8. their different application, 270, 271. force 
in Composition, 271, 272. change into Adverbs 272, 205 

Principles, to be estimated from their consequences, 7. 
232, 236, 325. of Union and Diversity, their different 
ends and equal importance to the Universe, 250. {See 
One, Union, Diversity.) elementary Principles mys- 
teriously blended, 307. their invention difiicult, why 
325. those of Arithmetic and Geometry how simple 352 

Priscian, defines a Word, 20. explains from Philosophy 
the Noun and Verb, 28, 33. quoted, 34. explains how 
Indication and Relation differ, 63. the nature of the 
Pronoun, 65. of pronominal Persons, 67. his reason 
why the two first Pronouns have no Gender, 70. why 
but one Pronoun of each sort, 71. ranges Articles with 
Pronouns according to the Stoics, 74. a pertinent 
observation of his, 88. explains the double Power of the 
Latin Pneteritum, 125, 131. his doctrine concerning 
the Tenses, 130. defines Moods or Modes, 141. his 
notion of the Imperative, 155. of the Infinitive, 165, 
166. of Verbs which naturally precede the infinitive, 168. 
of Impersonals, 175. of Verbs Neuter, 177. of the Par- 
ticiple, 194. of the Adverb, 195^ of Comparatives, 202. 
quoted, 210. his reason why certain Pronouns coalesce 
not with the Article, 225, 226. explains the different 
powers of Connectives which conjoin, 243, 244, 245. 
of Connectives which disjoin, 250. quoted, 262. 



INDEX. 

his notion of the Interjection, 291. of Sound or 
Voice . . . . . . . . 316 

Proclus, his Opinion about Rest, 95, 4S1. quoted, 310. 
explains the Source of the Doctrine of Ideas, 434, 435, 

436, 438 

Pronouns, why so called, 65, their Species or Persons, 
65, 66. why the first and second have no Sex, 69, 70. 
resemble Articles, but how distinguished, 73. their co- 
alescence, 74, 75. their importance in Language, 77. 
relative or subjunctive Pronoun, its nature and use, 78 
to 83. those of the first and second person when expres- 
sed, when not, 83. 'EyicXtTtKai and opOorovs/xevai, how 
distinguished, 84. Primitives refuse the Article, why 

225 

Protagoras, his notion of Genders, 42. a Sophism of 
his . . . . . . . . . . 144 

Proverbs of Solomon . . . . . . 405 

PuBLius Syrus . . . . . . . . 124 

Q. 

QuiNTiLiAN 154, 233, 407 

Qualities occult^ what in modem Philosophy supplies their 
place . , . . . . . . 393 



R. 



Relatives, mutually infer each other, 251, 286. their usual 
Case, the Genitive . . . . . . ibid. 

Rhetoric, what . . . . . . 5,6 

Romans, their character as a Nation, 411. Roman Ge- 
ntus, its maturity and decay . . . . 418, &c. 



INDEX. 



S. 

Sallustius Philosoph. .i .. , .. 401 

Sa^jcti us, his elegant account of the different Arts re- 
specting Speech, 5. quoted, 36, 163, 171 . rejects Im- 
personals, 175. quoted, S02. his notion of the Con- 
junction, after Scaliger^ 238. of the Interjection 291 
ScALiGER, his Etymology of Quis^ 82. his notion of 
Tenses from Grocinus, 128. his elegant observation 
upon the order of the Tenses, 138. upon the pre-emi- 
nence of the Indicative Mode, 169. his account how the 
Latins supply the place of Articles, 233. his notion of 
the Conjunction, 238. his subtle explication of its 
various powers, 242 to 247, 258. his reason from Phi- 
losophy why Substantives do not coalesce, 264. his 
origin of Prepositions, 266. his Etymology of Scientia 

370 
Science, 5. its Mode the Indicative, and Tense the Pre- 
sent, why, 159. its Conjunction the Collective, why, 
246. defended, 295. valuable for its consequences, ibid, 
for itself, 296 to 303 (See God.) pure and speculative 
depends on Principles the most simple, 352. not 
beholden to Experiment, though Experiment to it, 85S. 
whole of it seen in Composition and Division, 367. its 
Etymology, 369. residence of itself and its objects, 
where, 372. See Mind. 
Scriptures, their Sublimity, whence . . . . 410 
Sbneca , . . . . . 47, 139, 414 

Sensation, o£ the Fresent only, 105, 107, 139. none of 
Time, 105. each confined to its own Objects, 333, 369. 
its Objects infinite, 338, 353. Man's first Perception, 
ibid, consequence of attaching ourselves wholly to its 



INDEX. 

"Objects, 351. how prior to Intellection, 379. how sub- 
sequent . • . . • • • • 391 
Sentence, definition of, 19, 20- its various Species investi- 
gated, 14, 15. illustrated from Milton, 147, &c. con- 
nection between Sentences and Modes . . 144 
Separation^ corporeal inferior to mental, why 306 

Servius 132,227,432 

Sex (See Gender.) transferred in Language to Beings, 

that in Nature want it, and why, 44, 45. Substances 

alone susceptible of it . . . , . . 171 

Shakspeare . . 12, 13, 23, 41, 47, 51, 53 

Ship, Feminine, why . . . . . . 48 

SiMFLicius, his triple Order of Ideas or Forms 381, 382 
Sophocles . . . . . . . . 432 

Soul, its leading Powers . . . . 15, &c. 

Sound, species of, 314, 317. the"Y/\i], or Matter of Lan- 
guage, 315. defined, 316. See Voice. 
Space, how like, how unlike to Time, 100. See Place, 
Speech, peculiar Ornament of Man, 1, 2. how resolved or 
analysed, 2. its four principal Parts, and why these, 
and not others, 28 to 31. its Matter and Form taken 
together, 307 to '315. its Matter taken separately, 316 
to 326. its Form taken separately, 327 to 359. neces- 
sity of Speech, whence, 332, 333. founded in Compact 

314, 327 
Spenser . . . . . . 134, 164 

Spirits, animal, subtle Ether, nervous Ducts, Vibrations, 
&c. their use in modern Philosophy. See Qualities 
occult. 
Stoics, how many Parts of Speech they held, 34. ranged 
Articles along with Pronouns, 74. their account of the 
Tenses, 130. multiplied the number of Sentences, 



INDEX. 

144«. allowed the name of Verb to the infinitive only, 
into which they supposed all other Modes resolvable, 
164 to 166. their logical view of Verbs, and their Dis- 
tinctions subsequent, 179 to 181. their notion of the 
Participle, 194. of the Adverb, 195. called the Adverb 
TTuvdeKTrjg, and why, SIO. called the Pi'eposition (tvv- 
^eajULog irpoOeriKog, 261. invented new Words, and gave 
new significations to old ones, 269. their notion of 
Cases, 278. of the"YXrj or Matter of Virtue, 309, 310. 
of Sound, 316. of the Species of Sound, 322. their 
Definition of an Element . . . . 324 

Subject and Predicate, how distinguished in Greek, 230. 
how in English^ ibid, analagous to what in nature 279 
Substance and Attribute, 29. the great Objects of natural 
Union, 264. Substance susceptible of Sex, 171, 41. 
of Number, 40. coincides not with Substance, 264. 
incapable of Intension, and therefore of Comparison 

201, 202 

Substantive, 30, 31. described, 37. primary, ibid, to 

62. secondary, 63 to 67 (See Noun, Pronoun.) 

Substantive and Attributive, analogous in Nature to 

what . . . . . . . . 279 

'SiVfif^afjLa Ilapa(TVjuj3ajua, &c. . . . . 180 

Sun, Masculine, why . . . . . . 45 

Sylva, a peculiar Signification of . . 308, 309 

Symbol, what, 330. differs from Imitation, how, ibid, pre- 
ferred to it in constituting Language, why 332 



T. 



Tenses, their natural number, and why, 119, 1^0. Aorists, 
123. Tenses either passing or completive, what autho- 



INDEX. 

rities for these distinctioDS, 128 to 130. Pneleritum per- 
Jectum of the Latins, peculiar uses of, 131 to 134. Im- 
perfectum, peculiar uses of, 135 to 137. order of Tenses 
in common Grammars not fortuitous . . 138 

Teeence . . . . . . 205, 206, 272 

The and A. See Article. 

Themistius, 9. his notion how the Mind gains the idea 
of Time, 108. of the dependance of Time on the Soul's 
existence, 112. of the latest transition of Nature from 
one Genus to another . . . . 259, 432 

Theodectes . . . . . . . . 35 

Theophrastus, his notion of Speech under its various 
Relations, 4. mentioned . . . . 419 

Theuth, inventor of Letters, 324. See Hermes. 

Tibullus . . . . . . 76, 132, 133 

Time, Masculine, why, 50. why implied in every Verb, 
95, 96. gave rise to Tenses, ihid. its most obvious 
division, 97. how like, how unlike, to Space, 100 to 
103. strictly speaking, no Time present, 105. in what 
sense it may be called present, 116, 117, 432. all 
Time divisible and extended, 118, 100, 101. no object 
of Sensation, why, 105. how faint and shadowy in exist- 
ence, 106, 431. how, and by what power, we gain its 
idea, 107. Idea of the past, prior to that of the future, 
109. that of the future, how acquired, 109, HO. how 
connected with Art and Prudence, 111. of what faculty, 
Time the proper Object, 112. how intimately connected 
with the Soul, ibid, order and value of its several Spe- 
cies, 113. what things exist in it, what not, HiO to 162. 
its natural effect on things existing in it, 161, 50. 
described by Plalo, as the moving Picture of permanent 
2 n 



INDEX. 

Eternity, 389. this account explained by Boethius, ibid. 
See Now or Instant. 
Truth, necessary, immutable, superior to all distinctions 
of present, past, and future, 90, 91, 92, 159, 160, 404, 
405 (See Being, God.) its place or region, 162, 372. 
seen in Composition and Division, 3, 367, even nega- 
tive, in some degree synthetical, 3, 250, 364. every 
Truth One, and so recognized, how, 364, 365. factitious 
Truth . . . . . . . . 403 

V. 

Varro .. .. .. 56,61,74,413 

Verb, 31 . its more loose, as well as more strict accepta- 
tions, 87, 196. Verb, strictly so called, its character, 
93, 94. distinguished from Participles, 94. from Adjec- 
tives, ibid, implies Time, why, 95. Tenses, 98, 119. 
Modes or Moods, 140, 170. Verbs, how susceptible of 
Number and Person, 170. Species of Verbs, 173. active, 
174. passive, ibid, middle, 175, 176, transitive, 177. 
neuter, ibid, inceptive, 126, 182. desiderative or medi- 
tative, 127. formed out of Substantives, 1 82, 183 (See 
Time, Tenses, Modes.) Impersonals rejected . . 175 
Verbs Substantives, their pre-eminence, 88. essential to 
every Proposition, ibid, implied in every other Verb, 
90, 93. denote existence, 88. vary, as varies the Exist- 
ence, or Being, which they denote, 91 , 92. See Being, 
Truth, God. 
Verses, logical . . . . . . 340 

Vice, Feminine, why . . . . > • 66 

Virgil, 46, 47, 48, 49, 57, 68, 83, 132. his peculiar 



INDEX. 

method of coupling the passing and completive Tenses, 
133 to 136. quoted, 141, 18S, 198, 199, 206, 235, 
286, 287, 389, 401, 432. his idea of the Roman 
Genius 235, 412 

Virtue, Feminine, why, 55. moral and intellectual differ, 
how, 299, 300. its Matter, what, 309, 310. its Form, 
what, 311. connected with Literature, how . . 407 

"rXri, 308. See Matter, Sylva. 

Understanding, its Etymology, 369 human understand- 
ing, a composite of what . . . . 425 

Union, natural, the great Objects of, 264, 279. perceived 
by what power, 363. in every Truth, whence derived 365 

Universe. See War Id, 

Voice, defined, 318. simple, produced how, 318, 319. 
differs from articulate, how, idid. articulate, what, 319 
to 324. articulate, species of, 321 to 323. See Vowel, 
Consonant, Element, 

Volition. See Perception. 

Vossius . . . . . . 35, 75, 290 

Vozoel, what, and why so called , . 321, 322 

Utility, always and only sought by the sordid and illiberal, 
294, 295, 298. yet could have no Being, were there 
not something beyond it, 297. See Good. 

W. 

Whole and Parts . . . . . , 7 

Wisdom, how some Philosophers thought it distinguished 

from Wit . . . . . . '^Qs, 433 

Words, defined, 20, 21,328. the several Species of, 23 

to 31. significant by themselves, significant by Relation, 



IN D EX. ^/ .- // 

27. variable, invariable, 24. significant by themselves 
and alone, 37 to 211. by Relation and associated, 213 
to 274. significant by Compact, 314, 327. Symbols, 
and not Imitations, 332, Symbols, of what not, 337 to 
341. Symbols, of what, 341 to 349, 372. how, though 
in Number finite, able to express infinite Particulars 

346,372,373 

World, visible and external, the. passing Picture, of what, 
383, 437. preserved one and the same, though ever 
changing, how, 384, 385. its Cause not void of Rea- 
son . . . . . . . . 436 

Writers, ancient polite, differ from modern polite, in what 
and why . . . . . . 259, 260 



Xenophon, 5Q, 407. his character, as a Writer, compared 
with Flaio and Aristotle . . . . 422, 423 



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